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THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY

will appear twice in the year, in June and in November. It may be regarded as a Second Series of the Journal of Classical and Sacred Philology, of which the first number was published on the first of March 1854, *and the twelfth and last in March* 1860. *The following extract, taken with slight modifications from the original prospectus, marks out the field which the Journal proposes to occupy.*

"The range of subjects is best indicated by the term 'Philology,' in its wider signification, comprising not only the criticism of language, but every topic connected with the Literature and History of Antiquity: thus the manners, arts and institutions, the mythology and the philosophy of ancient nations, the illustration of single passages of the Bible, the methodical study of its several books and their history, including that of the versions and transcripts made in various periods, and also the criticism of Ecclesiastical Literature and History under the Empire and even during the Middle Ages, may in turn come under review."

THE JOURNAL

OF

PHILOLOGY.

ON CHTHONIAN WORSHIP.

A DREAD of malignant spirits, of unseen powers of evil, seems, from its universality, to be an instinct in man. And generally the lower he is in the scale of humanity, the more he is the victim of these fears. Witchcraft, the evil-eye, devilish possession[1]; the belief in counteracting charms and phylacteries, fetish-rites, sorceries, and the haunting by ghosts, are notions said to be more or less prevalent among all the African, American, and other low tribes. In some cases these superstitions are so strong, that men's lives are rendered miserable by them. But we all know that even races of a high intellectual order are by no means exempt from similar terrors. We all know that our own age and country would furnish ample illustrations of such fantasies. Lucretius praised Epicurus as the greatest benefactor to mankind, because he taught practical atheism and the nonexistence of a future state. We cannot deny that "the dread of something after death" is natural.

[1] Corresponding Greek terms are *ἐπηλυσίη, ἐπῳδαί, βασκαίνειν, φαρμάσσειν, δαιμονᾶν, βαρυδαιμονεῖν, γοητεία, μαγεύματα.* Lunar influences, especially eclipses, were attributed to a kind of possession, to avert which the Romans used to tinkle copper vessels (Martial, XII. 57, 16), as in the middle ages church bells were rung to avert storms. The power of witches to bring down the moon from the sky was asserted by both Greeks and Romans, but not, of course, seriously believed. Prayers and incantations were, however, addressed to it as a divinity.

There is a mystery about the Unseen that takes equally strong hold of the cultivated and the untutored mind: but in the former it is subjected to reason and faith in all-controlling Providence, in the latter it degenerates into pure unreasoning dread. Even children who have never been wantonly frightened are apt to fear the dark. There is but too much reason to believe, that the earliest notions of worship in the human race were dictated by fear rather than by love. If we follow the analogy of our own times, we can hardly doubt that the grovelling races who in very remote ages lived in caves and made flint or bone implements, had no exalted ideas of a beneficent Creator. To worship and obey are higher efforts than to fear and to bribe. Hence the propitiation of malignant powers rather than the adoration of a Supreme Good seems to have formed the basis of the early religions of the world. It is certain that even element-worship, although, coming as it did from the Persians and Medians, both highly gifted families, it had some grand conceptions, had also its dark side, and dealt largely with the powers supposed to reside under the earth[1]. A right understanding of this subject is by no means unimportant to the correct appreciation of the mind of the Greek and Roman poets. It is a very extensive subject; but I hope to give such a sketch of it in brief as will be useful to those who have not directed their attention specially to it.

I say then, without fear of contradiction, that a large part of the early religion of the Greeks was very little removed from devil-worship. True, the Zeus, the Apollo, the Athena of the Homeric poems were celestial beings, generally friends of man, though under some aspects also potent for evil. There was a Ἑρμῆς χθόνιος and a Ζεὺς καταχθόνιος. Pluto and Persephone, Hecate and Cybele or Rhea, were connected with earth and Hades, and exercised a great and much dreaded power in

[1] This indeed was inseparable from the fact that the sun and the moon are alternately hidden and visible. Hence arose the story of the compact made between Pluto and Demeter, that her daughter Persephone should live a third part of the year under the earth, and two-thirds in heaven (Hom. Hymn. εἰς Δημ. 446). So also Castor and Pollux agreed to take turns in remaining above and below, Hom. Od. xi. 303; Pind. Pyth. xi. fin.; 'alternus Castor,' Mart. Ep. x. 51, 2.

both. Indeed, Earth herself, according to the early pantheistic doctrines, was a real power, possessing consciousness and volition, and capriciously friendly or unfriendly to man. The bloody worship of Cybele, i. e. the cutting with knives practised by her votaries, is intelligible on the principle of propitiation. So Demeter and Artemis had their kindly parts; but they were also she-devils of the most terrific and malignant kind. The Artemis of Tauri and Brauron, and the Diana of Aricia, required, like the Moloch of the Phoenicians, to be glutted with human sacrifices. Cronus and Saturn were rather demons than gods; cannibals, destroyers of their own offspring[1], and like the kindred Titans, the Giants, the Typhöeus and the rest, powerful even as enemies of the other gods. Hence we see why the Roman astrologers thought the planet Saturn[2] so malignant. Again, the Furies, though they had the euphemistic name of *Eumenides*, were also she-devils, blood-sucking monsters, who had the power of causing emaciation and decay of the vital powers[3]; like them were the Fates, Μοῖραι, and the kindred Κῆρες[4]; and there was a demon called Ὅρκος for the punishment of perjurers. All had dealings with the infernal agencies, and could send up from below blights, pestilence, earthquakes, sudden deaths, and all kinds of unforeseen evil. Apollo himself, as Λύκειος, and perhaps as the hero Lycus[5], had also his hostile attitude towards men. He and

[1] Human victims were anciently offered to Saturn, Ovid, Fast. v. 627. The Germans did the same to Mercury, Tac. Germ. 9. Cf. *ib.* 39; and the Scythians to their war-god, Herod. iv. 62. So too the Celtic Druids, Diodor. Sic. v. 31.

[2] '*Grave* Saturni sidus in omne caput,' Propert. v. 1. 84. 'Saturnumque *gravem* nostro Jove frangimus una,' Pers. iv. 50.

[3] Aesch. Eum. 265.

[4] Hes. Theog. 217.

[5] Arist. Vesp. 819. It is remarkable that Hesychius (in Λύκος) describes him as εἷς τῶν τελχίνων. These latter were demons who exercised certain powers of sorcery. (Diodor. Sic. v. 55. Hesych. in v.). Callimachus (εἰς Ἀπολλ. 12—15), says that the chorus of boys must dance and sing when Apollo visits Delos, if they hope to attain to marriage and old age, and that their houses shall be unshaken by earthquakes. Here, as in Aesch. Ag. 1080, he is the Destroyer, the Apollyon. —I may here add, that I have some misgivings whether Λύκειος really meant the 'god of light.' 'Wolfish,' or 'wolf-god,' Aesch. Theb. 145, seems to me the ancient idea, though I see Mr Jebb on λυκοκτόνος θεὸς, Soph. El. 6, takes the former view, as I myself used to do, following Müller.

his sister Artemis were worshipped as *προστατήριοι*, under the form of stone pillars placed in the *πρόθυρον* before the doors of houses[1]. Their influence in slaying or 'shooting' young men and maidens, especially women in child-birth, was very much dreaded. Add to the above a long list of supernatural monsters[2], born of Earth and Hades, Cerberus, Geryon, Echidna, the Gorgons, the Hydra, the Chimaera, Empusa, the Sphinx, the Harpies, &c. But of all the powers of evil the *heroes* seem to have been most feared. They were the spirits of departed chieftains[3], who were worshipped and propitiated with living victims, *αἱμακουρίαι* ('blood-gluttings') or *ἐναγισμοὶ*, annually sacrificed at their graves. They were regarded as *δαίμονες*, a term of rather obscure origin[4], and in fact as performing a double part, both celestial and infernal[5]. Subjects of Aïdoneus[6] or Pluto, they could revisit the earth for evil or for good, according to the permission given them. Some of these heroes were represented as living in the isles of the blest, like Achilles, Menelaus, Cadmus, Peleus, &c.[7], and Cronus himself was their king.

We can only comprehend the nature and principles of hero-worship by realizing the purely materialistic ideas of the Greeks, and probably of the early world generally, about the state of the dead. They were believed to retain a kind of feeble semi-animate existence in the other world; they were *καμόντες*,

[1] Callim. *εἰς Ἄρτ.* 38, *καὶ μὲν ἀγυιαῖς ἔσσῃ καὶ λιμένεσσιν ἐπίσκοπος.* See Soph. El. 637, Aesch. Theb. 449. These *ἀγυιεῖς* or *κίονες* seem to have been connected with phallic rites, as I have no doubt the Hermae were, and even the Roman Termini. It may be inferred from Pindar, Pyth. x. 36, that a phallic worship of Apollo existed. The country Apollo (*Νόμιος*) had several attributes in common with Pan. Compare *λυκοκτόνος* with *Lupercus* (lupos arcens). Also *ἤ τις Ἀπόλλων ἢ Πάν*, Aesch. Ag. 55.

[2] Given in Hes. Theog. 270 seqq.

[3] *βαρύτιμοι χθόνιοι θήκας κατέχοντες*, Aesch. Suppl. 25. As late as the time of Aristotle we find sacrifices offered to Brasidas as a hero, Eth. v. ch. 7.

[4] Hesych. *δαίμονες, οἱ θεοὶ, δαήμονές τινες ὄντες, οἷον ἔμπειροι, ἢ ὅτι πάντα μερίζουσιν, ἀπὸ τοῦ δάσασθαι.* The latter etymology is generally adopted. Homer, as Plutarch observes, De Defect. Orac. § 10. uses *δαίμονες* indifferently with *θεοὶ* for gods celestial; but Hesiod uses *δαίμονες* distinct, for deified heroes.

[5] Hesiod, *Ἔργ.* 120. 141. Plat. Symp. p. 202 E.

[6] Æsch. Pers. 642.

[7] Pind. Ol. II. 70. Hesiod, *Ἔργ.* 169.

κεκμηκότες, ἀμενηνὰ κάρηνα, εἴδωλα, ψυχαί,—beings not indeed destitute of all sense and consciousness, but having it in an inferior degree[1], and in fact *bodiless*, so far as thews and sinews and bones were concerned[2]. Death was not so much an extinction, as a negation of the pleasures and energies of life,—a doleful existence, dark and drear, and rendered more or less tolerable by the regard or neglect of the friends on earth. Of the sensations of hunger and cold the spirits were fully capable; and to feed and clothe the disconsolate ghost was the best and readiest way of securing its favour[3]. As with the Jews, so with the Greeks, the vital principle was supposed to reside in the blood. Hence to glut the ghost with blood was to restore to it for the time strength and animation. Rousing cries at the tomb were added, as if to awake the ghost to action, especially pathetic appeals for aid from relations in distress[4]. The blood was supposed to be conveyed through the kindly agency of earth[5] to the far-distant spirit in the regions beneath. For the same ends, viz. to amuse and propitiate the ghost, games and contests were performed over his tomb, as if he could still take part as a spectator in those exhibitions of strength and skill which had afforded him pleasure in life. The soothing strains of music, chaplets, offerings of locks of hair at the tomb, and other νερτέρων μειλίγματα were added, as honey, milk, oil, with pure spring-water, of refreshing but not stimulating properties, though wine too was sometimes given. On the same principle of pleasing, and from a fear of offending, the deceased, all grief and wailing (that from relations alone excepted, the θρῆνος and κλαυθμὸς from them being specially demanded) were avoided in their hearing[6]. The idea which pervades all the early sacrifices

[1] φρένες οὐκ ἔνι πάμπαν, Il. xxiii. 104, θανόντι δ' οὐ φρονοῦντι, Aesch. Cho. 517. Even Aristotle takes this view, Eth. i. 11.

[2] Od. xi. 218—22, and 393—4. See this notion satirized by Lucian, Ver. Hist. ii. ch. 12.

[3] Thuc. iii. 58, ἀποβλέψατε ἐς πατέρων τῶν ὑμετέρων θήκας, οὓς ἀποθανόντας ὑπὸ Μήδων καὶ ταφέντας ἐν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ ἐτιμῶμεν κατὰ ἔτος ἕκαστον ἐσθήμασί τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις νομίμοις, ὅσα τε ἡ γῆ ἡμῶν (ἡμῖν?) ἀνεδίδου ὡραῖα, πάντων ἀπαρχὰς ἐπιφέροντες.

[4] Aesch. Cho. 333.

[5] ἔχει μὲν ἤδη γαπότους χοὰς πατὴρ, Aesch. Cho. 164.

[6] Hence Aristophanes says of the hero Lycus, whose statue was near one of the law-courts, Vesp. 392, κἀβουλή-

seems to be that of appeasing a hungry and ravening ghost,—to supply the food and drink for which he craved, the corn and the wine and the meat, and without which he was powerless for action[1]. Hence arose the custom of libations to the dead, and the symbolical union of fruit-offerings and blood-offerings in the meal which was thrown on the head of the victim about to be sacrificed, as well as on the people standing by[2]. There is too much reason to fear that early practices of Cannibalism—remnants of which we detect in the stories of Polyphemus, the Thyestean feast, the serving up of Pelops at the feast of Tantalus, &c.—first led to the immolation of human victims as food for the ghosts. At all events, the view I have taken of this subject offers a ready and plausible explanation of the terrible fact, that there was hardly any nation of antiquity that did not accept and carry into effect the doctrine of expiatory human sacrifices. Vicarious victims, *καθάρματα*, were offered with the hope and belief that those who offered them to some insatiate unseen power of evil might be themselves spared. This custom was kept up till quite late times in the Athenian republic[3], and symbolically even among the Romans, in the *Argei* or straw effigies thrown into the Tiber[4], the *pilae*, ("dummies," like our scarecrows), dressed up like men[5], and thrown to be baited by bulls; the touching of the altar of Diana of Aricia with a virgin's blood[6], and the custom of leaping through bonfires at the Palilia[7]. The notion of a hungry and therefore ill-tempered ghost pervades all these early superstitions. The *feralis cena* and the

θης μόνος ἡρώων παρὰ τὸν κλάοντα καθῆσθαι. So Callim. *εἰς Δήμητρα* 18, *μὴ δὴ ταῦτα λέγωμες, ἃ δάκρυον ἄγαγε Δηοῖ.* As 'the grieving mother,' *Ἀχαία*, she was much feared; see Hom. Hymn. *εἰς Δημ.* 305 seqq. Herod. v. 61. In Plutarch, De Isid. et Osir. § xxvi, it is stated as the opinion of Xenocrates that all days of mourning, fasting, and lamentation, belonged to certain spirits of evil, which were satiated by the performance of these rites, and did no worse harm (*πρὸς οὐθὲν ἄλλο χεῖρον τρέπονται*).

[1] Hom. Od. xi. 96—9, 147—9. The notion of licking and lapping (*λείχειν*, Aesch. Eum. 106) was perhaps an indication of feeble physical powers.

[2] *οὐλοχυταί, προχυταί.* See Arist. Nub. 262, Pac. 962. Il. i. 458, Od. xi. 26.

[3] See Photius in *φαρμακός*.

[4] Ovid, Fast. v. 621.

[5] Martial, ii. 43. 6.

[6] Ibid. iv. 64. 16.

[7] Ovid, Fast. iv. 728. Propert. v. 4. 77.

silicernium of the Romans, and the τὰ Ἑκαταῖα[1], offerings to Hecate, were instituted on this principle. When a Scythian chief died, the body was carried round to the friends, who held a feast, offering the corpse whatever they partook of themselves[2]. And there can be no doubt that the vases and lecythi, so often found in ancient Greek tombs, contained real food for the ghost. Indeed pots or vessels of provisions appear to have been placed in the tumuli of every ancient nation. The saying *indulge genio* amounted to no more. "Give your genius, or attendant spirit, a good meal by taking one yourself" (the two being viewed as inseparable). A goblin with a wide mouth and a capacious maw, a *manducus*, going about to devour, was the object of universal dread. The pictures of the middle ages are full of such representations of hell and evil spirits. Hence *Charon*, 'the gaper,' and *lemures*, λαμυροὶ, all point to swallowing and devouring, as our word *goblin* is supposed to do[3].

Not even the celestial gods were removed by their exalted position from this sensuous idea of being appeased by food, though it could only reach them in a vapourised state. The Homeric Apollo is pleased as the savour of meat ascends to his nostrils in the sacrificial smoke[4]; and in the *Birds*[5] Prometheus complains that the gods are fairly starved out, as no κνῖσα now reaches them from sacrifices. By a similar stroke of satire on the early superstitions, Hermes is represented as bribed by a present of a beef-steak[6]. In Homer we find Hector especially praised as religious, because he regularly offered sacrifices to the gods. The wholesale destruction of animals in the hecatombs of the ancients is satirized in Aristophanes[7], while the Stoics did not hesitate to proclaim the absurdity of it[8]. Hesiod defines the duty of a good man 'to offer, according to his means, sacrifices with a pure heart to the immortal gods, and libations and incense every night and morning[9].'

[1] τὰ Ἑκαταῖα κατεσθιειν is mentioned as a piece of impious bravado in Demosth. p. 1269.

[2] Herod. IV. 73.

[3] New Cratylus, § 282. Compare *larvae*, (laruae,) *Lares*, *Lamia* (*lama*, Hor. Epist. I. 13; 10).

[4] Il. I. 317. Pind. Isthm. III. 84.

[5] 1516.

[6] κρέας, Ar. Pac. 192.

[7] Equit. 659.

[8] Persius, II. 46.

[9] Ἔργ. 336, with which compare Xen. Mem. I. 3. 3.

All sacrifices implied (as did all libations) a partaking of the good cheer on the part of those who offered them. This usage very clearly points to the notion of inviting the gods to feast by example. Burnt offerings may be explained by the ancient practice of burning the bodies of the dead. They implied either that the viands were to be offered ready cooked, or, perhaps more probably, that they would reach the beings for whom they were intended by being transmitted through the pyre[1]. Nothing so material as food or raiment could reach the spirit in Hades, except through fire[2]. That was a sacred element, and was endowed with supernatural properties beyond the ken of man. To propitiate the element itself a piece of the meat was cut off and given as food for the flame (*ἀπαρχαὶ*), and a tuft of the hair from the living victim was also thrown into the fire[3]. It was supposed that the offerings either resumed their natural properties, or took some other property more suited to a ghostly existence, when transmitted through the fire to Hades[4]. On the same principle the chieftain's dogs, horses, mistresses, favourite servants, &c., slain on the pyre, were presumed to serve him again below[5]. In all these matters, reason ceased to exercise its province in minds enthralled by superstition. However absurd and impossible, these theories were still believed. As the pyre which consumed the body yet left something to survive it[6], so it is probable that the victuals transmitted through fire to the manes were regarded rather as transformed than as consumed. The *nidor* at least was thought to be grateful and sustaining.

If the heroes or any of the Chthonian powers were offended

[1] On this doctrine the Moloch-worship of burning *living* human victims appears to depend. The early indulgence of cannibalism furnishes by far the most ready solution of these horrible usages.

[2] See an excellent note by Dr Arnold on Thuc. III. 58.

[3] See Eurip. Electr. 811, Herod. III. 16.

[4] See the strange story of the ghost of Melissa asking for clothes, and the burning of them accordingly on a pyre, in Herod. v. 92. Diodorus, v. 28 fin., says that the Celtic people threw written letters to their departed friends into the burning pyre, believing they could thus be read in the other world.

[5] Herod. IV. 71.

[6] Hom. Od. XI. 220. Aesch. Cho. 324. Propert. v. 7. 1, 'Letum non omnia finit, Luridaque evictos effugit umbra rogos.'

by neglect of sacrifices, insult to their shrines or tombs, the violation of the rights of asylum, &c., they were said to entertain an enduring anger, the technical term for which is *μῆνις* or *μήνιμα*[1]. This could only be removed by special *ἐναγισμοὶ* sent to the spot where the offence had been given, by the offending party or his nearest relations.

Certain propitiatory rites of a mystical nature, *ἱλασμοὶ, καθαρμοὶ, τελεταὶ,* involved blood-offerings for the cleansing from crimes, and for propitiatory purposes. The pig seems to have been chosen, as connected with the worship of Demeter[2]. Hence the mention in the *Ranae*[3] of the delightful smell of roast pork in Hades. It is remarkable that neither the Greeks nor the Romans have any word in their languages to express *sin*, just as they have none for *religion*, in the abstract sense of the words. Nor can we wonder at this, since the doctrine and obligation of moral obedience were so little understood. They thought however that by the commission of certain crimes, e.g. murder and sacrilege, guilt (*ἄγος*) could be contracted, the consequences of which would not only be visited on the individual, but remain inherent in families for generations. Certain powers called *λύσιοι θεοὶ* were invoked, or rather, bribed to release men from the evil consequences[4]. The *τελεταὶ* were part of a real sacramental system, first made known to the Greeks, probably from the east, but apparently transmitted from Samothrace, by Orpheus and Musaeus[5], who were regarded as inspired[6]. The state of the dead in the nether world was thought to be easier for the *μεμυημένοι*[7], especially if they had lived moral lives. The nature of the rites was strictly secret and mystical, *ἀπόρρητον*, and it was impious to divulge or perform them in mockery, as Alcibiades was accused of doing[8]. They involved prayers and sacrifices to Demeter and Dionysus, the gods of the primary elements of human food, corn, and wine.

[1] Pind. Pyth. IV. 159. Plat. Phaedr. p. 244 D. Eur. Phoen. 934, &c.

[2] Ovid, Fast. I. 349, 'Prima Ceres avidae gavisa est sanguine porcae, Ulta suas merita caede nocentis opes.' Aesch. Eum. 283, *καθαρμοὶ χοιροκτόνοι.* Cf. Ar. Pac. 525.

[3] 338.

[4] Plato, Resp. p. 366 A.

[5] Ar. Ran. 1032.

[6] Plato, Phaedr. p. 244 E.

[7] Ar. Ran. 454. Plat. Phaedo, ch. XXIX.

[8] Thuc. VI. 28.

Though sin, in the abstract sense, was an idea hardly intelligible to the early Greeks, and perhaps not at all until higher ideas of the duty of man to God and his neighbour had been inculcated by philosophy, they had traditions of a very explicit kind about a future judgment, with rewards and punishments[1]. The notion of *vengeance*, perhaps, is human, though that of *retribution* may be a divine instinct. The doctrine *δράσαντι παθεῖν*, which was a *τριγέρων μῦθος* even in the time of Aeschylus[2], is that of eternal justice, and without any necessary admixture of the notions of spite and pleasure in the infliction of suffering. That is a notion indeed much more closely allied to devil-worship, for it is the delight only of malignant spirits. The religion that deluged temples with blood, and built altars or adorned temples with the bones and skulls even of human victims[3] was certainly a brutal and degraded one, whatever was its origin. It is melancholy to think that even now it is by no means extinct in the world. The "blood-ponds" of the sable king of Dahomey show that no step has been taken in advance by savage man: and the horrible rites of the Mexicans no long time ago were of a kindred kind. The inexplicable mania for blood, which so often breaks out in frantic and uncontrolled violence in the most civilized nations, and even in individuals of abnormal idiosyncrasy[4], is one of the mysteries of our nature. But no thinker will be disposed to deny its existence in us. Probably we may hence explain the excesses so graphically described in Euripides[5], where the excited Bacchanalians rend the living herds to pieces, and toss them into the air; and the sanguinary rite of the Scythians in honour of their god Ares[6], by immolating human victims, and flinging up the right arm and shoulder. If this be so, then the tendency to regard blood-offerings as acceptable to the powers below becomes still more readily

[1] Pindar, Ol. II. 60. Aesch. Suppl. 230. The celebrated passage at the end of Plato's Gorgias will occur to all.

[2] Cho. 313.

[3] Eur. Iph. T. 74. Pind. Isthm. III. 79. Callim. *εἰς Ἄπ.* 61.

[4] Two instances of child-killing for the mere *pleasure* of killing (unquestionably a form of mania in itself) have occurred quite recently in England, and both the culprits have been executed.

[5] Bacch. 741, 1136.

[6] Herod. IV. 62.

intelligible. Again, we now see more clearly why those human victims who were either annually or occasionally sacrificed by the Athenians at the feast of Thargelia as 'scape-goats[1],' were actually *fattened* up before being immolated[2]. They were supposed thus to form a more grateful banquet to the cannibal-demons whose wrath they were intended to appease. Plutarch[3] expressly says that in his opinion human sacrifices were not and could not be acceptable to the gods, but were anciently devised to satisfy the wrath of malignant demons.

Higher aspirations probably began in pagan nations with the dawn of philosophy. It is likely that all early forms of religious belief recognised the existence of antagonistic powers or spirits of Good and Evil[4]; but as fear naturally predominates over love, so devil-worship was likely to have preceded or practically superseded the cultus of an ἀγαθὸς δεσπότης such as Plato represents the Divine Being in his attitude towards man[5]. The very magnificent passage in the Theaetetus[6] on the existence of evil on earth resulted from speculations of this kind,—how the beauty and the goodness and the fitness of things, which must have emanated from a divine εὔνοια, could be reconciled with the evil that of necessity prevails, if only to bring out by its contrast and antagonism the contrary principle of good. The Eumenides of Aeschylus is a remarkable attempt to bring the divine benevolence, under the guise of Athena and Apollo, prominently forward to effect a reconciliation between man and the infernal powers of evil personified by the Eumenides.

The doctrines of reconciliation with God and of mediation are distinctly Platonic[7]. Love and harmony among the gods themselves eventually succeeded to hate and jealousy; and a new and better order of things both in heaven and on earth was the happy result of a destined triumph of Good over Evil.

Few of the infernal powers were more dreaded than those

[1] καθάρματα, φαρμακοί, δημόσιοι. See Photius in φαρμακοί.

[2] Ar. Equit. 1136, ὥσπερ δημοσίους τρέφεις. Hence Aesch. Eum. 304, ἐμοὶ τραφεὶς τε καὶ καθιερωμένος.

[3] De Defect. Orac. § XIII.

[4] See Plutarch, De Is. et Osir. § 46.

[5] Phaedo, p. 63 C.

[6] p. 176 A.

[7] See Symp. p. 193 B, 202 E. Also 195 C.

which sent earthquakes. A huge snake-form monster was supposed to reside in the depths of the earth, the hissings[1] of which (like the barkings of the dog Cerberus) may be referred to natural causes, such as the escape of gases. The name *Bromius* given to Bacchus, and his worship, as well as that of the earth-goddess Cybele, by drums or tambourines, *τύμπανα*, evidently refer to the notion of propitiating these hostile powers by imitating the natural sounds in which they were supposed to take pleasure.

The power to conjure up the spirits of the departed, and to make them disclose the secrets of the future, or the present state of far-distant friends, by certain magic rites called *νεκυομαντεία*, or *ψυχαγωγία*, was believed in by the ancients[2]. It has been brought forward of late, in a form hardly differing from the ancient superstition, in 'spirit-rapping;' the advocates of which are not always aware that it is not a new discovery, but a mere revival of the practice described in detail in the eleventh book of the Odyssey. Connected with this prophetic power of spirits was their ability to send up dreams from the nether world. On this subject, however, as well as on that of omens, auguries, oracles, and auspices, it is impossible now to dwell. The brief remarks offered in the present paper are designed to call attention to the strong prevalence of true demon-worship even in the intellectual nations of antiquity, and its close connection with the cultus of the celestials.

It will be asked, perhaps, how can these views be reconciled with the Jewish doctrine of sacrifices, and all its momentous consequences? I think we may fairly reply, We are not called upon to reconcile them. We are not building up questionable theories, but expounding unquestionable matters of fact; and it is a perfectly open subject of discussion, whether the pagan idea of sacrifices is a corruption of a revealed oblig-

[1] Propert. v. 8. 8, where there is a curious account of offering food to a subterranean dragon. See especially Pindar, Pyth. i.

[2] The lake Avernus was formerly a *νεκυομαντεῖον*, Diodor. Sic. iv. 22: another was by the side of the river Acheron in Thesprotia, Herod. v. 92. Witches too were believed to have the power of summoning up spirits, Tibull. i. 2, 45, as we are told in Scripture that the 'Witch of Endor' actually did.

ation of man to his Creator, or whether it was (as many will think more probable) independently derived and developed from the materialistic and sensuous notions of the untutored races of antiquity, about the nature, condition, and wants of beings infernal and supernal.

The conviction that the body was antagonistic to the soul, and that the latter was liberated and purified by punishing and coercing the former, was common to most systems of philosophy, and was essentially an eastern doctrine. It need not be remarked that this idea pervades the Platonic doctrine of the ψυχὴ, which he, with all his idealism, confounded in great measure with *vitality*[1]. Hence, and in connection with views about the purifying effects of fire[2], arose some very curious legends about immortality being conferred by the burning away of all that was mortal and leaving the spirit pure and undefiled, καθαρὸν καὶ εἰλικρινές. The passages in the sixth Aeneid will at once occur to the reader. They are completely in accordance with the ancient legends of Ceres throwing the infant Triptolemus on the fire[3], and of Hercules being burnt alive on mount Oeta[4]. The locality of the fires that were to purge from human defilements in the after-life[5], were placed in the center, or even beneath the earth, because fiery lava-floods (ῥύακες) were seen to issue from thence. We cannot read the μῦθος in Plato's Phaedo[6], about the Pyriphlegethon and the other infernal rivers, without feeling how large a part of this belief is due to purely materialistic ideas. Such precisely is the fiery prison-house conceived by Milton; such the Tartarus of Hesiod[7], the dark chasm under the earth, with brazen walls and gates, and the δικαιωτήριον of Plato[8], the κολαστήριον of

[1] So in the well-known passage of the Phaedrus, p. 245 c. he defines ψυχὴ to be 'the source and beginning of motion to all things that move.' Scientifically the opinion was wrong, since the intellect or brain-power is impaired by a too low state of body.

[2] 'Omnia *purgat* edax ignis,' Ovid, Fast. IV. 785.

[3] Hymn. Hom. εἰς Δημήτρ. 239, whence Ovid derived his account of the same event, Fast. IV. 553. The same was recorded of Isis. Plutarch, De Is. et Osir. § XVI.

[4] Soph. Trach. 1197 seqq. Diodor. Sic. IV. 38.

[5] Aen. VI. 735—47.

[6] p. 113.

[7] Theog. 721 seqq.

[8] Phaedr. p. 249 A.

Lucian[1]; Elysium, like the figment of the Isles of the Blessed, arose from an attempt to reconcile the drear abodes of the dead with the better condition of those who had displayed warlike valour in life.

The Scythian *ἀθανατίζοντες*[2], and the triple life or trinal periods of probation both here and in Hades[3], are connected with the Pythagorean notion of metempsychosis, and do not of themselves indicate a clear view of the immortality of the soul, at least in our meaning of the term. In other words, no ideas of a future life, except a materialistic one, appear to have been held by the pagan nations of antiquity. The nearest approach to a doctrine of a spiritual immortality, and one that finds happiness in the constant contemplation of the Beatific Vision, is that marvellous and all but inspired passage in the Symposium[4], in which Plato shows that a life on earth spent in contemplating first concrete, then abstract or ideal beauty, is the fittest discipline for the enjoyment of the life hereafter. In the Phaedo, true happiness in the other world is made to consist in the free exercise of pure *φρόνησις*, apart from the ties and the disturbances caused by bodily pains, wants, and diseases. Hence arises the *fear* he there expresses, of the annihilation of the soul, by being dispersed in air and becoming extinct at the moment of dissolution, viz. lest the faculty of pure reason should be wanting, in which alone happiness could be found.

F. A. Paley.

[1] Ver. Hist. II. ch. 30, where a very sensational account is given of the torments of the wicked, and also (ch. 14) of Elysium. Pindar (Ol. II. 67) calls the tortures of the damned, i. e. of Tantalus, Sisyphus, Ixion, &c. *ἀπροσόρατον πόνον*. Lucian even talks of the smell of roasted men.

[2] Herod. IV. 94.

[3] Pind. Ol. II. 68. Plat. Theaetet. p. 177 A, Phaedr. p. 249 A, Phaedo, p. 70 C. Diodor. Sic. V. 28, *τὰς ψυχὰς τῶν ἀνθρώπων—δι' ἐτῶν ὡρισμένων πάλιν βιοῦν*.

[4] p. 211.

ON FRONTO.

The remains of Fronto, mainly consisting of a correspondence between him and M. Aurelius, first as Caesar, afterwards as Emperor, were, as is well known, first brought to light in the present century. In the year 1815 Cardinal Mai, then an official of the Ambrosian Library at Milan, found there a MS. containing in 452 pages a Latin account of the Acts of the Council of Chalcedon. The beginning of the first Act was lost; as well as the end of the 14th. On examination the MS. proved to be a palimpsest; the original writing on the application of chemical agents was found to contain some orations of Symmachus, Scholia on Cicero, part of the *Panegyricus* of Pliny the younger, lastly, some of the above-mentioned letters of Fronto. The whole of these were published by Mai in the course of that and the following year. Shortly afterwards he removed to Rome as librarian of the Vatican. There he found another piece of the same palimpsest, 286 pages in all. The first 94 of which contain letters and edicts preliminary to the Council of Chalcedon; the rest is taken up with the first Act of the Council. One leaf or two pages are wanting at the beginning, two leaves or four pages at the end. Here the Ambrosian portion of the MS. falls in, continuing with a slight break the first Act, and proceeding regularly to the fourteenth, part of which with the remaining 15th and 16th Acts, as well as some supplementary matter which probably concluded the account of the Synod, is believed by Naber, from whose edition of Fronto this description of the palimpsest is mainly derived, to form a third though shorter volume, as yet undiscovered, but probably still existing at Rome, Milan, Verona, Naples, Turin, or Vienna. It is inferred from a note on the first page, *Liber S. Columbani de Bobio,* that the MS. belonged originally to the famous monastery founded at the beginning of the seventh

century by S. Columba at Bobbio, a town in the heart of the Ligurian Apennines, S.W. of Placentia. The later writing, i.e. of the Acts of the Council of Chalcedon, is supposed by Mai to be not earlier than the 10th century. On the antiquity of the original writing various opinions have been formed; Mai considered it to be very old, indeed not later than the fourth century; Niebuhr referred it to the beginning of the 7th, arguing from the shape of the letters, which are not unlike those of the Pandects in the famous MS. at Florence. Naber refers it to the beginning of the 6th century, and considers it to approximate most nearly to the Vienna MS. of Livy. This view he conceives to be further supported by the form and character of the Greek letters (the MS. contains several epistles of and to Fronto in Greek) and the absence of accents and marks of aspiration. There are few contractions, q' for *que*, B' for *bus*, IMP. for *imperator*. The facsimile given by Mai at the end of his Milan edition 1815 has in some cases a large comma written above the line, apparently to divide words from each other, or shew when sentences end; but it is hard to speak confidently, as in a short letter of 36 words and 5 sentences, the comma is introduced five times, but in two of the five after words which do not end a sentence, and one which does not even end a clause. The text of Fronto in the MS. was emended at an early period by a person whose name Caecilius was formerly legible at the end of the third book of Epistles, though it has now been obliterated. When Caecilius lived is uncertain; little can be made out from the writing, which is cursive and abounds in long strokes, a form of great antiquity. He has written in the margin sometimes words, sometimes sentences, whether transposed and altered or in imperfect excerpts or in full. His notes are more numerous towards the end. There are a few various readings. All this is reproduced in the edition of Fronto before us. After the publication of the Ambrosian part by Mai, it was again edited by Niebuhr, Buttmann, and Heindorf conjointly. Mai, on the discovery of the Vatican portion, re-edited the whole in 1823, since which time nothing of importance has been done till a few years ago, when Naber's friend, Du Rieu, again examined

the MS. very carefully, and re-arranged the whole. Instead however of publishing his results himself, he entrusted them to Naber, whose edition supplies, with the exception of a facsimile, which it is to be hoped will appear in a second edition, all that a careful student of the text can require.

P. 12. ed. Naber. Illud vero dictum elegans AVTAVIATVV ...AISNEQ^{N} alia omnia quae 'Οδυσσείαν faciunt. Read *haut a via tuum quod ais* 'neque alia omnia quae 'Οδ. faciunt.' 'This again is a choice expression of your own, not borrowed from the streets.'

p. 20. Qui orationem spreverit, litteras concupiscet; qui scripta contempserit, scribtorem reverebitur. ut si simiam aut volpem Appelles pinxsit et bestiae ... pretium adderet. The space in the palimpsest has A.Iv*i*CVIA~. This looks as if it were either APICVLAM. or AVICVLAM. In the latter case he probably had in his mind a story told by Strabo (XIV. 2. 4) not of Apelles, but Protogenes. Protogenes had painted a Satyr leaning against a column on the top of which was a partridge; the people were so much delighted by the partridge that they overlooked the main figure of the picture, the Satyr.

p. 21. Omnibus tunc imago patriciis pingebatur insignis. Read *in signis.*

p. 33. Qui aliter regi dictis dicunt, aliter in animo habent. Read *animos,* like frequentem in forum, p. 191.

p. 34. Merito ego mi magisterii fraglo. Read *magister te.*

p. 35. Ubi id audivi calcar equo subringo. Read *suburgo.*

p. 54. Haec mecum anxie volutans inveniebam te multum supra aetatem quantus (afterwards corrected to quantum) est, multum supra tempus quo operam his studiis dedisti...in eloquentia promovisse. Naber reads *quanta:* perhaps it is better to keep *quantus* and change *est* to *es,* 'much beyond the age to which you have now attained.'

p. 69. Tot exemplis unum atque idem verbum syllabae adque litterae commutatione in varium modum ad censum usurpatur. Read *adcensum, ἀξιωθέν.*

p. 83. Pro Faustina mane cotidie deos appello: scio enim me pro tua salute optare ac praecari. Read *scis.*

ib. Ego adeo perscripsi ut mitte aliud quod scribam. Naber changes *ut* to *et,* Orelli to *tu.* Perhaps it is a construction not unlike Thuc. IV. 92: *χρὴ δεῖξαι ὅτι ὧν ἐφίενται πρὸς τοὺς μὴ ἀμυνομένους ἐπιόντες κτάσθωσαν.* Such harsh constructions are in the Frontonian manner. p. 204. Vagi palantes nullo itineris destinato fine non ad locum sed ad vesperum contenditur. p. 230. Ad hoc quo iucundior hominibus somnus esset donat et multa somnia amoena, ut quo studio quisque devinctus esset, ut histrionem in somnis fautor spectaret ut tibicinem audiret, ut aurigae agitanti monstraret, milites somnio vincerent, imperatores somnio triumpharent, peregrinantes somnio domum redirent.

p. 89. Si quo modo integrum redigi, ac pro te tuisque ac liberum tuorum commodis insolutum dependi potest. Mai proposed *in solidum; in solutum* would do as well, 'as so much debt discharged.'

p. 97. Nimirum quisquam superiorum imperatorum; imperatoribus enim te comparare malo, ne viventibus compararem. Schopen changed *imperatoribus* to *superioribus,* and Naber follows him; but as this is the first in the series of letters to M. Aurelius as Imperator, the courtier-like delicacy of the expression is much impaired by the alteration. *Imperatoribus* implies what *superioribus* would too coarsely express.

p. 113. Quid si quis postularet ut Phidias ludicra aut Canachus deum simulacra fingeret? Aut Calamis Turena, aut Polycletus Etrusca? Read *Turintina* or *Turintena.* Polycletus was an Argive.

p. 114. An cum labore quidem et studio investigare verba elegantia prohibes, eadem vero si ultro, si iniussu atque invocatu meo venerint, ut Menelaum ad epulas quidem recipi iubes? Read *tu idem.*

p. 122. Ornatior videbar daduchis Eleusinae faces gestantibus. Perhaps *Eleusine,* at Eleusis.

p. 128. Pauci militum equum sublimitus insilire, ceteri aegre calce genu poplite repere. Perhaps *repetere,* 'regain their seat.'

p. 153. Quod si ita haec verba contra dixisset: quique pene bona patria laceraverit, inedita obscenitas verbis appareret. Inedita, which has been changed by Naber to *indita*, by C. F. W. Müller to *insita*, by Buttmann to *inaudita*, is possibly right. 'The words would bear on their face a coarseness not found in our actual editions.'

p. 158. Isti autem tam oratores quam poetae consimile faciunt atque citharoedi solent, unam aliquam vocalem literam de Henone vel de Aedone multis et variis accentibus cantare. For Henone perhaps *Epope*.

p. 166. Res autem istas quas nec [tenere] voluimus, nec [negare] credimus, et, si dii aequi sunt, veras et congruentes simplicitati nostrae amicitiae semper adsequamur. Perhaps *nec negare e re* (or *a re*) *credimus*.

p. 197. Hoc quod vocas interim, quanti sperabit? Si tantisper....., paulisper sperabit. Read *quantisper sperabit? si tantisper dum spirat, paulisper sperabit*.

ib. Etiam soli... centi verbum est interim, occi... confestim. Read *recenti occidenti*.

p. 227. Agere de finibus duos claros et nobiles vesperum et Luciferum puta; ubique demonstrationem sui *quisque liminis ostendunt: horum cognitioni interesse postulat somnus, nam se *quisque ad finem esse negotio et adtingi iniuria ait.

On the first quisque Naber says: Codicis lectio non satis certa est; neque est *quisque* neque *quoque* neque *quaque;* alii videant. Probably it was *quoisque*, the old form of the genitive, as *quoi* indicates. The same genitive is obviously required in the second place. Niebuhr conjectured *quoique*, Orelli *quoque*.

p. 241. *ἐκείνου μὲν οὕτω παῖς, ὥσπερ Ἀθηνᾶ τοῦ Διός, σὸς* . . . *δὲ* CΩ'NIOC *ὡς τῆς Ἥρας ὁ Ἥφαιστος*. Read *υἱωνός*.

p. 246. *Φίλῳ δὲ οὐχ ὡς τοῦτον ἐπιδεικνύντων θράσος εὐνοίας,* ΑΛΛΑΝΑΙΤΟΝΤΩΝ *ὑποδέουσι ἔπεμψα τὸ πρὶν ἐπιτρέψῃς*. Read *οὐχ ὡς τούτων ἐπιδεικνύντων θράσος εὐνοίας ἀλλ' ἀναττόντων ὑπὸ δέους, εἰ ἔπεμψα τὸ πρὶν ἐπιτρέψῃς*, 'but forgive your friend, for sending them before, not considering the slaves to be displaying any confident good will, but as bounding up (quivering) for fear of your displeasure.

p. 250. Εἰ γοῦν ἀποτιμήσεις γίγνοιντο ἡμῖν ΤΣΜΙΝΟ πέμψας τοὺς δύο τούτους παῖδας, μικροτέραν, ἐγὼ δ' ὁ λαβὼν μείζω τὴν οὐσίαν ἀποφανοῦμαι. Naber reads ὁ μέν: σὺ μὲν ὁ is perhaps better.

Ὁμολογήσαις δ' ἂν καὶ τοῦτο, ὡς CCCICIOCANTI μὲν ἔπαινον παρασκευάζοι, ἕτερον δὲ ἐπαίνου ἀποστεροίη οὐ δίκαιος. This is the reading of the Palimpsest according to Du Rieu. Naber reads εἴ τις ἑαυτῷ, which cannot be right Perhaps ὅστις ἱερώσαντι. OCTICICPOCANTI might easily be corrupted into OCTIEPOCANTI, and the rest would follow. The meaning appears to be: 'you will allow that a man has no right to be inconsistent; if he praises one for making an unselfish gift, he must not blame another. *You are* inconsistent: you make me so splendid a present, that whatever praise redounds to you for making it, an equal amount of blame redounds to me for accepting it.'

p. 251. ματευσαιμην δανεικοντας νωητιω χρωμενος. Read Μαιευσαίμην δ' ἂν εἰκόνι ἀνοήτῳ or ἀδιανοήτῳ (Quint. II. 8. 20) χρώμενος. The last word in the sentence which Mai read προσέμην, Du Rieu προσήκων, may be προσηκαίμην. cf. p. 248. πολλὰ πολλάκις παρὰ πλείστων πεμπόμενα οὐ προσήκατο.

p. 253. Ego hercule TE . IAMORE depereo neque DEBE... REOR isto tuo dogmate: ac si magis eris alieis non aman..... et promptus, ECI tamen.....ACUOSQ amabo. Of the two latter lacunae, Mai says the first represents about eight letters, the second six. I conjecture *Ego hercule te* et *amore depereo neque deve*rti v*ereor isto tuo dogmate; ac si magis eris alieis non aman*tibus facilis (so Mai) *et promptus, eci*am *tamen* te ac tua *tuosque amabo.*

p. 258. ἀλλὰ θηρίου δίκην ὑπὸ λύπης εὐθὺς ΕΙΟΙΤΟ ἂν καὶ βαίνειν προθυμοῖτο μηδὲν αἰδούμενος. Read σείοιτο, the σ having dropped owing to the σ of εὐθύς.

p. 259. ἀλλ' οὐδέν γε πλέον ΑΠΟΛΛΥΣΕΙΟΔΕ. Naber reads ἀπόλλυσι, οὐδέ. I suggest ΑΠΟΛΛΥΣΕΙ.

Ἀλλ' ἔγωγέ σοι ἐπιδείξω, ΙΙΧΟΥΣ πρὸς τὸν Ἰλισὸν ἅμα ἄμφω βαδίσαιμεν. Naber εἰ εὐθὺς, better εἰ ἰθὺς, which seems to have been confused with ἰχθύς.

R. Ellis.

ON THE FRAGMENTS ATTRIBUTED TO PHILOLAUS THE PYTHAGOREAN.

It is not a paradox to say of most of the great writings of antiquity that the witness for their genuineness is one within them. We assume the fact of their excellence as something fixed and final; this seems enough to constitute an eternal distinction between a genuine work of the best ages and its late counterfeit; and criticism has accordingly in this case a very secondary part to play. But it is quite clear that the Philolaic fragments have no place in a category like this: their claims on our acceptance, supposing them to be real, have to be established by the laborious methods of criticism, and we shall see that there are good reasons for reconsidering those claims, although the learned world, with one or two recent exceptions (Val. Rose and Prof. Schaarschmidt), seems to have acquiesced in the conclusions of the well-known monograph which Boeckh published nearly half a century ago. It is the object of the present essay to re-open the question by an examination in some detail of two main points: (1) What weight is due to the tradition which ascribes the fragments to Philolaus? (2) Is it possible, looking at their contents and form, to conceive of them as the fruits of his age and school of thought? The mode of procedure here adopted may perhaps seem unnecessarily formal, but some sacrifice may well be made to attain a result of definite and intelligible logical value.

I.

The external evidence is a sort of episode in the literary history of Pythagoreanism. The worthlessness of that history as a whole can hardly be gainsaid: we easily see how the tradition becomes from age to age less historical, until at last in

the time of Porphyry Pythagoras is the hero and centre of a legend, a divine personage as well as the origin of all subsequent Greek philosophy. Our earliest authorities know nothing of this. The Pythagoreans are with them simply a political or religious society, with certain bizarre observances, followers, we might say, of the 'rule' of Pythagoras, as others followed that of the mythical Orpheus. We learn further, from the same sources, that with their 'Pythagorean life' (*βίος Πυθαγόρειος*) an interest was combined in music, astronomy, and mathematical science. When we restrict our view to Aristotle, and the writers before him, we find nothing to indicate, still less prove, that the order had ever produced a philosophic literature in our sense of the term: the scattered statements of Pythagorean opinion depend, to all appearance, on hearsay, and not on an acquaintance derived from books. Little is known of great and representative men like Archytas and Philolaus; their very names occur at intervals of singular rarity, that of Philolaus, for instance, only once in Aristotle (Eth. Eudem. II. 8), and once or twice in Plato's Phædo, in which Simmias and Cebes are said to have met him during his stay at Thebes. And as for Pythagoras himself, we must remember that even the notice of him in Herodotus is already legendary, and that it is not easy for criticism to discover in it a firm historic outline.

What, however, is the state of the literary world in the first century of our era? The void of history is filled up with a cycle of myths, and there is a whole literature also in existence professing to be the work of Pythagorean authors of Plato's time or even earlier. Although the spurious origin of these writings is now pretty well acknowledged[1], it may still be desirable to enumerate some of the chief marks of spuriousness in them, in order thus to establish a criterion for our use when we come to examine the fragments of Philolaus.

1. They ignore or contradict much which Aristotle regards as most characteristic of Pythagorean speculation.

[1] See Zeller, Phil. der Griech. III. 2, p. 85 seqq., and Gruppe, Ueber die Fragmente des Archytas und der älteren Pythagoreer, Berlin, 1840.

2. They contain traces of later philosophies, Stoicism, Peripateticism, &c., fused and confused together with eclectic impartiality. The pseudo-Archytas, for instance, transfers whole sections from Aristotle and Plato to his own pages; the work of Timaeus Locrus is little more than an epitome of the Platonic Timaeus (Martin, Etudes sur le Timée, II. p. 390); the signs of plagiarism are equally manifest in Ocellus Lucanus, in the *Πυθαγορικὰ ὑπομνήματα* (quoted by Diog. Laert. VIII. 1), and in the fragments attributed to Diotogenes, Ecphantus, and others.

3. The language is the common philosophic prose as fixed by Aristotle. An archaic colouring is superadded by various artifices, but principally by the employment of the Doric dialect[1].

The date of these writings is uncertain, and the particular circumstances of their origin are wrapped in much of the haze and mystery which the annals of successful forgeries shew to have been a necessary condition of their success. There are one or two of them[2] however, which we have definite reasons for assigning to the first century B. C.; the first century therefore may perhaps be taken as the approximate date of the great majority of them. No moment could have been more favourable for their production. The Roman world was then beginning seriously to educate itself; there was throughout it an interest almost passionate in everything which the Greek intellect, in its worst as well as in its best days, had achieved, and as the natural complement of this interest, a zeal for the collection of Greek books. The barbarized Platonism which had

[1] The book of Ocellus Lucanus, as we now read it, is in the common dialect, but Stobaeus always quotes it in Doric, and Mullach (Praef. de Ocell. Lucan. in Fragm. Phil. Graec. I. p. 385), has shewn good reason for believing it to have been translated into its present form in Byzantine times. The Doric of this Pythagorean literature generally, is very indifferent, and an expert in these matters (Ahrens, De Dial. Dor. p. 24), tells us that that of Philolaus is hardly an exception in this respect.

[2] e. g. Ocellus Lucanus, and the *Πυθαγορικὰ ὑπομνήματα* (the latter quoted by Alex. Polyhist. ap. D.L. VIII. 1): see Zeller, III. 2, p. 81.

by this time become associated with the name of Pythagoras was not forgotten. It found an adherent at Rome in the person of Nigidius Figulus, the friend of Cicero (Cic. Tim. 1), and in its character of a 'superstitious philosophy' (as Bacon terms it) must have commended itself to a wide circle of admirers. We know at least this much: its influence reached as far as Mauritania where Juba, one of the royal and illustrious authors of antiquity, seems to have fostered it, as though it were part of the genuine tradition of old Greek learning. And an ancient writer[1] expressly tells us, that a spurious Pythagorean literature arose through Juba's patronage of letters, just as at an earlier period the demand for books at Pergamus and Alexandria had notoriously encouraged the manufacture of forgeries of a different kind. This can hardly have been an isolated occurrence; what actually happened in a remote corner of Africa may fairly be presumed to have had its parallel elsewhere.

It is an obvious question, but one, as the result will shew, not without the most direct bearing on the main issue, how was it that the learned world ever came to accept a base coinage like the literature[2] of which we have been speaking? The

[1] David the Armenian (Comment. in Arist. Categ. p. 28 *a*, ed. Berlin): *νοθεύονται τὰ βιβλία πενταχῶς· ἢ δι' εὐγνωμοσύνην μαθητῶν τὰ οἰκεῖα συγγράμματα τοῖς οἰκείοις διδασκάλοις ἀνατιθέντων, ὡς τὰ Πυθαγόρου καὶ Σωκράτους ἐπιγραφόμενα βιβλία, μὴ ὄντα Σωκράτους ἢ Πυθαγόρου ἀλλὰ Σωκρατικῶν καὶ Πυθαγορικῶν· ἢ διὰ φιλοτιμίαν βασιλικήν· Ἰοβάτους γὰρ τοῦ Λιβύων βασιλέως συνάγοντος τὰ Πυθαγόρου καὶ Πτολεμαίου τὰ Ἀριστοτέλους τινὲς καπηλείας χάριν τὰ τοχόντα συγγράμματα λαμβάνοντες ἐκέδρουν καὶ ἕσηπον διὰ παραθέσεως νέων πυρρῶν, ἵνα σχοῖεν δῆθεν τὴν ἐκ τοῦ χρόνου ἀξιοπιστίαν.* κ.τ.λ. Comp. the words of Galen (Vol. xv, p. 109, ed. Kühn): *ἐν τῷ κατὰ τοὺς Ἀτταλικούς τε καὶ Πτολεμαϊκοὺς βασιλέας χρόνῳ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἀντιφιλοτιμουμένους περὶ κτήσεως βιβλίων ἡ περὶ τὰς ἐπιγραφάς τε καὶ διασκευὰς αὐτῶν ἤρξατο γίγνεσθαι ῥαδιουργία τοῖς ἕνεκα τοῦ λαβεῖν ἀργύριον ἀναφέρουσιν ὡς τοὺς βασιλέας ἀνδρῶν ἐνδόξων συγγράμματα.* The doubtful origin of a part of this Pythagorean literature seems to have been frequently acknowledged by the ancients; comp. Diog. Laert. VIII. 1. 5, and VIII. 2. 2; Porphyr. Vit. Pyth. 53 (p. 35, Nauck).

[2] Its genuineness was, I believe, first impugned by Meiners in 1781. The Philolaic fragments, as already stated, found a defender in Boeckh (Philolaos des Pythagoreers Lehren—Berlin, 1819), who was commonly thought to have settled the question in their favour, until it was re-opened by Val. Rose (Comment. de Aristotelis librorum ordine et auctoritate—Berlin,

answer, in part at least, is the truism that the ancients were wholly uncritical. They were quite ready to accept anything with a pretence of antiquity about it, however superficial it might be, and they habitually and from preference viewed earlier phases of thought through a distorted and discoloured medium. The case of Pythagoras proves how in matters of history all things are possible when the historical spirit is absent. Stoic writers transformed him into a sort of Stoic before Stoicism; while a Peripatetic, trading on the words of Aristotle misunderstood, would represent him as an advanced Platonist of the type of Speusippus or Xenocrates. The common view of him in Cicero's day (comp. Alex. Polyhist. ap. D. L. VIII. 1) was simply a monstrous union of these and kindred misconceptions, and it is not too much to affirm that a forgery which canonized them had nothing to fear on this score from even the best ancient criticism. But what more immediately ensured the acceptance of Pythagorean books as soon as produced was a sense that they were wanted. It was assumed that they had once existed: how else was it possible to explain the intellectual eminence of Plato and Aristotle, and the other writers of the grand era of Greek philosophy? from whom, in other words, could they have borrowed or rather 'stolen[1]' their materials? Sometimes the hypothetical personage to whom Plato was thus indebted was an obscure or nameless Pythagorean; sometimes the secret of his greatness was said to be his acquaintance with the 'hidden wisdom' of Orpheus or Moses or the Magi. If a likeness was seen to subsist between some book of dubious antece-

1854), and more recently by Schaarschmidt (Die angebliche Schriftstellerei des Philolaus—Bonn, 1864). Ueberweg, as I am glad to find, considers their genuineness 'very doubtful' (Grundr. der Gesch. der Phil. I. 47, ed. 3), and Zeller has done good service in setting aside some at least of the longer fragments as spurious (Phil. der Griech. III. p. 519, ed. 1, and I. p. 269, ed. 2). I take this opportunity of acknowledging the great obligation I am under to Val. Rose as well as to Professor Schaarschmidt.

[1] Comp. Porphyr. de Vit. Pythag. 53 (p. 35, ed. Nauck): *τὸν Πλάτωνα καὶ Ἀριστοτέλη Σπεύσιππόν τε καὶ Ἀριστόξενον καὶ Ξενοκράτη, ὡς φασὶν οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι, τὰ μὲν κάρπιμα σφετερίσασθαι διὰ βραχείας ἐπισκευῆς, τὰ δ' ἐπιπόλαια καὶ ἐλαφρὰ * * * συναγαγεῖν καὶ ὡς ἴδια τῆς αἱρέσεως καταχωρίσαι.*—Porphyr. ap. Euseb. P. E. 468: *πολλοῖς καταχρῆται* [sc. *Πλάτων*] *τῶν πρὸ αὐτοῦ, αἰδοῦμαι γὰρ τῷ τῆς κλοπῆς ὀνόματι ἐπὶ τούτου χρῆσθαι.*

dents and a Platonic masterpiece, antiquity had a ready solution of the difficulty, the fraud was all on the side of Plato. A tendency in this direction may be observed as early as Theopompus, and Aristoxenus[1]. The latter of these two writers, indeed, assures us that a considerable part of the Republic was simply a transcript from a work of Protagoras 'On Being;' if again we are to believe Timon the Pyrrhonist, who comes a generation or two later, Plato's claims to originality in the Timaeus were almost equally fictitious.

καὶ σὺ Πλάτων, καὶ γάρ σε μαθητείης πόθος ἔσχεν,
πολλῶν δ' ἀργυρίων ὀλίγην ἠλλάξαο βίβλον,
ἔνθεν ἀπαρχόμενος τιμαιογραφεῖν ἐδιδάχθης[2].

These words of Timon, notwithstanding his notorious genius for calumny (comp. D. L. IX. 12 and Euseb. P. E. 759), seem to have stimulated the invention or research of subsequent writers: they tell us when and where Plato bought the 'little book,' the price that he paid for it, and what is even more, the name of its author, a point on which Timon had not given them the slightest hint. The author was a Pythagorean, and according to a common belief, Philolaus. Here then we come at last to a matter of cardinal moment, what is the historical value, if any,

[1] Theopomp. ap. Athenae. XI. p. 508 D—Aristoxen. ap. D.L. III. 25. The book of Protagoras (a spurious one doubtless) was still extant in the time of Porphyry (Euseb. P. E. 468).

[2] Timon ap. Aul. Gell. III. 17, and, with variations, elsewhere (see the note in Wachsmuth, De Timone Phliasio, p. 60). V. Rose (Comment. p. 11) seems to infer that when the above lines were written, the work of the pseudo-Philolaus, or something very like it, was already in existence. But this can hardly be true of the fragments of Philolaus now extant (1) because the cosmical theory in them is the exact opposite of that in the Timaeus, and their affinity is rather with the Philebus and the Phaedrus; (2) like other Pythagorean forgeries, and the book *περὶ κόσμου*, they seem to belong to a late eclectic age, and not to that of Timon when the antagonism of rival schools was still in full vigour (see Schaarschmidt, p. 75). Supposing Timon to have had some actual book in view, it must have been of the same type as Timaeus Locrus, related that is to the Platonic Timaeus in much the same way as Protagoras *περὶ τοῦ ὄντος* was to the Republic. Comp. on this point the language of Aristoxenus and Porphyry (see last note) and also that of Favorinus (ap. D. L. III. 35): *ἦν* (sc. *τὴν Πολιτείαν*) *καὶ εὑρίσκεσθαι σχεδὸν ὅλην παρὰ Πρωταγόρᾳ ἐν τοῖς ἀντιλογικοῖς φησι Φαβωρῖνος.*

of this element in the story? If our result is to possess any scientific validity, we must first look into the context of the tradition by which Philolaus is thus made to play so important a part in history.

(1) Plato was a Pythagorean, turned out, however, from the society for divulging its tenets, like Philolaus and Empedocles before him (Timaeus of Tauromenium, and Neanthes ap. D. L. VIII. 2, 2).

(2) Plato in the course of his travels went to Italy to hear either Philolaus and Eurytus (Anon. ap. D. L. III. 8) or Archytas and Timaeus the Locrian (Cic. De Fin. V. 29).

(3) The 'little book' was one by Ocellus Lucanus, which Archytas sent to Plato from Sicily (Spurious Platonic letter to Archytas ap. D. L. VIII. 4).

(4) The 'little book' was that of Timaeus Locrus (Schol. Ruhnken. in Plat. Tim. 20 A).

(5) Plato through Dion bought *τρία βιβλία πυθαγορικά* from Philolaus for 100 minae (Satyrus ap. D. L. III. 11).

(6) Hermippus read a statement somewhere that Plato bought the book from the kinsmen of Philolaus for 40 Alexandrine minae, while on a visit to Dionysius in Sicily (comp. D. L. VIII. 7: *γέγραφε* [sc. *Φιλόλαος*] *βιβλίον ἕν, ὅ φησιν Ἑρμιππος λέγειν τινὰ τῶν συγγραφέων Πλάτωνα τὸν φιλόσοφον παραγενόμενον εἰς Σικελίαν πρὸς Διονύσιον ὠνήσασθαι παρὰ τῶν συγγενῶν τοῦ φιλολάου ἀργυρίου Ἀλεξανδρηνῶν μνῶν τετταράκοντα καὶ ἐντεῦθεν μεταγεγραφέναι τὸν Τίμαιον*).

(7) The book was given to Plato by a disciple of Philolaus, whom he had induced Dionysius to release from prison (Anon. ap. D. L. VIII. 7).

Thus we see the story of Philolaus and his authorship in the successive stages of its development. It has certainly all the marks of a myth about it: it gains as it advances, its details become more precise and circumstantial, and yet there is hardly a single particular in which any two writers agree. First of all, we have in Aristotle (Metaph. I. 5) a general assertion of Plato's

debt, if such it can be called, to his Pythagorean predecessors, without mention of teachers, or indication of a literature from which he might possibly have borrowed. Next, by the time of Neanthes and Timaeus, Plato becomes a member of the Pythagorean order, or at any rate a disciple of one of its leading men; the order itself likewise is now known to have possessed a wisdom which was not to be lightly revealed to the uninitiated. The legend in the hands of Alexandrine critics takes a new turn, one suggested, we may imagine, by the lines of Timon. At this point a *book* first appears in the story: Plato, it is said, either during his travels, or through Dion or Archytas, became the owner of a Pythagorean volume, which, if not anonymous (comp. the *τρία βιβλία πυθαγορικά* of Satyrus), bore the name of either Philolaus or Ocellus Lucanus or Timaeus Locrus. The accounts contained still further divergencies. The treatise of Philolaus was either bought from him or his family, or given to Plato by a disciple; and it cost, if bought, 100 minae, or 40 Alexandrine minae. We need not stop to enquire when and where this last touch was added[1]. Such, or pretty nearly such, was the state in which Hermippus[2] found the legend. His words, if rightly reported, do not necessitate the inference that he had ever seen the book, although he was a learned man, and lived in the learned age of Callimachus and Eratosthenes. The omissions of Alexandrine critics of this period are not without significance. Had the work in question then existed and found a place in the library at Alexandria, the probability is that they would have left posterity some definite bibliographical details about it, together with a separate life of its author. The case

[1] Biographi Graeci veteres, mendacissimum genus hominum, says Dindorf. Chron. Demosth. p. 67 (prefixed to the Teubner ed. of Demosthenes).

[2] The industry at any rate of Hermippus, *ὁ Καλλιμάχειος*, as he is called, may be judged from the list of his writings in Jonsius, Scriptor. Hist. Phil. p. 161 (ed. Frankf. 1659). He continued the bibliographical and other labours of Callimachus in connexion with the Alexandrine library. As to the nature of these labours, a point of vital importance in matters of Greek literary history, see Ritschl 'On the Alexandrine libraries' and 'On the Stichometry of the Ancients' (Opusc. Vol. I), Volkmann 'De Suidae Biographicis Quaest. Alter.' (Symb. Philol. Bonnens. p. 717), and Grote's Plato, Ch. IV.

however is otherwise. They tell us, it is true, a great deal about Philolaus and his writings, but it seems to occur invariably as a sort of parenthesis in lives of Empedocles or Plato. Yet there is no doubt that the book was in existence at the time of Cicero, when a few of its opening words were quoted by the grammarian Demetrius Magnes (D. L. VIII. 7). But what can be said for its history up to this moment? It reads like the history not so much of a book as of a literary ignis fatuus[1] floating before the eyes of imaginative writers, and not finally grasped in a substantial form till more than 300 years after the death of the real Philolaus. It appears also at a time when, as we have seen, a spurious literature of similar kind was 'at a premium' in the most literal sense of the words, and when the state of opinion secured it an easy acceptance.

So much for the historical credentials of our Fragments. It now remains for us to discover whether the internal evidence, that of their style and contents, is stronger in their favour. If they are the genuine work of the age and school of Philolaus the contemporary of Socrates, we may expect them to exhibit (1) the coherence by which an original effort of mind is distinguished from a mere compilation or piece of patchwork: (2) they will be pre-Platonic in thought, consequently with no traces of Stoicism, Aristotelianism, or other later philosophies: (3) their style will be immature, something very far removed from the developed prose which Aristotle subsequently fashioned into the common language of abstract speculation: (4) these characteristics, if found, will establish a visible difference between them and the apocryphal literature with which they might possibly be confounded.

[1] A curious parallel is presented by the famous work 'De Tribus Impostoribus' attributed to nearly every great mediaeval heretic, Frederic II. among the rest. The excessively rare book now bearing this name [reprinted at Brussels in 1867] is probably not earlier than 1597, and may be of still more recent origin, if we are at liberty to suppose the date to be falsified: it seems certain that before 1597 at any rate, it existed only in the imagination of credulous controversialists (Renan, Averroès, p. 297).

II.

The book attributed by the ancients to Philolaus seems to have opened with certain metaphysical statements about number[1]. The criticism of the fragments which naturally fit into this part of it becomes possible only on one condition, viz. that we can get some notion of Pythagorean theories of number ab extra, and from a sufficiently trustworthy source. Thus then a preliminary question is forced upon us, what light does Aristotle throw upon these theories? Wherein were they according to him distinguished from the speculations of succeeding schools of thought?

The Pythagoreans, we are told in a well-known passage, (Metaph. I. 5) analysed number into its elements, the odd and the even, or the definite and the indefinite: unity, it was said, arose out of a combination of these elements, and number out of unity. And further, in a superficial sort of way, they anticipated the Platonic definitions: they observed a variety of analogies between particular numbers and the things around them; in one number, for instance, they saw a symbol of justice, in another, of mind and so on. Number consequently became with them a general expression for the world: the whole universe was a number or harmonious system of numbers.

This account, obscure and defective as it is in more than one respect, is the substance of all that Aristotle here, or elsewhere, tells us about the arithmetical philosophy of the Pythagoreans. If there is any admixture of positive error in his statement, the secret of it is probably this, he exaggerates the metaphysical import of an early theory, or substitutes inferences of his own in the place of a true interpretation. We know from parallel cases what his usual procedure is. His interpretation is constructive, not critical: he discovers a developed scheme of philosophy in some rude and primitive formula; he puts even the poets to the torture, and extracts from them an answer to difficulties not dreamt of in their modes of thought, or those of the age in which they lived. As regards the arith-

[1] See Boeckh (Philol. p. 47), and Schaarschmidt (Die angebl. Schriftstell. des Philol. p. 64).

metical theories now under discussion, his treatment of these seems to form no exception to the general rule; his constant aim is apparently to extort from them a meaning not their own, to cite them systematically in controversies of which their authors knew absolutely nothing. The following are some of the difficulties in which we find the Pythagoreans entangled:

(1) Are the Pythagorean numbers immanent or transcendental? (Metaph. XIII. 6).

(2) Are they to be considered as the material or as the formal causes of things? (Metaph. I. 5).

(3) Are they magnitudes in space? (Metaph. XIII. 6).

(4) How is it possible to construct solid bodies out of number, the corporeal out of the incorporeal? (Metaph. XIII. 8).

Were we unable to criticize the method of interpretation here adopted, we might perhaps for a moment imagine the Pythagoreans to have had some precise views on all the above-mentioned questions. Histories of philosophy not unfrequently attribute to them a quasi-metaphysical construction of the line and therefore of the surface and the solid, out of points or monads: Aristotle, however, in one place at least, gives us clearly to understand that such a construction is, at any rate, not Pythagorean: 'Some generate lines out of insensible points (*στιγμαί, μονάδες*), surfaces out of lines, bodies out of surfaces, but this is really the annihilation of body. And the same criticism applies to those Pythagoreans who construct the world out of number' (De Caelo, III. 1). When he says, 'construct the world out of number,' he means no more than is involved in his original expression: *τὸν ὅλον οὐρανὸν ἁρμονίαν φασὶν εἶναι καὶ ἀριθμόν.* There is another Aristotelian passage (Metaph. XIV. 3), in which an allusion is commonly found to a Pythagorean construction of body out of the 'limits of body.' The substance of the passage is as follows: 'If mathematical numbers are transcendental, how can they be properties of concrete bodies? The Pythagoreans escape the difficulty through not making their numbers transcendental: whereas the Platonists, to avoid Heraclitean doubts as to the possibility of knowledge, conceive

not only numbers but even mathematical magnitudes as separate from the things of sense (*χωριστά*) * * * Some affirm the real existence of surfaces, lines and points from the fact that points are the limits of lines, lines of surfaces, surfaces of bodies (*στερεόν*). This argument, however, is untenable; the limits of things are not necessarily substances, and if they were, they would be sensible, and consequently, not transcendental.' By the last class of thinkers Aristotle can hardly mean the Pythagoreans as is supposed by Bonitz (ad loc.), Zeller (*in his first ed.* I. p. 109), and others[1]: they at any rate are assumed throughout the chapter to have ignored the dualism between *ἀχώριστα* and *χωριστά*, through their unconsciousness of the Platonic want which afterwards necessitated it. It must be confessed that the language of Aristotle is often ambiguous or of impenetrable obscurity; but there is one fact which we can neither overlook nor explain away, the great gulf which he conceives to be fixed between Pythagorean theories and the later developments of Platonism. Transcendental number, a construction of bodies out of certain geometrical abstractions, the antithesis of the *πρώτη μονάς* and the *ἀόριστος δυάς*, everything, in short, which rests on the Ideal theory as its basis, is certainly Platonic and not earlier. We may sum up this result in more general terms, with the Platonists a profound metaphysical interest was predominant; with the Pythagoreans properly so called, it existed in a very slight degree, if at all.

The impression thus derived from Aristotle himself is not materially altered when we pass on to the writings of the Aristotelian school. The speculative calibre of the Pythagorean Eurytus we can sufficiently estimate from these words of Theophrastus:—*τοῦτο τελέου καὶ φρονοῦντος, ὅπερ Ἀρχύτας ποτ' ἔφη ποιεῖν Εὔρυτον διατιθέντα τινὰς ψήφους· λέγειν γὰρ ὡς ὅδε μὲν ἀνθρώπου ὁ ἀριθμὸς, ὅδε δὲ ἵππου, ὅδε δ' ἄλλου τινὸς τυγχάνει, νῦν δ' οἵ γε πολλοὶ μέχρι τινὸς ἐλθοντες καταπαύονται*[2]

[1] Sextus Empiricus (p. 126, 26 ed. Bekk.) attributes the theory in question to the 'mathematicians' as distinct from *οἱ περὶ Πυθαγόραν*: these 'mathematicians' late writers convert into a grade in a Pythagorean hierarchy.

[2] i.e. the Platonists: comp. Arist. Metaph. XII. 1073 a 19, and XIII. 1084 a 12, ed. Bekk.

(Metaph. 11). Yet it is to be remarked that even at this period we see the beginnings of a tendency to confound Plato with his Pythagorean predecessors (see esp. Theophr. Metaph. 33). In course of time all distinction between them became effaced and forgotten: the Neopythagorean and Neoplatonist of histories of philosophy do not so much represent different types of thought as different aspects or stages of the great revival of Platonism.

The foregoing discussion comes to this: if we may trust writers of the fourth century B.C., the Pythagorean doctrine of number belonged, at least in its more essential features, to arithmetic rather than to metaphysics, although a metaphysical sense more or less profound might be read into it by an uncritical system of interpretation. The question therefore now immediately before us resolves itself into a somewhat narrower one, Are the Philolaic fragments on number metaphysical rather than arithmetical, that is to say, Platonic in their origin rather than Pythagorean?

§ 1.

PHILOLAUS.

Ἀνάγκα τὰ ἐόντα εἶμεν πάντα ἢ περαίνοντα ἢ ἄπειρα· ἢ περαίνοντά τε καὶ ἄπειρα, ἄπειρα δὲ μόνον οὔ κα εἴη· ἐπεὶ τοίνυν φαίνεται οὔτ' ἐκ περαινόντων πάντων ἐόντα οὔτ' ἐξ ἀπείρων πάντων, δῆλόν τᾰρα ὅτι ἐκ περαινόντων καὶ ἀπείρων ὅ τε κόσμος καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ συναρμόχθη.

ἐπεὶ δὲ ταὶ ἀρχαὶ ὑπᾶρχον οὐχ ὅμοιαι οὐδ' ὁμόφυλοι ἔσσαι, ἦδη ἀδύνατον ἦς κα αὐτοῖς κοσμηθῆμεν, αἰ μὴ ἁρμονία ἐπεγένετο, ὥτινιῶν τρόπῳ ἐγένετο. τὰ μὲν οὖν ὅμοια καὶ ὁμόφυλα ἁρμονίας οὐθὲν ἐπεδέοντο, τὰ δὲ

PSEUDO-ARCHYTAS.

ἐπεὶ τὸ κινεόμονον ἐναντίας ἑαυτῷ δυνάμιας ἴσχει τὰς τῶν ἁπλόων σωμάτων, τὰ δ' ἐναντία συναρμογᾶς τινος δεῖται καὶ ἑνώσιος, ἀνάγκα ἀριθμῶν δυνάμιας καὶ ἀναλογίας καὶ τὰ ἐν ἀριθμοῖς καὶ γεωμετρικοῖς δεικνύμενα παραλαμβάνεν, ἃ καὶ συναρμόσαι καὶ ἑνῶσαι τὰν ἐναντιότατα δυνασεῖται ἐν τᾷ ἐστοῖ τῶν πραγμάτων ποττὰν μορφώ· καθ' αὑτὰν μὲν γὰρ ἔσσα ἃ ἐστὼ ἄμορφός ἐντι (Stob. Ecl. Phys. ch. 35, 714; p. 195, ed. Meineke).

ἀνόμοια μηδὲ ὁμόφυλα μηδὲ ἰσολαχῆ ἀνάγκα τᾷ τοιαύτᾳ ἁρμονίᾳ συγκεκλεῖσθαι, αἱ μέλλοντι ἐν κόσμῳ κατέχεσθαι (Stob. Ecl. Phys. ch. 21, 456—460, p. 127—128, ed. Meineke). *ἔστι γὰρ ἁρμονία πολυμιγέων ἕνωσις καὶ δίχα φρονεόντων συμφρόνησις* (Nicomach. Introd. p. 115, ed. Hoche).

The theory embodied in these fragments is a perfectly intelligible one: here we evidently have the limit and the limitless in the Platonic sense, that of form and matter, warring opposites which have to be harmoniously united to make up a concrete world. This harmonious union is the work of the Cause, says Plato in the Philebus; of God, say our so-called Pythagoreans, Archytas (ap. Stob. Ecl. Phys. p. 195, Mein.), Aristaeon (ap. Stob. Ecl. Phys. p. 119), and in all probability, Philolaus also (comp. Boeckh, Phil. p. 148, and Zeller, I. 268—272). Aristotle, however, can hardly have conspired to mislead the world, and according to him the Pythagorean *ἄπειρον* was an arithmetical (= *τὸ ἄρτιον*) and not a metaphysical conception (= *ὕλη*[1]). It is indeed difficult to believe that the theory of the Philebus could have been thus simply a plagiarism from without, rather than what it naturally seems to be, the result of a progress within the sphere of Platonism itself.

This view of the function of number, or as he here calls it, harmony, our author loses sight of in our next fragment: instead of regarding it as the link between matter and form, he now appears to identify it with form itself, the knowable element in things.

§ 2.

Philolaus.	Pseudo-Archytas.
καὶ πάντα γα μὰν τὰ γιγνωσκόμενα ἀριθμὸν ἔχοντι· οὐ γὰρ	*Ἀνάγκα καὶ δύο ἀρχὰς εἶμεν τῶν ὄντων, μίαν μὲν τὰν συ-*

[1] Themistius (in Arist. Phys. III. 4) has a very clear perception of this point: see esp. I. p. 220 and 227, ed. Spengel.

PHILOLAUS.

οἷόν τε οὐδὲν οὔτε νοηθῆμεν οὔτε γνωσθῆμεν ἄνευ τούτω. ὅ γα μὰν ἀριθμὸς ἔχει μὲν δύο ἴδια εἴδεα περισσὸν καὶ ἄρτιον, τρίτον δὲ ἀπ' ἀμφοτέρων μιχθέντων ἀρτιοπέρισσον (Stob. Ecl. Phys. ch. 21. 456).

PSEUDO-ARCHYTAS.

*στοιχίαν ἔχοισαν τῶν τεταγμένων καὶ ὁριστῶν, ἑτέραν δὲ τὰν συστοιχίαν ἔχοισαν τῶν ἀτάκτων καὶ ἀορίστων. καὶ τὰν μὲν ῥητὰν καὶ λόγον ἔχοισαν καὶ τὰ ἐόντα ὁμοίως συνέχεν καὶ τὰ μὴ ἐόντα ὁρίζεν καὶ συντάσσεν *** τὰν δ' ἄλογον καὶ ἄρρητον κ.τ.λ.* (Stob. Ecl. Phys. ch. 35, 712).

This fragment introduces us to a clear-cut theory of 'Knowing and Being.' We are required to believe it to have been propounded in a pre-Socratic school of thought, and at a time when the critical enquiry 'How is knowledge possible?' had been barely started, much less settled. But after Plato's time the unknowableness of matter without form (*ὕλη ἄγνωστος καθ' αὑτήν*, says Aristotle), became with various modifications a received formula wherever his influence extended; it was a common-place, and as such, the compiler of a spurious literature would naturally find it useful for his purpose. Leaving the speculative regions of Being and Knowing, our author now passes not without some abruptness to common arithmetic. Number is said to be either odd, even, or even-odd (*ἀρτιοπέρισσος*), the last term, it would seem, being a designation for those even numbers the halves of which are odd (e.g. 2, 6, 10, etc.). This was certainly a popular classification in Neoplatonic times[1], but it is not easy to reconcile with Aristotle's statement that with the Pythagoreans *unity* was both odd and even. We know from Aristotle that the even numbers were identified with the limitless, and therefore, according to our fragments, with matter: how can this be, if number generally, all three kinds included, is said to be the knowable and formal element in things? It will be observed, moreover, that Aristotle speaks of the odd and the even as 'elements' in number, whereas in our author they are simply described as 'kinds' (*εἴδη*).

[1] Comp. Nicom. Geras. Introd. I. ch. 9 (p. 19. ed. Hoche), and Theon. Smyrn. ch. 9 (p. 38. ed. Gelder).

There is another fragment which treats of the mysterious perfections of number, a theme which Neoplatonists repeat with variations wearisome through their incredible lack of sanity. An extract from it will enable us to judge of its character and affinities.

PHILOLAUS.

*θεωρεῖν δεῖ τὰ ἔργα καὶ τὰν ἐσσίαν τῶ ἀριθμῶ καττὰν δύναμιν ἅ τις ἐστὶν ἐν τᾷ δεκάδι. μεγάλα γὰρ καὶ παντελὴς καὶ παντοεργὸς καὶ θείω καὶ οὐρανίω βίω καὶ ἀνθρωπίνω ἀρχὰ καὶ ἀγεμὼν κοινωνοῦσα δύναμις καὶ τῆς δεκάδος, ἄνευ δὲ ταύτας πάντ' ἄπειρα καὶ ἄδηλα καὶ ἀφανῆ * * * ἴδοις δέ κα οὐ μόνον ἐν τοῖς δαιμονίοις καὶ θείοις πράγμασι τὰν τῶ ἀριθμῶ φύσιν καὶ τὰν δύναμιν ἰσχύουσαν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρωπίνοις ἔργοις καὶ λόγοις πᾶσι παντᾷ κ.τ.λ.* (Stob. Ecl. Phys. ch. 1, 8—p. 2, ed. Mein.).

PSEUDO-PYTHAGORAS.

Ὀρφεὺς ὁ Καλλίοπας κατὰ τὸ Πάγγαιον ὄρος ὑπὸ τᾶς ματρὸς πινυσθεὶς ἔφα, τὰν ἀριθμοῦ οὐσίαν ἀΐδιον εἶναι μὲν ἀρχὰν προμαθεστάταν τῶ παντὸς ὠρανῶ [read :—*εἶναι, ἀρχὰν μὲν προμαθεστάταν τῶ παντὸς ὦσαν ὠρανῶ*] *καὶ γᾶς καὶ τᾶς μεταξὺ φύσιος, ἔτι δὲ καὶ θείων καὶ θεῶν καὶ δαιμόνων διαμονᾶς ῥίζαν* (Iambl. de Pyth. Vit. § 146, ed. Westermann).

§ 3.

PHILOLAUS.

Φιλόλαος πῦρ ἐν μέσῳ περὶ τὸ κέντρον, ὅπερ ἑστίαν τοῦ παντὸς καλεῖ καὶ Διὸς οἶκον καὶ μητέρα θεῶν· βωμόν τε καὶ συνοχὴν καὶ μέτρον φύσεως· καὶ πῦρ ἕτερον ἀνωτάτω τὸ περιέχον· πρῶτον δὲ εἶναι φύσει τὸ μέσον, περὶ δὲ τοῦτο δέκα σώματα θεῖα χορεύειν οὐρανόν, πλανήτας, μεθ' οὓς ἥλιον, ὑφ' ᾧ σελήνην, ὑφ' ᾗ τὴν γῆν, ὑφ'

PHILOLAUS.

ἦ τὴν ἀντίχθονα, μεθ' ἃ σύμπαντα τὸ πῦρ ἑστίας περὶ τὰ κέντρα τάξιν ἐπέχον· τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀνωτάτω μέρος τοῦ περιέχοντος ἐν ᾧ τὴν εἰλικρίνειαν εἶναι τῶν στοιχείων, ὄλυμπον καλεῖ, τὰ δὲ ὑπὸ τὴν τοῦ ὀλύμπου φοράν, ἐν ᾧ τοὺς πέντε πλανήτας μεθ' ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης τετάχθαι, κόσμον· τὸ δὲ ὑπὸ τούτοις ὑποσέληνόν τε καὶ περίγειον μέρος, ἐν ᾧ τὰ τῆς φιλομεταβόλου γενέσεως οὐρανόν. καὶ περὶ μὲν τὰ τεταγμένα τῶν μετεώρων γίγνεσθαι τὴν σοφίαν, περὶ δὲ τὰ γενόμενα τῆς ἀταξίας τὴν ἀρετήν, τελείαν μὲν ἐκείνην, ἀτελῆ δὲ ταύτην (Stob. Ecl. Phys. ch. 22, 488—p. 134, ed. Mein.).

PSEUDO-ARCHYTAS.

λέγω δὲ σοφίαν μὲν ἐπιστάμαν τῶν θείων καὶ δαιμονίων, φρόνασιν δὲ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων καὶ τῶν περὶ τὸν βίον (Stob. Flor. I. 77—Vol. I. p. 33, ed. Mein.).

The Pythagorean system of the universe, as we gather from Aristotle (De Caelo, II. p. 293 a), was distinguished from all others by two principal conceptions, the antichthon and the central fire, around which the earth itself was said to revolve, as well as the other heavenly bodies[1]. The cosmical theory of Aristotle is not only more elaborate than this view, but in some respects at least, is the exact antithesis of it. The immoveable centre of the world, according to him, is the earth; it is around it that the heavenly bodies move, in an atmosphere of their own purer and rarer than fire or the grosser elements, a region which a popular instinct has rightly recognized as divine and the abode of gods (De Caelo, I. p. 270 b.—Meteor. I. p. 339 b). Beneath this extends the sphere of the four elements, a world of perpetual birth and decay, an insignificant

[1] See Boeckh, Klein. Schrift, III. p. 326.

part of the whole (Metaph. IV. p. 1010 a). Yet there seem to be degrees of perfection even in the upper and diviner part (*τὸ ἄνω καὶ μέχρι σελήνης*), for its atmosphere loses in purity the nearer it lies to the air of our earth (Meteor. I. p. 340 b).

Our fragment of Philolaus is seen at a glance to be a combination, or rather a confusion of two antagonistic theories. The difficulties in it do not stop here. The atmosphere around the universe is first of all conceived as a fire, which was one view (Meteor. I. p. 339 b), the common one in Stoic times, though probably not Pythagorean (see Arist. Phys. III. p. 203 a, and IV. p. 281: also Zeller, I. p. 316): then, secondly, as a sort of pure ether (*εἰλικρίνεια τῶν στοιχείων*), in which our author, working out the hints of Aristotle, affirms a difference, that namely between Olympus and *κόσμος*—strangely chosen names, although not so strangely chosen as *οὐρανός*[1] for the lower terrene world. This distinction again had its parallel among the Stoics, if Diog. Laertius (VII. 1, 69) is right in thus stating their opinion: *ἀνωτάτω εἶναι τὸ πῦρ, ὁ δὴ αἰθέρα καλεῖσθαι, ἐν ᾧ πρώτην τὴν τῶν ἀπλανῶν σφαῖραν γεννᾶσθαι, εἶτα τὴν τῶν πλανωμένων· μεθ' ἣν τὸν ἀέρα, εἶτα τὸ ὕδωρ, ὑποστάθμην δὲ πάντων τὴν γῆν, μέσην ἁπάντων οὖσαν.* It looks indeed as if our compiler, under the influence of Peripatetic or later ideas, had forgotten by this time the counter-earth and the central fire, for we can hardly imagine him placing the *ἑστία τοῦ παντός*, the 'house of Zeus,' the 'altar, band and measure of nature' in the sublunary world of change and birth. Lastly he tells us, as Aristotle had done before him, that this lower world is not the sphere of philosophy but of the moral judgment, or as he prefers to phrase it, 'virtue.'

Aristotle's notion of a finer ether in which the stars live and move, led his followers and the Greek historians of philosophy to attribute to him a 'fifth element,' a *quinta essentia* as the Latins termed it. The same notion, however, is found in Philolaus in this its hardest and most technical form:

ἐν τᾷ σφαίρᾳ σώματα πέντε ἐντί, πῦρ ὕδωρ καὶ γᾶ καὶ ἀὴρ

[1] The meaning of *οὐρανός* in Plato and Aristotle is explained by Krische (Forschungen, p. 196, and 283) with his usual clearness.

καὶ ἁ τᾶς σφαίρας κυκλὰς [libri, *ὁλκὰς*] *πέμπτον.* (Stob. Ecl. Phys. ch. I. 10—p. 3 ed. Mein.)

The ancients were fully aware that a 'fifth element' was something peculiarly Aristotelian (Attic. ap. Euseb. P.E. xv. ch. 7); and its occurrence in the Platonic Epinomis is merely one of the many indications of the late origin of that dialogue.

§ 4.

Philolaus.	Ocellus Lucanus[1].
*παρὸ καὶ ἄφθαρτος καὶ ἀκαταπόνατος διαμένει τὸν ἄπειρον αἰῶνα· οὔτε γὰρ ἔντοσθεν ἄλλα τις αἰτία δυναμικωτέρα αὐτᾶς εὑρεθήσεται οὔτ' ἔκτοσθεν φθεῖραι αὐτὸν δυναμένα, ἀλλ' ἥς ὅδε ὁ κόσμος ἐξ αἰῶνος καὶ ἐς αἰῶνα διαμένει, εἷς ὑπὸ ἑνὸς τῶν συγγενέων καὶ κρατίστω καὶ ἀνυπερτάτω κυβερνώμενος· ἔχει δὲ καὶ τὰν ἀρχὰν τᾶς κινάσιος * * καὶ τὸ μὲν ἀμετάβλατον αὐτοῦ τὸ δὲ μεταβάλλον ἐστί· καὶ τὸ μὲν ἀμετάβολον ἀπὸ τᾶς τὸ ὅλον περιεχούσας ψυχᾶς μέχρι τᾶς σελάνας περαιοῦται, τὸ δὲ μεταβάλλον ἀπὸ τᾶς σελάνας μέχρι τᾶς γᾶς. * * * ἀνάγκα τὸ μὲν ἀεικίνατον τὸ δὲ ἀειπαθὲς εἶμεν, καὶ τὸ μὲν νῶ καὶ ψυχᾶς ἀνάκωμα[2] πᾶν, τὸ δὲ γενέσιος καὶ μεταβολᾶς, καὶ τὸ μὲν πρᾶτον τᾷ δυνάμι καὶ ὑπερέχον, τὸ δὲ ὕστερον καὶ καθυπερεχόμε-*	*εἰ δὲ καὶ δοξάζοι τις αὐτὸ φθείρεσθαι ἤτοι ὑπό τινος τῶν ἔξω τοῦ παντὸς φθαρήσεται δυναστευόμενον, ἢ ὑπό τινος τῶν ἐντός· οὔτε δὲ ὑπό τινος τῶν ἔξωθεν· ἐκτὸς γὰρ τοῦ παντὸς οὐδέν * * * ἄφθαρτος ἄρα καὶ ἀνώλεθρος ὁ κόσμος* (p. 392). *ἰσθμός ἐστιν ἀθανασίας καὶ γενέσεως ὁ περὶ σελήνην δρόμος* (p. 394). *τὸ ἀεικίνητον κυβερνῇ, τὸ δ' ἀειπαθὲς κυβερνῆται· καὶ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον τᾷ δυνάμι, τὸ δὲ ὕστερον· καὶ τὸ μὲν θεῖον καὶ λόγον ἔχον καὶ ἔμφρον, τὸ δὲ γενατὸν καὶ ἄλογον* (p. 407).

[1] Quoted from Mullach's Edit. at the end of his Frag. Phil. Graec. Vol. I.

[2] *ἀνάκωμα* is a vox nihili, whatever Boeckh may say in its favour. Some such word as *ἀγγεῖον* seems required by the sense: comp. *ὕλη ἀγγεῖον γενέσεως* (Herm. ap. Stob. Ecl. Phys. p. 84. Mein.).

Philolaus.	Ocellus Lucanus.
*νον. τὸ δὲ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων τούτων, τῷ μὲν ἀεὶ θέοντος θείω. τῷ δὲ ἀεὶ μεταβάλλοντος γενατῷ, κόσμος * * * καὶ τὰ μὲν φθορᾷ ὄντα καὶ φύσι κατὰ μορφὰς σώζεται, τᾷ γονᾷ πάλιν τὰν αὐτὰν μορφὰν ἀποκαθιστάντα τῷ γεννάσαντι πατέρι καὶ δαμιουργῷ* (Stob. Ecl. Phys. ch. 20, 420—p. 116, ed. Mein.).	*τὸ δὲ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων αὐτῶν, τοῦ μὲν ἀεὶ θέοντος θείου, τοῦ δὲ ἀεὶ μεταβάλλοντος γενητοῦ κόσμος ἄρα ἐστίν* (p. 400).

In this long fragment not a vestige remains of a primitive Pythagorean cosmology; in its place we find a confusion of Stoic and Peripatetic theories, such as frequently appears in similar compositions, in Ocellus Lucanus, for instance, and in the pseudo-Aristotelian book *περὶ κόσμου*. It does not require much consideration to prove that the thought, to say nothing at present of the language, would have been an anachronism at the time of the real Philolaus, the contemporary of Socrates (see Zeller, I. p. 269, who has discussed this fragment at some length).

1. The writer first of all affirms the eternity of the world. The idea indeed might seem foreshadowed in the weighty words of Heraclitus, 'no god or man created the world, but it is and will be an everliving fire': as an explicit philosophic dogma, however, it has a somewhat different origin. Aristotle, following a hint in the Timaeus (p. 31), gives a new turn to the process by which the Eleatic demonstrated the eternity of being, and Plato (in Rep. II.) the unchangeable nature of Deity. The universe as the perfect whole of existence has nothing outside to create or destroy it (see De Caelo I. 10 and II. 1; and comp. Bernays, Dialoge des Arist. p. 101). This notion became a part of the speculative creed of Neoplatonic times, and to an uncritical generation nothing seemed more natural than to find it in the old Pythagorean literature from which Plato and others had 'stolen' so largely[1].

[1] Comp. Philo, de Mundi Incorrupt. (II. 489 ed. Mangey):—*ἔνιοι οὐκ Ἀριστοτέλη τῆς δόξης εὑρετὴν λέγουσιν ἀλλὰ καὶ Πυθαγορείων τινάς.* In the

2. The world is next affirmed to have one ruler, 'the strongest of all his kindred.' Plato in the Timaeus speaks of the Creator and the 'mortal gods' in language which in Stoic hands assumed a new and pantheistic sense The *δημιουργός* was now no longer a purely mythical personage; he was Zeus, the creative fire (*πῦρ τεκνικόν, ἡγεμονικόν*), by the changes of which all things else come into being, the earth as well as the sun moon and stars[1], the 'mortal gods' of the popular religion. When Philolaus mentions the 'one ruler' in a context like the present, he must mean, if anything, the pantheistic Zeus of Stoicism. Little doubt however remains as to the true origin of the passage when we find the etherial envelope of the world (the *περιέχον* of Aristotle) spoken of as a *soul*. Comp. Areius Didym. (ap. Euseb. P. E. xv. 822); *εἶναι ψυχὴν ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ φασὶν* [sc. *οἱ Στωϊκοί*], *ὃ καλοῦσιν αἰθέρα.*

3. Further, the definition of the *κόσμος* as a whole consisting of a divine upper region and a lower or terrene one is likewise a Stoic commonplace. It is instructive to quote the words of Poseidonius (ap. D. L. vii. 1, 70) on this point: *ἔστι κόσμος * * * σύστημα ἐξ οὐρανοῦ καὶ γῆς καὶ τῶν ἐν τούτοις φύσεων * * * οὐρανὸς δέ ἐστιν ἡ ἐσχάτη περιφέρεια ἐν ᾗ πᾶν ἵδρυται τὸ θεῖον.* [Comp. also Areius Didym. ap. Euseb. P. E. xv. 817.] Here too, it is not unfair to ask the question, What has become of the narrower conception of *κόσμος*, according to which it was so sharply distinguished from *ὄλυμπος* and *οὐρανός*?

4. Lastly, as if to complete a string of anachronisms, our author adds the assertion that nature is 'careful of the type' (*τὰ φθορᾷ ὄντα καὶ φύσει κατὰ μορφὰς σώζεται*) amid all the vicissitudes of birth and change. In Aristotle a statement like this would cause no surprise (comp. Zeller, ii. 2, p. 326), since he would be simply investing a Platonic result with a new and fruitful meaning: can we believe him to have been antici-

next sentence Philo (if the author is really Philo) proceeds to quote Ocellus Lucanus *περὶ κόσμου* in support of the assertion.

[1] Comp. Chrysipp. ap. Plut. de Stoic. Repugn. (p. 1287, ed. Dübner):—*Ἥλιος καὶ σελήνη καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι θεοὶ παραπλήσιον ἔχοντες λόγον γεννητοί εἰσιν, ὁ δὲ Ζεὺς ἀϊδιός ἐστιν * * * ὅμοια δὲ περὶ τοῦ φθίνειν καὶ περὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι ῥηθήσεται, περί τε τῶν ἄλλων θεῶν καὶ τοῦ Διός· οἱ μὲν γὰρ φθαρτοί εἰσι, τοῦ δὲ τὰ μέρη ἄφθαρτα.*

pated by an obscure thinker at a time when the whole Ideal theory was still unknown?

§ 5.

Φιλόλαος διττὴν [*λέγει*] *εἶναι τὴν φθορὰν τοῦ κόσμου, τὸ μὲν ἐξ οὐρανοῦ πυρὸς ῥυέντος, τὸ δ' ἐξ* [*ἐξ?*] *ὕδατος σεληνιακοῦ περιστροφῇ τοῦ ἀέρος ἀποχυθέντος* (Stob. Ecl. Phys. ch. 22, 418—p. 116, ed. Mein.).

Is it possible to find the idea of a beginning or end of the world in early Greek philosophy? Although a 'final conflagration is often attributed to Heraclitus[1], the better view is this, his *ἐκπύρωσις* is not a physical catastrophe in which a physical process culminates at some remote period; it must be conceived rather as something perpetually latent in the phenomena of nature, a sort of sensuous image of the pervading law of movement and change. To ask Heraclitus when the world was to become fire would have been as unmeaning to him as the corresponding question to Anaxagoras, When did mind reduce all things to order? The first trace of the idea as far as it appears in the literature of philosophy is to be sought not in Heraclitus or in any pre-Socratic, but in Plato.

Whenever Plato (Tim. 22. c) and Aristotle touch on the subject of periodical destructions of mankind by fire or water, it is easy to see that there is no scientific interest in their statements, that they are, in fact, a mere reminiscence of certain legendary stories of unknown antiquity. The words of Aristotle are decisive:—*γίγνεται διὰ χρόνων εἱμαρμένων, οἷον ἐν ταῖς κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν ὥραις χειμών, οὕτω περιόδου τινὸς μεγάλης μέγας χειμὼν καὶ ὑπερβολὴ ὄμβρων. αὕτη δὲ οὐκ ἀεὶ κατὰ τοὺς αὐτοὺς τόπους, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ὁ καλούμενος ἐπὶ Δευκαλίωνος κατακλυσμός. καὶ γὰρ οὗτος περὶ τὸν Ἑλληνικὸν ἐγένετο μάλιστα τόπον* (Meteor. I. 352 a: comp. Theophr. Frag. XXX. ed. Wimmer). A cataclysm however, as a cosmical phenomenon and not a merely local one, is a wholly different kind of conception, and has a different origin. There is a hint thrown out in the Timaeus as to the

[1] By Zeller (I. 478) and Bernays (Heraclitea, Rhein. Mus. IX. 265), among others. On the opposite side Hegel (Gesch. der Phil. I. 313), and Lassalle (Herakleitos, II. 149), may be quoted.

existence of a great cosmical year, just as the sun and planets have each their year or period of revolution. The Stoics seem to have modified this theory and thus to have given the fiery process of Heraclitus a history: they spoke of the great or rather the 'greatest' year (comp. Areius Didym. ap. Euseb. P. E. 821) as the time which the fire takes to return to itself, the period that is from the fiery beginning of the world to its fiery end. Certain moments in the transformation of the fire coincided with seasons in the great year; its summer was the time when all was fire, its winter that when all was water. This view may be illustrated by the words of two writers who, if not actually Stoics, were inspired by Stoic theories:—

> Est praeterea annus quem Aristoteles maximum potius quam magnum appellat, quem solis et lunae vagarumque quinque stellarum orbes conficiunt, cum ad idem signum ubi quondam simul fuerunt, una referuntur; cujus anni hiemps summa est cataclysmos, quam nostri diluvionem vocant, aestas autem ecpyrosis, quod est mundi incendium: nam his alternis temporibus mundus tum exignescere tum exaquescere videtur[1] (Censorin. de Die Nat. XVIII.).

> Φασὶ τοίνυν οἱ δοκιμώτατοι φιλόσοφοι ταῦτα περὶ τῆς διαμονῆς τῶν ὅλων * * * πυρὸς μὲν οὖν αἰφνιδίως ἐκζέσαντος ἁπάντων ἔσεσθαι κοινὴν ἐκπύρωσιν· εἰ δ' ἀθροῦν ὕδωρ ἐκραγείη κατακλυσμῷ τὸν κόσμον ἀπολεῖσθαι (Heraclid. Alleg. Hom. XXV. p. 53 ed. Mehler).

A cataclysm, not in the legendary but in the scientific sense of the word, was possible only as the counterpart of a general conflagration (*κοινὴ ἐκπύρωσις*) and could not have been earlier

[1] The Stoicism of great part of this passage is almost demonstrated by the parallel in Seneca (Quaest. Nat. III. 28, 29), his description of the universal deluge. In attributing a *maximus annus* to Aristotle Censorinus probably misunderstood his authorities (philologi commentarii: comp. De Die Nat. ch. I.), since Areius Didymus assures us that this was a Stoic term and there is no vestige of it in Aristotle's extant writings. It is an arbitrary hypothesis to say, as Bernays does (Theophrastos' Schrift über Frömmigkeit, p. 170), that the words were perhaps to be found in one of the lost dialogues.

than the Stoics. The divergence between the language of Plato (Tim. 22 C—comp. Polit. 270 D) and Aristotle (Meteor. l. l.) and that of Censorinus is just sufficient to prove the one essential point, that their notion is still the popular one of poetry and legend.

Turning now to our fragment *διττὴν εἶναι τὴν φθορὰν κ.τ.λ.* we have to ask ourselves the question whether the writer means a partial and local phenomenon or a grand universal breaking up of the world. The latter, if we may trust the form in which the fragment has come down to us. The destruction of the world is said to be twofold, by the fall of fire from heaven, and by the pouring forth of the water of the moon (comp. *ἐκραγείη* in the Alleg. Hom.). The theory is a Stoic one, although the expression is unscientific, just as it is in Seneca (Quaest. Nat. III. 28, 29), and in the 'Homeric Allegories.' It is difficult to imagine what is meant by *περιστροφῇ τοῦ ἀέρος*: Boeckh indeed sees in the words a notion that 'by the movement of the air' the water enveloping the moon is converted into cloud, and sent down in the shape of mist and rain. If a conjecture may be allowed, the true reading (either of this passage or perhaps of its Stoic prototype) was *περιστροφῇ τοῦ αἰθέρος*[1]: the sense would then be that the cataclysm takes place at the turning-point of the great year, when the planets are beginning to revert to their original position; cum ad idem signum ubi quondam simul fuerunt, una *referuntur*, says Censorinus. It should be remembered that some of the ancients, not however in the ages before Stoicism, went so far as to determine the precise length of the cosmical year and the moment when each catastrophe was to occur.

§ 6.

Καὶ τέσσαρες ἀρχαὶ τοῦ ζώου τοῦ λογικοῦ ὥσπερ καὶ Φιλόλαος ἐν τῷ περὶ φύσεως λέγει, ἐγκέφαλος, καρδία, ὀμφαλός, αἰδοῖον. κεφαλὰ μὲν νόω, καρδία δὲ ψυχᾶς καὶ αἰσθάσιος, ὀμφαλὸς δὲ ῥιζώσιος καὶ ἀναφύσιος τοῦ πρώτω, αἰδοῖον δὲ σπέρματος κα-

[1] One of Heeren's MSS. of Stobaeus (who likewise quotes the passage) reads *ἀστέρος*: *ἀέρος* is confused with *αἰθέρος* even in the Herculanean MS. of Philodemus *περὶ εὐσεβείας* (see Gomperz, Herkul. Studien, II. p. 83).

ταβολῆς τε καὶ γεννάσιος. ἐγκέφαλος δὲ τὰν ἀνθρώπω [ἔχει?] *ἀρχάν, καρδία δὲ τὰν ζώω, ὀμφαλὸς δὲ τὰν φυτῶ, αἰδοῖον δὲ τὰν ξυναπάντων* (Theolog. Arithm. p. 22).

Here we have an enumeration of four principles, or rather organs, in man—brain, heart, etc., and of four corresponding forms of life. The position of the fragment in the history of thought will become intelligible as soon as we discover what Plato and Aristotle say or omit to say on the point in question.

Plato's tripartite division of the soul receives a sort of physiological justification in the Timaeus. The 'mortal gods,' we are told, placed the divine part (i. e. the reason) by itself in the head, the nobler of the passions (= *τὸ θυμοειδές*) in the region between the neck and diaphragm, the more sensual in the part below the diaphragm. Aristotle, at least in his more scientific moments (e. g. in the *περὶ ψυχῆς*), adopts a different mode of division; he distinguishes between a principle of rational life (*τὸ διανοητικόν*) peculiar to man, a sensitive principle (*τὸ αἰσθητικόν*) common to all animals, and a principle of nutrition growth and reproduction (*τὸ θρεπτικόν*) possessed by everything that can be said to live, by plants therefore as well as by the more highly organised existences. Herein he is definitely a step in advance of Plato who has not learnt to isolate the 'vegetative life' in this way; the plant, according to the Timaeus (77 B), is in all respects like the lower animals, except that it is stationary and rooted to the ground (*μόνιμον καὶ κατερριζωμένον*).

If anything is clear it is this, that the theory of our fragment is on the Aristotelian rather than on the Platonic level of analysis: the writer indeed seems even to refine on Aristotle's view, that nutrition and reproduction are joint functions of *τὸ θρεπτικόν*. His aim is apparently a strange one, to imitate Plato's procedure in the Timaeus, but with the modifications required by the advance of knowledge in the interim. Thus it is that he is led into the absurdity of locating his 'sensitive principle' in the heart, simply because Plato had done the same with his *θυμοειδές*: the position of the Aristotelian principle of nutrition likewise seems determined in a similar way, with variations however, impossible before Aristotle, doubly impossible

in the days of the real Philolaus. It is not, as with Aristotle, the 'nutritive principle' which links man with the vegetable kingdom; the resemblance between man and the plant consists not so much in *τροφὴ καὶ γέννησις* (Arist.) as in *ῥίζωσις καὶ ἀνάφυσις τοῦ πρώτου*; it extends consequently, not (as Aristotle says, Eth. Nic. I. 13) throughout the whole of our physical existence, but only through the embryonic period of life[1]. The many interesting analogies between higher and lower organisms are passed over in favour of one common point, the rooted life (*ῥίζωσις*) which for a while the animal shares with the plant. The reason of this somewhat quaint innovation is perhaps not far to seek. It was a Stoic theory that the principle of life (*τὸ ἡγεμονικόν*) in the plant was in its root (Cic. N. D. II. 11): our author has but to apply this with the requisite modification in order to arrive at the formula, *ὀμφαλὸς τὰν φυτῶ ἔχει ἀρχάν*.

Lastly, he treats reproduction as something distinct in kind from other forms of the vegetative life, on purpose, it would seem, to assign this likewise to its organ, and thus complete the parallelism between organs and functions. He tells us that the organ of reproduction contains the *ἀρχὰν τὰν ξυναπάντων*, the origin, that is, of the perfect whole in which vegetative, animal, and rational elements are combined. This again, is but the echo of a Stoic commonplace[2]. If it came natural to Philolaus to say what is attributed to him in this fragment, he must be henceforth considered little short of a prophet—speaking a language unintelligible to his contemporaries.

[1] Chrysippus seems to have anticipated this doctrine; comp. Plut. de Stoic. Repugn. c. 41—p. 1288, ed. Dübner:—*τὸ βρέφος τρέφεσθαι ἐν τῇ γαστρὶ φύσει νομίζει* (sc. Chrysippus) *καθάπερ φυτόν· ὅταν δὲ τεχθῇ ψυχούμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀέρος καὶ στομούμενον τὸ πνεῦμα μεταβάλλειν, καὶ γίνεσθαι ζῷον.*

[2] Seneca, Nat. Quaest. III. 29: in semine omnis futuri hominis ratio comprehensa est, et legem barbae canorumque nondum natus infans habet: the idea occurs in an equally Stoic form in the *Πυθαγορικὰ ὑπομνήματα* (ap. D.L. VIII. 1, 19): *ἔχειν* (sc. *τὸ σπέρμα*) *ἐν αὑτῷ πάντας τοὺς λόγους τῆς ζωῆς, ὧν εἱρομένων συνέχεσθαι κατὰ τοὺς τῆς ἁρμονίας λόγους, ἑκάστων ἐν τεταγμένοις καιροῖς ἐπιγιγνομένων*; it had probably by this time become a received scientific theory; comp. pseudo-Hippocrates *περὶ γονῆς*, Vol. I. p. 374 ed. Kühn.

§ 7.

Μαρτυρέονται δὲ καὶ οἱ παλαιοὶ θεολόγοι τε καὶ μάντεις, ὡς διά τινας τιμωρίας ἡ ψυχὴ τῷ σώματι συνέζευκται καὶ καθάπερ ἐν σήματι τούτῳ τέθαπται (Theodoret. Graec. Aff. Curat. ed. Schulze, v. p. 821).

A peculiar importance attaches to this fragment because it embodies an idea to which Plato is commonly supposed to allude in a passage in the Gorgias, with an indication of its Pythagorean origin. It is of course possible to advance another view, viz. that the writer of the above fragment compiled it with Plato's words before him. Which, then, of these two hypotheses is the more plausible? This is a point to be decided in only one way, by a comparison of the fragment itself with the actual language of Plato in the place in question (Gorg. 493 A):

ἦ δή του ἔγωγε καὶ ἤκουσα τῶν σοφῶν, ὡς νῦν ἡμεῖς τέθναμεν, καὶ τὸ μὲν σῶμά ἐστιν ἡμῖν σῆμα, τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς τοῦτο ἐν ᾧ ἐπιθυμίαι εἰσί, τυγχάνει ὂν οἷον ἀναπείθεσθαι καὶ μεταπίπτειν ἄνω κάτω. καὶ τοῦτο ἄρα τις μυθολογῶν κομψὸς ἀνήρ, ἴσως Σικελός τις ἢ Ἰταλικός, παράγων τῷ ὀνόματι διὰ τὸ πιθανόν τε καὶ πειστικὸν ὠνόμασε πίθον, τοὺς δὲ ἀνοήτους ἀμυήτους· τῶν δὲ ἀμυήτων τοῦτο τῆς ψυχῆς οὗ αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι εἰσί, τὸ ἀκόλαστον αὐτοῦ καὶ οὐ στεγανόν, ὡς τετρημένος εἴη πίθος, διὰ τὴν ἀπληστίαν ἀπεικάσας. τοὐναντίον δὴ οὗτος σοί, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἐνδείκνυται ὡς τῶν ἐν Ἅιδου—τὸ ἀειδὲς δὴ λέγων—οὗτοι ἀθλιώτατοι ἂν εἶεν οἱ ἀμύητοι καὶ φοροῖεν εἰς τὸν τετρημένον πίθον ὕδωρ ἑτέρῳ τοιούτῳ τετρημένῳ κοσκίνῳ. τὸ δὲ κόσκινον ἄρα λέγει, ὡς ἔφη ὁ πρὸς ἐμὲ λέγων, τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι· τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν κοσκίνῳ ἐπείκασε τὴν τῶν ἀνοήτων ὡς τετρημένην, ἅτε οὐ δυναμένην στέγειν δι' ἀπιστίαν καὶ λήθην.

Here, on close inspection, we see (1) a tendence to allegorize myths and to force an ethical meaning into their details, however minute: (2) an affection for etymologies, and strange plays upon words for which the Sophists, the Heraclitean section[1]

[1] I take this opportunity of remarking that the affinity which Lassalle (Herakleit. II. 95) finds between Heraclitus and Philolaus is seen in most

more especially, were notorious: (3) there is a touch of irony and contempt in the language; 'one of the *σοφοί*,' the 'clever person mythologizing,' would seem in the mouth of Socrates to describe a Sophist with his pretentious ingenuity rather than so respectable a personage as the Philolaus of the legend (see Schaarschmidt, p. 7). Who, therefore, can be indicated by the *κομψὸς ἀνήρ, ἴσως Σικελός τις ἢ Ἰταλικός*? It is a mere guess to say with the Scholiast, Empedocles, or with Boeckh, Philolaus, since some one must be meant with whom Socrates was brought into direct personal contact, that is, if the words will bear the least stress (*ἦ δή του ἔγωγε ἤκουσα τῶν σοφῶν—ὡς ἔφη ὁ πρὸς ἐμὲ λέγων*). Another solution yet remains, one which satisfies all the conditions of the problem. Plato is thinking of some Sophist, a rhetorician of the school of Gorgias who had made a show-speech on the subject of the state of the dead. We can easily imagine the sort of treatment such a subject would receive at the hands of a Sophist, the opportunity it would give for rhetorical art, for allegory and the various devices by which a new face is put on things old and trite. It is just possible that the books *περὶ τῶν ἐν ᾅδου* mentioned in the literary history of this period[1] were rhetorical exercises of very similar character.

One point, however, is pretty certain, the notion that *σῶμα σῆμα ψυχῆς* is nothing exclusively Philolaic or Pythagorean. It formed part of the darkened view of existence which in Plato's time was gradually winning its way, in connexion with a new and strange form of religious observance. Life was sometimes said to be a prison-house, from which nevertheless it was wrong to escape (*ὁ ἐν ἀπορρήτοις λεγόμενος λόγος*, Phaed. 62 B); sometimes a state of punishment during which the soul lay dead and buried in the flesh by way of atonement for former sin. Plato himself tells us plainly to whom this latter view belonged: *καὶ γὰρ σῆμά τινές φασιν αὐτὸ εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς ὡς τεθαμμένης ἐν τῷ νῦν παρόντι * * * δοκοῦσι μέντοι μοι μάλιστα*

pseudo-Pythagorean remains, and must be considered due not so much to direct Heraclitean as to Stoic influences.

[1] Books *περὶ τῶν ἐν ᾅδου* are ascribed to Protagoras and Heraclides Ponticus; see D. L. IX. 8, and V. 6.

θέσθαι οἱ ἀμφὶ Ὀρφέα τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα, ὡς δίκην διδούσης τῆς ψυχῆς, ὧν δὴ ἕνεκα δίδωσιν (Cratyl. 400 B).

Our fragment of Philolaus is proved to be a plagiarism, if by nothing else, by the inconsistencies of thought into which the writer seems to have fallen. To speak of the Orphic societies of the fifth century B.C. as οἱ παλαιοὶ θεολόγοι καὶ μάντεις, would have been quite natural in a late author, of the age of Cicero[1], for instance, but it is hardly what we should expect in the real Philolaus, who according to the legend lived and died in the fifth century. The fragment moreover contains one positive contradiction. It is one thing to say that the soul is now dead and buried in the body (ἤκουσα ὡς νῦν ἡμεῖς τέθναμεν καὶ τὸ σῶμά ἐστιν ἡμῖν σῆμα. Gorg. 493); another, that it is 'linked by way of punishment to the body.' The implied sense in the latter case is that the soul is even now essentially a thing that lives, although by a refinement of cruelty tied and bound to a dead yoke-fellow, the body. This somewhat fanciful way of illustrating the relation between the two was a favourite one in antiquity, and seems to have been found even in Aristotle (Bernays, Dial. des Aristot. p. 24, and 144). Our fragment, however, confuses it with a conception diametrically opposite, and can hardly, therefore, be the work of a great and original thinker, such as we are, by hypothesis, compelled to assume the real Philolaus to have been.

§ 8.

The remaining fragments treat of the nature of the sun (Boeckh, p. 124), of the moon (p. 130), of the central fire (p. 114), of the mystical virtues of particular numbers (p. 139—146), of the connexion between the gods and certain geometrical figures (p. 153), of musical intervals (p. 66), etc. In the case

[1] Cicero actually uses the Latin equivalent: '*veteres illi sive vates sive in sacris initiisque tradendis divinae mentis interpretes*, qui nos ob aliqua scelera suscepta in vita superiore poenarum luendarum causa natos esse dixerunt:' Cicero's Hortensius, quoted by Bernays, Dial. des Aristot. p. 144 (Frag. 55, ed. Nobbe). This undesigned coincidence between Cicero and our fragment points, I think, to one common original.

of most of these minute criticism is out of place[1]: some might have been produced in any age and by any school of thought; others have come down to us in a mutilated and untrustworthy form; others, again, have a semblance of genuineness which ultimately resolves itself into this merely, that they correspond more or less exactly with some Aristotelian statement about Pythagorean teaching; as regards these last, the simpler supposition is that the Aristotelian passage is the original, and the Philolaic the copy. Looking at some few of the condemned fragments by themselves, it is quite open to us to maintain, with Zeller, that they are interpolations in a substantially genuine work: it is a view, nevertheless, which becomes untenable as soon as we reflect on the large proportion of 'negative instances,' the unity of type exhibited by the whole, and its resemblance to other specimens of so-called Pythagorean literature. We may say, in the words of Boeckh himself (p. 38), 'assuming there was but one Philolaic book genuine or not, there is but one possible alternative, to acknowledge the remains of it as all equally genuine, or to discard them as all equally spurious.' The preceding discussion seems to justify the latter conclusion.

III.

If the matter of these fragments is fatal to their pretensions, the same also must be said of their form and language. We have only to read some of the longer passages to see that on the literary side they are not what we should expect in a vigorous but 'lisping' period of philosophy; they present rather the unchastened fulness, the cheap wealth of words, which characterize an age of decadence and not of growth. No organic connexion, however slight, is discoverable between the language and the Doric colouring with which it is overlaid; if you modernize the dialect, as you can by the change of a letter or an inflexion,

[1] If I may be allowed to say it, Prof. Schaarschmidt has attempted too much: he controverts Boeckh even on questions which Boeckh has made his own, although he prudently refrains from criticising the defence (in Boeckh, p. 66), of the Philolaic fragment on music.

there remains, for the most part, nothing but the common philosophic prose as vulgarized by a late rhetorician. It is nevertheless true that the style considered as a whole is scarcely more homogeneous than the matter has proved to be: it is an epitome of many styles, florid[1] and jejune by turns, the latter especially in the fragments in which the writer treads more closely than usual in the steps of Aristotle. Hypercriticism apart, we may enumerate the following definite anachronisms of language in the fragments.

1. In the use of words. [N.B. when * is prefixed, the word or expression occurs in a passage not quoted in the foregoing selection].

μορφή (in the Platonic and Aristotelian sense of 'form' or 'type').

ἐσσία or *ἐστώ* (the Aristotelian 'essence').

ἀρχή (in the Aristotelian sense of 'principle').

**ἐνέργεια* (Aristotelian).

στοιχεῖον (Aristotelian: (Plato Tim. 48 B) seems to apologise for giving the word a philosophic sense).

ἕνωσις (Aristotelian and Neoplatonic[2]).

**σωματοῦν* (Aristotelian and Neoplatonic[3]).

σοφία (as opp. to *φρόνησις*, Aristotelian).

[1] Nosti floridum Pythagoreorum dicendi genus, says Meineke (Ann. Crit. ad Stob. p. VI.)

[2] *ἑνοῦν* was perhaps coined by Aristotle (comp. Pol. II. 1261 *b* 10): *ἕνωσις*, though not in Plato, occurs certainly once in Aristotle (De Gen. et Corr. I. 321 *b* 22), and seems to be, like *συναρμογή* etc., one of the commonest words in late, esp. Neoplatonic, literature. Comp. Steph. Thes. (ed. Dind.) s.v.: 'frequentissimum utroque numero est in scriptis Dionysii Areop. eorumque paraphr.'

[3] Not found in Plato. (1) The passive *σωματοῦσθαι* Aristotle uses in the purely physical sense of to 'become solid' (*σωματώδης*); comp. De Sensu, 445 *a* 22: (2) in Neoplatonic and theological Greek the word signifies to 'become corporeal' i.e. to be 'made flesh;' comp. Hermes ap. Stob. Ecl. Phys. p. 199, ed. Mein. (3) *σωματοῦν* = *σωματοποιεῖν*, to unite into one body or substance; comp. pseudo-Archyt. (Stob. Flor. I. p. 33, ed. Mein.): *θεῶ μὲν εὐδαιμοσύνα καὶ βίος ἄριστος, τῶ δ' ἀνθρώπω ἐξ ἐπιστάμας καὶ ἀρετᾶς καὶ τρίτω εὐτυχίας σωματουμένα παραγίνεται.* It is in this last sense that Philolaus seems to use the word: *ἀριθμός* * * * *σωματῶν καὶ σχίζων τὼς λόγως τῶν πραγμάτων* (ap. Stob. Ed. Phys. p. 2, Mein.).

2. In the use of expressions.

τοῦ ἀεὶ θέοντος θείου (Plat. Cratyl.).

ἐξ αἰῶνος καὶ εἰς αἰῶνα διαμένει (Platonic).

*τὰ γιγνόμενα καὶ φθειρόμενα πολλά (Platonic).

τὰ φθορᾷ καὶ φύσει ὄντα (Platonic: φύσις in the sense of γένεσις is perhaps the most successful attempt at an archaism in our fragments).

τῷ γεννήσαντι πατέρι καὶ δημιουργῷ (Plat. Tim. 37 c).

κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχων (Plat. Tim. 28 c).

ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως (Aristotelian).

*τοὺς λόγους τῶν πραγμάτων (Aristotelian and Stoic).

πέμπτον σῶμα (the peculiarly Aristotelian 'fifth element').

τὸ μὲν ἀεὶ κινητικόν, τὸ δὲ ἀειπαθές (the Aristotelian opposition of active and passive principles).

ἡ τὸ ὅλον περιέχουσα ψυχή (Stoic).

3. Whole sentences occasionally an echo of Aristotle or Plato.

PHILOLAUS.

Ἀνάγκα τὰ ἐόντα εἶμεν πάντα ἢ περαίνοντα ἢ ἄπειρα, ἢ περαίνοντά τε καὶ ἄπειρα, ἄπειρα δὲ μόνον οὔ κα εἴη· ἐπεὶ τοίνυν φαίνεται οὔτ' ἐκ περαινόντων πάντων ἐόντα οὔτ' ἐξ ἀπείρων πάντων, δῆλον κ.τ.λ.

ARIST. DE CAELO, I. 7.

Ἀνάγκη δὴ σῶμα πᾶν ἤτοι ἄπειρον εἶναι ἢ πεπερασμένον, καὶ εἰ ἄπειρον, ἤτοι ἀνομοιομερὲς ἅπαν ἢ ὁμοιομερές, κἂν εἰ ἀνομοιομερές, ἤτοι ἐκ πεπερασμένων εἰδῶν ἢ ἐξ ἀπείρων. ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν οὐχ οἷόν τε ἐξ ἀπείρων φανερόν, εἴ τις κ.τ.λ.

ὁ κόσμος εἷς ἐστίν· ἤρξατο δὲ γίνεσθαι ἄχρι τοῦ μέσου, καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ μέσου εἰς τὰ ἄνω διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν τοῖς κάτω ἐστὶ τὰ ἄνω τοῦ μέσου ὑπεναντίας κείμενα τοῖς κάτω. τοῖς γὰρ κάτω τὰ κατωτάτω μέσα ἐστίν, ὥσπερ τὰ ἀνωτάτω, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ὡσαύτως,

PLAT. TIM. 62 D.

τοῦ παντὸς οὐρανοῦ σφαιροειδοῦς ὄντος, ὅσα μὲν ἀφεστῶτα ἴσον τοῦ μέσου γέγονεν ἔσχατα, ὁμοίως αὐτὰ χρὴ ἔσχατα πεφυκέναι, τὸ δὲ μέσον τὰ αὐτὰ μέτρα τῶν ἐσχάτων ἀφεστηκὸς ἐν τῷ καταντικρὺ νομίζειν δεῖ πάντων εἶναι τοῦ δὴ κόσμου

Philolaus.	Plat. Tim. 62 d.
πρὸς γὰρ τὸ μέσον κατὰ ταὐτά ἐστιν ἑκάτερα, ὅσα μὴ μετενήνεκται (Phil. ap. Stob. Ecl. Phys. ch. 14, 360—p. 97, ed. Mein.[1]).	*ταύτῃ πεφυκότος * * * ὁ μὲν γὰρ μέσος ἐν αὐτῷ τόπος οὔτε κάτω πεφυκὼς οὔτε ἄνω λέγεσθαι δίκαιος, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ ἐν μέσῳ· ὁ δὲ πέριξ οὔτε δὴ μέσος οὔτ' ἔχων διάφορον αὑτοῦ μέρος ἕτερον θατέρου μᾶλλον πρὸς τὸ μέσον ἤ τι τῶν καταντικρύ. κ.τ.λ.*

Here we may sum up the argument against these fragments of Philolaus. (1) The matter of them is Platonic, Aristotelian, Stoic, anything rather than Pythagorean: (2) their form and language are equally late: (3) as a literary whole the 'test of excellence' condemns them: (4) in all these respects they resemble the forgeries which bore the names of Archytas, Ocellus, and other real or imaginary Pythagoreans: (5) the time of their appearance is suspicious; the first century B.C., the age of Demetrius Magnes, we know to have been most prolific in supposititious literature of a very similar kind: (6) the history of the book before the time of Demetrius belongs to the legend of literary history, and will not bear criticism. The success of such a book might seem strange, if we did not remember the long list of forgeries which have often, for a time at least, won an unquestioned acceptance. But the bar to its further acceptance with us is this, that criticism has now learnt to see continuity even in the world of thought; we assume that ideas do not spring up fortuitously or out of due season, but in the intellectual soil and atmosphere prepared for them. A work like that attributed to Philolaus would have been simply a chronological miracle in the age of the real Philolaus; this alone is enough to condemn our fragments, to say nothing of their affinity with the literature of imposture which likewise passed till recently for Pythagorean.

[1] The passage is corrupt, and perhaps intentionally obscure.

I. Bywater.

ON PARTS OF RIBBECK'S PROLEGOMENA CRITICA TO HIS EDITION OF VIRGIL.

M. Ribbeck has conferred a great boon on all critical students of Virgil by the careful collations which he has made or caused to be made of the principal MSS. In his Prolegomena he has accumulated a large amount of collateral learning, bearing on the life of the poet and the criticism of the text, the value of which I cannot appraise as I should wish, owing to my want of acquaintance with the subject. I am anxious to say this at starting, because the remarks which I am going to make will be chiefly concerned with points on which I have the misfortune to differ from him. The parts of his Prolegomena which I purpose to examine are the three later chapters on the Georgics, the chapter on the Aeneid, and a few points in later chapters, all of them connected with the integrity of the text as we at present possess it.

The present paper will be confined to the chapters on the Georgics.

That Virgil retouched the Georgics after their original publication is likely enough. The lines in the exordium of the Third Book (vv. 30 foll.) seem to point to events belonging to the later years of the poet's life: Servius' story that the Fourth Book was altered after the fall of Gallus (four years after the probable date of the completion of the work) looks the same way: and the grammarians and commentators speak occasionally of verbal changes found in the author's own handwriting. Thus there is nothing *prima facie* improbable in the supposition of occasional derangements in the text, which it may be reserved for the critical sagacity of modern times to detect and set right. The only question is the question of fact, has modern critical sagacity discovered any such? Let me review successively those which M. Ribbeck has pointed out.

After going through the notices of varieties of reading preserved by the older critics, he finds a difficulty in Book I. vv. 100—103 ('Humida solstitia...Gargara messes'). He enumerates the various precepts beginning v. 43, notices a certain symmetry in vv. 94—96, 97—99, and again in vv. 104—110, 111—117, two sentences of three lines each being succeeded by two of seven, and complains that the four lines in question interrupt the natural order of thought. He thinks that they ought to have been placed either at the beginning or at the end of the whole passage, and considers whether room could be found for them after v. 49, but decides that it is impossible. Accordingly, his conclusion is that they were no part of the passage, as it originally stood, but that Virgil wrote them afterwards, intending to work them into the context, but failing to do so. Now I am not disposed to contend that the lines would be in their place in a systematic treatise in prose, or even in a poem so severely didactic as that of Lucretius: I only say that, standing where they do, they are quite in keeping with Virgil's manner. Virgil, above all things, consults liveliness and variety: he approaches one part of his subject in one way, another in another, not because the different parts require a different treatment for didactic reasons, but because he is a poet, and does not wish to fatigue his readers by harping too long on the same string. As good an instance as any of this peculiarity of his is the first half of the Third Book, where having to deliver much the same series of precepts about oxen and horses, he passes at will from one to the other, talks of the choice of the dams under the head 'cow', and changes to the head 'horse' when he has to treat of the sires, leaving in each case the remaining half of his advice to be inferred. In the passage before us he had, as he doubtless thought, gone on long enough in the strain of ordinary precept, and so he interposes a relief. He addresses the husbandman directly, but instead of telling him anything more that he is to do about his land, bids him pray for wet summers and dry winters. This is his way of calling attention to another part of the subject, the evils of too much drought and too much wet, and the way to remedy them. The reader's attention thus aroused, he becomes didactic again

—recommends irrigation as a remedy for a dry soil and drainage as a remedy for a wet one.

M. Ribbeck's next instance is from Book II. vv. 371 foll. where he finds the same remark delivered twice: in vv. 373—375 cattle are said to do more harm to the young vines than cold or heat, and in vv. 376—379 cold and heat are said not to do so much harm as the teeth of cattle. The two, he says, are obviously different draughts of the same passage, the second being the later and superior. This charge of repetition depends on an arbitrary interpretation of 'super' in v. 373, which may just as well mean 'beside' as 'more than', and for the purposes of the passage, infinitely better. Virgil amplifies, if that is a fault, but he does not repeat himself. He says that over and above unjust winters and tyrannous suns the young shoots have other enemies to fear, the buffalo, the roe, the sheep, and the heifer. He then goes on to say that these new enemies are worse than the old, and he says it characteristically: he takes a line to dwell on the severity of cold, another line to enforce the oppressiveness of heat, and then says that neither is so injurious as the cattle, the venom of their tooth, and the deep scar they leave on the young tree's bark. He had before tried to give a notion of the number of the assailants: he now pictures the mischief they effect. Each sentence has its relevancy as it stands, and to substitute the one for the other would be to mutilate the thought.

We now come to the Third Book, where the passage about the madness of love (vv. 242—283) is similarly accused of confusion and tautology. M. Ribbeck rightly says that after dwelling in the previous paragraph upon the effect of passion on bulls, the poet intends specially to commemorate horses as the subjects of a similar frenzy. But why, he asks, are men introduced promiscuously among a crowd of other animals, instead of having a place of honour reserved for them? and why are horses mixed up with the rest of the creation, when mares are kept for a separate description lower down? Clearly the lines in which Hero and Leander are celebrated ought to follow, not precede, the lines about lynxes, wolves, dogs, and deer: clearly also the horses ought to be introduced before the mares, while

the two lines in which the latter are described as scaling mountains and swimming rivers ought to be omitted, as being part of the first edition, written before the poet had resolved to speak of horses as excited to a similar display of energy. Here again I think that a little consideration will show that Virgil intended the passage to stand as it has come down to us. He has just painted his bull-fight as a companion picture to his racer: the horses have had their turn in relation to one part of the subject, the oxen have their turn in relation to another. In speaking of sexual passion, then, he does not mean to assign an equal prominence to horses in reference to the didactic object of the poem: but he intends to mention them nevertheless. How does he manage it? By including them in a general description, which he adds by way of digression. To this description he gives a studied appearance of indiscriminateness: the stallion is separated from the mare, which is mentioned at the end as a signal instance of the truth of the general remark, not with any didactic purpose, but simply as occurring in the course of observation. This accounts for the position of the young lover, who is regarded for the moment merely as a proof of the universality of passion, and so left to find his place as he may. Whether it would have been a greater compliment to the dignity of humanity to place him, as M. Ribbeck would have had him placed, after all the brute creation, *except* horses and mares may, I think, be doubted. The rhetorical effect would have been injured: the prerogatives of the human race would scarcely have been vindicated. As to the two lines which M. Ribbeck wishes to cancel, it is difficult to see what would be gained by waging special war against them. They were probably introduced to gratify Virgil's love for geographical allusion, just as in the lines immediately preceding he indulges his taste for mythological reference. Even if they are struck out, the alleged tautology will not be wholly removed: after impregnation, the mares will still scamper 'saxa per et scopulos et depressas convalles,' while 'scopuli rupesque cavae' fail to retard the horses.

In the Fourth Book M. Ribbeck repeats the objections which have been made by various critics to the position of

vv. 47—50. They had long ago been answered by Heyne, who shows that there is connexion enough to justify an unsystematic writer in mentioning later what a systematic one would probably have mentioned earlier. Virgil had begun by directing the bee-master to choose a neighbourhood for the bees where they might expatiate without injury: he now speaks of the hive, and after enjoining that it should be made weather-tight, he naturally passes on to speak about smells and sounds which might penetrate it and injure the inmates. It does not seem to have occurred to M. Ribbeck to ask himself whether the passage would read equally well as a piece of poetry if the lines in question were removed or transposed. But most readers, I think, will feel that Virgil has intentionally elaborated his language and rhythm as he approaches the end of a paragraph, and that the verses about the echo,

aut ubi concava pulsu
Saxa sonant, vocisque offensa resultat imago,

make a fuller and more appropriate close than the simple 'raras superiniice frondes.'

The lines 203—205 are confessedly very difficult to harmonize with the context, and, taken by themselves, may be fairly said to support M. Ribbeck's theory. I have nothing better to suggest in defence of their present position than has been suggested in my commentary, that the mention of the constant succession reminded Virgil of the accidents which carry off bees before their time, in themselves a proof of the energy of the race, and that thence he was led to observe that, in spite of the frequency of such accidents and the scanty lives enjoyed by individuals in any case, the line was inextinguishable. No other place which could be assigned to them would be free from objections, as M. Ribbeck seems to feel. Wagner's proposal to insert them after v. 183 would probably suit the sense best: but 'tantus amor florum et generandi gloria mellis' would in that case come too soon after 'Cecropias innatus apes amor urget habendi.' As they stand, there is no reason why 'saepe etiam,' of which M. Ribbeck complains, should not refer to a suppressed thought, 'they show their energy too in that,' &c.

The paragraph 228—250 has given trouble to other scholars

besides M. Ribbeck; but it need not trouble any one who is not anxious to bind Virgil by the precision of a technical treatise. He tells the bee-master what he must do when he wants to take the honey, informs him what are the periods for doing so, warns him that it is a hazardous business, says that if it is decided to leave them the honey for the winter the combs may advantageously be cut, and finally declares that the bees will second any remedial care bestowed on them, and repair any injuries they may have received. The whole passage is arranged so as to draw out what I may call the human interest of the subject,—to make us regard the bees as if they were creatures like ourselves. I must again express my wonder that M. Ribbeck should think that the last three lines of the paragraph formed no part of the paragraph as it originally stood. Take them away, and we should be left with a dull cheerless impression of the bees as a prey to innumerable enemies: leave them in their place, and we are inspired with the feeling which the poet throughout desires to excite—a sympathy for indomitable energy existing in the lower creation.

Vv. 289—294 stand on a different ground from any other passage in the Georgics. The varieties in the MSS. are a clear external warrant for suspecting the integrity of the passage, and critical hypothesis is invited accordingly. I do not however think that the omission of the three lines most in question, vv. 291—293, which is M. Ribbeck's present view, as it has been the view of others, is the most feasible way of dealing with the difficulty. The passage seems overloaded: but I see no reason for supposing that any part of it was not written by Virgil.

After thus going through the four books, M. Ribbeck steps back, and examines other passages in the poem without much regard for order. I follow him in doing so, though I could have wished, for the sake of my readers, that his arrangement had been more systematic.

He complains of the lines on Envy, Book III. vv. 37—39, which he thinks would have come in more appropriately after v. 33 as part of the sculpture on the doors of the temple. Accordingly, he supposes that in v. 37, 'metuens,' found in the

Palatine MS., was the original reading, the sentence having been left incomplete by the poet, and afterwards altered to make it suit the place into which it had been unskilfully foisted. Once more I must contend that the lines, rhythmically and poetically, are better where they stand. They form an appropriate close to the sense: they would have been somewhat too elaborate elsewhere than at the close. The monument to Augustus concludes with Envy in her torments, just as the prophecy of Jupiter (Aen. I. 294 foll.) concludes with Fury in his prison. As for the artistic appliances by which the representation of Envy is to be made, we may well be left to imagine them for ourselves.

After a proposal which he does not press, to insert vv. 343—345 of Book II. after v. 335, M. Ribbeck returns to Book III, and following Tittler, a scholar with whom he does not generally agree, pronounces that vv. 120—122 of that book ought to stand after v. 96. The proposal is much older than Tittler, having been made in the last century by a friend of Warton. No doubt Virgil has expressed himself carelessly, confusing a comparison of different qualifications in the same horse with a comparison of different qualifications in different horses; but his meaning is plain enough: and as before, the transposition of the lines would rob the paragraph of an appropriate and sonorous close, and leave it tame and spiritless. Tittler would remedy this by further transposing vv. 113—119, so as to place them after v. 102. But v. 102 would suffer greatly by being separated from the description of the chariot race: and it can scarcely be doubted that Virgil intends to repeat the thought of the first lines of the paragraph in the last, leaving on the reader's mind the one clear impression, that past services in a horse are not to blind the breeder to the essential superiority of youth to age.

The next passage which is called in question is Book I, vv. 204—310. M. Ribbeck first places vv. 257, 258 before v. 252, and then finds that the lines so re-arranged are a revised edition of vv. 204—207. He next pronounces the paragraph about the zones (vv. 231—251) and that about the occupations for wet days and holidays (vv. 259—275) to be later insertions, imperfectly harmonized with the context, and finally concludes that

the whole ought to stand thus, omitting vv. 204—207 altogether: vv. 257, 258, vv. 252—256, vv. 231—251, vv. 208—230, vv. 276—286, vv. 259—275, vv. 287—310. The notion of transposing vv. 257, 258, so that they should precede v. 252, occurred to myself many years ago, as I could not understand how they cohered either with the following paragraph, with which they were generally printed, or with the preceding lines. Afterwards I saw that Professor Ramsay was right in connecting them with the preceding lines, as they really depend on 'hinc' v. 252, the sense being 'It is this disposition of the mundane system which makes our observation of stars and seasons not in vain.' Thus the lines refer back to vv. 204—207, at the same time that they do not simply repeat them. 'Idcirco,' v. 231, to which M. Ribbeck demurs, refers to the whole preceding paragraph: it is with a view to our carrying on the operations of husbandry at their proper seasons that the mundane system is arranged. Just so later in the book (vv. 351 foll.) the poet tells us that Jupiter himself has ordained certain things as the antecedents of fine or stormy weather for the benefit of man. After v. 258 the precepts become more desultory: rainy days suggest holidays, holidays lucky and unlucky days, and these again bring us back to the natural suitableness of different times and seasons to different occupations. Thus explained, the passage vindicates itself as having been intended by Virgil to stand as we now read it, and lends no countenance whatever to the theory of two editions. There are however one or two further difficulties detected by M. Ribbeck. One is about vv. 297, 298, where he would read with Peerlkamp, '*Nec* rubicunda Ceres...*At* medio,' &c., and then place the lines immediately after v. 290. But it was long since pointed out that 'medio aestu' is to be understood of summer, not of the heat of the day, Virgil having made a transition in the lines just preceding from times of day to times of year by speaking of the man who works through a long *winter* night. M. Ribbeck is also not quite satisfied about the right position of vv. 259—275, which he refers to the operations of the summer, but cannot connect with the lines where summer and winter operations are contrasted: nor is he clear about the best place for vv. 291—296. These are difficulties which he may be fairly

said to have brought on himself, and one who believes that no transpositions are needed can hardly be asked to help in removing them.

Three short passages, Book III. vv. 81—83 ('Honesti...et gilvo'), Book I. vv. 173, 175, and Book IV. 276, are next noted as marginal jottings made by the poet with a view to a second edition. Such slight matters will scarcely bear argument; and it is perhaps enough to say that, as M. Ribbeck himself evidently regards them only as very subsidiary proofs of his theory, they may be left to the reader's judgment after he has made up his mind on the strength or weakness of the more important part of the case.

In the observations which immediately follow I am glad to welcome M. Ribbeck as a defender of the integrity of Virgil's text. Tittler maintains that Books I. and II. are the only parts of the Georgics given to the world by the poet himself, and supposes the exordium of Book III. to be a mixture of two different draughts. M. Ribbeck vindicates the passage as it stands very satisfactorily (though confessing a difficulty in the mention of the Britons, v. 25), refuting the notion that the temple which Virgil promises to raise to Augustus is a symbolical representation of the Aeneid, and explaining it rightly as an undertaking that was never performed. In replying, however, to another part of Tittler's dissertation, which treats of the invocation of Maecenas near the beginning of Book II., he relapses, I regret to say, into unauthorized conjecture, adopting a suggestion of Peerlkamp's, to put v. 41 after v. 42 and alter 'da' into 'dare.' Virgil doubtless intended by 'pelago patenti' not what we call the open sea, but a sea not crowded with other ships, though it would have been better if he had chosen a different word, so as to avoid the verbal inconsistency with what follows. This leads M. Ribbeck to further speculations about Book II., and the spirit of re-arrangement takes possession of him again. He agrees with Hanovius (Hanow?) in believing that the invocation of Maecenas should follow the invocation of Bacchus, but is perplexed to know what to do with the previous lines, vv. 35—38, till he sees that their true place is immediately before v. 109. Any one who feels the full

enthusiasm of vv. 35 foll. will, I think, be slow to believe that they ought to stand anywhere but where they do. The poet, after surveying some of the details of his subject, is visited by an access of inspiration as he contemplates the work before him, points to the triumphs to be won in planting whole mountains with the vine and the olive, speaks of his own labours as parallel to the husbandman's, and calls upon his patron to bear his part in the undertaking. Dislocate the passage and the effect is gone: Bacchus and Maecenas lose respectively by juxtaposition: and the lines about Ismarus and Taburnus are rendered tame by being attached to a reminder that all lands do not produce all things.

Passing rapidly over transpositions in Book IV., by Peerlkamp and Heyne, which he disapproves, and Schrader's transposition of vv. 369, 370, which he accepts, M. Ribbeck concludes his chapter, 'De retractatis a poeta Georgicis,' by discussing the latter part of Book III. Here again he finds traces of a confusion between two alternative draughts. After v. 519 he thinks the poem might have been continued either thus, vv. 534—536, 531—533, 537—547, or thus, vv. 520—530, 548—553, 556—566. Vv. 554, 555 he condemns as an interpolation. The only reason for suspecting the text as it stands is that Virgil after speaking of cattle digresses to other things, and then returns to cattle again. Whether it may not be Virgil's manner to do so is a question which M. Ribbeck does not ask; indeed, it would be somewhat late to ask it at the end of a chapter which is devoted (so a believer in the integrity of the existing text may fairly say) to obliterating the various indications of that manner which abound in the poem. The issue raised is really one of aesthetic criticism, of the order in which a poet may be expected to present his thoughts and images. If we criticize the passage before us as poetry, we shall not, I think, be inclined to pronounce it deficient. Virgil, as I have said already, is fond of variety; he does not keep the reader long on the stretch, but is always finding some expedient for relieving him, at the same time that he takes care that the impression finally left on the mind shall be uniform and consistent. After exciting our feelings for the labouring ox, struck down in the

midst of his work, he changes the subject, tells us briefly of the difficulty of procuring cattle for processions and of tilling the ground at all, describes the universality of the pestilence as extending to all creatures, tame or wild, harmless or noxious, and then reverts to the condition of the cattle, which, instead of ministering to man even after death by the food and raiment they supply, have become useless and injurious, and require to be buried out of sight as fast as they fall. The two condemned lines add to the variety: as we read them, we think of pleasant pastures, of mountain slopes and river banks, once vocal with the bleating or the lowing of healthy cattle, now echoing with their dying groans. Whether our understandings would be assisted by the dismemberment of the passage I will not say: I am very sure that our imaginations would be appealed to less powerfully.

Such are M. Ribbeck's reasons for believing that the Georgics, as they have come down to us, have suffered from the unskilfulness of those who edited them after the author's death. The two remaining chapters, in which he points out interpolations in the poem and discusses conjectures on the text proposed by recent critics, are much shorter.

After noticing two or three lines as suspicious, because occurring also in the Aeneid, he condemns v. 433 of Book II. as being absent in the Medicean MS., not commented on by Servius, and not quoted by any ancient author, and also as being out of harmony with the context. It is absurd, he says, to ask 'Et dubitant homines serere atque impendere curam?' when the poet is speaking of things which grow spontaneously, 'non rastris, hominum non ulli obnoxia curae.' I have elsewhere expressed my opinion of the blindness which would rob us of one of Virgil's finest lines; so I will merely say here that the poet's purpose is to rouse the cultivator to the duty of seconding nature by art, by setting before him what nature can do and is doing unaided. Book IV. v. 506 is said to be justly rejected by Heyne, as being superfluous after v. 503. It is true no doubt that we already know that Orpheus has lost Eurydice, but that does not prove that the fact will not bear to be brought home to us further—that it is super-

fluous to tell us that while Orpheus is casting about in agony how to recover her, she is floating off in the Stygian boat, death-chilled already. The omission of vv. 134, 135 of Book I. would be less felt as a poetical loss, but it would destroy a characteristic trait of Virgil, who is fond of combining the particular with the general: nor does there seem ground enough for pronouncing v. 144 an interpolation in the face of the MSS. Book III. v. 162, again, is harmless enough, if explained, as M. Ribbeck sees that it ought to be explained, in connexion with what follows rather than what goes before; so that his final sentence, 'ambiguo illo versu malim equidem carere,' is, to say the least, a little arbitrary. V. 288 of the same book is more than harmless; it is eminently characteristic. As usual, Virgil in approaching a new part of his subject points out to the husbandman the difficulty and glory of the task: as usual, he goes on in the following verses to identify his own toil with theirs. Peerlkamp has been severe on the Ovidian redundance of the description of the Scythian winter later in the book (vv. 360 foll.): but M. Ribbeck has happily been proof against his critical acumen except in the case of v. 362, which he thinks 'loquacior.' In the remainder of the chapter I am glad to say that he devotes himself to the defence of supposed interpolations against Peerlkamp and others, observing with regard to one place that the 'Batavus sagacissimus,' as he elsewhere calls him, 'pulchram imaginem cum non intellegeret delevit.' *Si sic omnia!*

The concluding chapter on the Georgics, which is chiefly occupied with the enumeration of some conjectures of Peerlkamp's, is still briefer than the last, and need scarcely detain us a moment. M. Ribbeck does not pledge himself to any of these conjectures, while some of them he expressly controverts. Perhaps the only really tempting one is 'divinius' for 'divinitus,' Book I. v. 415, which was long since proposed by Reiske; and even that can be shown to be inadmissible. The rest are mostly ingenious, but a reader, who is convinced that Virgil's text does not require the aid of conjecture, will be apt to be intolerant of such a perverse application of cleverness. M. Ribbeck declares himself almost a convert to an emendation

by Hanovius of Book I. 142, 'Alta petens alius pelago trahit numida lina,' which may perhaps be an improvement of the original line as he and others point it, but cannot be set against the old punctuation, by which 'Alta petens' is referred to the preceding verse; and he also approves of a proposal by the same critic to alter the stopping of Book III. vv. 223 foll., so as to make a new sentence begin with v. 226, in which it is difficult to see any advantage. He atones, however, for these concessions by resisting a suggestion that vv. 187—192 of Book I. should be placed after v. 203, disposing of it by the just remark, which I cannot but wish he had thought of on other occasions, 'solere Vergilium singula praeceptorum capita item ut libros singulos graviore vel aliquo modo insigniore sive sententia sive imagine concludere.'

J. CONINGTON.

A HINDU VERSION OF THE STORY OF RHAMPSINITUS, HEROD. II. 121.

THE story of Rhampsinitus has several times reappeared in European literature. We find an imperfect version of it in Pausanias' account of the treasury of Hyrieus (lib. ix. 37; compare also the narrative from Charax in the schol. to Aristoph. *Nubes*, 508); and there is a mediæval imitation of it in the *Historia Septem Sapientum Romæ;* but, with the exception of a short notice by Professor Wilson, I am not aware that any one has hitherto pointed out an Oriental version.

In the twelfth century Somadeva Bhatta of Cashmir compiled in Sanskrit a huge collection of popular stories current in India, called 'the Ocean of the streams of narrative.' This work professes to be an abridgment of an older and yet more extensive work, the *Vrihat Kathá*, so that the main elements of the stories found in Somadeva belong to a much earlier date. Professor Wilson, in a series of papers originally printed in the Calcutta *Quarterly Journal*, and subsequently republished in the collected edition of his works, pointed out several striking parallels between these Indian stories and the various European collections in mediæval and more modern times; and he subsequently wrote a similar paper in the *British and Foreign Review*. Dr Hermann Brockhaus has lately published a complete edition of the original Sanskrit text[1]; and in Book x. we find the following version of Herodotus' well-known story. The original occurs in Dr Brockhaus' third vol. pp. 164—166.

"There were in a certain city two thieves named Ghata and Karpara. One night Karpara, having left Ghata outside, made

[1] Books I—V. were published in Devanágarí characters with a German translation in 1839; books VI—VIII. appeared in 1862 in Roman characters in the 'Abhandlungen für die Kunde des Morgenlandes,' and books IX—XVIII. were published in the same series in 1866.

a hole through the wall and entered the dwelling of the king's daughter. The princess, being awake, saw him standing in the corner, and immediately falling in love with him, called him to her. After a while she gave him money and said to him, 'I will give you much more if you will come to me again.' He then went out and told the story, and, having given the money, sent Ghata away to his house with the king's treasure. He himself remained behind, and once more entered the princess' apartment; who can see danger when drawn on by love and greed? There he passed the time in love and drinking, and, falling asleep, perceived not that the night was gone. In the morning he was surprised by the guards when they entered; they bound him and brought him before the king, who, in his wrath, ordered him to be slain. While he was being led to the place of execution, his friend Ghata came to seek for him, as he had not returned in the night. The moment he saw him come near, Karpara said to him by secret signs, 'Carry off and save the princess.' He saw that his message was understood, and was then carried off by the executioners, and hanged on a tree.

"Ghata went home sorrowing, and at nightfall he dug a hole underground, and entered the princess' apartment. There he found her bound and alone; and coming up to her, he said, 'I am Ghata, the friend of that Karpara who to-day was slain for your sake. For love of him I am come to deliver you from this place; come away with me ere your father does you some harm.' She gladly embraced his offer and gave her consent, and he removed her chains. Then forthwith she gave herself to his charge, and the robber went out with her, by the underground way, and returned to his home.

"In the morning the king discovered that some one had stolen his daughter by the passage which had been so cunningly dug, and he thought to himself, 'Surely it is some daring kinsman of that executed ruffian, who has thus carried off my daughter.' So he gave orders that certain of his servants should watch Karpara's dead body, and thus he spake to them, 'Whosoever comes weeping to perform the funeral rites, bind him fast, for from him I shall find that girl who has shamed her family.' The guards received the command and promised to

obey; and they stood ceaselessly watching the robber's dead body.

"Meantime Ghata found it all out and he thus spoke to the princess, 'Karpara was my dearest friend, and by his generosity I have obtained yourself and all that treasure, and I can enjoy no rest if I pay not friendship's debt to him. I will go and see him, and by some stratagem bewail his death; I will then perform his funeral rites, and throw his bones into the sacred stream. Fear not for me; I am not a fool as poor Karpara was.' So speaking, he assumed the dress of an ascetic under a vow, and taking boiled rice and curds in a pot (*karpara*), he wandered near the spot of execution as if his way had led him thither. As he came near, he made a stumble, and dropped from his hand and broke in pieces his jar, and bitterly he bewailed his loss, 'Alas for my precious Karpara!' The guards thought that he was only mourning the misfortune of his begging vessel, and he speedily made his way home and told his success to the princess.

"The next day he sent before him a servant dressed as his wife, and another followed behind bearing a vessel of food well drugged with *datura;* while he himself, dressed like a drunken peasant, came staggering near the guards at the close of day. 'Who are you, brother? who is this woman with you? and whither are you going?' thus the guards addressed him; and thus, in stammering accents, did the cunning knave reply, 'I am a peasant, and this is my wife; I am going to my father-in-law's house, and I carry for him this present of provisions. You have shewn yourselves my friends by your kindly welcome, so I will content myself with a half, and leave the other half for you.' So saying he distributed the various provisions among the guards, and all of them, laughing, seized what he gave, and made good cheer. They were soon stupified by the drug, and Ghata that night piled the fuel and burned the body of Karpara. When he was gone, next morning the king, having learned what had happened, imprisoned those foolish guards, and appointed others in their stead; 'these bones must now be watched; and whosoever comes to take them, let him be seized; but do you take no food from any one.' Hearing these words of

the king, they, day and night, kept heedful watch; and Ghata heard all that took place. Then he, well knowing the power of incantations given by the goddess Chandiká, made a confidant of a certain religious mendicant. He went with that mendicant, skilled in charms, and having bewitched the guards, he stole away the bones of Karpara. And having thrown them into the Ganges, he went and told what had happened, and then, with the princess and the mendicant, he abode in peace.

"The king, having learned that the guards were thus beguiled and the bones stolen away, now thought that all, even to the carrying off of his daughter, must have been devised by a magician. 'If that magician who has stolen my daughter and has done all the other achievements, will but reveal himself to me, I will give him the half of my kingdom;' such was the proclamation which the king issued in his city; and Ghata, when he heard it, wished to shew himself to the king. But he was stopped by the princess, who said to him, 'Do not act so heedlessly; trust not in this king who can slay by treachery.' Then, fearful of discovery, taking with him the princess, Ghata went to another country in the company of the mendicant."

If we compare the two stories, as given in Herodotus and Somadeva, we easily see that the same original lies at the bottom of both, though the Hindu version is far inferior to the Greek in compactness and interest. It is curious too that in both an irrelevant conclusion is tacked on; in Herodotus we have the monstrous device of the king to discover the successful thief, and in Somadeva the subsequent adventures of the princess, which we have left untranslated, are only added to point a commonplace moral of Hindu storytellers against placing trust in a woman's constancy.

E. B. Cowell.

67 Nauck.

ἔνθ' ἐπὶ δυσμαῖς ἴσου
πατρὸς Ἡφαιστοτυκὲς
δέπας, ἐν τῷ διαβάλλει
πολὺν οἰδματόεντα φέρει δρόμου πόρον οὐθεὶς
μελανίππου προφυγὼν
ἱερᾶς νυκτὸς ἀμολγόν.

In v. 4 *οὐθεὶς* is manifestly a corruption of *συθεὶς*, in which I find Conington has anticipated me. For *οἰδματόεντα φέρει δρόμου πόρον*, which Hermann changed into *οἰδματόεντ' ἀμφίδρομον πόρον*, I conjecture either *αὐρίδρομον*: cf. Hesych. *Αὐριβάτας Αἰσχύλος τὸ αὖρι* (*αὔριον* cod.) *ἐπὶ τοῦ ταχέως τίθησι καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς Ψυχοστασίᾳ οὕτως φησὶ τὸ ὄνομα ταχυβήμων* (*ταχύβηλων* cod.), or *ἀφρόδρομον*. In l. 1 *δυσμαῖσι σοῦ* seems likely.

153 Nauck.

ἔνθ' Ἀδραστείας ἕδος
Ἴδη τε μυκηθμοῖσι καὶ βρυκήμασι
πρέπουσι μήλων, πᾶν δ' ἐρέχθει (*ἐρέχθεον* alii codd.) *πέδον.*

Perhaps *ἐρεύγεται*, a sense however supposed to be confined to the aorist. Il. xx. 403, *ἤρυγεν ὡς ὅτε ταῦρος Ἤρυγεν ἑλκόμενος.*

154 Nauck.

Plutarch, Mor. 603, *τί γὰρ ἡ πλατεῖα χώρα πρὸς ἄλυπον βίον; οὐκ ἀκούεις τοῦ Ταντάλου λέγοντος ἐν τῇ τραγωδίᾳ*

σπείρω δ' ἄρουραν δώδεχ' ἡμερῶν ὁδὸν
Βερέκυντα χῶρον

εἶτα μετ' ὀλίγον λέγοντος

Θυμὸς δέ ποθ' ἁμὸς οὐρανῷ κυρῶν ἄνω
ἔραζε πίπτει, καί με προσφωνεῖ τάδε·
γίγνωσκε τἀνθρώπεια μὴ φρονεῖν ἄγαν.

Porson changed Θυμὸς δέ ποθ' ἁμὸς into Οὑμὸς δὲ πότμος, which has been generally accepted. The objection to this is that it seems strange to represent a man's fate as a speaking and personified existence, whereas Aeschylus would be speaking characteristically in making Tantalus's mind address him. Cf. Theb. 1033:

τοίγαρ θέλουσ' ἄκοντι κοινώνει κακῶν
ψυχὴ θανόντι ζῶσα συγγόνῳ φρενί.

Eum. 103, ὅρα δὲ πληγὰς τάσδε καρδία σέθεν, and hence the force of the expression Ran. 1041, ὅθεν ἡμὴ φρὴν ἀπομαξαμένη πολλὰς ἀρετὰς ἐποίησεν. I therefore retain θυμὸς and propose for δέ ποθ' ἁμὸς, δ' ὁ θερμός. Cf. Agam. 1172, ἐγὼ δὲ θερμόνους τάχ' ἐν πέδῳ βαλῶ. The Self rises from the ground where it has fallen cold, and speaks.

fr. 173 Nauck.

Εὐρύμαχος οὐκ ἄλλος οὐδὲν ἧσσονας
ὕβριζ' ὑβρισμοὺς οὐκ ἐναισίους ἐμοί.
ἦν μὲν γὰρ αὐτῷ κότταβος ἀεὶ τοὐμὸν (codd. τοῦ μὲν) κάρα
τοῦ δ ἀγκυλητοῦ κοσσάβιός ἐστι σκοπὸς
ἐκτεμὼν ἠβῶσα χεὶρ ἐφίετο. 5

I start from l. 4 as the most probable basis. There is nothing that calls for alteration there except κοσσάβιος. Conington indeed considers ἐστι σκοπὸς a corruption of ἐπίσκοπος. But σκοπὸς was, if one may use the expression, a technical word in reference to the game κόταβος. Critias, fr. 11, quoted by O. Iahn in a very full and interesting article Philol. XXVI. 203:

Κότταβος ἐκ Σικελῆς ἐστὶ χθονὸς, ἐκπρεπὲς ἔργον,
ὃν σκόπον ἐς λατάγων τόξα καθιστάμεθα

Nonnus, XXXII. 74:

> ἀργύρεος δὲ
> κεῖτο λέβης ἐν ἀγῶνι καὶ οἰνοχύτου βρέτας Ἥβης
> μεσσοφανῆ σκόπον εἶχε. cf. 93 εἰς σκοπὸν ἠκόντιζεν.

And this is tacitly admitted by Conington, who approves of Dobree's emendation in l. 3 of σκοπὸς ἀεὶ for κότταβος ἀεί. Keeping then ἐστι σκοπὸς, what are we to make of κοσσάβιος? I conceive there was another form of κόσσαβος in -ευς, of this κοσσάβεως would be the genitive, corrupted in the fragment to κοσσάβιος. Some part of the same form I would restore to l. 3, either the nom. sing. or the nom plur. In the last line for ἐκτεμὼν I propose ὅσ' ἐκτενῶν, ὅσ' having fallen out after the last syllable of σκοπὸς, and ἐκτενῶν meaning literally, 'of men on the stretch,' i.e. with the arm (generally the right) stretched in the particular curve requisite for throwing the wine in such a manner as to fall exactly. Cf. Bacchylides, fr. 24:

> εὖτε τὴν ἀπ' ἀγκύλης ἵησι τοῖσδε τοῖς νεανίαις
> λευκὸν ἀντείνασα πῆχυν,

and more closely Dionysius, III. 5:

> ὄμματι βηματίσαισθε τὸν ἀέρα τὸν κατὰ κλίνην
> εἰς ὅσον αἱ λάταγες χωρίον ἐκτέταται:

and see the numerous pictorial illustrations appended to the previously mentioned discussion by O. Iahn, in nearly all of which the arm is outstretched. The two last lines may then be translated, 'the mark of the Cottabus so-called "bent" is the distance which the vigorous hand of men whose arm was in full stretch in each case reached.' The adj. ἐκτενὴς is used by Æschylus in the Supplices, l. 983.

213 NAUCK.

In the passage of Hesychius ἀναροιβδεῖ...Ὅμηρος δὲ ἀναπίνει καὶ ἀναροφήματα ποιοῦν ἦχον read ἀναρόφημα τὸ ποιοῦν ἦ.

238 NAUCK.

Antigonus Caryst. c. 115, τῶν δὲ θηλέων ζῴων ῥοπικώτερόν φησιν εἶναι πρὸς τὴν συνουσίαν ἵππον.....φαίνεται δὲ καὶ

Αἰσχύλος ἱστορικῶς τὸ τοιοῦτον οὕτως πως εἰρηκέναι πρὸς τὰς παρθένους ἐν ταῖς τοξότισιν.

Ἄδων ταῖς ἀγναῖς παρθένοις γαμηλίων
λέκτρων ἄστει μὴ βλεμμάτων ῥέπει βολή.

Hermann emended ἀδών τις and ἑτοίμη, putting a comma at λέκτρων, and translating *Si quis placet innuptis virginibus statim adnuunt.* I would read

Ἀγῶνας ἀγναῖς παρθένοις γαμηλίων
λέκτρονδ' ἑτοίμη βλεμμάτων ῥέπει βολή.

Γαμηλίων is explained in Etym. M. Γαμηλία· παρὰ τὸ γαμῶ γαμήσω γαμήλια ὡς δεμῶ δεμήσω δεμήλια καὶ θεμήλια, καὶ ὡς παρὰ τὸ κατοικῶ κατοικήσω κατοικήσια καὶ κατοικέσια. Ἐστὶ δὲ θυσία τοῖς ἐν τῷ δήμῳ θεοῖς. There is no difficulty in transferring the meaning from marriage-sacrifice to marriage more generally, as in Hesychius γαμηλία is the dowry and the feast given by the bridegroom. ΛΕΚΤΡΟΝΔΕΤΟΙΜΗ is very near palaeographically to ΛΕΚΤΡΟΝΑCΤΕΙΜΗ, whilst the termination of λέκτρονδε suits well with the notion of inclination towards one of two directions contained in ῥέπει. Cf. Od. VIII. 292, Δεῦρο φίλη λέκτρονδε τραπείομεν εὐνηθέντες. The two inclinations are the wish to preserve virginity on the one hand, and the wish for marriage on the other. This is expressed with sufficient clearness in ἀγῶνας γαμηλίων, i.e. either struggling inclinations for marriage, or the moment of struggle which marriage brings.

293 Nauck.

ἐν ᾗ πυρωπὸς ἥλιος ἐκλάμψας χθονὶ
τήκει πετραίαν χιόνα.

Perhaps χρίμψας.

307 Nauck.

Athen. XIV. p. 632, πάντας τοὺς χρωμένους τῇ τέχνῃ ταύτῃ (sc. τῇ μουσικῇ) σοφιστὰς ἀπεκάλουν, ὥσπερ καὶ Αἰσχύλος ἐποίησεν·

εἶτ' οὖν σοφιστὴς καλὰ παραπαίων χέλυν.

Read σκαιά.

332 Nauck.

ὁ κισσεὺς Ἀπόλλων, ὁ Βακχεῖος, ὁ μάντις.

Read *ὁ βακχειόμαντις.*

347 Nauck.

ὑψηλὸν ἡ βάσασα τεκτόνων πόνον

Perhaps *ὑβώσασα,* 'making crook-back'd,' i.e. causing to cave in and so collapse. Hesych. *ὑβώματα· κυρτώματα.* Cf. Xenoph. Cyrop. VII. 5, 11, *οἱ φοίνικες ὑπὸ βάρους πιεζόμενοι κυρτοῦνται.*

348 Nauck.

Plutarch 625 D, *οἱ γὰρ πρεσβύτεροι πόρρω τὰ γράμματα τῶν ὀμμάτων ἀπάγοντες ἀναγιγνώσκουσιν, ἐγγύθεν δὲ οὐ δύνανται. καὶ τοῦτο παραδηλῶν ὁ Αἰσχύλος φησίν· οὐδὲ ἀπὸ αὐτὸν οὐ γὰρ ἐγγύθεν· γέρων δὲ γραμματεὺς γενοῦ σαφής.* Hermann read *ἰδοῦ δ' ἀποσταδόν.* I propose *οὐ διφῶ λαγών,* with this meaning: 'I am no tracker of hares; no, I don't follow close. You must play the old scribe that sees clearly (at a distance), if you would do my bidding.' ΟΥΔΕΑΠΟΑΥΤΟΝ might easily be corrupted into ΟΥΔΕΙΦΟΛΑΓΟΝ. The expression is found in an epigram of Callimachus, XXXI. ed. Meineke:

Ὠγρεύτης, Ἐπίκυδες, ἐν οὔρεσι πάντα λαγών
δίφᾷ καὶ πάσης ἴχνια δορκαλίδος,
στίβῃ καὶ νιφετῷ κεχρημένος· ἦν δέ τις εἴπῃ
'τῇ τόδε βέβληται θηρίον', οὐκ ἔλαβεν.
χοὔμὸς ἔρως τοιόσδε, τὰ μὲν φεύγοντα διώκειν
οἶδε, τὰ δ' ἐν μέσσῳ κείμενα παρπέταται.

377 Nauck.

ἔφριξ' ἔρως δε τοῦδε μυστικοῦ τέλους.

Perhaps *ἐρῶσα.*

187 Nauck.

A Balliol MS. written in the 15th century (n. 136) contains with other things the Tusculan Questions. It appears to be

copied from a good original, and is of considerable consequence, in my judgment, partly for settling the orthography of particular words, partly for determining the reading in the much-contested fragments of early poets, especially Ennius and Attius. I hope to speak of these later; at present I give the deviations of this MS. from the received text of the fragment translated by Cicero from Aeschylus's Prometheus Unbound.

l. 2 aspice 4 atendunt adnectunt 5 Saturnus infinxit (m. pr., n struck through) 6 mulcebri asci 7 inferens 8 artes 12 pastis delaniat ferro 13 Tum iecur opime frata et saciata adfratim 14 advolans 15 Pennata advolat 16 ad esum inflatum 18 sic huc 19 Que me perhenni vivum 20 Nam videtis 22 vidus 23 terminum acquirens mali (malū the first hand, I think) 24 Set 25 sedis 27 Equo excludunt.

In l. 4 *attendunt*, as less common than *adnectunt*, is perhaps the word used by Cicero. l. 6 *Mulcebri* need not be changed to *Mulcibri*; (see the numerous similar instances given by Mommsen, C. T. L. I. 605). *ascium* is not unlikely a formation from *adscire* (Virg. Aen. XII. 38, *Socios sum adscire paratus*), like *conscius* from *conscire*. *manus* must then be genitive, 'and Jove's will, taking into alliance the strong hand of Mulceber.' l. 13 seems to represent a different reading from that of Priscian, X. 907, where the MSS. read *iecure optimo* (i.e. *opimo*); the accus. *iecur* may have been used by Cicero to give a more Greek character to his translation. 14 *advolans* is probably a corruption of *abvolans*, not of *avolans*. Most extraordinary is the form which the end of this line assumes in the MSS. of Nonius, 47. Accius Prometheo (a mistake, probably arising from a passage from Accius being quoted in the same chapter of the Tusc. Quest.), *tui mei volans Pennata cauda nostrum adulat sanguinem*. 18 *Huc alo*, 'I feed to approach me' might be justified by Plaut. Capt. I. 2. 28, *Set si ullo pacto ille huc conciliari potest*; Cato, R. R. 157, *intro quæ dolitabunt*; and similar uses. Bentley's conjecture *hanc* does not seem to rest on very good authority; but he was right in feeling that the vulture is throughout described as feminine, *farta satiata avida*. This difficulty is removed by the reading *huc*. 20 Perhaps

Nam quod videtis. 23 It is difficult to choose between *anquirens*, the reading adopted by Hermann from Victorius, 'looking round for' (cf. Festus, Anquirere, circum quaerere), and *acquirens*, 'ready to gain,' not any usual object of desire, but the only end which the passion of death can have, deliverance. 27 *excadunt* seems more likely to be represented by *excludunt* than the ordinary reading *excidunt*.

R. Ellis.

ON A PASSAGE OF HESYCHIUS.

ἀφροδίσιος ὅρκος· παροιμία ἣν καὶ ἀναγράφουσιν· Ἀφροδίσιος ορκος οὐ δάκνει· πρῶτος δὲ Ἡσίοδος ἔπλασε τὰ περὶ τὸν Δία καὶ τὴν Ἰώ. ὤμοσεν. ἀλλὰ [*λέγουσιν ἀληθέα, τοὺς ἐν ἔρωτι ὅρκου μὴ δύνειν ὕδατ' ἐς ἀθανάτων. Καλλίμαχος*]. So we may fill up the lost part from Callim. Epigr. XXVI. Blomfield.

R. Ellis.

EMENDATIONS ON TWO PASSAGES OF AESCHYLUS.

In Supplices 996 (1019 Dind.) we have the following verse, addressed by one half of the chorus to the other half:

ἴτε μὰν ἀστυάνακτας μάκαρας θεοὺς γανάεντες,

the metre of which is *Ionic a minore*. The word γανάεντες, as Hermann says, "aperte vitiosum est"; and he reads γανάοντες, the uncontracted participle of γανάω (whence the Homeric γανόωντες &c.). Having then nothing better to suggest, I followed him in my text. There remains however the difficulty of making either γανάοντες or ἴτε govern θεούς. For it is one thing to say ἰέναι δόμον, ἰέναι ὁδὸν, but quite another to say ἰέναι τινα. So far as I know, the Greeks said, ὡς or πρός τινα. I now propose to read,

ἴτε νυν ἀστυάνακτας μάκαρας θεοὺς ἀγαλοῦντες.

The future of ἀγάλλω, in the sense of γεραίρω, occurs in Ar. Pac. 399,

καί σε θυσίαισιν—ἀγαλοῦμεν ἡμεῖς ἀεί.

The active aorist ἀγῆλαι is found in Eur. Med. 1027. It is not improbable that from the omission of the initial α the residue γαλοῦντες passed into γανοῦντες and γανάεντες, first by a common corruption, then by a metrical botching.—The reading νυν for μὰν seems also probable.

In Eumenides 983 (1029 Dind.),

τιμᾶτε, καὶ τὸ φέγγος ὁρμάσθω πυρὸς,

Athena is telling the chorus and the citizens to join in escorting the Eumenides with torches into their subterranean abode under the Areopagus, and is ordering them to start the procession. Now the technical word for walking in a processional step is προβαίνειν (Arist. Ach. 257. Vesp. 230. Plut. 759), Lat. *incedere*. In the present passage, τιμᾶτε is manifestly wrong. I propose προβᾶτε, 'move on,' which is exactly the word we require. As τι and π, μ and β, are very often interchanged, it is clear that πβᾶτε, resulting from a contraction or corruption of προβᾶτε, would be most easily mistaken by the next transcriber for τιμᾶτε.

F. A. Paley.

I.

γίγνεσθαι, γιγνώσκειν.

The verbs γίγνεσθαι and γιγνώσκειν stand quite alone in the Greek language, without kindred or affinities, nihil simile aut secundum: they have of course some of the ordinary derivatives, but these are not numerous. This singular fact, as likewise the similarity of form—to say nothing of the alternative form of the first syllable, γιγ or γι common to both, which *may* no doubt be due merely to the variations of Copyists, and not essential to the words—is suggestive at first sight of some close affinity or connexion between themselves; and to examine this, and if possible to establish it, is the main object of this brief essay.

In tracing this we shall be able at the same time to discern a rudimentary distinction in several members of the Indo-Germanic family, Greek, Latin, French, Italian, German, English (which probably also extends to all the rest) of two forms of knowledge, one direct and intuitive, the other the result of a gradual process or growth; and corresponding to the 'fundamental antithesis' of 'being' and 'becoming,' of which γίγνεσθαι and γιγνώσκω in Greek represent the one side, εἶναι and εἰδέναι the other.

We will first direct our attention to the distinction of the forms of knowledge, and trace it in the terms by which it is expressed in the six languages above named. To begin with the Greek. οἶδα and εἰδέναι are manifestly forms of the perfect tense of an original εἴδω 'I see'; as appears from its second aorist εἶδον ἰδεῖν, which remained in use. In the primary acceptation therefore of this word the act of knowledge expressed by εἰδέναι is identified with an act of sense, the sense of sight: in the subsequent stages of the language it is applied metaphorically to express an intuitive act of the mind, analogous in its

immediate and direct operation to the sight of an object: 'to have seen' is 'to know'. This obvious and yet striking analogy appears constantly in the ordinary language of poets and prose writers, and thus illustrates the original meaning of the word. Mental 'blindness and insight', 'clear sighted', and such like are two of the commonest of all metaphors[1].

Let us notice here by the way an analogy in the Latin 'sapere', as a similar instance of a bodily sense transferred to the expression of a mode of mental apprehension.

I have collected from Aristotle and other authors a few illustrations of this metaphorical transfer of sight, organ or faculty, to mind. Eth. Nic. I. 4, 1096. b. 29, *ὡς γὰρ ἐν σώματι ὄψις ἐν ψυχῇ νοῦς.* Again, the sight and the eye, or the senses in general, are taken as the representatives of the *special* organ of the intellect, the *νοῦς*, and its *intuitive* operation; or of any intellectual faculty, as *δεινότης*, which acts *intuitively* and immediately upon its object; Eth. Nic. VI. 12, 1143. b. 5, *τούτων οὖν ἔχειν δεῖ αἴσθησιν, αὕτη δ' ἐστὶ νοῦς.* Ib. V. 13, *διὰ γὰρ τὸ ἔχειν ἐκ τῆς ἐμπειρίας ὄμμα ὁρῶσιν ὀρθῶς.* Ib. VI. 13, 1144. a. 30, *τῷ ὄμματι τῆς ψυχῆς, τῇ δεινότητι,* (cleverness, quickness, shrewdness, shown in an immediate and intuitive perception of the means to a moral end.) Epicharm. ap. Plut. Mor. p. 98. B, 336. B, 961. A, *νόος ὁρῇ καὶ νόος ἀκούει· τἆλλα κωφὰ καὶ τυφλά.* Soph. Œd. R. 371, *τυφλὸς τά τ' ὦτα τόν τε νοῦν τὰ τ' ὄμματ' εἶ.* Eur. Phœn. 834, *ὡς τυφλῷ ποδὶ ὀφθαλμὸς εἶ σύ.* Phaeth. Fr. 12 (Dind.), *τυφλὰς ἔχουσι τὰς φρένας.* Plat. Rep. VII. 519. B, *τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ὄψιν,* Ib. 533. D, *τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ὄμμα.* Parmen. 132. A, *ἐὰν ὡσαύτως τῇ ψυχῇ ἐπὶ πάντα ἴδῃς.* Rhet. ad Alex. (in the spurious letter) *τὸ τοῖς τῆς ψυχῆς ὄμμασιν ὀξυδορκεῖν ἐστὶ θαυμαστόν.*

And as *εἰδέναι* represents the intuitive and immediate process of acquiring knowledge, so the opposite member of the antithesis *γιγνώσκειν* signifies the gradual growth and development of it; the coming into being; the passage from the *δύναμις*, the

[1] And some of the Pharisees which were with him heard these words, and said unto him, Are we blind also? Jesus said unto them, If ye were blind ye should have no sin: but now ye say, we see; therefore your sin remaineth. John ix. 40, 41.

potentiality or capacity, to the actual, realised existence, the ἐνέργεια of knowledge; a process which in the other case, is instantaneous. The proof of this, to be gathered hereafter from the connexion of γιγνώσκειν with γίγνεσθαι, if it can be made out, must be for the present deferred.

On the use of εἰδέναι and γιγνώσκειν in the New Testament, see Dr Lightfoot's remarks in Cambr. Phil. Journ. Vol. III. No. VII. p. 116. The view there taken of the distinction agrees entirely with my own. "While οἶδα is simple and absolute, γινώσκω is relative, involving more or less the idea of *a process of examination.* Thus while οἶδα is 'I know', and is used of the knowledge of facts and propositions in themselves, γινώσκω, 'I recognise', implies reference to something else, and gives prominence to either *the attainment of the knowledge,* or *the knowledge of a thing in its bearings.*" And then follow examples from the N. T. I may here notice for the sake of clearness, though it applies equally to the other languages which follow, that the first term (in the antithesis) expresses in all cases *internal* knowledge or an act of *internal* consciousness, the cogito ergo sum,—and is applied exclusively to thoughts as objects: whilst the second is rather an outward perception which leads to knowledge, or by which knowledge is acquired, or comes into being, or grows, as from *without;* and can be applied therefore to persons and external objects, as a perception, as well as to inward objects or thoughts. And this usage will serve as a test to distinguish the two. Thus εἰδέναι can never be applied to persons, or in the strict and proper sense to anything but our own thoughts, of which we have an immediate and intuitive apprehension, the knowledge of external objects of sense being mediate; γιγνώσκειν is to 'recognise' or perceive persons and external things, and this by intermediate steps gradually becomes knowledge. The Greeks said, οἰδά τι; γιγνώσκω τι, or τινά. This appears equally in the Latin scire: we say scire *aliquid,* noscere, or cognoscere, *aliquem;* the German says wissen *etwas,* kennen *einen;* ich weiss *das,* ich kenne *ihn;* in French, savoir quelque *chose,* connaître quelqu'*un;* Ital. non so *questo,* non *lo* conosco; the English 'know' is used nowadays to express both, but we once had the Germ. wissen, in the forms I

wis, I wot, to wit, (comp. wit, subst., and wise,) and with the same meaning; and opposed to 'know', which is connected in form as well as sense with γιγνώσκειν, gnoscere, kennen, connaître, conoscere, and represents the mediate process of *acquiring* knowledge. However the antithesis of instinctive, intuitive, *wisdom*, and acquired progressive *knowledge*, still remains in our language.

To pass on to the Latin in the illustration of the two terms of this antithesis of modes of knowledge. In this language we have scire and gnoscere (otherwise noscere, comp. notus, nomen,) or cognoscere, as analogues of εἰδέναι and γιγνώσκειν. Of the first Pott says, Etym. Forsch. II. 291, that it may be traced to the Sanskrit *ki:* and in Bopp's Gloss. Comp. Ling. Sanscr. I. p. 83. *a*, we find "*ki* scire; fortasse lat. *scire* præfixo s: hib. (i.e. Hibernice, in Irish) *ci* 'see, behold', *ci-thi* 'you see', *citear* 'it seems, appears'." Bopp further directs us to compare the Sanskr. *kit*, videre, cernere, percipere, animadvertere; a most remarkable analogy with the Greek ἰδεῖν and εἰδέναι. Pott compares *scio* with *queo*, which seems rather to favour the notion of an 'intuitive or instinctive faculty' of acquiring knowledge—but I do not insist on this. Of the second, *noscere* or *cognoscere*, the terms used by Forcellinus to explain the primary meaning are, to learn, to find out, ascertain, perceive, discover, get a knowledge of; also, to study, investigate, explore, 'to make oneself acquainted with'; all processes of mediate knowledge: to recognise, as a person is recognised; which appears still more distinctly in *agnoscere*. I will notice here, though it is an anticipation, the connexion of gnascor (nascor) with gnosco (nosco), of gnatus (natus) and gnotus (notus), as analogous to that of γίγνεσθαι and γιγνώσκω, and tending to confirm it; which is to be found in the Sanskrit dictionaries. Döderlein, Latein. Synon. Vol. V. p. 266, § 2, distinguishes *scientia* from *notitia* and *cognitio* on precisely the same grounds; and this agreement is all the more valuable in that he has no theory of the origin of the words in view, but is simply explaining them in what he supposes to be their primary and characteristic meaning. Im vergleich mit *scientia* bezeichnet *notitia*, so wie Kunde, einen zustand des blos *receptiven* seelenvermögens, welches eine äussere erscheinung zum bewusst-

sein festhält, *scientia* aber involvirt eine *Spontaneität* und ist sich der wahrheit des gegenstandes bewusst. § 3, Zu beiden wörtern, welche einen zustand der seele bezeichnen, verhält sich cognitio, so wie erkenntniss (from *kennen*, observe), als der *inchoative begriff:* and then quotes five passages from Cicero in which the two are conjoined and opposed.

In German we have *wissen* and *kennen* opposed in these senses. With *wissen* is connected *weise*, which implies a natural power of judgment in thought and action, as well as the acquired experience and knowledge which constitutes practical wisdom; but wisdom always judges and decides *intuitively*, whether this be the result of acquired knowledge or of a natural habit of mind. So from *wissen* are derived *bewusst* and *bewusstsein* 'conscious,' and 'consciousness', both intuitive; and *wissenschaft* the exact and complete knowledge which no longer needs inquiry, but judges and pronounces at once. *Wissen* also like εἰδέναι and *scire* is akin to the Greek Fἰδεῖν and Lat. vid-ere, and accordingly is presumed to act like a sense. To this is opposed *kennen*, Engl. to *ken*, the representative of, and etymologically connected with, γιγνώσκειν and *gnoscere*, in the two preceding languages: also with *können*, as *scio* (according to Pott, u.s.) with queo. *Kennen* is defined in Grimm's Dictionary, s.v. Vol. v. p. 532 [this article is by Dr R. Hildebrand, one of the continuators of the work], 'Noscere, cognoscere, dignoscere, agnoscere. Es ist unmittelbar von *kann* novi, novit (s. *können*) abgezweigt worden. In the modern usage of the word (p. 537), all the senses are traceable to the primary and original one, 'to recognise'; a signification which appears more distinctly in *bekennen, erkennen, anerkennen;* which are used in the explanations of the earlier usage of the other, p. 535 seq. Its connexion with *können* shows that it implies rather the capacity or faculty of acquiring knowledge, than actual knowledge operating as it were intuitively. Hence *kennen* is to come to know or to recognise, *erkennen, anerkennen*, comp. *kennbar;* whence *bekannt* (acquainted), and *bekanntschaft* (acquaintance) of *persons*, in which sense *wissen* and its derivatives are never (I believe) employed.

In French and Italian precisely the same opposition is found

between the two corresponding terms, *savoir* and *connaître, sapere* and *conoscere;* and they closely follow the analogies of their Latin parent. With respect to *sapere* the Italian representative of the immediate and intuitive form of knowledge, I have already remarked the curious analogy of the intellectual apprehension assimilated by metaphor to the instinctive sense of *taste,* with that other more common one which in other languages (and in the Latin also in the term scire) compares it with that of *vision.*

In the English language, the last of the six in which I proposed to trace this antithesis, we have in its earlier stages the verb to wit, (witan Angl. Sax. wissen Germ.) contrasted with 'to ken or know'. I have already observed that 'wit' in this sense has become obsolete, and the distinction lost; 'to know' being now employed in both senses. Again, 'wit' (subst.) and 'the wits' have undergone a change of meaning, which has been narrowed from that of the senses (so Richardson) or the intellect in general, to one which I will not take upon me to define, but will rather refer to Pope's ingenious attempt; True wit is nature to advantage drest, What oft was thought but ne'er so well exprest; and Barrow's still more ingenious analysis and enumeration of the various forms which it assumes: and content myself with observing that when contrasted with *humour* it is shown in the *language* rather than in the *character.* [on 'humour', see Ben Jonson's preface to 'Every man in his humour'].

To *know,* the opposite, is as we have seen connected etymologically with *γιγνώσκειν* and gnosco, and kennen, and connaître, and conoscere, and has the same primary sense to 'recognise' or 'acquire knowledge'; implying a process and growth, as distinguished from the direct and immediate apprehension by the other of its object. "We speak of a dog *knowing* his master, of an infant *knowing* his mother. In such expressions to know means to recognise. But to know a thing means more than to recognise it".—that is, *now* that the distinction between it and 'to wit' has disappeared from the language—Max. Müller, Lect. on Language, I. 385; and the author goes on to connect it with general names and general ideas.

We have now to turn to the second part of our inquiry, and to see if an *etymological* affinity can be established between γίγνεσθαι and γιγνώσκειν, and whether they are traceable to one root. This has already seemed a priori probable from the similarity in form of the two words; and the probability has been confirmed by the parallel case in Latin, the common origin viz. of nascor and nosco (I use the later form of the words), natus and notus. The apparent analogy between the *forms*, εἶναι and εἰδέναι, and γίγνεσθαι and γιγνώσκειν, in the two pairs of opposites, I do not insist upon.

There are two Sanskrit roots ǵñâ (or jñâ, Benfey, Sanskr. Dict. and Prof. Cowell,) 'scire, nosse, cognoscere, intelligere[1]', (the two modes of apprehending knowledge, in the ancient Sanskrit, as in our modern *know*, being not yet distinguished): and a second, *ǵan*, (Bopp.) or *jan*, 'nasci, oriri, fieri', and also 'gignere, generare'; Gr. ΓΕΝ. γίγνομαι; Lat. GEN. gigno, genui, (g)nascor, gnatus &c.[2]; jan (Benfey), transitive, 'to 'bring forth, produce', and intransitive 'to be born, to be produced, to be caused, to grow, to *become* &c.'

Prof. Max Müller, Lect. on Language, 2nd series, p. 193, expresses himself thus upon the point. "Thus *to know* points back to Sk. jnâ, but this jnâ, the Lat gnô in gnôvi, or gnō in Gr. ἐgnōn, again points back to janâ, contracted to jnâ...Thus jan, which means to create, to produce, and which we find in Sk. janas, Gr. γενός, genus, kin, is raised to jnâ in order to express the idea of being able to produce." This is precisely parallel to the case of kennen and können, above cited, the 'capacity' involved in the 'acquisition of knowledge'.

Now although it would ill become one who is not thoroughly versed in the composition and structure of the Sanskrit language to assert that these two words must have been originally the same, yet I think that the light of nature reason and analogy is sufficient to enable us to pronounce, that two words, each of but three letters, those letters being the same, and two of them only transposed, must have *some* connexion both in origin and

[1] Bopp, Gloss. Comp. L. Sanskr. p. 155 seq. Benfey, Sansk. Dict. 'to know, to be intelligent, to recognise, to search, to investigate, to perceive.'

[2] Bopp. op. cit. p. 146.

in signification: that consequently, in the earliest known form of the Indo-Germanic languages the cognate notions of 'becoming' and 'learning to know', of 'coming to be' and 'coming to know', were derived from one source, and most probably expressed in one word; and that that word was either jan, or some common form from which jan and gnâ or jnâ might descend, hardly distinguishable from either. This affinity in form and sense has been transmitted through six at least of the members of the great Indo-Germanic family, and is even now traceable in them. If so much as this be admitted, I shall believe that the connexion I am seeking to prove between *γίγνεσθαι* and *γιγνώσκειν* as contrasted with *εἶναι* and *εἰδέναι* is sufficiently established.

I have been favoured with a letter from Prof. Cowell upon this subject, accompanied with the kind permission to print it, of which I now gladly avail myself.

"I have looked into the question of *γιγνώσκω* and *γίγνομαι*, and I send you all that I can find out about their relation. 1. As to the words themselves. Jan in Sanskr. is usually found in the passive sense 'to be born' = *γίγνομαι*; but in the Veda we find the active form of the 3rd, or reduplicated, conjugation, jajan (3rd sing. present *jajanti* = gignit for gigenit, *γίγνει*). The Greek and Latin words are therefore clearly relics of the old root in its reduplicated form. *Γιγνώσκω* appears to be a desiderative form, which in Sanskrit requires reduplication and the addition of a final ṣ to the root; thus *jnâ* 'to know', *jijnâs* 'to wish to know'. The Greek *κ* is only an euphonic accompaniment of the sibilant as in *ἔσκον*, and the old Latin future *escit*. We have the same desiderative form in *βιβρώσκω*, *μιμνήσκω*, *πιφαύσκω* &c., though in Greek the desiderative meaning is lost. 2. As to their meaning and connexion. The most direct parallel is the root *man* 'to think', which we also have in the Sanskr. *mnâ* 'to remember', lit. 'to fix in the mind by constant repetition—these two forms exactly correspond to *jan* and *jna*. Müller (Lectures 2nd series, p. 193,) would connect these latter as root and causal, i. e. 'I produce' and 'I am able to produce'; but I doubt whether this causal signification can be established; it does not exist as between

man and *mná*. But perhaps we may take it as intensifying the original meaning; in this sense it will hold in both pairs. Curtius refers to a paper in Zeitschrift, x. 184, for an attempt to connect *jan* and *jná* by means of the idea 'des keimens'—others, he says, would bring in the roots *ga* and *gam* 'to go', and this he himself prefers.

"I am almost afraid that the idea of the production of knowledge as something gradual and mediate (as opposed to vid- εἴδω &c.) might be too artificial and metaphysical for those early times. Both words are very old—and the thread of connexion which binds them must have been recognized long before the tribes separated."

I will only venture to say in reply to this last objection, that the question is one of facts, and not of theory or hypothesis. If two words in the same language are almost exactly alike in formation, it seems a priori probable that they should be derived from one root, or at any rate be very closely allied in their origin. Again as to the association of the notions of 'a form of being' and 'a form of knowledge' being too subtle and artificial for a very primitive civilization—first, it seems that the Oriental intellect is actually of an unusually subtle character, whatever cause may be assigned for the fact; secondly, the formation of words seems to be due rather to some spontaneous process arising from habits of mind natural or acquired, views and feelings circumstantial or local, than to any special exercise of thought and nice discriminations of sense—a broad and general idea is conceived and embodied in a combination of letters, which in the course of time becomes invested with countless associations, and widens or narrows its comprehension; apparently—so far as we can trace the changes—more by accident than design. And thirdly, we must remember that all the early Greek Philosophies, including Plato's Ideal theory, are remarkable for the identification or confusion of the subjective and the objective, of thought and being, the logical and the metaphysical[1]; and, these speculations being carried on in a semibarbarous age, where there could have been no suggestion

[1] 'Like is *known* by like', was, according to Aristotle (de Anima), a universal principle pervading alike all the early systems of Greek Philosophy.

from without, I should rather infer that the connexion in question is rather one which arises unbidden, and spontaneously in the human mind, than that it is the result of express study and subtle inquiry; and therefore that it is compatible with the lowest degree of general civilization.

[The two following articles were written as appendices to a commentary (in the course of preparation) on Aristotle's Rhetoric, and have reference to I. 11. 17, and I. 12. 22, in that work.]

II.

στοργή, ἔρως, φιλεῖν, ἀγαπᾶν.

There are four terms in Greek which represent different states or degrees of affection, fondness, liking, love, in its most general acceptation. Of these *στοργή* and *ἔρως* are coordinate terms, in this respect, that they both designate what Aristotle calls *πάθη*, instinctive affections, implanted in sentient beings by nature.

στοργή is the natural and instinctive affection that subsists between parent and child; irrational but moral, an *ἄλογον πάθος*, but *ἠθικόν*. *ἡδύ γε πατὴρ τέκνοισιν εἰ στοργὴν ἔχοι*, Philem. ap. Stob. Meineke, Fr. Comm. Gr. IV. 63. Fr. Inc. 108. *στέργειν*, Œd. R. 1023. *ἔστερξεν* of *parental* affection; Œd. Col. 1529. Plat. Legg. VI. 754. B, *καθάπερ παῖς...στέργει τε καὶ στέργεται ὑπὸ τῶν γεννησάντων*. Ar. Eth. N. IX. 7, 1168. 2, *στέργοντες ὥσπερ τέκνα*; Ib. V. 7, *στέργει δὴ τὸ ἔργον, τοῦτο δὲ φυσικόν*, which describes an *instinctive* feeling, though not here the specially parental; comp. VIII. 14, 1161. b. 18, *οἱ γονεῖς μὲν γὰρ στέργουσι τὰ τέκνα...τὰ δὲ τέκνα τοὺς γονεῖς*; and v. 25, *οἱ μὲν γὰρ εὐθὺς γενόμενα στέργουσιν*; for which immediately afterwards *φιλεῖν* is twice substituted, v. 27, 28. But the verb is by no means confined to this special sense, and passes readily into the more general signification of 'liking' in the modified form of 'acquiescence' and 'toleration' (to acquiesce in, put

up with, as αἰνεῖν and ἀγαπᾶν); and is even applied to the sexual affection, as Xen. Symp. VIII. 14 and 21: and in Ar. Eth. N. VIII. 5, 1157. 29, it is used to express the instinctive liking or love which children feel for one another, δι' ἡδονὴν ἀλλήλους στέργοντας, ὥσπερ οἱ παῖδες. ἔρως again, the other form of instinctive or animal affection, is sometimes substituted for στοργή; as Eur. Fragm. Erechth. 19. (Dind.), ap. Stob. 77. p. 454, ἐρᾶτε μητρὸς παῖδες· ὡς οὐκ ἐστ' ἔρως τοιοῦτος ἄλλος, οἷος ἡδιών ἐρᾶν.

ἔρως differs from the preceding only in respect of its special direction and the absence of *moral character:* otherwise it is an ἄλογος ὄρεξις, a natural, animal, impulse; the sexual form of ἐπιθυμία, or natural appetite. ὅτι ἐπιθυμία τις ὁ ἔρως παντὶ δῆλον, Plat. Phædr. 237. D. ἡδονῇ καὶ λύπῃ μεμιγμένον (the characteristic of ἐπιθυμία) ἔρωτα, Tim. 42. A; and, though it is doubtless applied metaphorically, in the sense of a 'passionate desire' *similar* to the animal appetite, to represent intellectual and moral desires, as when Plato says ἐρᾶν μαθήσεως, φρονήσεως, τῶν καλῶν, yet I believe that when directly and literally applied to its object it seldom or never means anything else. Arist. Eth. N. IX. 10, 1171. 12, ἐρᾶν...ὑπερβολή γάρ τις εἶναι βούλεται φιλίας, τοῦτο δὲ πρὸς ἕνα, is an exception; here ἐρᾶν is said to be a kind of φιλία; the individual passion opposed to 'affection' or 'love' in general. The reverse of this—the ordinary distinction of the two words—appears in Pl. Phædr. 231. C, τούτους μάλιστά φασι φιλεῖν ὧν ἂν ἐρῶσι, that is, they feel the highest (moral) affection for those who inspire them with the sensual passion. Comp. 255. E, καλεῖ δὲ αὐτὸν καὶ οἴεται οὐκ ἔρωτα ἀλλὰ φιλίαν εἶναι. Symp. 179. C, ὑπερεβάλετο τῇ φιλία διὰ τὸν ἔρωτα, where ἔρως represents the στοργή, or natural affection. Ib. 182. C, φιλίας, ὃ δὴ μάλιστα φιλεῖ ὁ ἔρως ἐμποιεῖν. Ar. Polit. II. 4, 1262. b. 12, ὡς τῶν ἐρώντων διὰ τὸ σφόδρα φιλεῖν ἐπιθυμούντων συμφῦναι, Eth. N. IX. 5, 1167. 3, ἔοικε δὴ ἀρχὴ φιλίας εἶναι, ὥσπερ τοῦ ἐρᾶν, ἡ διὰ τῆς ὄψεως ἡδονή. The distinction of ἔρως and φιλία appears very clearly in Eth. Nic. IX. 1, sub init. 1164. a. 3 seq. ἐν δὲ τῇ ἐρωτικῇ κ.τ.λ. When the word is applied to a higher and purer love—in such passages as Eur. Fragm. Dict. VIII. (Dind.

Wagner,) *ἀλλ' ἔστι δή τις ἄλλος ἐν βροτοῖς ἔρως, ψυχῆς δικαίως σώφρονός τε κἀγαθῆς, καὶ χρὴν δὲ...τῶν εὐσεβούντων οἵτινές γε σώφρονες ἐρᾷν*; and Fragm. Œdip. III. (Dind.), VII. (Wagn.), *ἑνὸς δ' ἔρωτος ὄντος οὐ μί' ἡδονή· οἱ μὲν κακῶν ἐρωσῖν, οἱ δὲ τῶν καλῶν. ὁ δ' εἰς τὸ σῶφρον ἐπ' ἀρετὴν ἄγων ἔρως ζηλωτὸς ἀνθρώποισιν*—this is only an apparent exception, for here it is still the animal impulse which is represented as sublimed and purified, and transformed (by a metaphor) into a *moral* appetite, just as the ἔρως in Plato's Phædrus and Symposium is converted by the same process into a passion of philosophical enthusiasm.

φιλεῖν and *φιλία* are designations of 'love' in its widest and most comprehensive sense. The verb may even stand as a synonym of *ἐρᾶν*, as Topic. A. 15, 106. b. 2, *τῷ μὲν κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν φιλεῖν τὸ μισεῖν ἐναντίον, τῷ δὲ κατὰ τὴν σωματικὴν ἐνέργειαν οὐδέν.* Where the *τὸ φιλεῖν κατὰ τὴν σωμ. ἐν.* is of course equivalent to *ἐρᾶν*. It also includes the whole family of likings and fondnesses, natural and acquired, which are attached to special and particular classes of objects, expressed by compound adjectives; as *φιλοτοιοῦτος* 'one who is fond of so and so,' *φίλοινος, φίλιππος, φιλότιμος, φιλόνικος, φιλέταιρος, φίλαυτος*, &c. In the eighth and ninth books of the Nic. Eth. *φιλία* embraces every kind of moral and intellectual affection instinctive or acquired, and is identified both with *στέργειν* (VIII. 14, 1181, 27, 28.) and *ἀγαπᾶν*—see for example VIII. 3, where all three are employed as equivalent terms (1156. 14, 16), *ἐρᾶν*, the sensual appetite being expressly distinguished from them by its own name, b. 2, 4. In Plato, Phædr. 241. C, D, it comprehends even *ἔρως, τὴν ἐραστοῦ φιλίαν, ὡς παῖδα φιλοῦσιν ἐρασταί*; and in the same verse *ἀγαπᾶν* is used in the same sense. In the Ethics therefore it expresses every shade and variety and gradation of the feeling of love in its moral and intellectual aspects from the instinctive affection of the parent, to the highest and ideal form of love; which according to the Greek notion was not that which subsists between the two opposite sexes, but that between two members of the superior sex; and again within that, the *friendship* of two *good* men. The definition of *φιλία* in the Rhetoric, II. 4. 2, is 'the wishing any one what you think good, for his sake and not for your

own' (this is repeated from the Ethics), 'and the inclination or tendency to do such things to the best of your power.' This is disinterested affection, love in its moral aspect, and also in some degree intellectual in so far as it implies choice: and in this respect corresponds with the Latin diligere, or deligere, to *choose* the object of your affection, which implies a *judgment* of his value. The analysis as well as the definition of the *πάθος* in the Rhetoric excludes all consideration of *ἔρως*, and in fact it is treated rather as friendship than as love.

We next come to the distinction between *φιλεῖν* and *ἀγαπᾶν*. Döderlein, Lat. Syn. p. 103, and Rost u. Palm in their Lexicon, connect *ἀγαπᾶν* with the root of *ἄγαμαι* and its congeners: this would make the distinctive character of *ἀγαπᾶν* an intellectual form of love derived from 'admiration' or a high *estimate* of the merits of the person loved. Whether this be the true derivation of the word or not, this notion of selection, or affection conceived, on the ground of admiration, respect, and esteem, certainly enters into its meaning. Xen. Mem. II. 7. 9, is decisive on this point. Speaking of the relations of a master to his female servants, Socrates says, *ἐὰν δὲ προστατήσῃς ὅπως ἐνεργοὶ ὦσι, σὺ μὲν ἐκείνας φιλήσεις ὁρῶν ὠφελίμους σεαυτῷ οὔσας· ἐκεῖναι δέ σε ἀγαπήσουσι αἰσθόμεναι χαίροντά σε αὐταῖς.* The same conception of value (*estimation*) and hence *esteem*, as the foundation of love—complete *φιλία*—appears in a passage of Plato's Lysis, 215. A, B, *τὰ δὴ τοιαῦτα πῶς ἂν ὑπ' ἀλλήλων ἀγαπηθείη μηδεμίαν ἐπιχουρίαν ἀλλήλοις ἔχοντα*; (the service rendered or benefit conferred is the ground of the esteem and affection;) *ὁ δὲ μή του δεόμενος οὐδέ τι ἀγαπῴη ἄν. ὃ δὲ μὴ ἀγαπῴη οὐδ' ἂν φιλοῖ.*

I have looked over with the help of an index the instances of the word which occur in the Nicomachean Ethics, and find that in every case it may, and in many must, have this sense of an acquired affection, founded upon the judgment or intellectual faculty, which is indicated by the term 'esteem', and thereby distinguished from the irrational appetite *ἔρως*, and the purely emotional, and usually moral, affection, *φιλία*. In I. 3, init. 1095, b. 17, the *esteem* which the vulgar have for a life of sensual enjoyment is represented as the result of a *judgment*

about pleasure: and the same is the case with δι' αὑτὰ ἀγαπᾶται at the end of the Chapter. 'They are valued, prized, esteemed, in and for themselves'. In III. 13, 1118. b. 4, it is distinguished from χαίρειν, the instinctive affection, in the sense of to 'estimate or prize'; and at the end of c. 14, there is a very marked and decisive exemplification of this sense of the word, ὁ γὰρ οὕτως ἔχων μᾶλλον ἀγαπᾷ τὰς τοιαύτας ἡδονὰς τῆς ἀξιάς, where the ἀξία 'their value' shows clearly what determines the particular character of the affection. In further illustration of this I will merely refer to other places of the Ethics. In IX. 7, from 1167. b. 32 onwards, four examples occur nearly together of the word in this signification; in one of them it is actually contrasted with φιλεῖν: and X. 7, 1177. b. 2, and 9, 1179. 28, where it is placed in juxtaposition with τιμῶντας another word which conveys the notion of 'value', are two clear instances. ἀγαπᾶν therefore as contrasted with ἐρᾶν and φιλεῖν represents the Latin diligere as opposed to amare[1].

It may be questioned whether this is the primary and original sense of ἀγαπᾶν, since the meaning that appears most prominently and conspicuously in the Homeric use of it and ἀγαπάζειν is that of the external manifestations and signs of affection shown in 'welcoming[2]' a friend or stranger; or in fondling and caressing, as a father his child, Odys. π'. 17: and the word is the precise counterpart of ἀσπάζεσθαι. See the examples in Damm's Lexicon, which all have this character; except Odys. φ'. 289, where it bears the sense, common in the later language, and shared with αἰνεῖν and στέργειν, of acquiescing in, putting up with, contentment. But as it seems easier and simpler to derive the notion of the external indications of welcome from an internal sense or judgment, previously acquired, of the worth or value of one whom you receive so kindly, than the reverse process, the derivation of the feeling, whether it be esteem or affection, from the external manifesta-

[1] Ernesti Clav. Cic. s. v. diligere magis ad judicium, amare vero ad intimum animi sensum pertinet. See Dœderlein, Lat. Syn. p. 97, seq. and Trench, New Test. Syn. p. 43, seq.

[2] Dr Lightfoot in Camb. Journal of Philology, No. 7, Vol. III. p. 92, regards this usage of Homer as determining the primary and original sense of the word.

tions of it, I prefer regarding the intellectual judgment as the basis of the distinction between it and the other forms of affection, and 'esteem' as its primary and original signification. If Döderlein's derivation from *ἄγαμαι*, and words of that family, could be depended upon, no doubt would be left upon the question.

In common usage however it is, like *φιλεῖν*, by no means confined to a single sense. In Plato's Sympos. 180. B, it takes the place of *ἐρᾶν* in the representation of the lowest and most sensual form of the passion or appetite of love, *ὅταν ὁ ἐρώμενος τὸν ἐραστὴν ἀγαπᾷ ἢ ὅταν ὁ ἐραστὴς τὰ παιδικά.* In Luc. Ver. Hist. II. 25, we find similarly, *ἐπιμανῶς ἀγαπῶσα τὸν νεανίσκον.*

We therefore arrive at the conclusion in respect of these terms, expressive of different kinds of love or affection, that, although they are all of them more or less interchangeable in the ordinary language, yet in the strict and proper application of them they may be thus distinguished.

στοργή and *ἔρως* are alike in that they are natural, spontaneous, and instinctive; but *ἔρως* is properly a sensual appetite, and *στοργή* a moral affection.

φιλία, the most comprehensive (in its ordinary use) of the four, belongs to the *emotional* part of our nature, includes all grades of the natural instinctive affection from a liking for wine to the perfect friendship (the highest form of love) between good man and good man; and in this its highest and normal sense acquires a *moral* aspect.

ἀγαπᾶν (*ἀγάπη* does not appear in any writers earlier than those of the N. T.) gives the *intellectual* aspect of love, in the shape of esteem; no longer a mere *emotion*, but an affection acquired and conceived after an exercise of judgment, consisting in a valuation or estimate formed of the *worth* of the object of preference.

III.

On an irregular formation of the Greek passive verb.

φθονεῖσθαι, φθονούμενοι, is an example of the irregular formation of the passive which is not seldom found in other Greek

authors, but is so much more frequent in Aristotle's writings that it may perhaps be regarded as one of the characteristics of his style. In the Greek Grammars that I have consulted, with the exception of Dr Donaldson's, who only bestows on it a passing observation[1], it is left unnoticed, and I will therefore illustrate it by some examples that I have collected. The best account of it that I have found is given in Madvig's Latin Grammar, Ch. III. on the dative case, § 244. b, and Obs. 3, 4, Engl. Transl.; his explanation of the Latin usage will apply equally well to the Greek.

The transitive verb, which expresses a *direct* action of subject on object—the relation of the two being inverted in the passive, in which agent becomes patient and patient agent, I strike A, A is struck by me—is the only kind that according to strict grammatical rule admits of the passive formation: verbs neuter, in which the action ends in itself, to walk, to run, and verbs which transmit the action, but *indirectly*—these are verbs which in Greek and Latin 'govern' other cases than the *accusative* (the case which expresses the direct action)—cannot properly speaking be converted into passives.

Speaking of the dative case, 'the object of reference' in Latin, Madvig says, § 244. b, "this cannot, like the proper object, become the subject with the passive, and such verbs (like those that are intransitive) can only be used impersonally in the passive, invidetur, nemini nocetur." [I am not sure that there is any exact analogy to this in Greek, *ἁμαρτάνεται* is a doubtful case.] Obs. 4, gives a few exceptions "To make such a dative the subject, and to use the verb of it personally in the passive, is a rare irregularity; invideor, Hor. A. P. 56, credor, Ov. Trist. III. 10. 25, medendis corporibus, Liv. VIII. 36," add regnari, Tac. Hist. I. 16; virginibus bacchata Lacænis Taygeta, Virg. Georg. II. 487, regnata, Hor. Od. II. 6. 11, III. 29. 27, Ovid. Heroid. X. 69, imperor, Hor. Ep. I. 5. 21. Heusinger ad Cic. de Off. II. 4, gives a list of 'neuter' verbs which become passives, but does not make the necessary distinctions; most of those which he quotes are used as *impersonals*.

Obs. 2, "Some few verbs are used both with the accusative

[1] Grk. Gram. § 431. Obs. hh, ii.

and the dative [in applying this to the Greek, for *dative*, must be substituted, 'some other case with or without a preposition',] without any perceptible difference in their signification, adulor, æmulor, despero, præstolor." In Greek θορυβεῖσθαι, (ἡμᾶς θορυβείτω, Plat. Phædr. 245. B.) ἀμελεῖσθαι (ἀμελεῖν with accus. Herod. VII. 163) are analogous.

In English a similar license is admitted, particularly in verbs which are constructed with prepositions, 'do as you would be done by,' or 'done unto,' Locke. Ess. Bk. I. ch. 3. § 4 and 7. 'to be sent for' 'gone for' 'looked for' 'to be relied upon' (hence the vulgar, reliable, unaccountable, and similar irregularities). See an observation on this subject in Marsh's Lect. on the Engl. Language, Lect. XVIII. § 14. "The rejection of inflexions, and especially the want of a passive voice, have compelled the use of some very complex and awkward expressions. ...such a thing *has been gone through with, to be taken notice of, to be lost sight of* are really compound, or rather agglutinate, passives, &c."

I subjoin some instances of this irregular passive from various Greek authors. Euripides Ion. 87, Παρνησιάδες δ' ἄβατοι κορυφαὶ καταλαμπόμεναι, Ib. 475, χορευομένῳ τρίποδι, Iph. Taur. 367, αὐλεῖται δὲ πᾶν μέλαθρον.

Thuc. I. 126, ἐπιτετραμμένοι τὴν φυλακήν, ["even the dative or genitive of the person, which had formed the object of the active verb, may become the subject of the passive. Thuc. I. 126. Xen. Anab. II. 6. 1, ἀποτμηθέντες τὰς κεφαλάς[1], &c." Donaldson, Gr. Gr. u. s.]

[1] I rather think that this is not the right explanation of the construction in these two cases; at all events it may be otherwise explained. The verbs ἐπιτρέπειν and ἀποτέμνειν are both transitive, and therefore the *passive form* is regular. The accusative is the *local* accusative, which expresses the *seat* of any affection or quality, and follows adjectives and verbs neuter and passive; [Jelf (Kühner) *Gr. Gr.* § 545. 6, supposes with great probability that this is a mere extension of the ordinary cognate accus. and its varieties,] ἀγαθὸς τὴν ψυχήν, τὰ πολιτικά, ἀρετήν &c. (Plat.), καλὸς τὸ πρόσωπον, ἀλγεῖν τὴν κεφαλήν, τὰ ὄμματα, δέρεσθαι τὸ νῶτον, τῶν τὰ ὦτα κατεαγότων; Gorg. 515. E. βοὴν ἀγαθὸς Μενέλαος, πόδας ὠκὺς Ἀχιλλεύς, and so on. By the same rule, τὴν φυλακήν after ἐπιτετραμμένοι expresses the seat of, the place as it were in which it is deposited or lodged; the trust, (viz. the watch,) committed to them.

The deponents *αἱρεῖσθαι* and *ὠνεῖσθαι* are converted into passives in Xen. Memor. III. 2. 3, Ar. Pol. VI(IV). 45, 1299. 19, *αἱροῦνται δὲ καὶ πρεσβευταί* (this may possibly be justified by the transitive use of *αἱρεῖν, but in a different sense*, the *middle* being necessary to the notion of 'choosing', or '*taking for oneself*'.) Plat. Phæd. 69. B, (in Ast's note several other examples of *ὠνεῖσθαι* pass. from Xenoph. and Plat.) sim. *ἀπαρνεῖσθαι*, passive, Ar. Anal. Pr. I. 32, 47. b. 2, 3, 4. *ἀναβαθείς*, Xen. de re Equestr. III. 4, of a horse that *is mounted*, (the regular constr. is *ἀναβαίνειν ἐφ' ἵππον*, or *ἐφ' ἵππου*.) *ἀναβαίνειν* in Hom. with the accus. has a diff. sense, 'to go up *to*'.) *ἀπειλεῖσθαι*, Conv. IV. 31. *χαλεπαίνεσθαι* to be regarded, or treated, with angry feeling, Plat. Rep. I. 337. A, *σπουδάζεσθαι*, to be eagerly pursued, (several other examples in Ast. Lex. s. v. *ἐσπουδασμένους*, Isocr. Panath. § 144) Ib. VI. 485. E, *ἀμελεῖσθαι* (see above) VIII. 551. A, *καταφρονεῖσθαι*, Ib. 556. D, *καταγελασθῆναι*, Euthypro. 3. C, *πλημμελεῖσθαι*, Phædr. 275. E, Dem. de Cor. § 155, (in a law). *σπουδάζεσθαι*, *καταφρονεῖσθαι*, Ar. Rhet. II. 3. 7, *ὑπερέχεσθαι*, Rhet. I. 7. 2, 3, and Eth. N. IV. 8, 1124. b. 10, [*ὑπερέχειν τι* or *τινά*, do occur, but rarely.] *θορυβεῖσθαι*, I. 2. 10, II. 23. 30, Topic. A. 12, 105. a. 16, Isocr. Panath. *ἐπηνημένος καὶ τεθορυβημένος* (on *θορυβεῖσθαι* see above). *βοηθεῖσθαι*, Rhet. II. 6. 6, *ἐπικεχείρηται*, III. 1. 3. *ἐπιβουλεύεσθαι*, Pol. VIII (V.) 10, 1311. b. 35, *φθονεῖσθαι*, Ib. 11, 1313. a. 23, *πιστεύεσθαι*, Ib. 10, 1310. b. 16. Xen. Symp. IV. 29, Isocr. c. Demon. § 30, *πιστευθέντες, π. εἰρήν.* § 76, Dem. c. Aristocr. p. 622. § 4. *μετέχεσθαι*, 'to be participated in', Arist. Metaph. A. 9, 990. b. 30, Top. Δ. 121. a. 12, *τοῦ μετεχομένου λόγου*, 126. a. 18 and 21, Eth. Eud. I. 8. 2. *προστάττεσθαι*, Top. E. 129. a. 14, *ἐπιτάττεσθαι*, Metaph. A. 2, 982. a. 18. *ἐνυπάρχεσθαι* (an unusually strange form), Anal. Post. I. 4, 73. b. 18. (Waitz. ad loc.) *κατηγορεῖσθαι* passim ap. Arist. (Waitz. ad Anal. Pr. 47. b. 1.)

ἁμαρτάνεσθαι, certainly occurs as a pass., frequently in Sophocles and Plato, Eurip. Troad. 1028, Ar. Eth. Nic. IV. 9, 1125. a. 19, in the form *ἡμαρτημένος*; and in some other forms which are undoubtedly passive; Xen. Mem. I. 2. 9, *ἁμαρτανόμενα*, bis, Arist. Eth. Nic. III. 3, 1111. 35, *ἁμαρτηθέντα*, [also *ἁμαρτάνεται*, as II. 5, 1106. b. 26, (and elsewhere), which in this place from

the opposition to κατορθοῦται, v. 30, seems more likely to be passive than middle]: but in those cases where the choice between passive and middle is open, and the form does not determine it, as ἁμαρτάνεται ἁμαρτανόμενος, it is often difficult to decide between the two. Homer certainly employs the middle, Od. IX. 512, ἁμαρτήσεσθαι; and there seems no positive objection to the interpretation of some of the forms employed by Plato and Aristotle as middle. (Ast. in his Lex. ranks all of them in Plato amongst the passives). If the forms in question, ἁμαρτάνεσθαι &c., are regarded as passive, the accusative which *in this case* becomes the nomin. to the passive verb, is the *cognate*, and not the *direct*, accusative. The *object* of the erroneous proceeding is the *mistake* that is made, ἁμαρτάνειν ἁμάρτημα; which becomes the subject to the passive.

CAIUS OR HIPPOLYTUS?

Caius, the Roman presbyter, plays an important part in the literary history of Christianity at the opening of the third century. If the ravages of time have spared only fragments of his works, he has not been more hardly treated in this respect than many famous writers of the Antenicene Church. Even without the important Fragment on the Canon and the elaborate Refutation of all Heresies, both of which works have been attributed to him by some modern critics, the literary remains bearing his name with the accompanying notes occupy some thirty pages in Routh's collection. It may therefore be thought the height of audacity to question the existence of such a person. Yet this appears to me to be a very probable inference from the facts established during the Hippolytean controversy; and I am surprised that it has not been drawn by any one before.

The works attributed to Caius by ancient writers and included under his name in Routh's collection are the following:

(1) The Dialogue with Proclus, directed against Montanism. It is quoted several times by Eusebius, who mentions Caius as the author[1].

(2) A Treatise on the Cause of the Universe, directed against the Platonic doctrine. Photius states that certain persons attributed it to Caius. A considerable fragment of this work is extant.

(3) The Little Labyrinth, from which long quotations are given by Eusebius, though without mentioning the author's name. Photius says that it was generally ascribed to Caius, and seems himself to acquiesce in this opinion[2].

[1] *Hist. Eccl.* II. 25, III. 28, 31, VI. 20. [2] *Biblioth.* 48.

(4) A Treatise against the heresy of Artemon, mentioned by Photius as assigned to Caius[1].

But besides the treatises above enumerated, of whose literary parentage some account must be given, before we can dispose of Caius, certain facts are recorded of his life, which seem at first sight to give him a substantial existence and to resist any attempt to annihilate him.

We learn from Eusebius, that he was a member of the Catholic Church (ἐκκλησιαστικὸς ἀνήρ); that he was a man of great learning (λογιώτατος); that he resided in Rome; that he held the dialogue with the Montanist Proclus during the pontificate of Zephyrinus; and that he received only thirteen Epistles of St Paul, thus excluding the Epistle to the Hebrews. Jerome, as usual, has derived all his knowledge from Eusebius, and repeats the same statements somewhat more loosely. Theodoret only knows Caius as the writer of the Dialogue against Proclus[2]. Photius is somewhat fuller. 'This Caius,' he writes, 'is reported to have been a presbyter of the church in Rome during the pontificate of Victor and Zephyrinus, and to have been ordained bishop of the Gentiles.'

I have already alluded to the fact, that the 'Refutation of all Heresies,' which was first brought to light and published some twenty years ago, was added to the literary achievements of Caius by several able critics. This fresh honour was the immediate occasion of his downfall. The Refutation is now ascribed by pretty general consent to his learned contemporary Hippolytus. On this point the representatives of the most opposite schools—Bunsen, Wordsworth, Döllinger—are agreed; and the coincidence with respect to the authorship is the more striking, because the work affords material for manifold theological controversy.

Unhappily for the fame of Caius, the Refutation cannot stand alone. Its author must also have written all the treatises ascribed by ancient authorities to this learned Roman presbyter, with the exception of the Dialogue with Proclus.

The *Treatise against Artemon* may conveniently be taken first. It is generally agreed that this treatise must be identical

[1] *Biblioth.* 48. [2] *Hær. Fab.* II. 3, III. 2.

with the Little Labyrinth, and that Photius has blundered in making two distinct works out of two titles to the same work. The grounds of this charge appear to be conclusive. For, though the extant fragments are directed chiefly against Theodotus, another leading monarchian, yet Eusebius, to whom we are indebted for their preservation, says that the work was written 'against the heresy of Artemon'[1]; and Theodoret, after mentioning both Artemon and Theodotus, says, 'Against the heresy of these men was composed the Little Labyrinth[2].' It may be inferred indeed from his own language, that Photius had not himself read the work to which he refers, and if so, he might easily fall into this error. After mentioning the Little Labyrinth, he adds 'They say that he composed another treatise also specially (ἰδίως) against the heresy of Artemon.'

Who then was the author of the *Little Labyrinth?* Eusebius does not know, and quotes the work anonymously. Theodoret states merely that it had been ascribed to Origen, but that this opinion is refuted by the style. He does not give his own view and probably had none to give. Photius asserts that at the end of the Little Labyrinth the author mentions the treatise on the Cause of the Universe, as being his own work. This statement he makes on the strength of some marginal notes in his copy of the latter treatise. This marginal annotator also attributed both works to Caius, the writer of the Dialogue with Proclus. How Caius came to be singled out for this honour, I shall endeavour to explain hereafter. At present we may consider one point as settled; that the Little Labyrinth proceeded from the same author as the Cause of the Universe.

We have therefore to ascertain, who was the author of the *Cause of the Universe.* Photius mentions that, as it was anonymous, some attributed it to Josephus, others to Justin, others to Irenæus, 'just as some have ascribed the Labyrinth to Origen.' His own copy seems to have borne the name of Josephus, for he commences the section, 'I have perused a treatise of Josephus "On the Universe," which I have read inscribed in other copies "On the Cause of the Universe," and in others again

[1] *Hist. Eccl.* v. 28. [2] *Hær. Fab.* II. 5.

"On the Nature of the Universe." It consists of two short discourses (λογιδίοις) and in them (the author) shows that Plato contradicts himself.' This description exactly accords with the title of a work inscribed on the statue of Hippolytus, 'Against the Greeks or against Plato, or also, on the Universe.' Again, a considerable fragment of this work is preserved[1], bearing the title in one copy 'Of Hippolytus[2],' in another 'Of Josephus,' 'From the discourse to the Greeks bearing the title Against Plato on the Cause of the Universe.' Lastly, the author of the Refutation refers to this treatise as a work of his own[3]; and therefore all the independent arguments which go to prove that Hippolytus wrote the Refutation are equally valid to enforce his claims to the authorship of the treatise on the Universe. This evidence seems irresistible; and, as the treatise on the Universe carries with it the Little Labyrinth, both these works must be transferred from Caius to Hippolytus. Even before the discovery of the Refutation had so materially strengthened the evidence, Routh had suggested this as a probable inference from the facts already before him[4].

Thus stripped of his borrowed plumage, Caius retains only the Dialogue with Proclus the Montanist. Of this work a brief notice is given by Eusebius, who also preserves two or three short fragments[5]. It appears from these that the dialogue professed to have been held in Rome during the pontificate of Zephyrinus; that Caius was the orthodox and Proclus the Montanist disputant; that in defending the prophesyings of his sect Proclus appealed to the four daughters of Philip, who with their father were buried at Hierapolis; and that, as a set-off against these precious reliques, Caius offered to show his antagonist the tombs of St Peter and St Paul, the one at the Vati-

[1] See Lagarde's *Hippolytus Romanus*, p. 68. To this edition I shall refer, when I have occasion to quote the smaller works.

[2] This is distinctly stated by Bunsen (I. p. 401), and Wordsworth (p. 155); but I have only been able to trace the name of Hippolytus in the heading of this fragment to the editorship of Le Moyne. However the authorship of the treatise seems to be established without this additional proof.

[3] *Refut. Hæres.* x. 32.

[4] *Rel. Sacr.* II. p. 143.

[5] See the references given above, p. 98, note 1.

can, the other on the Ostian Way. Moreover, a passage is quoted (obviously from a speech of Caius), which, as the exact expressions have an important bearing on the subject of this paper, I shall here quote at length:

'But Cerinthus also, by means of revelations purporting to have been written by a great apostle, lyingly imposes upon us marvellous prodigies which he professes to have been shown him by angels, saying that after the resurrection the kingdom of Christ is an earthly kingdom, and again that men shall live in Jerusalem in the flesh and be the slaves of lusts and pleasures. And, being an enemy to the Scriptures of God, he would fain deceive and says that a tale of a thousand years is to be spent in marriage festivities[1].'

Having thus given the facts which bear upon the decision, I will state my hypothesis. Unless I am mistaken, it explains all the phenomena better than they have hitherto been explained; and, if so, it may fairly claim a hearing.

Caius is simply an interlocutor in a dialogue against the Montanists written by Hippolytus. By this person, who takes the orthodox side in the discussion, Hippolytus may have intended himself, or he may have invented an imaginary character for dramatic purposes. In other words, such a dialogue may really have taken place, or the narrative may be fictitious from beginning to end. In the former case, we may suppose that Caius was his own prænomen; for then he would naturally so style himself in the dialogue, just as Cicero appears under the name of Marcus in his own writings. Not being a slave and being in some sense a Roman, Hippolytus must almost necessarily have had two names, if not more; just as his Alexandrian contemporary is styled in full T. Flavius Clemens, and his African contemporary Q. Septimius Florens Tertullianus. Such a combination as Caius Hippolytus is natu-

[1] Euseb. *Hist. Eccl.* III. 28 ἀλλὰ καὶ Κήρινθος [ὁ] δι' ἀποκαλύψεων ὡς ὑπὸ ἀποστόλου μεγάλου γεγραμμένων τερατολογίας ἡμῖν ὡς δι' ἀγγέλων αὐτῷ δεδειγμένας ψευδόμενος ἐπεισάγει, λέγων μετὰ τὴν ἀνάστασιν ἐπίγειον εἶναι τὸ βασίλειον τοῦ Χρίστου· καὶ πάλιν ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ ἡδοναῖς ἐν Ἱερουσαλὴμ τὴν σάρκα πολιτευομένην δουλεύειν. καὶ ἐχθρὸς ὑπάρχων ταῖς γραφαῖς τοῦ Θεοῦ ἀριθμὸν χιλιονταετίας ἐν γάμῳ ἑορτῆς θέλων πλανᾷν λέγει γίνεσθαι.

ral in itself, and indeed occurs in an extant inscription found at Placentia; Q. Poblicio L. L. C. Hippolytus[1]. On the latter supposition (that Caius is an imaginary person), we may appeal to the legal formula 'Ubi tu Caius, ego Caia,' as suggesting that Hippolytus might avail himself of the name which corresponds to the anonymous N. or M. of our own formularies. Of the former kind of dialogue, where the author himself is the orthodox disputant, the work of Justin against Trypho may be taken as a type: of the latter, where a fictitious person maintains the right cause, the dispute between Jason and Papiscus by Ariston of Pella will serve as an example[2].

I suppose then that the copies of the Dialogue in general circulation were anonymous. The title may have run Διάλογος Γαΐου καὶ Πρόκλου (or πρὸς Πρόκλον) ἢ κατὰ Μοντανιστῶν. A writer, into whose hands this Dialogue fell, would naturally infer, as Eusebius inferred, (and the analogy of Justin's work would favour the inference), that Caius was the actual author of the book. The few particulars which Eusebius gives respecting the life of Caius were doubtless drawn from the Dialogue itself. Those which are added by Photius came from the other writings attributed to Caius, from the Cause of the Universe or the Little Labyrinth, or perhaps even from the Refutation itself. The critics, whom he quotes and to whom he is indebted for these particulars, had observed the cross references from one work to another and correctly inferred therefrom the identity of authorship. Among these cross references was one which connected the authorship of the 'Dialogue of Caius and Proclus' with the other works, just as these are connected among themselves and proved to belong to the same author. Hence Caius, assumed to be the author of the Dialogue, was credited with the other works also.

This is the explanation of the fact that all the particulars, which are predicated of Caius, are predicated or predicable of

[1] Gruter, DCCCCLXXXIX. 4.

[2] The work of Minucius Felix stands midway between the two; for, while the chief disputant on the right side is a third person, the writer himself is supposed to be present. Another instance of an early polemical writing thrown into the form of a dialogue is the dispute of Archelaus and Manes. Routh's *Rel. Sacr.* v. p. 3 sq.

Hippolytus also. They both flourish during the same pontificates; they are both styled 'presbyters' and both live in Rome; they both receive only thirteen Epistles as written by St Paul, excluding the Epistle to the Hebrews; they both are men of great learning, though the Roman Church for some generations before and after this time was singularly devoid of literary eminence. And lastly, we have here an explanation of the otherwise not very intelligible statement, that Caius was appointed 'bishop of the Gentiles[1];' for Hippolytus in the Refutation speaks of himself as holding the episcopal office[2], and addresses the Gentiles more than once as though they were his special charge[3]. If the designation 'bishop of the Gentiles' is not strictly correct, it was at least a very easy inference from his language in this work; and probably he expressed himself similarly elsewhere, when the occasion demanded, as for instance in the treatise on the Universe addressed to the Greeks.

To this identification of Caius and Hippolytus another ancient notice also points. The extant MSS of the Martyrdom of Polycarp profess to be derived ultimately from a copy which was 'transcribed from the writings (or manuscripts or lectures) of Irenæus the disciple of Polycarp by Caius, who also was intimate with Irenæus[4].' Now I shall not stop to enquire whether this postscript to the account of Polycarp's martyrdom contains authentic matter or not; but in any case it would

[1] Photius *Bibl.* 48 *χειροτονηθῆναι δὲ αὐτὸν καὶ ἐθνῶν ἐπίσκοπον.* Fabricius would read ΑΘΗΝΩΝ for ΕΘΝΩΝ, and Dr Wordsworth (*St Hippolytus* p. 29, note 5) suggests ΕΩΘΙΝΩΝ. The view which Hippolytus seems to have taken of his special mission is the real explanation of the phrase *ἐθνῶν ἐπίσκοπος*; and how the position of his see might lead him to take this view, will be best learnt from Dr Wordsworth's own words elsewhere (p. 101); 'He was well qualified to be Bishop of Portus, because it was the principal harbour of the imperial city and was thronged with strangers, Greeks, Asiatics, and Africans, merchants, shipmen, and soldiers, philosophers, physicians, ambassadors, and astrologers, Christians, Jews, and Pagans, flocking to Rome.'

[2] *Refut. Hæres.* I. procem. p. 3 *τῆς αὐτῆς χάριτος μετέχοντες ἀρχιερατείας τε καὶ διδασκαλίας.*

[3] *Ib.* x. 31, 32, 34. In the close of the treatise, which is wanting, he may have alluded to his episcopate more directly in connexion with the Gentiles to whom this peroration is addressed.

[4] § 22 *ταῦτα μετεγράψατο μὲν Γάϊος ἐκ τῶν Εἰρηναίου μαθητοῦ τοῦ Πολυκάρπου, ὃς καὶ συνεπολιτεύσατο τῷ Εἰρηναίῳ.*

seem that the transcriber here intended was none other than our Caius, the Roman presbyter; for he is the only notable personage of the name and age, whose attestation would be of value to accredit the genuineness of the narrative. If so, it is remarkable that he is represented as a disciple of Irenæus. For Hippolytus also attended the lectures of this father and was much indebted to them for the materials of his earlier Compendium against heresies[1]. In his later Refutation also he twice mentions Irenæus as 'the blessed elder,' and in the second of the two passages avows his great obligations to him[2]. May we suppose that Caius in the Dialogue with Proclus expressed himself similarly with respect to this father?

Again, the hypothesis of an anonymous copy falls in with another class of facts mentioned above. The knowledge of Eusebius was limited in character and extent by the materials within his reach. To the library at Cæsarea, collected by the diligence of his friend Pamphilus, we probably owe the valuable remains of early Christian literature which he has preserved to us; and, where this library was defective, his knowledge would be defective also. Now it appears to have contained some volumes bearing the name of Hippolytus; for, though he passes over this father very lightly, he gives a list of several books written by him, adding, 'And you may find very many works besides still extant in the hands of many persons[3].' But, in addition to the works which he enumerates, the library also contained another stray volume, from which the writer's name was accidentally omitted and of which Eusebius therefore did not recognise the authorship. This volume comprised the Dialogue of Caius and Proclus, the Little Labyrinth, and the Cause of the Universe. The first of these Eusebius ascribes to Caius (of whom he evidently knows nothing besides), because Caius is the orthodox interlocutor. The second he quotes but quotes anonymously, not knowing who was the author. Of the third it is worth remarking this negative fact, that he has not

[1] Photius *Biblioth.* 121 *ταύτας δὲ (τὰς αἱρέσεις) φησὶν ἐλέγχοις ὑποβληθῆναι ὁμιλοῦντος Εἰρηναίου, ὧν καὶ σύνοψιν ὁ Ἱππόλυτος ποιούμενος τόδε τὸ βίβλιον φησὶν συντεταχέναι.*

[2] *Refut. Hæres.* VI. 42, 55.

[3] *Hist. Eccl.* VI. 22.

included it in his list of the works of Hippolytus, though it is so included in the catalogue on the statue. From its subject it probably would not assist his historical researches, and he therefore does not quote from it and probably did not read it. In the same form also—perhaps in a copy transcribed from the archetype in the Cæsarean library—the three anonymous treatises fell into the hands of the critic or critics mentioned by Photius. They saw from the cross references that the three works must be ascribed to the same author; and, either following Eusebius or drawing the same easy but incorrect inference independently, they attributed the Dialogue against the Montanists to one Caius. To Caius therefore this anonymous volume was assigned.

And I think also that on the supposition that this dialogue was written by Hippolytus a better explanation can be found than has hitherto been given of another ancient notice relating to this writer. In a list of his works contained in the Syrian catalogue of Ebed-Jesu is mentioned 'Heads[1] (or theses, or propositions) against Caius.' No heretic bearing this name is known to have existed. Some therefore have supposed that there is a corruption in the text, and that the work was directed against the Cainites[2];' but the Syriac form of the word does not countenance this view, for it is simply the Greek word 'Gaios' written in Syriac characters. Others again have supposed that this work of Hippolytus was directed against the Roman presbyter Caius. Hippolytus is known, from the catalogue on his statue and from other sources, to have been the author of a work 'In defence of the Gospel and Apocalypse of St John;' and on the other hand Caius (in the passage quoted above[3]) is supposed to deny the Apostolic authorship of the Apocalypse.

[1] c. 7, Assemanni *Bibl. Orient.* III. p. 15. The word *rishe*, heads, occurs frequently in this Catalogue of Ebed-Jesu; e.g. pp. 41, 95, 103, 153, 163, 176, 177, 189, 192, 204, 361. The form which the title of the work here takes may have been shaped by the requirements of the metre.

[2] As these heretics derived their name from Cain (Iren. I. 31. 1, Hippol. *Hæres.* v. 16), the form *Caiani*, which is frequently read, must be incorrect. The word is written Καϊνοὶ in Hippolytus (VIII. 20), and this is apparently the correct reading in Epiphanius (XXXVIII. 1, p. 276), where the common text has Καιανοί.

[3] See p. 102.

It is therefore maintained that the work 'Against Caius' is identical with this defence of the Gospel and Apocalypse. But, allowing for the moment that the language in the Dialogue of Caius and Proclus does imply a denial of the genuineness of the Apocalypse, the following formidable objections occur to the identification of the two. *First;* it is highly improbable that Caius, in whom Eusebius and other writers recognise an orthodox Roman presbyter, should have questioned the authorship of the Gospel, whatever may have been his view of the Apocalypse (and of this I shall have to speak presently). *Secondly;* Ebed-Jesu mentions separately as *a distinct work* of Hippolytus an 'Apology for the Apocalypse and Gospel of John the Apostle and Evangelist;' and as he appears to have read at least the headings of all the works he enumerates, this fact must be considered fatal to the identification. But may not this work 'Against Caius' have been the very Dialogue of Caius and Proclus with which we are concerned? Owing to a careless heading (which might have been introduced in the process of translation), or to a superficial impression derived from its opening sentences, it might have been taken to be written against Caius, because the interlocutor Proclus, who perhaps opened the debate, was found arguing against him. This supposition seems to me at least as plausible as any which has hitherto been suggested to explain the title of this work of Hippolytus.

But independently of the theory itself, are there reasons for supposing that Hippolytus ever did write against Montanism? There is at least a presumption, that so determined and so ruthless a scourge of heterodoxy in all its forms should not have left this type of error unassailed. Besides writing two general works against all the heresies—his earlier Compendium, the little book read by Photius[1] and apparently preserved (though not without considerable modifications) in the Latin treatise attached to the writings of Tertullian[2], and his later and fuller

[1] *Biblioth.* 121. Hippolytus refers to this earlier and shorter treatise in his great work *Refut. Hæres.* I. procem. *ὧν καὶ πάλαι μετρίως τὰ δόγματα ἐξεθέμεθα κ.τ.λ.*

[2] See especially the careful and acute investigations of R. A. Lipsius *Zur Quellenkritik des Epiphanios* (Wien, 1865).

work, the Refutation, first brought to light and published in our own generation—he likewise attacked in special treatises the more important heresies which were rife in his own age and church. We have seen how he refuted the monarchian doctrines of Theodotus and Artemon, by which the Roman community was assailed about this time. We have moreover an extant fragment of a work against Noetus, whose heretical views also threatened this same church in his day[1]. He wrote likewise against Marcion, against Vero, and perhaps also against the Nicolaitans[2]. It would seem strange therefore if so persistent a champion of orthodoxy had been silent about Montanism, which was certainly one of the most formidable antagonists of the Catholic Church among the Roman Christians at this time.

On the other hand, in the Refutation he dismisses this heresy very briefly. Bunsen complains that 'the whole article is meagre' and fails to fulfil the promise which Hippolytus made at the outset, that he would leave no form of error unanswered. I think this meagreness is easily explained on the hypothesis which I have put forward. Just as in a previous section Hippolytus had dismissed the heresy of Theodotus (though second in importance to none in its influence on the Christian history of his time) with a very few lines[3], because he

[1] Lipsius (*l. c.* p. 38), after Fabricius (p. 235), supposes this fragment to have been the conclusion of the earlier compendious work on heresies, which ended, as we learn from Photius, with the Noetians. The reasons given are strong.

[2] The treatise against Marcion is mentioned in several catalogues. Of the work against Vero a fragment is preserved (Lagarde's *Hippolytus*, p. 57 sq.); I have not added the name of Helix, because it is doubtful whether we should not read Βήρωνος καὶ ἡλικιωτῶν αἱρετικῶν for Βήρωνος καὶ Ἥλικος τῶν αἱρετικῶν. For the references to Hippolytus against the Nicolaitans see Fabricius I. p. 223. It does not follow however that this was a distinct work, as the Nicolaitans are mentioned in both the Compendium and the Refutation, as also in a fragment addressed to Mammæa and preserved in a Syriac translation (See Lagarde's *Analecta Syriaca* p. 82, Cowper's *Syriac Miscellanies* p. 55).

[3] *Refut. Hæres.* VIII. 19. Another case in point is the article on the Quartodecimans (VIII. 18), who are dismissed still more summarily. Hippolytus had discussed them in his treatise 'On the Passover.' In all these three cases Bunsen (*Hippolytus* I. pp. 376, 382, 385) supposes that our manuscript has preserved only an abstract of what Hippolytus wrote. The account I have

had controverted it in the Little Labyrinth, so now he disposes of Montanism with the same despatch, because he either has written, or intends to write, a special treatise on the subject. If the words which follow refer, as they perhaps do, not to the Noetians who are mentioned just before, but to the Montanists who are the main subject of the paragraph, this polemical work was still an unaccomplished project. 'Concerning these,' he says, 'I will write more in detail at a future time.' The supposition that the Dialogue was not yet written, though projected, is quite consistent with the fact, that the discussion which it reproduced purported to have been held during the pontificate of Zephyrinus. The Refutation indeed was not written till after the death of Callistus, the successor of Zephyrinus. But, as Callistus only held the see for four years (219—223), no long time need have elapsed between the supposed date of the discussion and the publication of the Dialogue, so that no dramatic propriety would be violated. But on either supposition, whether the Dialogue existed already, or was only planned in the author's mind, the fact would explain why he is satisfied with this very cursory notice of the Montanists in his great work.

From this Dialogue also Stephanus Gobarus may have quoted, when, as represented by Photius[1], he stated 'what opinions the most holy Hippolytus held concerning the Montanists.' The account of these heretics in the Refutation is almost too short to explain this language. And, if the Latin of the Pseudo-Tertullian adequately represents his earlier work,

given in the text seems to me much more probable. At the same time I am disposed to think that the Refutation was left unfinished by its author, and that he had intended to expand these meagre articles, making use of his special treatises for this purpose. This hypothesis will explain much which needs explanation in the form of the work.

[1] *Biblioth.* 232. Neander (II. p. 441 Bohn's transl.) writes thus: 'Moreover it deserves consideration in this respect, that by Stephanus Gobarus the judgments of Hippolytus and of Gregory of Nyssa respecting the Montanists are set one against the other, so that we may conclude that the former belonged to the defenders of Montanism.' And others have attributed Montanizing views to Hippolytus. But we do not know in what respect the opinions of these two fathers were contrasted by Stephanus, if they were contrasted. At all events Hippolytus in the Refutation speaks quite as strongly against the Montanists as the case justifies.

the Compendium also was equally brief. Indeed in the later work he does little more than repeat the statements of the earlier respecting these heretics.

It only remains to enquire, whether the extant fragments of the Dialogue are consistent with the hypothesis that Hippolytus was the author.

As regards style, the work might well have been written by this father: though any inference drawn from such scanty extracts can have but little value. The matter however presents some difficulty. The inference has been often drawn from the passage quoted above[1], that the writer of the Dialogue considered the Apocalypse of St John to be a forgery of Cerinthus; and, if this inference were true, my hypothesis must be abandoned; for Hippolytus not only quoted largely from the Apocalypse as a work of St John, but also, as we have seen, wrote a book in its defence. This adverse interpretation however may reasonably be questioned[2]. It is difficult to see how an intelligent person should represent the Apocalypse as teaching that in the kingdom of Christ 'men should live in the flesh in Jerusalem and be *the slaves of lusts and pleasures*,' and again that 'a thousand years should be spent in marriage festivities[3]'. It is hardly less difficult to imagine how a man of great learning, as the author of the Dialogue is represented to have been, could have reconciled such a theory with the known history and tenets of Cerinthus. It must be confessed indeed that Dionysius of Alexandria appears so to have interpreted the language of Caius in the dialogue. At all events he speaks of some previous writers (*τινὲς τῶν πρὸ ἡμῶν*) as maintaining that the Apocalypse was written by Cerinthus, and describes their views in language

[1] See p. 102, note.

[2] 'I may express my decided belief,' writes Mr Westcott, 'that Caius is not speaking of the Apocalypse of St John, but of books written by Cerinthus in imitation of it. The theology of the Apocalypse is wholly inconsistent with what we know of Cerinthus' views on the Person of Christ.' *On the Canon*, p. 245, note 1. Elsewhere (p. 359) he refers to a tract by Münster *de Dionys. Alex. Judic. c. Apocal.* pp. 35 sq., 67 sq., as holding the same opinion. Such also has been the view of many other writers, e.g. Routh.

[3] The word *γάμος* however need not signify a marriage festival, as it is used elsewhere of festivities generally; e.g. LXX, Esth. ix. 22.

somewhat resembling the passage of the Dialogue[1]; though he himself, while questioning the Apostolic authorship of the book, has the good sense and feeling to reject this solution as untenable. It is not so clear that Eusebius also understood the passage in the same way. On the other hand Theodoret adopted a different interpretation. 'Cerinthus,' writes this father, 'also invented certain revelations pretending *to have seen them himself* (ὡς αὐτὸς τεθεαμένος). Against him not only have the above-named persons written, but with them also Caius and Dionysius the Bishop of Alexandria[2].' So interpreted, the passage signifies that Cerinthus set himself up for 'a great apostle,' who had revelations[3]: and this is more in accordance with his attitude towards St John as it appears in other ancient notices. But, whatever be the exact bearing of the words ὡς ὑπὸ ἀποστόλου μεγάλου γεγραμμένων, the description is inappropriate to the Apocalypse of our Canon. Nor indeed is it likely that an orthodox presbyter of the Roman Church should have so written of a book which a contemporary presbyter of the same Church reverenced as the genuine work of an inspired Apostle: for the author of the Dialogue does not write as one who is putting forward an opinion which would be contested by his own compeers[4].

It may be said however, that at all events Caius attacks the millennarians, whereas Hippolytus himself held millennial views. But both propositions involved in this statement are open to question. Caius did indeed condemn a sensuous millennium, but it is by no means clear that the passage goes so far as to condemn Chiliastic doctrine in all its forms. On the other hand it is not certain that Hippolytus was a Chiliast at all,

[1] In Euseb. *Hist. Eccl.* VII. 25: comp. III. 28.

[2] *Hær. Fab.* II. 3.

[3] See the parallel given by Routh (II. p. 139) from Apollonius in Euseb. *Hist. Eccl.* V. 18, μιμούμενος τὸν ἀποστόλον, καθολικήν τινα συνταξάμενος ἐπιστολήν, speaking of one Themiso, a Montanist. The more natural interpretation of the words however seems to be, that Cerinthus palmed off his forged Apocalypses under the name of some Apostle, perhaps St Peter.

[4] The writer of the Muratorian Canon, who perhaps represents the views of the Roman Church about a generation earlier, seems to speak of the Apocalypse of St John as though it were received without question.

while it is quite certain that he must have scouted all Chiliastic views which wore a sensuous garb. As regards the first point, he does indeed maintain that the world will last six thousand years, corresponding to the six days of creation, and that afterwards will come the reign of Christ, of which the Sabbath is the type[1], but the parallel is not pressed so far as to insist upon the same duration for his antitypical sabbath as for his antitypical working-day; and he elsewhere speaks of the second Advent in such a way as to leave no room for a millennium. It is at least remarkable, that though he again and again enlarges on eschatological subjects, he is wholly silent on this one point, even where the subject would naturally lead him to state the doctrine, if he held it[2]. But, if it is hardly probable that Hippolytus held Chiliastic opinions of any kind, it is quite certain that he would have condemned, as strongly as any one, the sensuous conception of the millennium attributed to Cerinthus in the Dialogue. 'In the resurrection,' he writes, 'men shall be as the angels of God: that is to say, in incorruption and immortality and immutability (*ἀρευσίᾳ*). For incorruptible being is not born, does not grow, does not sleep, does not hunger, does not thirst, does not toil, does not suffer, does not die, is not pierced by nails and spear, does not sweat, does not shed blood: such beings are those of the angels and of souls released from bodies: for both these are different in kind from (*ἑτερογενεῖς*) and alien to the visible and corruptible creation of the (present) world[3].'

The question, Caius or Hippolytus, was frequently repeated and answered in opposite ways, during the discussion relating to the authorship of the Refutation. It is here asked, so far as I am aware, for the first time with reference to the Dialogue against the Montanists. What weight others may attach to the considerations which I have urged, I do not know; but to myself they seem sufficient to justify a grave suspicion, if nothing more, that Caius has not any personality distinct from Hippolytus, and that therefore no question of an alternative remains.

J. B. LIGHTFOOT.

[1] Hippol. *Fragm.* 59 (on Daniel), p. 153 (Lagarde).

[2] See the treatise on Antichrist throughout (especially c. 44 sqq.) or that *περὶ τῆς συντελείας* (p. 92 Lagarde), besides several fragments bearing on the subject.

[3] Hippol. *Fragm.* 9, p. 90 (Lagarde).

ON LUCRETIUS.

If any one, an Editor of Lucretius ought to be in a position to judge how much has yet to be done for the text and illustration of his author. It was therefore with real pleasure that I received a year ago a long letter from a resident in Richmond Virginia, Mr N. P. Howard. This communication, which the writer has placed entirely at my disposal, I gladly take the earliest opportunity of making public. As the remarks will speak for themselves, I will not indulge in useless expressions of praise; but I may just point to the notes on I 755, I 884 885, and II 1058—1061, as most important contributions to the criticism of Lucretius. The list Mr Howard gives of passages in which he had anticipated the corrections or explanations of Lachmann and myself is of course most welcome, as affording a strong confirmation of their truth or probability. As he only possessed my first edition, it will be seen that this list is somewhat enlarged by my second. Where I have any remarks to make on a note of Mr Howard's, I will append them to it within square brackets. At the end I trust to be able to give some further corrections of our author, originating with myself or suggested by the criticisms of others, such as Mr Friedrich Polle in his 'Jahresbericht' just published in the Philologus. On the whole renewed study makes me ever more conservative, more disposed to adhere to the text as handed down in manuscripts, more convinced that many manifest errors had their rise in the circumstances under which our poem first saw the light. In other cases however my eyes have been opened to new defects.

H. A. J. MUNRO, A.M.

Richmond, Virginia, *May* 1, 1867.

Sir,

The public character which in some sort belongs to you as an editor of Lucretius will, I hope, be my apology for the liberty I now take in addressing to you this communication.

Having admired and loved the poetry of Lucretius from my boyhood until now when I am more than fifty years old, I began many years ago to ponder over the difficulties occurring in the construction, and to consult commentaries, translations, and various readings, so far as my means and opportunities enabled me to procure them, for the purpose of removing those difficulties. I thus gradually collected almost all the editions of my favourite author, from that of Pius, published in 1511, to your own published in 1864, inclusive of both. As early as 1848, I commenced the practice of making notes upon the passages which struck me as presenting difficulties; sometimes merely transcribing the explanation given by Pius, or Lambinus, or Gifanius, or Preiger, or Wakefield, or Forbiger, or some other annotator, where that appeared to be sufficient; sometimes suggesting my own construction, where I could find none given by the commentators in my possession, or none that seemed to me satisfactory; sometimes adopting, instead of the reading in the text, one or other of those furnished by the collection of various readings contained in the editions I had at hand, especially the editions of Pius, Havercamp, Wakefield, and Forbiger; sometimes even venturing to propound a conjectural emendation in the shape of a new reading or a new collocation of verses. In this way I had gradually amassed quite a large body of notes upon the whole of Lucretius before the edition of Lachmann was published. When that edition appeared and I obtained a copy of it, any vague ideas which I might previously have had that my own notes, or a selection from them, might possibly be worth publication were almost completely dispelled by my finding that Lachmann had already made many of the most important corrections which had occurred to myself. And since your

edition of 1864 has come to my hands (as it did in the latter part of 1865) so many more of the explanations and emendations suggested in my notes appear in yours, that all thoughts of seeking to procure the publication of any part of mine have been finally abandoned. It is not the business of this letter to give a list or rehearsal of these coincidences; I may mention however, in passing, that before I had seen Lachmann's edition or either of yours, I had noted on I. 566 that *possit tamen omnia reddi* should be read instead of *possint etc.* and the passage be explained as you have explained it; on I. 628 and 631 that *si minimas* and *nullis* were the true readings, and the passage to be understood, like I. 599—608, of inseparable least parts of atoms, not of the atoms themselves; on I. 1114 that a line immediately following, to the effect of that suggested in your annotation, had been lost; on II. 1011 that *quod* is the relative, not the conjunction, and to be interpreted in the manner you have shewn in your translation and notes; on III. 952 that *atque* should be read instead of *at qui*, and vs. 955 be prefixed to vs. 952; on IV. 72 that *iacere ac largiri* should be read; on IV. 396—399 that the proper construction is *Interque quos montes, procul exstantes medio de gurgite, ingens exitus liber patet classibus, ex his tamen* montibus *conjunctis etc.;* on V. 301 that *celatur* should be read instead of *celeratur* or *toleratur;* on VI. 45, 46 (before I had seen either Goebel's observations or your edition) that the reading of the manuscripts should be retained unaltered, *dissolvi* being not the infinitive but the perfect of the indicative, and equivalent to *resolvi* or *explicavi*, as shewn by the collation of V. 772 and IV. 500; on VI. 890 that *endo marist Aradi fons* should be read; besides various other corrections and interpretations, the same with what I afterwards found in Lachmann's edition or yours. All the verses above referred to are cited, as those hereafter referred to will be cited, according to the numbering in your edition of 1864.

As I have said, however, this statement of coincidences between my own notes and Lachmann's edition and yours is merely by the way. My chief purpose in this communication is to present respectfully to your attention some things relating to the text and interpretation of Lucretius which have occurred

to me, but seem to have been overlooked by Lachmann and yourself. It is quite possible that some of them were not in fact overlooked, but merely disregarded as not worth noticing. Not knowing how that may be, I submit them to your better judgment, to be treated according to the value which that shall assign to them. And as all my notes were written in Latin for the sake of uniformity with those selected from Lambinus and other commentators, I shall make no scruple to transcribe them when I find it convenient to do so.

I. 82 *quod contra saepius illa.* Barthius ad Claudianum in Rufin. I. 15 *quot contra saepius olim* legendum esse ait.

I. 97 *comitari hymenaeo.* The verb here may be deponent, not passive; for Cicero says Tusc. v. 35 *quae comitantur huic vitae.* [Yet as *comitat, comitavit, comitare* (infin.) and the passive *comitor* are all found in Ovid and others, it is better to look on the bride as escorted by, not escorting, the hymeneal].

I. 132. 133. *Et quae res nobis vigilantibus obvia mentes Terrificet morbo adfectis somnoque sepultis.* Your translation seems to treat these lines as if the words and the order of them were *Et quae res, obvia nobis, terrificet mentes vigilantibus* et *morbo adfectis, somnoque sepultis.* But does the collocation of the words admit such a construction? What I myself had annotated is as follows: *Et quae res nobis, vigilantibus obvia, mentes Terrificet morbo adfectis; somnoque sepultis.* Post verba *terrificet* et *adfectis* distinctio minima poni solet. Modum interpungendi mutavimus, sensu, ut nobis videtur, ita postulante. Nam simulacra *vigilantibus* obvia, iisdem, si morbo etiam affecti sunt, mentes terrore consternant; quae autem vigilantibus et nullo morbo laborantibus obvia sunt, mentes eorundem *dormientium* terrere non putandum est. Sed dormientium mentes terrentur simulacris quae in ipso somno occurrunt. Verba igitur *somnoque sepultis* ellipsin praeferunt, quae hoc modo explicanda et supplenda est: Et quae res, nobis somno sepultis obvia, mentes nostras per somnum terreat. Conferenda sunt poetae verba de eadem re disserentis IV. 33 *Atque eadem nobis, vigilantibus obvia, mentes Terrificant, atque in somnis.*

I. 271 *portus.* Codices *portus, portum, cortus;* nisi quod ad finem editionis Alteri p. 338 varia lectio *corpus* ex veteri quo-

dam codice notatur. Quae nescio an reliquis omnibus praeferenda sit, saltem si *pontus* in versu 276 legatur, quod ibi praebent omnes mss. Conferas IV. 259—264. [Yet *cortus* is the only genuine uninterpolated manuscript reading; and *corpus* appears to me to give no satisfactory meaning; while *portus*, which comes equally near to the mss., affords an excellent sense. Mr Polle in the Philologus XXVI p. 300 says *pontum* is 'festzuhalten'; but neither he nor other German critics seem at all to apprehend the real force of *portus*, though so practised an observer of nature as Lucretius would no doubt have understood it].

I. 287. I rather incline to believe that *cum* is the conjunction, and that a comma only should be put after *amnis*. [Certainly the preposition still appears to me much more emphatic than the conjunction. But I will here retract an emendation of mine in this passage, *ruitque aqua* for *ruit qua*, though my latest critic Mr Polle l.l. calls it a very happy one: I would now read 'amnis: Dat sonitu magno stragem volvitque sub undis Grandia saxa: ruit qua quicquid fluctibus obstat'. *quicquid* = *quicque*, as so often in Lucretius: comp. V 771 'Qua fieri quicquid posset ratione resolvi'; Aen. VII 400 'io matres, audite ubi quaeque Latinae'; and Plaut. Bacch. 252 where I read 'Istius hominis ubi fit quaeque mentio': mss. *quaque*, Ritschl and Fleckeisen 'quomque.' *qua quicquid* then = quacumque aliquid: comp. I 966 *quem quisque locum possedit*, and my note there: the whole sentence being a simple instance of that very favourite usage of Lucretius so fully illustrated in my note to I 15, the omission of the subject or object in the first clause of a sentence, it being understood from the second part: 'quacumque aliquid fluctibus obstat, illud amnis ruit'].

I. 321. Why should not *natura videndi* be construed together? *Speciem* sufficiently expresses *sight*. See IV. 236. 242. V. 707. 724. Glossarium vetus: "*Species* πρόσοψις, ὄψις." [Mr Howard will be glad to see that in my 2nd edition I had already adopted on the authority of Prof. Conington this explanation which is unquestionably right, though Mr Polle l.l. is pleased to call it a 'hoechst auffallender ansdruck'. It is not time for seeing that is wanting, but the physical power].

I. 377 *falsa totum*, wholly false. *Totum* seems to be an adverb here and in III. 686. IV. 1088.

I. 384. I think the reading *de concurso* here, and *in offenso* III. 941, should by all means be retained. Compare Livy XXXIX. 10 *propter crebrius eo anno de caelo lapidatum.* My note on III. 941 is this: *In offenso est.* In inviso est; invisa seu odiosa est. *Offensus*, pro invisus, apud Ciceronem saepius occurrit: ut I Catil. 7. *si me meis civibus suspectum atque offensum viderem;* Sest. 58 *cui nos offensi invisique fuerimus;* Ep. ad Att. II. 19 *nihil tam infame, tam turpe, tam peraeque omnibus generibus, ordinibus, aetatibus offensum.*

I. 423. It seems to me that *cui* is governed not by *valebit* but by *fides*, equivalent to *fides adhibita.* [Clearly so: there is more than one instance of this construction in the Aetna and in Livy: comp. too Ovid am. II 2 38 'In verum falso crimine deme fidem'].

I. 442. May not the reading *possunt* of the manuscripts in this place be defended by vs. II. 901? If the indicative be admissible in the latter verse, I do not well perceive why it should not be equally so in the former. [In a subsequent letter Mr Howard says he supposed *erit* not to be impersonal, but to have the same nomin. as *faciet* and *debebit*].

I. 557. May not *longa diei* be equivalent in meaning to *longaeva*, and similar in construction to παλαιὸς ἡμερῶν Septuagint Dan. VII. 9. and *vetus operis ac laboris* Tacit. Ann. I. 20?

I. 628. 631. Oppenrieder in his *Quaestiones Lucretianae*, published in 1847, defends the readings *si minimas* and *nullis*, and explains the passage as relating to the inseparable least parts of atoms. His explanation is the same with yours as well as mine, and of earlier date than either.

I. 755. I think that *utqui*—not *ut qui*, but as one word—is the true reading at the end of this line; at the end of II. 17; in place of the *quidum* of your edition in III. 738; and very probably also at the end of II. 428 and VI. 1007. I regard *utqui* as equivalent in meaning to the simple *ut;* and as being a word which, by strange and unaccountable accident, has been lost out of the Latin language, though legitimately belonging to it in its earlier period, and then forming one of the class of

particles with the suffix *qui*, such as *atqui, alioqui, ceteroqui.* In four out of the five places just mentioned, the reading *ut qui* is found in the best manuscripts; and I strongly suspect that in some, at least, of those places, some of the manuscripts would upon examination exhibit *utqui* written as a single word. Taking *utqui* as the reading in I. 755, II. 17, and III. 738, and as equivalent in meaning to *ut*, it appears to me undeniable that nothing could be more appropriate in those places to the sense. Nothing is required to shew this as to I. 755 and III. 738; in II. 17, indeed, some difficulty of construction would still remain, but less, it seems to me, than upon any other reading that I have met with. In II. 17—19 Nature is not only personified, but identified, as it were, with the *human* nature, so that the sense of the passage (treating *utqui* as equivalent to *ut*) would be this:—"that Nature demands for herself nothing more than that pain may be absent from the body, and that in mind she (Nature), far removed from care and fear, may enjoy pleasurable feeling." In II. 428 the manuscripts shew a loss of two syllables at the end of the line, so that any supplement must be merely conjectural: but if *utqui* in the sense of *ut* be read there, it will evidently suit the place far better than *ac quae*, or *quaeque*, or *quique*, or *unde*. In VI. 1007 the best manuscripts have *ut qui* at the end of the line; but if *utqui* be there retained in the sense of *ut*, it will be necessary to change *cadunt* in the same line into *cadant*, which Lambinus and Gifanius state to be the reading of some of their books, and the construction will be *fit cadant coniuncta, utqui* etc.—a construction which seems harsh for the want of an *ut* to follow *fit*, notwithstanding the fact that a similar omission is found in the best mss. in VI. 116. The reading *utqui* in the sense of *ut* I consider therefore as certain in I. 755, II. 17, and III. 738; almost certain in II. 428; but only probable in VI. 1007, where *utque*, so nearly approaching *utqui*, is much better suited to the sense and construction.

My persuasion that *utqui* is the true reading in these four places of Lucretius, and that it has the sense of *ut*, does not rest entirely upon the consideration and comparison of the places themselves, and of the readings which the mss. exhibit there,

but in a great degree upon the following passages in Plautus, in none of which does there seem to be any doubt about the reading *ut qui:* Asin. III. 1. 2 *An ita tu es animata, ut qui expers matris imperi sies?* Bacchid. II. 3. 49 *Adeon me fuisse fungum, ut qui illi crederem!* Capt. II. 1. 45. 46 *Quoniam nobis di immortales animum ostenderunt suum, Ut qui herum me tibi fuisse, atque esse nunc conservom velint.* Capt. III. 4. 19. 21 *Ain, verbero,—eum morbum mihi esse, ut qui me opus sit insputarier?* Curcul. II. 1. 2. 3 *Aesculapi ita sentio sententiam, ut qui me nihili faciat, nec salvom velit.* Trin. III. 2. 11 *An id est sapere, ut qui beneficium a benevolente repudies?* Now in the passage from the second act of the Captives, and in that from the Curculio, it is possible that *qui* in the sense of the relative may be retained: but in the others it seems to me impossible to retain it in that sense; we must either reject it altogether (which I suppose cannot be done without ruining the measure), or we must retain it as an absolutely unmeaning particle inserted to fill up the verse, or finally we must read *utqui* as one word and understand it in the sense of *ut*—a reading and sense which would also suit the passages from Capt. II and Curcul., though not absolutely necessary to be resorted to in those. I have searched in vain for any satisfactory or even plausible explanation of any of the above places of Plautus; and indeed I have seen no attempt to explain any of them but the first, upon which Lambinus makes the brief and wholly unsatisfactory annotation that *qui* is there put for *quae.*

I am satisfied that if we had the works of Ennius and Lucilius, many more examples would be found of *utqui* in the sense of *ut:* but I have found none in the fragments of those writers which yet survive, and none in Terence. Neither have I found any in the remaining works or fragments of other Roman authors coeval with Lucretius or more ancient than he. But as my search, except in the case of Terence, was made without the help of any accurate index, and for the most part without any *index verborum* at all, I do not feel by any means sure that the above examples from Lucretius and Plautus are all that exist. If however it were ascertained that these were all, I should still believe that *utqui* in the sense of *ut* ought to be

admitted without hesitation in at least four of the five places of Lucretius, and four of the six of Plautus.

The reading in I. 755 of *utque*, instead of the *atqui* of old editions, was recommended by Preiger to Havercamp, who however preferred to retain *atqui*. [This note is a real contribution not only to Lucretius but to Latin philology: I accept its conclusions in every instance but that of VI 1007, where the writer himself thinks *utqui* only probable. He will be glad to see that in III 738 I had already introduced *ut qui*, referring to Fleckeisen's krit. Miscellen, who illustrates *ut qui* from Plautus much as Mr Howard does; though the latter is I think undoubtedly right in making *utqui* a single word: I had also noted down for any subsequent edition that *ut qui* of mss. must be read in I 755 and II 428: I 753—755 is now I trust for ever freed from Lachmann's violent and unsatisfactory alterations, emphatically approved though they are by Mr Polle. I hesitated for some time about II 17, but I now accept Mr Howard's explanation, as not a letter of the mss. has to be changed and the asyndeton of 18 seems to add emphasis to the thought.

The next lines too of this long and involved paragraph may be rendered much more clear by better punctuation. I now with many of the older Editors put a full stop after *dolorem* in 21 and a comma at the end of 22: *delicias* will then have its proper meaning, 'luxurious and refined enjoyments', such namely as are enumerated in 24 foll. The whole sentence will then be a good example of that favourite usage of Lucretius referred to above in my note on 287: the subject of *possint* and the object of *requirit* are both understood out of vss. 24—28: in 22 *uti* is concessive and = quamvis, as explained by Lambinus: 'granted too that such objects are able to minister many exquisite enjoyments, yet it is at times more welcome and nature on her part feels not the want of them, when there are no golden etc.' We must read too 'Gratius interdum*st*'].

I. 851. 852. I think your translation does not accurately represent the proper construction of these verses, which seems to me to be this: *Nam in valido oppressu sub ipsis dentibus leti, quid eorum durabit, ut effugiat mortem?*

I. 884. 885. In the first of these verses *lapidi in lapidem* of the mss. ought in my judgment to be retained, and *herbas*, rather than *herbis*, be read in the second; without any stop after *cruorem* in the first, but with a full stop after *aluntur* in vs. 883. The construction will then be thus: *Consimili ratione decebat herbas quoque, cum* eas *lapidi* (ablative) *terimus in lapidem, saepe manare cruorem, et mittere dulces guttas laticis etc.* As corn, the food of human beings, ought when ground to shew signs of human blood or of some other fluid of the human body, in like manner grasses, the food of sheep, ought when crushed to distil blood and emit sweet drops of fluid similar in taste to the milk of sheep. Such seems to me to be the intended connexion of ideas. The transposition of verses 884 and 885 would adapt them better to the construction here suggested. [This note is another splendid gain for Lucretius, and clears up a most perplexed passage. The transposition of 884 885 is unquestionably to be made; but I would not change a single letter of the manuscript reading; for *cruorem* is the subject of *manare: manat cruorem* is hardly Latin; at all events Lucretius would say 'cruor manat herbis', not 'herbae manant cruorem'. The whole passage will then run thus: 'Consimili ratione herbis quoque saepe decebat, Cum lapidi in lapidem terimus, manare cruorem; Et latices cet.': for *latices* are the waters they drink: 'and it were fitting too the waters shou'd yield drops of milk'].

In glancing over my notes on the first book of Lucretius, the foregoing were the chief but by no means the only matters which occurred to me as possibly worth submitting to your notice. When I commenced this letter my intention was to go through the notes on the other books in the same way: but I find that to do so would take up more time than I am able to spare at present, even if I could hope that you would have the leisure and the patience to read so long a communication as the execution of my original purpose would produce. I shall therefore only add a few observations on the remaining books, and express those as briefly as I can. There are very many others in my notes, which to me appear to be of some consequence, but which I omit for the sake of sparing trouble to you as well as to myself.

II. 217. 218. *Cum deorsum rectum per inane feruntur ponderibus propriis.* In my opinion *feruntur ponderibus propriis* should be construed together, and *ponderibus* taken in its ordinary meaning. Cicero de nat. deorum I. 25 says of Epicurus, *Ait atomum, quum pondere et gravitate directo deorsum feratur, declinare paululum.* Cicero's *directo deorsum* is also clearly the same with the *deorsum rectum* of Lucretius. Lachmann's conjectural reading *decellere* in vs. 219 may perhaps be right, and worthy of adoption, though I confess I cannot understand why you should say, as you do in your notes I, that *spatio se pellere, decedere, secedere* of Avanc. Junt. Lamb. etc. have no meaning. If your objection regards the verbs in these readings, I do not see why *se pellere* should not be as admissible as *declinare sese* in vs. 250, or why either *decedere* or *secedere* should be considered inappropriate. And that *spatio* may well signify the line of direction in which the atom is descending seems to be proved by Cicero's *Deflexit enim iam aliquantulum de spatio curriculoque consuetudo maiorum.* (Lael. 12.) If *feruntur ponderibus* be properly joined, it follows that the reading of the mss. in vs. 219 *incertisque locis spatio* should be retained, unless *decellere,* or whatever other verb may be taken instead of it, be considered as used absolutely, without any ablative to be governed, in which case Lachmann's *incertisque loci spatiis* might be admissible but would be useless.—Compare also vs. v. 424 with those here in question. [We live and learn: confident as I once was that Lachmann was right, I have now come over to Mr Howard's view. Even *decellere* I am disposed to give up, and to read '*se* incerto tempore—depellere': *se* could easily fall out after *propriis*, and I learn from Mr Polle that the insertion of *se* in this place has already been proposed: though Lachmann's *decellere* may be right. In addition to what Mr Howard has given, *fer. pond. propr.* might receive abundant illustration from Cicero de fato: 'si gravitate feruntur ad perpendiculum corpora individua rectis lineis'; si semper atomus gravitate ferretur naturali ac necessaria'; 'ipsius individui hanc esse naturam ut pondere et gravitate moveatur'; 'naturalem motum sui ponderis', etc. Then for this use of *spatio* and *spatio depellere,* comp. Cicero's 'certo lapsu spatioque feruntur';

'spatiis immutalibus ab ortu ad occasum commeans nullum umquam cursus sui vestigium inflectat'; 'ab atomis errantibus et de via declinantibus'; Horace's 'recto depellere cursu'; Quintilian's 'recta via depulsus', 'depulsa recta via', 'recto itinere depulsi'].

II. 363. What possible objection can there be to retain the *subitam* of the mss. in the common meaning of *sudden?* When a cow is deprived of her calf, her grief for the loss is always a sudden grief, because she can never have any anticipation of such a casualty. I had long been accustomed to think the word *subitam* one of the chief beauties of the description, and cannot yet understand why Lachmann should have preferred *solitam*, Bernaysius *dubiam*, or you *sumptam*. As little can I discern the force of the objection to *subitis*, in III. 690 *lapis oppressus subitis e frugibus*, where *subitis* appears to me just as plainly put for *subito*, as *postremis* for *postremo* in *postremis datur ossibus* III. 250. Compare *Alitis in parvae subitam collecta figuram* Aen. XII. 862, where Heyne observes: "*subitam*, pro subito. Scilicet *subitam*, in quam subito *collecta*, conversa, est." [I confess to be unable to see any point in the adjective: I still hold *subitam* to be the participle, which I have illustrated at such length in my second edition: this I am glad to see Mr Polle approves. But here I must protest against the cruel way in which he murders (I can use no milder term) this passage, one of the most beautiful in Lucretius: first he objects to Lachmann's elegant and to me certain emendation *noscit* in 356, because with it what follows 'Omnia convisens etc.' is faulty, if even possible; and he himself proposes the inexpressibly weak *urguet* for *noscit* which by the way is more poetical and Lucretian than Brieger's *novit*. Why surely the poet means that the cow recognises the tracks left by her calf, but cannot see the calf itself, though she searches everywhere: *Ovid* at least, who in the fourth book of the fasti has imitated our passage, so understood it: 459 he says 'Ut vitulo mugit sua mater ab ubere rapto, Et quaerit fetus per nemus omne suos,' the 2nd v. being a manifest imitation of our 'Omnia convisens—fetum': then 463 'Inde puellaris nacta est vestigia plantae Et pressam noto pondere vidit humum,' an equally plain imitation of our

'Noscit humi cet.' I now come to my own *absistens*, of which I do not choose to speak so confidently as of *noscit*, but which I do think adds much to the beauty of the passage. Mr Polle however says it has been 'widerlegt' by Susemihl in the Philologus XXIV p. 439: the refutation I find to be this, that *crebra revisit* cet. shows the cow is not represented as already leaving off her search and that *absistens* would be too bald even to express this leaving off. Why it is this very *crebra revisit* that to my mind makes *absistens* so very expressive. Is stall-feeding so universal at Dresden and Greifswald that my critics have never seen such a picture as the poet here describes? the cow goes forth, looks for its calf, cannot find it, then stands still, lows piteously, 'completque querellis Frondiferum nemus absistens', leaves off the search, returns to its stall; and then again goes forth on a new search with like result. I am only too glad to be refuted by notes like some of Mr Howard's; but refutation like this of Mr Susemihl's I do not much admire.

Let me here refer to another passage as bearing on criticism of this kind: V 947 I have adopted Forbiger's simple and certain correction *Claru' citat* and have shown that Lachmann's objections proceed from his ignorance of the countries known to Lucretius. Ritschl proposes *Largus* for *Clarus*, which is not only a wide departure from MSS. but is far less true and poetical than *Clarus*. However Mr Polle l.l. declares he has decided for Ritschl in his Artis voce p. 42. On referring to this tract of his I find that he says Ritschl 'scribi iubet *largu' citat*, quam emendationem commendat collatis his locis: V 281, I 1031, 282, 412, V 866. assensus est Goebelius *neque potest quisquam dubitare* quin illud verum sit. nihilo setius Munro, quamvis eum Ritschelii emendatio non fugerit, Forbigeri coniecturam praefert.' The passages quoted prove that Lucretius does use the word *largus;* but have absolutely no bearing whatever on our passage; unless it be contended that because the sun's *fons luminis* is *largus*, therefore the mountain-rill from which a beast drinks must likewise be *largus*].

II. 515. 517. I think that the manuscript readings *hiemisque* and *Omnis* are certainly right. The *que* annexed to *hiemis*, and that annexed to *retro* vs. 516, are equivalent in my opinion to

et.....et and *finitumst* and *remensumst* are impersonals, the construction being as if the words were *et ab ignibus ad gelidas hiemis pruinas finitumst, et retro pari ratione remensumst.* The sense I apprehend to be substantially this: Fire and the cold frosts of winter are the two opposite extremes: for all heat and cold, and warmth, which is intermediate in nature, lie between both (those extremes of fire and frost). [*Omnis* I now believe to be right and to have the sense given to it by Mr Howard. Purmann I find has explained it in the same way; and even before receiving Mr Howard's letter I had decided to adopt it. But though I am sorry to give up *hiemisque* and think Lachmann's *iter usque* weak, I am wholly unable to understand such a position of *que*, even with Mr Howard's subsequent explanation, which is as follows: I take *que* in both places to be used for *et;.....finitumst* and *remensumst* I take for impersonal verbs; and the two lines I would thus render—'Finally there is *both* a limitation from fires onward to the cold frosts of winter, *and* a measuring back again in the same manner.' I will here add that in this and other passages I now unhesitatingly adhere to the MS. reading *interutrasque*, admonished by Buecheler in his tract on the Latin declension p. 32: in my critical note I had myself suggested it on the analogy of *alias alteras* or *foras;* but, as Buecheler observes, Nonius twice cites the exact parallel *utrasque.* Can we read 'ad gelidas, hiemem usque, pruinas'?].

II. 631 *sanguine fleti* of MSS. may perhaps be retained as a graecism. Compare Iliad XXII. 491 δεδάκρυνται δὲ παρειαί, and Eurip. Helen. 948 δακρῦσαι βλέφαρα.

II. 831 *filatim* etc. This verse has always seemed to me altogether useless, and for that and other reasons I suspect it to be an interpolation. [My conception of the passage requires the verse].

II. 853 *contractans.* The *prisca exemplaria* of Pius give, as he says, *contactus;* which, taken as the genitive of the noun, seems to me even a better reading than *contractans.* [But the 'prisca exemplaria' of Pius mean I fear little or nothing].

II. 859 *quae cum ita sunt tamen ut mortalia constent.* As *quae* must refer to the sensible qualities just before mentioned, and as it seems very incongruous to speak of these as *mortalia,*

mollia, fragosa, and the like, I think the sense and construction of the words *ita sunt ut mortalia constent* must be this: *eiusmodi sunt ut res* (scilicet quibus haec inesse contigerit) *mortales esse debeant* (or perhaps more simply, *ut* ex iis *res mortales constent.* Compare III. 266—268). Unless indeed it be supposed that *constent* is a corruption, and that the true reading was *conflent,* governing *mortalia* etc. in the accusative; a supposition which, from the facility with which *conflent* might pass into *constent,* I am much inclined to make. I find it very difficult to affix any satisfactory meaning to the word *tamen;* but that which, on the whole, strikes me as best is to take it in the sense of *quidem*—a sense of which numerous examples are collected in my note upon this verse. The connexion will then be this. It had been stated above that the *primordia* ought not to *employ* any such qualities as those referred to, in the production of things; to which it is here added, 'and since indeed these sensible qualities are of such a nature as to consist only with things perishable, it is necessary that all of them should be entirely *disjoined* from the *principia,* lest, etc.'

II. 924. For *corpore* I think that *corpora* (meaning the atoms) would be a reading much better suited to the context.

II. 1010—1012. In your notes I. you remark that 'Lach. and Bern. with all previous editors have quite misunderstood this passage, in which not a letter is to be changed: they all take *quod* to be the conjunction; it is really the relative.' This is not quite correct, unless you intended to discriminate between *editors,* strictly speaking, and annotators who were not such. Preiger, as you may see in his note on III. 948 ed. Hav., and in the fourth section of his epistle to Havercamp, among the prefaces to the same edition, made the discovery that *quod* was the relative, and gave the proper explanation of the passage. And Oppenrieder, in his *Quaestiones Lucretianae,* published in 1847, achieved the same discovery and explanation, not knowing that Preiger had done as much before him. [Oppenrieder's tract I have never been able to procure: Preiger I had overlooked, as Havercamp has chosen not to quote his remark at the passage to which it refers].

II. 1038 *quam*, whether taken as an adverb or as a relative pronoun, seems to me inferior to *quum*, which Faber gave from conjecture, and which the small Amsterdam edition of 1626 had given before him. The same edition, by the way, also anticipated Lachmann's conjecture of *quam* in IV. 1203: and in VI. 670 it has *ut ardescant* for *et ardescunt* of the MSS., a decided improvement, in my opinion. The reading *non tam in omni*, which it gives in II. 371 for *non tamen omne*, and *cum vi* for *cum vis* in VI. 582, may be more questionable; but they prove at least that the editor, whoever he was, fully appreciated the difficulties of the construction in those places, and exerted himself manfully to diminish, if not remove them. Whether *concredere* of the same edition, for *concedere*, in VI. 55 is merely a typographical error or not I am unable to say: if an error, it is a singularly apt and fortunate one. Who the editor was I have never succeeded in discovering.

II. 1058—1061. I am satisfied that *ipsa* refers to *natura*, not to *semina*, and that *colarit* (notwithstanding some metrical difficulty attending its introduction) is to be read in place of *coluerint*, or of any other verb, plural and intransitive, that may be selected or conjectured, from the multifarious readings of manuscripts and old editions, as suitable to that place. The active *offensando* which naturally calls for an accusative, the passives *coacta* and *coniecta* or (as Lachmann unnecessarily reads) *convecta*, and the whole scope of the context, shew clearly to my mind that the seminal bodies were here designed to be represented not as *agents* in the production of the earth, sea, sky and the animal race (though they are indeed represented as such agents in the similar passage V. 422—431), but only as passive material acted upon and employed by some extrinsic agent, who can be no other than nature herself: see verses 1072—1074. Besides, what sort of construction is afforded by *cum semina multimodis coacta tandem coaluerint ea quae fierent exordia terrae* etc.? The incongruity is manifest. The word *ea* and its collocation plainly shew that the seminal bodies forming the earth etc. are not wholly the same as those which are said to have been *multimodis temere incassum frustraque coacta*, but only a part of them, separated and collected from the rest. But they must be

wholly the same if *coluerint* or any similar verb be read; and then, in utter disregard of the order and collocation of the words, the construction will be *cum, multimodis temere incassum frustraque coacta, tandem coaluerint ea semina quae* etc.; upon which also the question immediately arises, how did it happen that these seminal bodies were ever *temere incassum frustraque coacta?* why might they not as well have given rise to the earth, sea etc. by their first assemblage together as by their last? to which I do not see how it is possible to give any satisfactory answer. All these difficulties are at once removed by referring *ipsa* to *natura*, and reading *colarit* for *coluerint*—thus making *ipsa* the nominative singular, *semina* the accusative after *offensando*, and *ea* the accusative after *colarit*. This last may be defined 'quasi per colum vel cribrum expresserit'—a sense entirely appropriate to the place. Compare the analogous use of the verb *ἀποκρίνω* by Epicurus in his epistle to Herodotus, Diog. Laert. x. 24 § 73. 74; and the words of Leucippus (discoursing about the generation of worlds) *τὰ μὲν λοιπὰ* [*σώματα*] *χωρεῖν εἰς τὸ ἔξω κενὸν, ὥσπερ διαττώμενα*, Diog. Laert. ix. 31—where, however, the reading is *διαττόμενα*, which Schneider in his edition of Epicurus p. 91 properly replaces by *διαττώμενα*. Compare also the example *κοσκινευομένων σπερμάτων* (seminum cribro discretorum) employed by Democritus to show that like things are everywhere aggregated to like by a certain force of natural attraction; Sext. Emp. contra Math. vii. § 117. p. 395 ed. Fabric. [This note is a most important contribution to the philosophy of Lucretius: in essentials Mr Howard is clearly right, though in some particulars I would construct the passage differently. The verb *colare* is no doubt genuine, as proved by his excellent illustrations from the Greek: but *colarīt ea* strikes me as metrically impossible. I therefore read *colarunt* with Niccoli and other mss. which doubtless represent Poggio's codex: A and B have *colerunt* differing by one letter: the only change I make is reading *ut* for *et* in 1058; and *ipsa* I refer to the *semina*, agents here as in the parallel passage in v: the whole sentence will read thus: 'ut ipsa Sponte sua forte offensando semina rerum, Multimodis temere incassum frustraque coacta, Tandem colarunt ea quae coniecta repente cet.': *offensando* then

is used like many other gerunds, cited in my note to I 312, both from Lucretius and others].

III. 156 *sonere aures.* Barthius upon Statius Theb. IV. 663 says that he found *canere aures* written in an ancient manuscript of Lucretius, and that he thinks it more elegant and poetical than *sonere aures.*

III. 259. It appears to me that *compta,* here and in IV. 27, means simply "united," and that *comptu* in vs. 845 of this book means simply "union." Glossarium vetus: "*συγκείμενος, comptus, compositus; συγκειμένως, contexte.*" Arnobius IV. 37 fin.: "qui ira quid sit ignorant, et ab eius comptu et permixtione sunt absoluti." Pius also explains *compta* here as meaning "apta, haerentia"; and *comptu* in vs. 845 as meaning "aptitudine, vinculo, glutino." The small Amsterdam edition of 1626 here reads *cumta;* and the ancient glossary in vol. VI of the *Classici Auctores* published by Mai at Rome in 1834, p. 519, explains *cumta* by "adunata." These illustrations and authorities I had collected in my note before I discovered that Lachmann, in his note upon II. 1061, had written thus: "*Comptus* et *coemptio* a coniungendo dicuntur, quod fere scribitur *comere,* unde Lucretius dicit *mixta et compta* in III. 259 et *cum corpore compta* in IV. 27."

III. 1060—1062. Brevissime ad nostri loci sententiam auctor ad Heren. IV. 15. *Ades? abesse vis: abes? reverti cupis.*

IV. 72 *largiri.* Glossarium vetus: "*Largior, προΐεμαι.*"

IV. 181. 182 *ille gruum quam Clamor.* Wakefieldus, collato Homero Il. III. 3 ubi *κλαγγὴ γεράνων* notatur, Statio Theb. V. 13, XII. 515, Claudiano Bell. Get. 444, quibus locis pariter de gruum *clangore* dictum est, miratur Lucretium non scripsisse *ille gruum quam Clangor.* Barthius ad Statium Theb. V. 12 sic adnotat: "Lucretius lib. IV. *ille gruum quam Clangor* etc. *Clangoris* vocem recte Lucretio reddimus, secuti membranas primum veteres, vel fragmentum potius, deinde Papinium nostrum hoc loco, Claudianum verbis proxime positis" (Bell. Gild. 475 *Ingenti clangore grues aestiva relinquunt*), "Maronem, qui pariter de stridore Harpyiarum, *magnis quatiunt clangoribus alas*" Aen. III. 226.

IV. 604—606. Perhaps these lines should be thus punc-

tuated: *Ex aliis aliae quoniam gignuntur, ubi una Dissiluit semel, in multas; exorta quasi ignis Saepe solet scintilla* etc. so that the construction may be *quoniam, ubi una semel dissiluit, aliae gignuntur ex aliis, in multas* (usque dum multae fiant); *quasi* etc. There appears to be something incongruous in joining *ubi una dissiluit semel in multas exorta.*

IV. 607. 608. Here also I would alter the punctuation, in this manner: *Ergo replentur loca vocibus abdita retro, Omnia quae circum fuerint sonituque cientur* (id est, et sonitu cientur omnia quae circum fuerint). The word *fuerint* is evidently inappropriate, and I presume therefore must be corrupt; nor is anything gained by substituting *fuerunt,* the reading of nearly all the manuscripts. Either *cinguntur,* or *sistunt,* or *steterunt,* (which perhaps comes nearest of the three to the manuscript reading in the *ductus literarum*) might serve to convey the sense required. [But can this position of *que* be defended?]

IV. 610. 611. *Saepe supra,* the reading of the mss., I think is correct. The construction is thus explained in my note: *quapropter saepe nemo potis est* (saepe fit ut non possit quis) *cernere supra, at* (possit) *accipere voces extra* (ab extra, a parte exteriore); ut *supra* et *extra* absolute sint posita.

IV. 638. 639. The difficulty of these two lines is entirely removed, it appears to me, by a change of one letter in the reading of the manuscripts, and the substitution of *et* for *ut* in the first line—making it *est itaque et serpens, hominis quae tacta salivis* etc. [This very reading once suggested itself to me; but I long ago came to the conclusion that neither *itaque* nor *et* gave any satisfactory sense].

IV. 681 *promissa canum vis.* Retinendum censemus vulgatum *promissa,* id est emissa, vel porrotenus missa, ob codicum consensum et Nemesian. Cyneget. 269. ubi equi dicuntur *promissi spatiosa per aequora campi;* etiamsi Lachmanno "animata et agentia non videntur *promitti* aut *se promittere.*"

IV. 750. 751. I take *quod* to be the conjunction, not the relative, and the construction (in which *quod videmus* must be regarded as exactly equivalent to the infinitive *videre*) to be properly made in this manner: *necesse est simili ratione fieri quod videmus* (videre) *mente, atque* quod videmus (videre) *oculis,*

quatenus hoc simile est illi. If *quod* should be taken as the relative, meaning "that which," or "the thing that," *fieri* would become wholly inappropriate, since the thing that we see with the mind, and the thing that we see with the eyes, cannot with any sort of propriety be said *to be produced* or *to take place* (*fieri*) in a like way. [This explanation appears certainly the right one].

IV. 823. 824. If *oportet* were read in place of *inesse,* the sense would be complete; but of course such a change would do too much violence to the reading of the mss. None of the attempts to correct that reading, which I have yet seen, are at all satisfactory to my mind. I think that a line, or perhaps more, must have been lost between the words *inesse* and *effugere.* [I am convinced no line is lost here, and do not hesitate to say that my own *avessis* seems to me far more probable than any other suggested correction].

IV. 1183 *stultitiaque ibi se damnet.* Omnes codices et Brix. Ver. Ven. *stultitiaque;* Ald. 1. 2. Bon. Junt. *stultitiaeque,* ut vulgo editur. Lachmannus etiam *stultitiaeque* legit, haec adnotans: "*Damnatur* aliquis *crimine* vel *iudicio,* sed *sceleris, parricidii, furti, iniuriae.* In Ciri 188 quod habent exemplaria, *quam tanto scelere damnare puellam,* neque modulatum est neque latinum." In lectione non aperte vitiosa codices et Wakefieldum sequi maluissem, etiam si non dixisset Cicero Philip. XIII. 12 *quo scelere damnatus.* [Mr Howard most justly defends the ablative: comp. too Seneca Herc. Oet. 902 'scelere te, misera, arguis'].

V. 343 *tanto quique* (also in III. 700). Compare *quantuliquique* of Gellius near the end of his preface, where the *quique* seems perfectly equivalent to *cunque;* also *taliacunque* in the XVIth of the Carmina ad Priapum, where one manuscript is said to have *talia quinque,* perhaps a corruption of *talia quique.* On considering these places of Lucretius, Gellius and the Priapeia, I incline to believe that *tanto quique magis* must be a phrase of studied indefiniteness (very likely regarded as an idiomatic grace of the Roman language) the analysis of which may be something like *tanto* (*quantumcunque id sit*) *magis,* as if one should say in English "so much the more, however much that

may be." If *quique* is a case at all in these places of Lucretius, and not merely a suffix equivalent to *cunque*, it must of course be the ablative.

v. 545 *quid quaeque queat res.* It strikes me that *gerat*, for *queat*, would be more suitable to the context than any amendment I have yet seen.

v. 737. 738. *It ver et Venus, et Veneris praenuntius ante Pennatus graditur, Zephyri vestigia propter.* Ita codices; optime, ut arbitror. *Veneris praenuntius pennatus* Cupido est scilicet; qui et infra in vs. 1075 *pinniger amor* dicitur. Bene idem Veneris dicitur praenuntius; *namque voluptatem praesagit multa cupido* IV. 1057.—Those who think with me that the beauty of this passage is seriously injured by the change of *Veneris* into *veris*, and of *Zephyri* into *Zephyrus*, have at all events the authority of the manuscripts, and consequently, according to all fair presumption, that of Lucretius himself, in vindication of their taste. [I too, even with Lachmann's 'sibilis digni' before my mind, have for some time been of opinion that the mss. must be adhered to; and just below in 747 I would follow them more closely by reading 'pigrumque rigorem Reddit: hiemps sequitur crepitans hanc dentibus algu': *algu* I take from Bergk for the *algi* of mss.: *bruma* again brings round the cold which spring had dispelled].

v. 875 *praedae lucroque.* Homero ἔλωρ καὶ κύρμα, ut Odyss. v. 473 δείδω μὴ θήρεσσιν ἔλωρ καὶ κύρμα γένωμαι, et saepe alias.

v. 878—881. I am satisfied that either the second or the fourth of these lines is an interpolation. If the fourth be rejected as such, the sense of the first three will be complete. If the second be rejected, and the fourth read thus, *Hinc illinc par vis ut non sit, esse potissit*, the sense will in like manner be complete, and perhaps to be preferred, as it will apply not only to centaurs but to all similarly incongruous formations, instead of being confined, like that of the first three lines, to centaurs alone. For *sit* it might be better to read *siet*, for the sake of the metre.—The opinion here expressed is the result of long pondering upon the difficulties of the passage, and the various readings in the fourth line, though I have no leisure to enter

upon a detail of the reasons which have led me to such a conclusion.

v. 889 *officit,* the reading of the mss., may perhaps well be retained, and construed as an active verb governing the accusative *malas,* with the sense of *offuscat, obscurat, inumbrat.* As to its capacity to govern the accusative, compare *officiuntur* II. 156, *offecti* IV. 763, *offecto* V. 776, and de Bello Afric. cap. 61 *adversariorum excursionibus iter officere non intermittit;* and as to the sense, compare the following definitions given in the Glossarium Vetus: "*Officit, ἀντισκοτεῖ. Officiendo,* [*τῷ*] *ἐπισκοτεῖν. ἐπισκοτῶ, obscuro.* (I should have mentioned before that by Glossarium Vetus I mean the glossaries of Philoxenus, Cyrillus and others, collected by Labbaeus, and published at Paris in 1679.)

v. 997 *privarent,* instead of *privarant* the reading of the manuscripts, is found in the small edition printed by Rapheleng in 1611, and certainly appears better suited than *privarant* to the place. [I have observed in my edition that the pluperfect is unexampled in Lucretius and that *privarunt* should perhaps be read: *privarent* however seems farther from his regular usage than *privarant:* see the n. in my edition to I 222].

v. 1001 *lidebant* should, in my opinion, by all means be retained unaltered, since it is not only the reading of the oldest and best manuscripts, but also receives support from the old onomasticon in the collection of Labbaeus, which gives the definitions *lido, κρούω*; *laedo, βλάπτω*; thus clearly distinguishing *lido* and *laedo* as words of different meaning and application. [*lido* seems merely to represent the compounds, *elido* etc.]

v. 1017 *et Venus imminuit vires.* Secunda ratio cur agrestes homines coeperint sentire frigus: quoniam scilicet assiduus usus veneris vires detrahit; quibus detractis, homo fit alsiosus. PIUS. Secunda potius videtur esse ratio cur homines coeperint *mollescere* vs. 1014.

v. 1027 *propago.* Propagatio, vel successio. Glossarium vetus: "*Propago, ἡ ἐπίδοσις τοῦ γένους.—ἐπίδοσις, porrectio.*"

v. 1096 *Et tamen.* Id est, Ne contineam me intra hoc exemplum tamen, quasi non aliud opportunum suppetat. WAKEF. Similiter Cicero ad Att. x. 6 *Meas cogitationes omnes explicavi*

tibi superioribus litteris: quocirca hae sunt breves: et tamen quia festinabam eramque occupatior. Conferas etiam vs. 1177.

v. 1098—1101. I think there should be a colon after *ignis* vs. 1098, another after *teruntur* vs. 1100, and that *Emicat,* the reading of the mss., should be retained in vs. 1099. My understanding of the passage will appear from the subjoined annotations upon it.—1100 *teruntur:* ab ipsis hominibus scilicet. Plinius N. H. XVI. 76 § 9, 77 § 1: *Mollissima tilia; eadem videtur et calidissima. Calidae et morus, laurus, edera, et omnes e quibus igniaria fiunt. Exploratorum hoc usus in castris, pastorumque reperit, quoniam ad excudendum ignem non semper lapidis occasio est. Teritur ergo lignum ligno, ignemque concipit attritu, excipiente materia aridi fomitis, fungi, vel foliorum, facillimo conceptu. Sed nil edera praestantius quae teratur, lauro quae terat.*—1101 *quorum utrumque* (scilicet, et arborum vento pulsarum collisio, et ramorum stirpiumque attritus ab ipsis hominibus factus) *potest,* aeque atque ipsum fulmen, *dedisse ignem mortalibus.* [I cannot understand 1100 otherwise than of the trees themselves: *utrumque* is surely the lightning and the natural friction].

v. 1105. 1106 *in victum commutare* valet, opinor, id quod "mutationes facere *circa,* vel *quod ad,* victum." Conferas Propert. III. 9. 18 *est quibus in celeres gloria nata pedes;* Virg. Aen. VI. 51 *cessas in vota;* Id. Aen. VII. 757 *neque eum iuvere in vulnera cantus;* Ovid. Met. XI. 178 *partem damnatur in unam;* Apulei. Met. I. p. 17 ed. Bip. *argento vel vitro aemulus in colorem;* Sen. de Ira I. 11. § 2 *armorum unica illis cura est, in alia negligentibus;* Tacit. Ann. II. 39 *forma haud dissimili in dominum erat,* et XII. 25 *adoptio in Domitium festinatur;* Petron. cap. 77 *tu parum felix in amicos es, nemo unquam tibi parem gratiam refert;* denique Tacit. Ann. III. 24 *ut valida divo Augusto in rem publicam fortuna, ita domi improspera fuit,* ubi Waltherus haec adnotat: "Ponitur hic praepositio *in* eadem vi atque graecorum εἰς, ut sit *quod attinet ad.* Eurip. Or. ἐγὼ δὲ τἄλλα μακάριος πέφυκ' ἀνήρ, πλὴν εἰς θυγατέρας. Xen. Oecon. XVIII. 1 δίδασκε με καὶ εἰς τοῦτο. Anab. II. 6. § 30 οὔτ' ἐς φιλίαν αὐτοὺς ἐμέμφετο. Hist. Graec. VII. 4. § 30 εἰς τὰ πολεμικὰ καταφρονούμενοι ὑπ' Ἀρκάδων." Possit etiam *in victum* adhibitum

fuisse pro *in victu;* sic Cato de re rustica XXXIX. 2 *coquito in fornacem;* Plaut. Casin. II. 3. 26 *ubi in lustra iacuisti?* Varro de re rustica III. 14. 3 *hunc in parietes stantes invenit.* Sed magis placet prior illa constructio.

v. 1152. 1153 *Circumretit enim vis atque iniuria quemque, Atque, unde exorta est, ad eum plerumque revertit.* Gravissima horum versuum sententia proxime accedit ad Psalmum VII. 16, ubi de iniurioso dicitur: *Convertetur dolor eius* (Sept. ὁ πόνος αὐτοῦ) *in caput eius, et in verticem ipsius iniquitas eius descendet.* Comparat etiam Wakefieldus Hesiodum Op. et Di. 265. 266 Οἳ αὐτῷ κακὰ τεύχει ἀνὴρ ἄλλῳ κακὰ τεύχων, Ἡ δὲ κακὴ βουλὴ τῷ βουλεύσαντι κακίστη. Similiter fere de Venetorum republica Thomas Moore, poeta anglicus: *Each harpy maxim, hatch'd by thee, Return'd to roost on thy own brow.*

v. 1229 *divom pacem adit.* Idem fere hic significare videtur *adit,* quod *ambit.* Similiter Apuleius Met. VI. p. 112 Oud. *volens adire cuiuscumque dei veniam:* de qua locutione Oudendorpius, nostri loci immemor, dubitat an latina sit. Similiter etiam Porcius Latro contra Catilinam cap. 23 *quas non adiit senatorum voces?* Mire tamen Lachmannus ad verba *divom pacem* adnotat "Significatur pacata deorum sedes."

v. 1324 *hauribant,* fodiendo aperiebant. Sic Ovidius Met. XI. 185—187 *humumque Effodit etc. terraeque immurmurat haustae.*

v. 1340 *facta.* Codex Poor. et (e correctione) Lugd. Bat. 2. *fata;* quod recepit Lachmannus. Pius etiam in notis ita corrigi iubet. Sed nostram lectionem respexisse videtur Ovidius Met. III. 248 sic de Actaeone scribens: *velletque videre, Non etiam sentire, canum fera facta suorum.*

v. 1409 *numerum servare genus.* Numerorum, id est modorum musicorum, genus accurate observare (in canendo). Et ita fere Pius (qui tamen cum Brix. Ver. Ven. et Ald. I. *numeris* legit), haec adnotans: "*Numeris.* Cum modis et sonis, qui numero teneantur et rhythmo. *Servare.* Observare genus, scilicet cantilenae; an phrygia sit, an lydia, an aeolia, an doria." Lachmannus tamen sic pronuntiat: "Lucretius scripsit *numerum servare sonis,* id est cantu ad artem composito." Nos, quibus nondum dixit Lucretius quid in hoc loco scripserit, codices inte-

rim secuti sumus.—I think that *genus* is at worst only pleonastic, not unmeaning. If *numeros memini* in Virg. Ecl. IX. 45 means "I remember the tune," as I presume it cannot mean anything else, then *servare numeros* would mean "to keep the tune;" and *servare genus numerorum* may well mean "to observe accurately the different *character* of tunes" (for *numerorum* may be used to denote several tunes as well as a single one—that is, the musical *numbers* or notes of several tunes as well as of a single one). Your reading—*et numerum servare recens didicere*—appears to me to excel that of the manuscripts in clearness and precision; so does the reading of Lachmann; but that does not, in my judgment, furnish a sufficient reason for adopting either your reading or his, in exclusion of that furnished by the manuscripts, so long as a tolerable sense can be elicited from the latter. If want of exact precision in poetry, when music is the subject, were a satisfactory reason for altering the text, what would become of Virgil's *obloquitur numeris septem discrimina vocum?* [Would Lucr. use *numerum* as gen. plur.?].

VI. 17 *efficere.* Melius fortasse legeretur *afficere.*

VI. 50. 51. It appears to me that the proper construction is *mortales saepe pendent, cum pavidis mentibus, cetera* etc., making *cum* the preposition, though redundant, as in *lento cum corpore nubem* vs. 439 and often elsewhere, and construing *pendent* with *cetera* in the accusative. Compare *mare quae impendent* I. 326. Although I have been unable to find any similar example of the verb *pendeo* governing the accusative, the context here seems to demand that construction. Of course *pendent cetera* will mean "anxiously dwell upon the other phenomena." [But see the note in my 2nd ed.].

VI. 108. May not *super* be the adverb, and *aequora* (like *caerula* in vs. 96) the nominative?

VI. 404. 405 *quid undas Arguit?* Similiter cum duplici accusativo Plautus *accusare* et *insimulare* usurpat: Trin. I. 2. 59 *si id me non accusas.* Amph. II. 2. 227 *mirum est qui illi collibitum siet me insimulare falsum facinus.*

VI. 614 *adaugmen.* This reading, for *ad augmen,* seems to derive confirmation from the ancient lexicon published by Mai in the *Classici Auctores,* which on p. 27, among the derivatives from

adaugeo, has "adauma, atis i. augmentum"; on p. 49 "adauma, aumentum"; and on p. 58 "adagma, aumentum."

VI. 690. In *fert itaque*, the reading of Lachmann for *fertitque* of the best manuscripts, the illative particle *itaque* appears to me inappropriate, as it necessarily introduces a new sentence, while the context seems to require a continuous sentence from vs. 684 to vs. 693. I therefore prefer *fert atque.* The ancient onomasticon in the collection of Labbaeus suggested to me another reading, which I think would be preferable to any other if it had the support of any classical authority. We there find "*futio*, ἐκχέω." But I cannot find the verb *futio* used by any classical writer. If it had been so used, the reading *futitque,* for *fertitque,* as giving exactly the sense which in my judgment the context demands, would have pleased me better than either *fert itaque* or *fert atque.* [*fert atque* is not Lucretian: *itaque* = atque ita].

VI. 697. 698. I think that *fatendum est* should be taken parenthetically, and *ventos* be read in place of *penitus.* This would yield a tolerable sense, without the necessity of supposing any line to have been lost.

VI. 712 *in aestatem crescit.* Voces *in aestatem* valent, opinor, id quod "secundum aestatem"; hoc est, secundum incrementa aestatis, pariter cum aestate crescente. *In* pro *secundum* usurpatum reperitur Stat. Theb. v. 461 *partus in vota soluti;* ubi scholiastes vetus: "*In vota*, secundum vota; ut optabatur". Conferas etiam Horat. Ep. II. 2. 188 *mortalis in unum Quodque caput* (id est, *pariter cum* unoquoque homine); et de arte poet. vs. 60 *ut silvae foliis pronos mutantur in annos.* Similiter accipiendum puto *in lucem rarescit* infra in vs. 875.

VI. 730. The reading *quo* may perhaps be right; for *magis* in the preceding line may be elliptical, signifying *eo magis,* in which case *quo* must signify *quo magis.* I think this construction should be adopted, rather than to change the reading of all the manuscripts. If *quod* had been the original word there, it is hard to understand how it ever could have been altered into *quo.* [the better a ms., the less rational its changes].

VI. 755 *sed natura loci opus efficit ipsa suapte.* No part of this reading, in which all the best manuscripts concur, seems to

me at all objectionable or unworthy of Lucretius. That *suapte* may stand alone, and be used as an adverb equivalent to *sua sponte*, or to *suapte sponte* of Varro de re rust. III. 7. § 1, I think is amply established by the following authorities: Glossarium vet. "*suapte, αὐτοφυῶς*". Accius apud Nonium IV. 279 *illos suapte induxit virtus.* Varro de L. Lat. IV. 22. p. 19. Goth. *posteaquam desierunt esse contenti heis quae suapte natura ferebat sine igne.* Apuleius Met. IX. p. 194 Oud. p. 208 Bip. *adseverans brevi, absque noxa nostri, suapte inimicum eius violentia sulphuris periturum.* [But I agree with Lachmann that a passage from Varro and one from Nonius, two of the most corrupt authors we have, are quite inadequate to establish so strange a usage, easily corrected as they are: my own emendation, the transposition of two letters, still appears to me the simplest correction: its metrical admissibility I have I think fully shewn in my note to IV. 741].

VI. 756 *esse videri* seems to me, as it did to Lambinus, to be equivalent to *videndus esse*—"to be to be seen". Arnobius in Book V. c. 11, says (probably in imitation of this very place of Lucretius) *Aestuatum est in concilio deorum, quibusnam modis esset intractabilis illa feritas edomari.* A construction very nearly the same occurs in Aeschylus Pers. 411 (417) *θάλασσα δ' οὐκ ἔτ' ἦν ἰδεῖν, Ναυαγίων πλήθουσα καὶ φόνου βροτῶν.*

VI. 888. 889. Ordinem verborum, et sensum, sic capio: "*Præterea, vis* quædam (nempe vis illa, naturæ eorum propria, qua sursum tendunt) *cogit ea* semina ignis *subito* (celeriter) *erumpere foras per aquam dispersa* (dispersim, singillatim, singula per se), *sursumque conciliare* (et supra aquam *conciliare se*, id est, congregare se, coniungere se, convenire)". Duae aliae scilicet afferuntur rationes, cur fons nequeat calidus fieri: et quod *celeriter* per eum semina ignis erumpant, et quod *dispersim.* Locum non satis explicarunt interpretes. Lachmannus pro *Praeterea* legit *Propterea;* quod mihi sententiam omnino pervertere videtur.—*Conciliare.* Wakefieldus ex veteri glossario profert "*Concilio, συνεδρεύω*". Vulgo contra codices editur *conciliari,* quod sequitur Lachmannus.

VI. 896. 897. *Et scatere illa foras, in stuppam semina quae*

cum conveniunt, aut in taedai corpore adhaerent, Ardescunt etc. Id est, *et scatere foras illa* semina, *quae semina cum in stuppam conveniunt, aut etc.* Similis adhibetur constructio in vs. 313, *et simul ex illa, quae tum res excipit ictum;* etiam in III. 133. 134. et IV. 560. 561. Vulgo tamen, hac constructione non perspecta, codicum lectio *quae* in nostro loco mutatur in *quo*, et verba sic ordinantur: *et scatere foras illa semina in stuppam; quo cum conveniunt, aut etc.* Sed ita de ipsis illis seminibus, quae scatere foras *in stuppam* dicta sunt, mox additur, "cum *in taedai corpore* adhaerent." [Mr Howard is clearly right here: see too what I say above on I 287 and I 755, and the n. in my ed. on I 15].

VI. 1001 *patefiet.* Patebit, aperietur. Non deest cautabundus nescio quis syllabaster qui *palam fiet* legendum contendit, priscis tamen exemplaribus reclamantibus. PIUS.

VI. 1199 *ut est.* Ita codices: mallem tamen *utut*, id est "quocunque modo". [But can *utut* be so used?].

VI. 1247 *In aliis alium.* Pro *alium post alios;* ut Cic. ad Att. IX. 10. § 2, *nec umquam aliud in alio peccare destitit.*

VI. 1266 *interclusa anima nimia ab dulcedine aquarum.* Confert Wakefieldus Lucan. IV. 368. 370. *Continuus multis subitarum tractus aquarum Artavit clusitque animam.* Addi potest Q. Curt. VII. 5. § 15. *Qui intemperantius hauserant, intercluso spiritu exstincti sunt.*

VI. 1276. Sic distinguendum videtur: *Nec iam religio, divom nec numina, magni etc.* [But Lucretius never has the copula *nec* in the 2nd place].

VI. 1279 *humari.* I think we should read *humare.* The words *hic populus consuerat humari* sound strangely at best, but become, to my apprehension, almost ludicrous, when immediately succeeded by *perturbatus enim totus trepidabat;* the first clause exhibiting *hic populus* as the dead subjects of burial, the second as the living and bustling actors in the business of burying. If *humare* be read, *mos sepulturae quo hic populus consuerat humare* will be parallel to *καθὼς ἔθος ἐστὶ τοῖς Ἰουδαίοις ἐνταφιάζειν* Joannis Evang. XIX. 40.

N. P. HOWARD.

In the preceding pages I have frequently referred to the remarks of Mr Friedrich Polle of Dresden who in several numbers of the 25th and 26th volumes of the Philologus has given a 'Jahresbericht' as it is called of the Lucretian literature since Lachmann and Bernays, and who has published besides in that Journal and in Jahn's Jahrbuecher several short articles on Lucretius, as well as a separate Latin tract 'de artis vocabulis quibusdam Lucretianis'. The most important of these, the 'Jahresbericht', specifies as many as 68 different books, separate tracts, or articles and notices in philological Journals, German, English and French. From the nature of the case such a Report will err sometimes on the side of excess, sometimes on that of defect. Thus all that precedes Lachmann is intentionally neglected, and undue importance attached in consequence to the very meritorious edition of Bernays, who necessarily in departing from Lachmann followed as a rule the older authorities, as any one in his position must have done. Mr Polle accordingly finds fault sometimes with myself for instance for want of sufficient deference towards Bernays: the truth being that he gained a great advantage over others by being lucky enough to be the first to publish after Lachmann. Some of the most certain corrections in his edition which deservedly belong to him, such as those in I 806 and IV 1168 and many others, would have been given by me if I had preceded him.

Very many of the pieces which he enumerates are really of no importance whatever, though he thinks it necessary to say something of them all. And while a vexatious prolixity is thus given to his paper, he often neglects what is important for quite trivial and insignificant details: he will criticise a dozen different conjectures with regard to some single word of little moment where it is impossible to determine what Lucretius wrote, and often offer no opinion about corrections of vital importance. For instance he merely alludes to my transposition of four verses after I 983, by which I have fully cleared up a difficult and much misunderstood section of the poem. In the same way he mentions Christ's transposition of III 582—606. I have only quite recently obtained the tract in which this is proposed, though it was published in 1855; but I see the great

value of his suggestion: only I think the vss. should be put after 575, not 579. Clearly this passage was a subsequent addition of the poet's, for which his Editor has not found the fitting place. I may observe that, while Mr Polle knows only by report, several of the English articles which he enumerates, he omits entirely one by Ussing in the Danish 'Tidsskr. for Philol. og Pædag.' for 1866, though it is of more importance than the great majority of his German articles.

Altogether he has spent so much time over these endless critical minutiae, that he has not mastered the exegetical portion of his work which he treats in a very perfunctory manner. He is pleased to make me many high compliments, far more indeed than are my due. On the other hand for the reasons just stated I am not put out when he says my commentary sometimes leaves one in the lurch, sometimes gives what is erroneous. He contents himself with one example of the former, viz. VI 1062 *Aeris* cet.: he says it is strange that no one before Lotze has seen that this passage is corrupt, and that Munro has not seen fit even to make a remark upon it: that Lotze has given the probable sense by reading *locutast* and *Cuius* for *Aeris*. Now, often no doubt as I have left readers in the lurch, here 'my withers are unwrung': there is no paragraph in Lucretius where I believe a competent reader will be more satisfied by my explanations: by taking 1056—1064 into the preceding paragraph and ending it with 1064, I have shewn that *Aeris* refers to what is told in 1044 foll. 1048 foll.: that Lucretius states a phenomenon which he has seen, but is completely mistaken in his induction. Nay I feel that I have been even needlessly diffuse in my comments: *Aeris* Lucretius wrote as certainly as he did *Aeneadum genetrix*. So much on this point: as an instance of what is erroneous he refers to I 966: I shall not stay now to speak of this; but will merely observe that neither Lachmann nor Mr Brieger nor Mr Polle have shaken my conviction that *inferna* is there right: this I hope at some other time to shew more fully. Equally certain am I that in VI 1138 *mortifer aestus* is right, though he is pleased to say in his Art. vocab. p. 46 that 'Munro temere et inepte praetulit' to Lachmann's *morti' ferai*. Nor do Mr Polle and

others see the true force of 'si pernosces' in I 1114, when they assert that *pernoris* would be needed: I would say the same of my *terantur* in IV 361; of II 460, 547, III 531, IV 101, V 970, 1341—1346, VI 237, 242, 1176: VI 740—746 *must* be genuine.

I have said that in matters of importance I have little confidence in Mr Polle's judgment: let me give a few examples. The difficult passage, II 522—568, I have made clear by merely reading in 529 *ostendens* for *ostendam;* Mr Polle who seems to have no inkling of the real purport of the passage, thinks *ostendam* must be genuine, though it is the one word which *cannot* be genuine. Again III 790—793, which recur in the 5th book without the mss. differing by a letter, I have explained without the change of a letter by a better punctuation: Mr Polle thinks Lachmann right in 790; and in 793 deems the wild transposition of Christ so convincing that the recurrence of the verse in V is of no moment. Nor in II 471—477 do I fancy many will follow him in preferring Lachmann's transpositions to my corrected punctuation. In I 190 he thinks *Crescentes* may agree with *omnia:* an impossibility, though even then the sense would be incomplete. I am certain a verse is lost; but I would now arrange it thus 'Paulatim crescunt, ut par est, [tempore certo, Res quoniam crescunt omnes de] semine certo Crescentesque'. In V 1427 he thinks Bergk's palpable blunder in reading *nunc* for *nil* unconditionally right.

To shew that Mr Polle has kept somewhat on the surface of his author, I will give one or two proofs: he believes I 919 920 to be spurious: of I 1012 1013 he thinks the same; for one reason because Lucretius could not write *alterum eorum:* why? because he never elides the *m* of dactylic ending words: V 589 we find *Alteram utram,* but that is merely an orthographical variety of *alterutram.* But in VI 485 we read *Innumerabilem enim numerum:* yes, but we nowhere else find *innumerabilis numerus* in Lucr. though the adjective does itself occur in two other places. But we twice get *innumerus numerus:* therefore Lucr. wrote here too 'Corpora enim innumero numero': therefore he is to be added to the many poets who avoid such elisions of *m.* What then are we to say of *Pluscu-*

lum habent in IV 616 and *spongiam aquai* in IV 618? not to mention *Tu quidem ut, Quam quidem ut, Non enim ut!*

On the whole however Mr Polle gives me more credit than I deserve, and sometimes approves of alterations of mine which I am now obliged to give up, for instance those in II 105 106. I would now retain the reading of the manuscripts untouched: this part of the poem is very difficult and obscure; but I now see that the poet is speaking of those smaller concretions of atoms yet invisible to the eye, less therefore than the motes we see in the sunbeams, which are perpetually flying through space, some of which never yet have formed part of things in visible being, while others have been thrown off from things. I cannot dwell more on this at present; but I may remark that in a most valuable article on the atomic theory of Lucretius in the 95th no. of the North British Review the writer says, p. 220, that the atoms 'never stop striking and rebounding; they are in perpetual motion tossed about by blows. Mr Munro's translation fails, it seems to us, to convey this view, reading as though the atoms struck, rebounded and remained quiet afterwards, hooked as it were together'. That the atoms were perpetually coming to and going from all things in being, is clear enough; but to suppose that they were not for a time attached to one another and at rest, seems to me alien to the thought of that age and not to harmonise with the rest of the poem. What was Newton's opinion in the passage quoted by me and by the reviewer in p. 217, when he says 'compound bodies being apt to break, not in the midst of solid particles, but where those particles are laid together and only touch in a few points'? Does not this quite express the views of our poet?

In other passages too I am now disposed to return to the manuscripts, or at all events to come nearer to them: I will only here specify two: in III 962, about which I have so often changed my mind, I now read with Orelli's 'censor Ienensis', mentioned by Forbiger, *magnus concede*, as I have found an exact parallel in Seneca epist. 110 18 'disce parvo esse contentus et illam vocem *magnus* atque animosus exclama': in VI 131 I incline to read *torvum* for the *parvum* of mss. com-

paring Aen. VII 399 'torvumque repente clamat'; Silius XI 99; and Apul. Flor. XVII p. 79 'voce hominis et tuba rudore torvior cet.'

I will briefly touch on one other point only: Mr Polle, quite unsuccessfully in my opinion, attempts to upset what Lachmann and others have established as to the time of Lucretius' death and of the publication of his poem. Mr Usener in vol. XXII of the Rhenish Museum p. 444 produces and comments on a new and curious document respecting the birth of Lucretius: in my opinion he makes it harmonise successfully with what I believe to be the true date. It appears from Schoene's excellent new edition of Jerome's chronicle that, as I suspected in p. 309 of my Lucretius, Mai's correction of the date rests on mere conjecture: the best mss. indeed put the poet's birth still one year later. But this I think is well commented on by Usener, who fixes on 656 rather than 655 as the true date, so that when the poet died in October of 699 he would not have completed his 44th year. Mr Polle wholly rejects the testimony of Donatus, and makes the poet live on to 704 or at least 703, and supposes his poem was published after that time. But this appears to me to throw the whole question into confusion: it seems quite incompatible with Lucretius' relations to Gaius Memmius; for Mr Polle will not I fancy prove that he was not Lucretius' friend. Again it has surely been demonstrated that Catullus' Liber was given to the world before the end of 700; and I have shewn on III 57 that the many imitations of Lucretius, which are found in his 64th poem, prove that Catullus when he wrote one portion of that poem must have been well-acquainted with the other's work. If then the statement of Donatus has no foundation whatever and Lucretius was not actually dead at the end of 699, at all events he was already dead to the world and his poem was in the hands of Marcus Cicero for publication. The poem, as left by the poet, must have been written in at least six, probably in many more *volumina*. Surely these then may have been called 'Lucretii poemata'. But I will now conclude.

H. A. J. MUNRO.

9 *May* 1868.

ON THE ORIGINAL CONFIGURATION OF THE PALATINE HILL AND ON THE POMŒRIUM OF ROMULUS.

VALUABLE as the results of the late French excavations on the Palatine have been in many respects, yet since they comprehend less than half the hill and are not yet completed even within that limited area, we can hardly expect that any general idea of the original configuration of the hill should have been gained. Its natural features have been thoroughly altered and obscured by the successive buildings piled upon it during more than a thousand years, and the rubbish which covers it is in some parts more than forty feet thick and of the most chaotic description. Nothing less than an investigation far more laborious and extensive than any as yet carried out, can supply us with facts sufficient to build a trustworthy theory of the original shape of the hill[1].

The following remarks, it need hardly be said, are only written as a protest against the too hasty adoption of yet unproved conjectures, and not as containing any final settlement of a vexed question. On looking at Dr Dyer's plan of the Forum, Capitol and Palatine, which faces the title-page of his interesting work on the city of Rome, I was surprised to find so much prominence given to Cavaliere Rosa's theory of the double form of the Palatine, which I considered disputable if not altogether mistaken. Finding the same to be the case also in Von Reumont's new work on Rome, it seemed advisable to warn students of topography that the arguments by which this new hypothesis is supported are by no means

[1] The plan of the Roman forum, Capitol, and Palatine, prefixed to Dr Dyer's work on the city of Rome, or the plan in Becker's Handbook of Roman Antiquities, or Canina's map, may be consulted in illustration of this paper.

sufficient to warrant its reception in place of the generally accepted topography. On such a point it would be presumptuous to offer any criticism without having made an actual survey of the ground, with this special object in view. This I had an opportunity of making in January 1866, and I have since availed myself of the visits of several friends to Rome to request them to examine the Palatine excavations carefully.

Before proceeding to discuss the several points at issue, I must express my obligations to Cav. Rosa himself, who with the greatest kindness explained his views to me on the spot, and of whose politeness and accessibility to strangers many of my friends besides myself have the most grateful remembrance.

The topographical questions of which Cavaliere Rosa offers a solution are those connected with the pomœrium of Romulus, the position of the Germalus and Velia, and the Nova Via. I shall first give the usually received conclusions on each of these points, and then discuss Cav. Rosa's views.

1. The pomœrium of Romulus is described by Tacitus in a well-known passage (Ann. XII. 24) as follows. Sed initium condendi et quod pomœrium Romulus posuerit, noscere haud absurdum reor. Igitur a Foro Boario ubi æreum tauri simulacrum aspicimus, quia id genus animalium aratro subditur, sulcus designandi oppidi cœptus, ut magnam Herculis aram amplecteretur. Inde certis spatiis interjecti lapides, per ima montis Palatini ad aram Consi, mox ad Curias Veteres, tum ad Sacellum Larundæ, forumque Romanum et Capitolium non a Romulo sed a Tito Tatio additum urbi credidere[1].

Of the four points here mentioned by Tacitus, the positions of the two first, the Ara Maxima and the Ara Consi, are approximately known. The Ara Maxima stood not far from Sta Maria in Cosmedin (Bullettino dell' Instituto, 1854, p. 28), in the piazza della Bocca della Verità, and the brazen bull may have stood a short distance to the north of this piazza in the

[1] I have followed Orelli's text. Ritter has mox Curias Veteres tum ad Sacellum Larum, omitting ad before Curias. Larunda was the mythological parent of the Lares Compitales. Ov. Fast. II. 597. Lactantius, I. 20. Varro, L. L. v. § 74, mentions the Ara Larundæ as distinct from the Ara Larum.

Forum Boarium. At this point therefore the pomœrium must have included a considerable part of the ground between the western end of the hill and the river. The next point, the Ara Consi, probably stood in the Via dei Cerchi, nearly opposite to the Villa Mills (Tertullian, de spect. 5. 8), but the sites of the Curiæ Veteres and Sacellum Larundæ cannot be determined. The most natural supposition is that they stood at the south-eastern and north-eastern corners of the hill, and that Tacitus mentions them to indicate how far at each corner the pomœrium lay from the actual slope of the hill.

2. We have an indication of the position of the Germalus in the statement of Varro that the name was derived from the twin brothers (Germani) Romulus and Remus, who were there *cast ashore* (Varro, L. L. v. 54). Varro therefore supposed that the slope of the Germalus came down to some point in the valley which could be reached by the waters of the Tiber during an inundation. The part of the hill most exposed to floods is the western corner, and here therefore most writers on Roman topography have placed the Germalus. In Festus the name appears as Cermalus (Festus, pp. 55. 340. 348. Müller in Varronem l. c., thinks Cermalus the right form of the word). A second indication of the situation of the Germalus is given by a quotation from Quintus Fabius Pictor preserved by Dionysius (Dionys. 1. 79). The Lupercal is there mentioned by Fabius Pictor as situated upon the Germalus, and the Lupercal is plainly stated to have been upon the road leading to the Circus Maximus, that is upon the road leading from the Forum and Capitol through the Velabrum to the Circus Maximus[1]. From these indications we gather that the Germalus was a part of the western slope of the Palatine.

3. The position of the Velia has been usually determined by topographers as follows. Dionysius says that the shrine of the Penates was not far from the Forum and stood upon the short cut by which the Carinæ was reached from the Forum[2]. The Carinæ, according to Varro, adjoined the Subura and was a district lying on the slope of the Esquiline[3]. Therefore the

[1] Dionys. 1. 32. [2] Dionys. 1. 68. [3] Varro, L. L. v. 48.

road from the Forum to the Carinæ must have passed over the slightly raised ground which separates the Forum valley from that of the Coliseum, and it is upon this raised ground that we must place the shrine of the Penates. But we have also the most direct evidence that the shrine of the Penates stood upon the Velia, for Varro, Livy, Solinus and the Monumentum Ancyranum all place it there[1]. Hence it may be probably concluded that the name Velia belonged to the slightly raised ridge which runs out from the Palatine towards the Esquiline.

4. The Nova Via has generally been supposed to have led along the south-western side of the Forum valley close under the Palatine hill. It began at the arch of Titus where it was called Summa nova Via[2], and passing at the back of the Regia and temple of Vesta turned round the northern angle of the Palatine and led into the Velabrum. Such is the usually accepted account of the respective situations of the four places above enumerated.

Cavaliere Rosa proposes an entirely new and ingenious hypothesis, according to which he rearranges all these differently[3]. He founds his views upon the supposed discovery of a depression or intermontium running across the centre of the Palatine from north to south and dividing it into two portions, to the eastern of which, now occupied by the convent and gardens of S. Bonaventura and the Villa Mills he assigns the name Velia, while to the western eminence, the site of the Farnese Gardens in which the excavations under his direction have been made, he gives the name Germalus. He also conjectures that the Curiæ Veteres mentioned by Tacitus stood at the southern extremity of the supposed intermontium, and the Sacellum Larundæ at the northern. He identifies this latter with the Sacellum Larum, the site of which near the arch of Titus is tolerably well ascertained. He further thinks that the Nova Via was made when the original road from the Forum to the Circus Maximus, which ran along this Palatine intermontium, had been blocked up by

[1] Varro, L. L. v. § 54. Liv. XLV. 16. Solin. I. 22. Mon. Ancyr. tab. IV. ed. Zumpt.

[2] Solin. I. 24. Ov. Fast. VI. 390. Gell. XVI. 17.

[3] Bullettino dell' Inst. 1862, p. 225. Annali dell' Inst. 1865, p. 346.

the Emperor Augustus in the course of his extensions of the imperial palace. Lastly, the Romulean pomœrium according to his view included only the western half of the Palatine hill, and was bounded on the east by the depression which is supposed to have separated the western from the eastern end of the hill.

Let us now proceed to state the newly discovered facts upon which these conclusions are based, and examine how far they may fairly be taken as sufficient to establish the alterations proposed by Rosa in the received topography.

The existence of an intermontium dividing the hill into two portions, is said to be proved, first by the position of the foundations of the Porta Mugionis, which seem to indicate a line of wall running from the gate along the intermontium, and secondly by the existence of some deeply sunk chambers constructed of tufa, which now lie nearly twenty feet below the surface in the supposed line of the intermontium, and seem to prove that the natural level of the ground was much lower at that point than at several other points further west, where it has been laid bare. A subterranean passage has also been lately discovered, leading across the hill from the ædes publicæ to the domus Tiberiana, in which it is said that the dip of the ground towards the line of the intermontium can be recognized. Now on inspection of the plan of the excavations laid down by Cav. Rosa, we do not find that the first of these indications of the line of depression agrees with the second. For the plan shews that the line of the road which passed through the Porta Mugionis does not at all correspond with the supposed line of the intermontium. And again the subterranean chambers to which an appeal is made have probably been excavated artificially, and afford no sure evidence of the original level of the ground. Nor does the testimony derived from the newly found subterranean passage appear to be much more conclusive. For although it proves that the general level of the ground on the western half of the hill was higher than the floor of the above-mentioned chambers, yet the doubt still remains as to whether these chambers may not have been sunk artificially, to supply cellars, or lower apartments, or drainage to the imperial suite of rooms under which they lie.

I proceed to consider the explanation given of the above-

quoted passage of Tacitus by Cav. Rosa in support of his theory. He would paraphrase the words of Tacitus as follows: "From the great altar of Hercules stones were placed at certain intervals along the foot of the Palatine Hill to the altar of Consus, and at a short distance from this to the Curiæ Veteres. Then the pomœrium turned at a right angle and traversed the hill along the intermontium till it reached the chapel of the Lares on the Summa sacra Via."

Thus he interprets the words "mox ad Curias Veteres" as meaning that a short space only intervened between the altar of Consus and the Curiæ Veteres, and thinks that in the last clause "tum ad sacellum Larundæ" a stress is to be laid upon the particle *tum* as indicating a sudden alteration in the direction of the pomœrium.

I cannot think that this is a legitimate construction to put upon the passage of Tacitus. For it seems plain that the expression "per ima Montis Palatini" belongs to all the three clauses which immediately follow it, and not only to the two first. The general line of the pomœrium was indicated by the words "inde certis spatiis interjecti lapides per ima Montis Palatini," and it was therefore only necessary to give a *very few points at long intervals to shew approximately the distance from the actual foot of the hill at which the pomœrium ran.* And surely if under the term Mons Palatinus Tacitus only intended to include the western end of the hill, he could hardly have failed to make some remark upon the difference between such a meaning of the name and its commonly received meaning in his time. Is it conceivable that he could have intended to describe the boundary of the ancient city as having passed through the very centre of that part of the palace which was in his time the emperor's suite of reception rooms, without the slightest intimation that the features of the ground had been changed in any respect?

The words of Tacitus seem to be totally irreconcilable with any knowledge of the supposed intermontium, and therefore whatever may be the value of his testimony on an archæological question such as that of the pomœrium, it is certainly not in favour of Cavaliere Rosa's theory.

But another ingenious argument has been used by those who entertain the notion of a division of the Palatine into two separate eminences, and the restriction of the Romulean pomœrium to the western portion of the hill. All the points, they say, mentioned by Tacitus whose site is certainly known lay on this side of the hill. The only one which could have been situated on the eastern side is the Curiæ Veteres. "Is it then probable," it is asked, "if the Romulean city covered the whole hill, that Tacitus would have defined the boundaries of one half of it by naming four objects, and those of the other and larger half by naming only one, the Curiæ Veteres[1]?"

In answer to this it must be remarked that the Curiæ Veteres is *not* by any means the only point mentioned by Tacitus which could have stood upon the eastern end of the hill. For it is by no means proved that the Sacellum Larundæ was identical with the Sacellum Larum, indeed it seems probable that it was not so[2]. Nor is the exact position of the Ara Consi by any means defined so accurately as to determine whether it must be assigned to the eastern or western half of the hill. It stood most probably, as we have seen, at a point which would correspond nearly to the southern end of the supposed intermontium, and therefore would strictly belong to neither portion of the hill.

Thus, in fact, the western end is almost as ill-defined by Tacitus as the eastern. On the western he gives the *Forum Boarium* and the *Ara Maxima* only, so far as we can distinctly ascertain, leaving the whole side adjoining the Velabrum, and also that adjoining the Forum without any boundary marks. If, then, the *Ara Consi* is to be considered as intermediate between the two parts of the hill, we have the *Curiæ Veteres* and the *Sacellum Larundæ* left to mark the corners of the pomœrium at the eastern end. The points mentioned by Tacitus seem not so much to be intended to mark the course of the pomœrium at regular intervals, as to shew where it diverged most from the foot of the Palatine Hill.

The passage of Solinus, quoted in support of Cav. Rosa's

[1] Dyer, City of Rome, p. 17.

[2] Assuming that Orelli's emendation of the passage is correct. See above, p. 147 note.

theory, is so vague that no important argument can be fairly drawn from it. The words run as follows, Romam condidit Romulus dictaque primum est Roma quadrata quod ad æquilibrium foret posita, ea incipit a silva quæ est in area Apollinis, et ad supercilium scalarum Caci habet terminum ubi tugurium fuit Faustuli[1].

A mere miraclemonger, like Solinus, is not to be trusted to give any definite kind of topographical information, and in this case it seems most probable that both Dionysius[2] and Solinus have confused the mundus or square pit, dug at the founding of the city according to Etruscan rites, with the shape of the walls of the ancient city, and that the true meaning of the expression Roma quadrata, as connected with the area Apollinis, is that given by Festus, "Quadrata Roma in Palatio ante templum Apollinis dicitur, ubi reposita sunt, quæ solent boni ominis gratia in urbe condenda adhiberi quia saxo munitus est initio in speciem quadratam[3]."

The remaining argument in favour of the restriction of the Romulean settlement to the western half of the hill rests upon the fact that all the places connected with the birth and life of Romulus are traditionally connected with this part of the hill. Thus the Lupercal, the Casa Romuli, the Ficus Ruminalis, the Cornus Sacra, the temple of Jupiter Stator, and the two ancient gates, the Porta Romanula, and Porta Mugionis, all belong to this end of the hill.

Now the first three of these spots are immediately connected with the birth and miraculous infancy of Romulus, and there would be a natural tendency to give them prominence in the early traditions about the Palatine settlement. The story of the occupation of the Aventine by Remus would have the same tendency to perpetuate the names of places upon the side of the Palatine which looks towards the Aventine. For the same reason the part of the hill which fronts the Capitoline and Quirinal and Forum, would naturally become more famous than that which fronts the Esquiline and Cælian, because most of

[1] Solin. I. § 18, ed. Mommsen.

[2] Dionys. II. 65.

[3] Festus, p. 258. ed. Müller. Becker, Handbuch, Theil I. s. 107.

the events of Romulus' reign relate to the rival settlements on the Quirinal and Capitoline, while the Esquiline and Cælian were uninhabited in those early times. Thus the prominence of the western half of the hill in the Romulean history seems sufficiently accounted for without necessarily confining the whole Romulean settlement to it.

If, then, we are right in rejecting the notion that the Palatine was divided into two separate eminences, as still unproved and inconsistent with Tacitus' description of the Romulean pomœrium; it follows that the new view of the position of the Germalus and Velia and of the Nova Via, as given above, must also be rejected.

But even independently of the rejection of this hypothesis, it is shewn by the passages from Varro and Festus, quoted in Becker's Handbook, that in the most ancient times the Palatine was considered as distinct from the Germalus and Velia, and not as formed by their union. Varro says, in speaking of the Servian regions, Quartæ regionis Palatium. Huic Germalum et Velias conjunxerunt, quod in hac regione scriptum est, Germalense quinticeps apud ædem Romuli; Veliense sexticeps apud ædem Deum Penatium. And in an enumeration of the heights forming the ancient Septimontium, Festus quoting Antistius Labeo mentions the Palatine as distinct from the Germalus[1].

R. Burn.

[1] Becker, Handbuch, Theil I. s. 123. Varro, Ling. Lat. v. § 54. Festus, p. 348, ed. Müller. See also Dyer, City of Rome, p. 19.

ON A PASSAGE OF ANDOCIDES.

In the year 400 B.C. Andocides was brought to trial on the charge of having been concerned, with Alcibiades and others, in a profanation of the Eleusinian Mysteries 15 years before. He defended himself in the extant speech Περὶ τῶν μυστηρίων. In this speech he contends, first, that he is not guilty; secondly, that, even if he had been guilty, it was illegal now to bring him to trial; because, when the democracy was restored in 403, it had been resolved, χρῆσθαι νόμοις ἀπ' Εὐκλείδου ἄρχοντος, to date the force of the (revised) laws from the archonship of Eucleides in that year. An act alleged to have been committed in 415 could not therefore be made the ground of a γραφὴ ἀσεβείας in 400. By way of shewing the wisdom of this provision, and of the measures for concord and mutual forgiveness taken under stress of public calamity after Aegospotami in 405, he goes on to quote from the earlier history of Athens another case in which an act of comprehensive amnesty had been passed with happy effect. The passage presents historical difficulties, and has had some share in leading Mr Grote to pronounce that 'in regard to the earlier history of Athens the assertions of Andocides are so loose, confused, and unscrupulous, that he is a witness of no value.' (Vol. IV. c. xxx. *note*, p. 168.)

With all respect for so high an authority, it is proposed to inquire whether the severity of this judgment (in so far as it rests upon the passage in question) will not fairly admit of some abatement.

The passage is Andoc. *de Myst.* p. 14 (Steph.), ss. 106 ff. The first and (for us) more important part of it runs as follows:—

ἵνα δὲ εἰδῆτε, ὦ ἄνδρες, ὅτι τὰ πεποιημένα ὑμῖν εἰς ὁμόνοιαν οὐ κακῶς ἔχει, ἀλλὰ τὰ προσήκοντα καὶ τὰ συμφέροντα ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς ἐποιήσατε, βραχέα βούλομαι καὶ περὶ τούτων εἰπεῖν. οἱ

γὰρ πατέρες οἱ ὑμέτεροι, γενομένων τῇ πόλει κακῶν μεγάλων, ὅτε οἱ τύραννοι μὲν εἶχον τὴν πόλιν ὁ δὲ δῆμος ἔφυγε, νικήσαντες μαχόμενοι τοὺς τυράννους ἐπὶ Παλληνίῳ, στρατηγοῦντος Λεωγόρου τοῦ προπάππου τοῦ ἐμοῦ καὶ Χαρίου οὗ ἐκεῖνος τὴν θυγατέρα εἶχεν, ἐξ ἧς ὁ ἡμέτερος ἦν πάππος, κατελθόντες εἰς τὴν πατρίδα τοὺς μὲν ἀπέκτειναν, τῶν δὲ φυγὴν κατέγνωσαν, τοὺς δὲ μένειν ἐν τῇ πόλει ἐάσαντες ἠτίμωσαν. ὕστερον δὲ, ἡνίκα βασιλεὺς ἐπεστράτευσεν ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα, γνόντες τῶν συμφορῶν τῶν ἐπιουσῶν τὸ μέγεθος καὶ τὴν παρασκευὴν τοῦ βασιλέως, ἔγνωσαν τούς τε φυγόντας καταδέξασθαι καὶ τοὺς ἀτίμους ἐπιτίμους ποιῆσαι καὶ κοινὴν τήν τε σωτηρίαν καὶ τοὺς κινδύνους ποιήσασθαι.

Two things are spoken of here: I. the infliction, by a victorious party in the state, of certain penalties upon its defeated opponents: II. the subsequent remission of these penalties.

I. The circumstances under which the penalties were inflicted are thus indicated :—'Your ancestors, at a time when great evils had befallen the state, when the despots held Athens, and the people had gone into exile, conquered the tyrants in a battle at the Pallenium, under the leadership of my great-grandfather Leogoras and his father-in-law Charias, whose daughter was mother of my grandfather. They returned to their country,—put some to death, sentenced others to banishment, allowed some to remain at Athens, but under disabilities.'

To what occasion does this refer?

Dr Thirlwall (*Hist.* c. xi. vol. II. p. 80, *note*), Sluiter (*Lectiones Andocideae* p. 8, Grote IV. 166), and Dr Wordsworth in his *Athens and Attica* (p. 198, *note*) agree in identifying the battle *ἐπὶ Παλληνίῳ* with the battle in which Cleomenes, the Spartan king, defeated the Thessalian mercenaries of Hippias in 510 B.C. (Her. v. 64). After this victory, Cleomenes marched to Athens. Hippias and his adherents garrisoned the Acropolis, and prepared to defend it; but, on some of their children falling into the hands of the enemy, surrendered, as the price of their restoration; and withdrew from Attica to the Troad. This was the end of Peisistratid rule at Athens; followed, probably in the same year, by the reforms of Cleisthenes.

There are, however, two serious objections to identifying the victory of Cleomenes with the battle mentioned by Andocides.

(*a*) As regards *the place*. Cleomenes marched from Sparta; invaded Attica by way of the isthmus; was met by the cavalry of Hippias; routed them; and pressed on to Athens. Her. v. 64, *τοῖσι δὲ ἐσβαλοῦσι ἐς τὴν Ἀττικὴν χώρην ἡ τῶν Θεσσαλῶν ἵππος πρώτη προσέμιξε, καὶ οὐ μετὰ πολὺ ἐτράπετο....Κλεομένης δὲ ἀπικόμενος ἐς τὸ ἄστυ, κ.τ.λ.* Now 'the Pallenium,' or temple of Athene at Pallene, by which Andocides indicates the scene of the battle, was entirely out of the course of an invader marching from the isthmus. Pallene seems to have been situated 'at the foot of Hymettus' at its northern end (Leake, *Demi of Attica*, p. 47, 2nd edit.); rather less than 10 miles E.N.E. of Athens. The evidence for this site is derived chiefly (1) from Her. I. 62, which shews that Pallene was somewhere between Athens and Marathon, but nearer to Athens: (2) from Eur. *Heracl.* 1030 as compared with Strabo VIII. p. 377. In Euripides, Eurystheus says: *θανόντα γάρ με θάψεθ' οὗ τὸ μόρσιμον,* | *δίας πάροιθε παρθένου Παλληνίδος, i.e.* 'in front of the temple of Athene Pallenis.' But Strabo says: *Εὐρυσθεὺς μὲν οὖν στρατεύσας εἰς Μαραθῶνα ἱστορεῖται πεσεῖν ἐν τῇ μάχῃ, καὶ τὸ μὲν ἄλλο σῶμα Γαργηττοῖ ταφῆναι, τὴν δὲ κεφαλὴν χωρὶς ἐν Τρικορύθῳ* (ed. Cramer, for *τῇ Κορύνθῳ*) *κ.τ.λ.* Now it is improbable that on a matter of so much local celebrity as the legend of Eurystheus, connected with the immediate neighbourhood of Athens, there should have been two conflicting traditions, assigning his grave to two distinct localities. It is more probable that Pallene was so situated in regard to Gargettus that a grave at the latter place could be described as being 'in front, in face' of the temple at Pallene; 'and that Gargettus having been, as appears from the name Garitó, at the foot of Pentelicum, Pallene was immediately opposite to it at the foot of Hymettus' (Leake, *Demi of Att.* p. 46). 'The precise position of Pallene seems to be indicated by some Hellenic ruins of considerable extent, on a height which is separated only from the northern extremity of Hymettus by the main road into the Mesogaea. This place is about a mile and a half to the S.W. of Garitó, near two small

churches, in one of which Mr Finlay found the following fragment: ΘΕΟΦΑΝΗΣ ΠΑΛΛ(ΗΝΗΥΣ)' (*note*, ibid.).

(*b*) *The sequel* of the battle mentioned by Andocides furnishes a second reason against identifying it with the event recorded in Her. v. 64. Andocides says that the conquerors, on coming to Athens, 'put some (of their late opponents) to death, sentenced others to banishment, allowed others to remain at Athens, but under disabilities.' Now Herodotus (v. 65) expressly says that Cleomenes, when, after his victory, he had besieged the Acropolis, would never have brought the Peisistratids to a surrender, strong as they were in supplies and in a position which defied his engineering skill, if the accident of the children being captured had not induced the defenders to capitulate. 'Then they surrendered, in order to ransom their children, on the condition named by the Athenians,—that within five days they should quit Attica.' Hippias and his adherents, a strong and compact party with ample resources, voluntarily resign a position of which they are masters, on the simple understanding that they are to withdraw from Attica. Were they likely to suffer, would they have permitted themselves to suffer, such rigorous and summary treatment as Andocides describes,—treatment such as might have been inflicted upon the scattered survivors of a vanquished and broken faction? Is it likely that some of them would have been put to death, or that others would have accepted 'permission' to remain at Athens as *ἄτιμοι*, paying the price of political existence for the privilege of lingering, after the rest of their party had emigrated, in a city where they would have neither friends nor rights?

It would appear, then, that neither the *locality* indicated by Andocides, remote as it is from the route of a Peloponnesian invader, nor the *result* of which he speaks,—implying, as it does, a decisive triumph, rather than an arrangement for mutual convenience between defenders and unsuccessful besiegers,—will permit us to identify the occasion to which he refers with the occasion described in Her. v. 64. This is the opinion of Mr Grote, who observes: 'the two events have not a single circumstance in common, except that each is a victory over the Peisistratidae or their allies' (IV. p. 166). But, while

admitting that the narrative of Andocides cannot be reconciled with the narrative of Herodotus, he intimates an opinion that they are intended as narratives of the same event. 'If, then,' (he says,) 'we compare the *statement given by Andokides of the preceding circumstances whereby the dynasty of the Peisistratids was put down*, with that given by Herodotus, we shall see that the two are radically different; we cannot blend them together, but must make our election between them.' Now, I venture to think that it is not necessary to make any such choice, or to pronounce either Herodotus or Andocides untrustworthy; for it appears to me very probable that they are *not* speaking of the same event. I do not believe that Andocides is describing 'the circumstances whereby the dynasty of the Peisistratids was put down.' After carefully considering the evidence, I am disposed to think that he is referring rather to the event by which the dynasty of the Peisistratids *was finally set up*,—to the second and final restoration of Peisistratus in or about 550 B.C.

The reasons which seem to make this hypothesis probable may be classified as relating to three points in the account given by Andocides of the battle which he notices: (1) its occasion: (2) its circumstances: (3) its consequences.

(1) *The occasion.* It is thus described: *γενομένων τῇ πόλει κακῶν μεγάλων, ὅτε οἱ τύραννοι μὲν εἶχον τὴν πόλιν, ὁ δὲ δῆμος ἔφυγε*: 'when great evils had befallen the city,—when the despots held it, and the people had gone into exile.' Examination will shew, I think, that this description is applicable in the main to the period immediately preceding the second and final restoration of Peisistratus, but does not apply so well to the period immediately preceding the expulsion of Hippias. We are so used to think of Peisistratus only in the character which belonged to him from the date of his second restoration,—*i.e.* as a despot with an unquestioned supremacy,—that it is easy to lose sight of the character in which he first courted success, and which, no doubt, was sedulously maintained so long as he had powerful rivals to fear. He first came forward,—he fought his way, through the vicissitudes of eleven years, to the tyranny,—emphatically as the champion of the people. While

Lycurgus led the rich proprietors of the Plain, and Megacles the Parali, or people of the sea-coast district in the S.E.,—who seem in point of property to have formed a sort of middle-class,—Peisistratus announced himself as the champion of the Diacrii (or Hyperacrii), the mountaineers of the north-east of Attica, the poorest class of the population. The significance of this is clearly brought out by Plutarch, *Solon*, c. 29: *καὶ προειστήκει τῶν μὲν πεδιέων Λυκοῦργος, τῶν δὲ* Παράλων *Μεγακλῆς ὁ Ἀλκμαίωνος, Πεισίστρατος δὲ τῶν διακρίων, ἐν οἷς ἦν ὁ θητικὸς ὄχλος καὶ μάλιστα τοῖς πλουσίοις ἀχθόμενος.* Again, c. 13, *ἦν γὰρ τὸ μὲν τῶν διακρίων γένος δημοκρατικώτατον, ὀλιγαρχικώτατον δὲ τὸ τῶν πεδιέων, τρίτον δὲ οἱ πάραλοι μέσον τινὰ καὶ μεμιγμένον αἱρούμενοι πολιτείας τρόπον.* It was to 'the people' that Peisistratus applied for his body-guard, Her. I. 59: *ἐδέετό τε τοῦ δήμου φυλακῆς τινος πρὸς αὐτοῦ κυρῆσαι...ὁ δὲ δῆμος ὁ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐξαπατηθεὶς ἔδωκέ οἱ τῶν ἀστῶν καταλέξας ἄνδρας τούτους.* Cf. Arist. *Pol.* V. 5. 5, *πάντες δὲ τοῦτο ἔδρων (ἐτυράννευον) ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου πιστευθέντες· ἡ δὲ πίστις ἦν ἡ ἀπέχθεια ἡ πρὸς τοὺς πλουσίους, οἷον Ἀθήνησί τε Πεισίστρατος στασιάσας πρὸς τοὺς πεδιακούς, κ.τ.λ.* Plato *Rep.* VIII. p. 566 B, *τὸ δὴ τυραννικὸν αἴτημα τὸ πολυθρύλητον...αἰτεῖν τὸν δῆμον φύλακάς τινας τοῦ σώματος, ἵνα σῶς αὐτοῖς ᾖ ὁ τοῦ δήμου βοηθός.* In this character—as *ὁ τοῦ δήμου βοηθός*—Peisistratus acted during the years 460—450 B.C., from his *début* as a candidate for power, until he had finally disposed of his competitors. Each of the two occasions upon which he was driven from Athens was a defeat for the popular party, a victory for the two allied parties who (in different degrees) represented the interests of property. Thus, in narrating the first expulsion, Herodotus does not speak of the combination against Peisistratus as a mere cabal of two powerful leaders, each with a passive following. He says (I. 60) that *the partisans* (*στασιῶται*) of Megacles and Lycurgus combined; it was a large party question, affecting whole classes of the population. The confederate Pedieis and Parali triumphed; the *δημοκρατικὸς ὄχλος* suffered defeat. Keeping this state of things in view, we can see how the words of Andocides—*ὅτε ὁ δῆμος ἔφυγε*—

apply to it. Peisistratus had been driven out for the second time by a combination—due to the influence of the offended Alcmaeonidae of whom Megacles was the head—between the richest class and the next richest. The poorest class, whose recognised leader he was, shared the consequences of his overthrow. Bitter as was then the feeling between rich and poor—outraged as 'respectability' must have felt itself by the recent successes of the *θητικὸς ὄχλος*—the latter had no mercy to expect; exile, either penal, or voluntarily sought to avoid worse miseries, would be a common fate for men of the people. The oligarchs were in, the popular party was out,—had been driven from Athens, and, doubtless, in a very large number of instances, from Attica itself: *ὁ δῆμος ἔφυγε.* The return of Peisistratus in 550 would be regarded by the popular party very much as the return of Napoleon from Elba was regarded by the French people in 1815.

But would the words of Andocides apply so well—apply in any sense—to the period immediately preceding the expulsion of Hippias in 510? The Peisistratid dynasty had then been firmly established for forty years. For forty years there had been no changeful warfare of class interests, no coming in or going out of parties. Could the *close* of such a period be fitly described as a juncture 'when great evils had befallen the city,'—a phrase which seems to imply that the event thus quoted to mark the date was comparatively recent? Again it is true that both Herodotus and Thucydides speak of the rigours which marked the last four years of the reign of Hippias; nor can it be doubted that during those years the ranks of the Alcmaeonid exiles must have received numerous accessions. But we have no mention of any event so definite and of such large effect that it could possibly be described by the phrase *ὁ δῆμος ἔφυγε.*

It is proper to notice, under this head, an objection which may fairly be made to the view that Andocides is speaking of the return of Peisistratus. It is an objection of which I feel the full force. Could Andocides have designated Megacles and Lycurgus,—or their successors in the leadership of their respective parties,—as *οἱ τύραννοι*? Certainly, as far as we

know, they could *not* be so called in any proper sense. They were merely leaders, champions, *προστάται* of their respective parties; not *τύραννοι*. It is true that, as Plato says, *ὅταπερ φύηται τύραννος, ἐκ προστατικῆς ῥίζης καὶ οὐκ ἀλλόθεν ἐκβλαστάνει*· but there is no evidence to shew that this transition had actually taken place,—that Megacles and Lycurgus had established a formal despotism on the ruins of that which they had overthrown. But at all events they, or the nobles who succeeded them as leaders of the Pedieis and Parali, must have exercised a paramount personal ascendancy; and the difficulty of supposing Andocides to have remembered indistinctly, and described inexactly, the nature of the power held by these great chiefs, is certainly less than the mass of difficulty involved in supposing that he alludes to Hippias. And I would just point out, as a circumstance to be taken for what it is worth, the latitude with which *τύραννος, τυραννεύω* are once or twice used by Herodotus; *e.g.* VI. 123, (Harmodius and Aristogeiton) *ἐξηγρίωσαν τοὺς ὑπολοίπους Πεισιστρατιδέων Ἵππαρχον ἀποκτείναντες, οὐδέ τι μᾶλλον ἔπαυσαν τοὺς λοιποὺς τυραννεύοντας*. Now Hippias *alone* remained; nor can the plural, in a plain prose statement, be compared with the poetical plural of vague or mysterious reference, like *δεσποτῶν θανάτοισι* for *Ἀγαμέμνονος θανάτῳ* in Aesch. *Cho.* 47. It must be explained by the light of Her. V. 64, where, speaking of Cleomenes besieging *Hippias* four years after the death of Hipparchus, he says, *ἐπολιόρκεε τοὺς τυράννους ἀπεργμένους ἐν τῷ Πελασγικῷ, i.e. τοὺς Πεισιστρατίδας*: where *οἱ τύραννοι* = simply 'the members of the ruling house.'

(2) *Circumstances* of the battle. Andocides says:—*νικήσαντες μαχόμενοι τοὺς τυράννους ἐπὶ Παλληνίῳ, στρατηγοῦντος Λεωγόρου τοῦ προπάππου τοῦ ἐμοῦ καὶ Χαρίου οὗ ἐκεῖνος τὴν θυγατέρα εἶχεν*. It has already been attempted to shew that the Pallenium, the temple of Athene Pallenis, could not have witnessed the battle mentioned in Her. V. 64. But this very temple is mentioned by Herodotus as the point at which, on the second return of Peisistratus, his forces, marching from Marathon, encountered those of the Athenian party: Her. I. 62, *καὶ οὗτοί τε (οἱ ἐκ τοῦ ἀστέος*, opposed to Peisistratus) *πανστρατιῇ ἤϊσαν*

ἐπὶ τοὺς κατιόντας· καὶ οἱ ἀμφὶ Πεισίστρατον, ὡς ὁρμηθέντες ἐκ Μαραθῶνος ἦϊσαν ἐπὶ τὸ ἄστυ, ἐς τὠυτὸ συνιόντες ἀπικνέονται ἐπὶ Παλληνίδος Ἀθηναίης ἱρόν. Here the exiles obtained the easy victory which secured their restoration. Mr Blakesley (*ad* Her. I. 63) refers the allusion of Andocides, as I do, to this battle; but considers that Andocides meant to represent Peisistratus as *defeated*. 'This is the same thing,' (he adds,) 'as if a Frenchman in the year 1958 should represent Louis Napoleon as becoming President of the French Republic in consequence of the victory of General Changarnier over the allies at Waterloo.' Precisely so: and doubting whether the Frenchman will venture upon such an assertion in 1958, I cannot but doubt whether Andocides meant to represent Peisistratus as defeated. That the battle should be spoken of as fought *στρατηγοῦντος Λεωγόρου καὶ Χαρίου*, and not *στρατηγοῦντος Πεισιστράτου*, need not surprise us. *στρατηγοῦντος* is not necessarily 'holding *the* command,' but simply 'holding *a* command.' Peisistratus had drawn to his standard at Eretria many men—such, for instance, as Lygdamis of Naxos, Her. I. 62—whose importance as contributors to his force would entitle them to share the command in the field. The orator is anxious to put forward the importance of his ancestors to the exiled champion of the popular cause; but, conscious that the recollections attaching to that champion's name are not those of unalloyed popularity, he does not care to run the needless risk of its jarring on the ears of the jury. As Andocides was born in 467 B.C., there is no difficulty in supposing his greatgrandfather to have been present at a battle fought in 550 B.C.

(3) *Consequences* ascribed by Andocides to the victory of which he speaks. *κατελθόντες εἰς τὴν πατρίδα τοὺς μὲν ἀπέκτειναν, τῶν δὲ φυγὴν κατέγνωσαν, τοὺς δὲ μένειν ἐν τῇ πόλει ἐάσαντες ἠτίμωσαν.* Results of this character—as has been already indicated—were hardly possible in connection with the surrender and withdrawal from Athens of the Peisistratidae, as related in Her. V. 64. Now compare the notice in Herodotus of what ensued on the victory and final restoration of Peisistratus. Among other precautions, he assured his position, *ὁμήρους τε τῶν παραμεινάντων Ἀθηναίων καὶ μὴ αὐτίκα φυγόντων*

λαβὼν καὶ καταστήσας ἐς Νάξον. From these words we gather at least thus much:—1. That some of the defeated oligarchical party had immediately fled from Athens. Against these a formal sentence of banishment would be recorded according to the usual practice in such cases. 2. That others had remained at Athens, submitting, as the price of the permission, to a demand for hostages. It may fairly be presumed that in some cases the price demanded would be heavier; and an obvious one would be submission to certain disabilities.

II. The second statement of importance in the passage which we are discussing is this:—that the sentences of *ἀτιμία* and of banishment inflicted after the battle 'at the Pallenium' were revoked under pressure of danger from a Persian invasion. Two charges against Andocides have been founded upon this part of the passage: (1) That he has actually confused the two great Persian invasions—that in 490 B.C., repelled at Marathon; and that in 480, of which the force was broken at Salamis. This charge is noticed by Mr Grote (IV. 166), as brought by Valckenaer and Sluiter; and he endorses it. (2) That it is 'a glaring mistake' to represent *either* of these two invasions as having prompted the act of amnesty in question (Grote, IV. 167).

The words of Andocides are as follows (p. 14. ss. 107, 108):—

ὕστερον δὲ, ἡνίκα βασιλεὺς ἐπεστράτευσεν ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα, γνόντες τῶν συμφορῶν τῶν ἐπιουσῶν· τὸ μέγεθος καὶ τὴν παρασκευὴν τοῦ βασιλέως, ἔγνωσαν τούς τε φυγόντας καταδέξασθαι καὶ τοὺς ἀτίμους ἐπιτίμους ποιῆσαι καὶ κοινὴν τήν τε σωτηρίαν καὶ τοὺς κινδύνους ποιήσασθαι. πράξαντες δὲ ταῦτα καὶ δόντες ἀλλήλοις πίστεις καὶ ὅρκους μεγάλους, ἠξίουν σφᾶς αὐτοὺς προτάξαντες πρὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἁπάντων ἀπαντῆσαι τοῖς βαρβάροις Μαραθωνάδε, νομίσαντες τὴν σφετέραν αὐτῶν ἀρετὴν ἱκανὴν εἶναι τῷ πλήθει τῷ ἐκείνων ἀντιτάξασθαι· μαχεσάμενοί τε ἐνίκων, καὶ τήν τε Ἑλλάδα ἠλευθέρωσαν καὶ τὴν πατρίδα ἔσωσαν. ἔργον δὲ τοιοῦτον ἐργασάμενοι οὐκ ἠξίωσάν τινι τῶν πρότερον γενομένων μνησικακῆσαι. τοιγάρτοι διὰ ταῦτα τὴν πόλιν ἀνάστατον παραλαβόντες ἱερά τε κατακεκαυμένα τείχη τε καὶ οἰκίας καταπεπτωκυίας, ἀφορμήν τε οὐδεμίαν ἔχοντες, διὰ τὸ ἀλλήλοις ὁμονοεῖν τὴν ἀρχὴν τῶν Ἑλλήνων κατειργάσαντο, καὶ τὴν πόλιν ὑμῖν τοιαύτην καὶ τοσαύτην παρέδοσαν.

(1) As regards the charge of confusing the two Persian invasions.

(*a*) It is true that we have no special mention of an act of amnesty, cancelling *ἀτιμίαι* and *φυγαί*, having been passed by the Athenians in 490 B.C.; and that such an act *is* mentioned by Plutarch (*Them.* c. 11) as having been passed shortly before Salamis in 480. But this does not prove that a similar measure was not adopted in 490 also: it would have been a very natural one under the circumstances; and the leisurely approach of the Persian fleet under Datis and Artaphernes, who attacked and reduced several of the Aegean islands on their way, would have given ample time for it.

(*b*) Andocides mentions Marathon by name, but does not mention Salamis; and says that the Athenians, after delivering Greece, 'entered upon their city desolate, their temples in ashes, their walls and houses in ruins.' Valckenaer and Sluiter (Grote, IV. p. 166) remark upon this that Andocides has transferred the burning of Athens by Xerxes to the invasion ten years earlier under Darius. But, if his words are read with attention, it will be apparent that this charge is quite unfounded. Andocides is speaking of the Persian crisis *as a whole:* the danger began in 490; reappeared in 480; and was finally crushed only by Salamis and Plataea. He is speaking in general terms of the deliverance ultimately wrought for Greece by Athenian effort—commenced at Marathon, but not crowned with final success until ten years later. *ἠξίουν ἀπαντῆσαι τοῖς βαρβάροις Μαραθῶνάδε, νομίσαντες τὴν σφετέραν αὐτῶν ἀρετὴν ἱκανὴν εἶναι τῷ πλήθει τῷ ἐκείνων ἀντιτάξασθαι· μαχεσάμενοί τε ἐνίκων, καὶ τήν τε Ἑλλάδα ἠλευθέρωσαν καὶ τὴν πατρίδα ἔσωσαν. ἔργον δὲ τοιοῦτον ἐργασάμενοι οὐκ ἠξίωσάν τινι τῶν πρότερον γενομένων μνησικακῆσαι. τοιγάρτοι διὰ ταῦτα τὴν πόλιν ἀνάστατον παραλαβόντες, κ.τ.λ.* Now it seems clear that *ἔργον τοιοῦτον ἐργασάμενοι* refers to *ἠλευθέρωσαν, ἔσωσαν*—to the *ultimate* result of Athenian heroism—and not exclusively to the clause *ἠξίουν ἀπαντῆσαι Μαραθῶνάδε*. He does not say that they returned to find their city desolate after Marathon; but after the final deliverance of Greece.

(2) Mr Grote points out that, as the Persian invasion in 490 was undertaken on purpose to restore Hippias, and the invasion in 480 partly at the instance of his family, either occasion would have been most inopportune for inviting Peisistratid exiles back to Athens. This is perfectly true; but the difficulty of course disappears if we suppose the sentences thus cancelled to have been originally imposed not *upon*, but *by*, the Peisistratid party. The remission in 490 of penalties decreed in 550 would of course have slight value except for the descendants of the persons so punished. But the members of oligarchical families who went into exile on the second return of Peisistratus may well have preferred to remain in banishment, even when the Peisistratid dynasty had fallen, rather than return to breathe the uncongenial democratic atmosphere which the Cleisthenean reforms began to diffuse at Athens almost immediately after the departure of Hippias. And as regards *ἀτιμία*, it is well known that, except in certain cases when it was temporary or partial, it descended to the children or heirs of the *ἄτιμος*. Cf. Andoc. *de Myst.* s. 74, *τούτους ἔδει καὶ αὐτοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἐκ τούτων ἀτίμους εἶναι.*

R. C. J.

CONJECTURES ON THUCYDIDES.

VI. 1.

καὶ τοσαύτη οὖσα (the island Sicily) *ἐν εἴκοσι σταδίων μάλιστα μέτρῳ τῆς θαλάσσης διείργεται τὸ μὴ ἤπειρος οὖσα.* So apparently all MSS. except h. I partially examined this with one or two other Parisian MSS. some years ago, and found in h *οὖσα* with *εἶναι* superscribed probably by a later hand. It bears evident token of being simply a conjecture. I am pretty confident that Thucydides wrote *ἠπειροῦσθαι*, "becoming mainland." Comp. II. 102 *ἠπείρωνται*, "have become, are mainland." *-οῦσθαι* might easily have dwindled into *οὖσα*, and *ἠπειρ-* would then as a matter of course be changed into *ἤπειρος*, especially if *ηπειρ-* ended one line and *ουσθαι* began the next.

VI. 18.

τὸν γὰρ προὔχοντα οὐ μόνον ἐπιόντα τις ἀμύνεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ μὴ ὅπως ἔπεισι προκαταλαμβάνει. Obviously this gives no sense. The transposition *ὅπως μὴ* does, but how can one account for the copyists agreeing in the inverted order? Besides *ἀλλὰ καὶ μὴ* i.e. *ἐπιόντα* strengthens the passage. Either between *ὅπως* and *ἔπεισι* on account of *μὴ* preceding *μὴ* has dropt out, or possibly by comparison of III. 46 Thucydides wrote *ὅπως μηδ' ἐς ἐπίνοιαν εἶσι*, the fragments after mutilation of older MS. or MSS. than we now possess presenting only *ὅπως... ἐπ...εἶσι.*

VI. 64.

τοὺς γὰρ ἂν ψιλοὺς τοὺς σφῶν.... Thucydides could have written *τοὺς...ψιλοὺς τοὺς ἑαυτῶν*, but it seems certain that the genitive of a pronoun which has a possessive form is not found in prose following an article. We say *ἡ γυνή μου* or *ἡ ἐμὴ γυνή* or *ἡ γυνὴ ἡ ἐμή*, but not *ἥ μου γυνή.* Poets may have a little more licence. Soph. Œdip. T. 62 *Τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὑμῶν ἄλγος εἰς ἓν ἔρχεται*, 1458 *ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν ἡμῶν μοῖρ' ὅπηπερ εἶσ' ἴτω. ἡμέτερος* is an unmanageable form in Iambic verse. I think Sophocles would not have written *ὅ σου παῖς* for *ὁ παῖς*

σου or ὁ σὸς παῖς, though Theocritus gives us τό μευ νάκος v. 2. In Thucydides several MSS., the Venetian and the Cambridge N among the number, have τῶν σφῶν, which suggests to me τῶν σφετέρων, the second word having been written compendiously. In VI. 89 τῶν δ' ἡμῶν προγόνων is additionally faulty. Alcibiades would not have spoken of himself in the plural number.

VIII. 10.

ἀλλ' ὕστερον ἄλλας προσπληρώσαντες ἑπτὰ καὶ τριάκοντα. The sense appears to require the interpretation of Poppo adopted by Arnold, "So that the whole number amounted to 37," but I do not see that sense in the words as they now stand. I conjecture that ἐς has dropt out after -αντες. Comp. for the use of ἐς, ἄρτι δ' ἀνειλήφει ἡ πόλις ἑαυτὴν ἀπὸ τῆς νόσου καὶ τοῦ ξυνεχοῦς πολέμου ἔς τε ἡλικίας πλῆθος ἐπιγεγενημένης καὶ ἐς χρημάτων ἄθροισιν, VI. 26. A similar correction in v. 49 φάσκοντες ἐς σφᾶς gets rid of one of the two examples of σφᾶς = eos in Thucydides.

VIII. 34.

ὥσπερ ἰδόντες ἐπεδίωκον. This of course contains no meaning. I am certain that ὡς εἶδον, the reading of the Vatican, is a mere conjecture, and if written by Thucydides would never have been corrupted into ὥσπερ ἰδόντες. My conjecture is ὥσπερ εἶχον ἰδόντες· ὥσπερ εἶχε we find in ch. 41 and 42, and ερ ιδον contains nearly all the letters found in εἶχον.

VIII. 102.

τὰς δὲ μετὰ τοῦ Μινδάρου ἅμα τῇ ἕῳ κατιδόντες τὴν δίωξιν εὐθὺς ποιούμενοι οὐ φθάνουσι πᾶσαι. The simple alteration of ποιούμενοι into ποιουμένου (i.e. Μινδάρου) makes all right. A similar error I find in Plat. Phædr. 234 A., where I some time ago suggested παυσαμένου for παυσάμενοι. I think this alteration better than παυσαμένοις, as τῆς σῆς ὥρας precedes, and σὺ follows. παυομένου, which the Master of Trinity mentions as suggested by me, must be set down to a clerical error in the letter which communicated to him my conjecture.

R. S.

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PHILOLOGY.

THE GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT OF LANGUAGE.

If we take any Greek or Latin word, and analyse it into its constituent parts, we shall almost invariably find that its ultimate stem is a monosyllable. Until the discovery of Sanskrit so complete an analysis would have been impossible, but the laws on which it should be conducted have now been so thoroughly investigated, and the pronominal and other elements which enter into all the commonest grammatical forms have been so clearly distinguished, that the general principles of word-formation in the classical languages can be made intelligible to the merest tiro. If we take such a word as am-a-ba-n-t-ur, 'they were being loved,' it can no longer be doubted that it consists of five distinct elements, and two junction-vowels; and we can not only resolve such forms as *ἐ-τύφ-θ-η-σα-ν* or *λε-λύ-σ-οι-ν-τ-ο* into their constituent elements, but we can see clearly that the distinction between them and analytic forms of expression, like their English equivalents, rests only in the fact that the ancient languages gave a sort of organic unity to compound-conceptions which modern languages, in their aim at greater precision, have disintegrated into a series of separate words.

As far back as we are able to trace the growth and development of the Aryan and Semitic languages, we see in all of them alike the tendency to pass from synthesis to analysis, from long much-expressive compounds to precise and numerous

single terms. If the English of to-day be compared with the English of the time of Wycliffe, the main difference will be found to consist in the abandonment of inflections, and the substitution for them of separate words; if again the English of Wycliffe be compared with Anglo-Saxon, it will be found to present the same characteristic difference; and Anglo-Saxon itself is less synthetic and inflectional than its ancestral Mœso-Gothic[1]. It is now well known that if we compare modern Persian with Zend, or Hindoostanee with Sanskrit, or Syriac with Hebrew, or Romaic with Ancient Greek, or Italian with Latin, or Danish with Icelandic, we shall in every instance observe the distinct workings of the same tendency,—workings so definite and so invariable in their character, that from the written documents of any living and progressive Aryan language five hundred years ago it would be easy to indicate with some certainty the general character of its present stage of development.

But vast as is the array of linguistic evidence to establish the reality of this tendency in the two chief Families of Language during historic periods, are we not inevitably compelled to assume the existence of *another and prehistoric* tendency to advance from analysis to synthesis? Even if there be no remaining traces, or none but the most evanescent and fugitive traces of such a change, are we not logically forced to *assume* a *cyclical* tendency of language? Can we, in short, avoid the conclusion, that every synthetic language which has become analytic must have passed through the five following stages of historic development, viz. 1. a monosyllabic stage in which the isolated roots were uttered in mere ungrammatical sequence as in the language of very young children; 2. a stage in which these roots were arranged in sentences, and combined into parathetic compounds; 3. a stage in which these parathetic compounds were fused into a sort of organic synthesis; 4. a stage in which these originally separable independent elements became reduced to mere inflections, expressive of purely grammatical relations; 5. a stage in which these inflections, having done their work,

[1] Compare for instance the scarcity of inflections in the English verb 'have' with the Mœso-Gothic haba, habai-s, habai-th, haba-m, habai-th, haba-nd.

become as it were deciduous, and are replaced by separate words, until language has well-nigh reverted to its primitive instincts, and yet has been so immensely refined and elaborated during the progress, that, whereas, in their original condition, languages were very miserable and imperfect instruments for the expression of thought, they became at their final stage the most powerful and splendid products of human intelligence? If these *à priori* conclusions be correct, Chinese and English would represent the starting-point and the goal of language. They would be like those vast rivers of Asia, the Ganges and the Bharampootr, or the Yenisei and the Obi, which have their sources and their mouths very near to each other, although they are separated by hundreds of leagues at the widest intervals of their course. Chinese never had any inflections,—English has lost almost every inflection it ever had[1]; Chinese does not express the genders of nouns,—English has discarded them; Chinese never possessed a grammar,—English has reduced its grammatical elements to the merest minimum. Yet Chinese, in spite of its extreme ingenuity, is one of the clumsiest and most complicated forms of utterance ever invented by the human mind, and English is one of the strongest, richest, noblest, and most concise. If such a cyclical progress could be demonstrated, the fact would be one of extreme interest in the history of humanity. The question before us is, Can such a progress be regarded as certain?

Instead of attempting an immediate answer to the question, let us consider some of the peculiarities of languages in their existing condition, and see if we can find any which actually represent these various stages of development. We shall at once see that there is not one of these supposed laws of evolution which does not represent the actual condition of some existing tongues; and independently of the general question which we have here stated, it may not be uninteresting or uninstructive to pass in review some of the most general of those linguistic facts which the labours of philologians, missionaries, and travellers have long been amassing.

1. First, then, we have in Chinese a language in precisely

[1] Dr Latham expresses this by saying that English is *anaptotic*, Chinese *aptotic*.

the condition which we should naturally have assumed to be the only kind of utterance possible to primitive mankind. I have elsewhere endeavoured to bring to a focus the many convergent arguments in favour of the origin of language from onomatopœias and interjections. Now in Chinese there are not only numerous onomatopœias, but also *its entire character* may in *two* respects be called interjectional.

i. For all real and simple interjections depend for their force on sound and tone,—and tone plays a part of infinite importance in Chinese. It is called *shéng* or intonation, and each of the 450 *yin* or vocal combinations of Chinese, is capable of *four* different *shéng*[1]. These have been called by Mr Wade (in his *Tzu Erh Chi*, Part I. p. 7) 1. the upper even; 2. the lower even; 3. the ascending; and 4. the receding; and the English reader may catch some notion of them by the pronunciation of the following monosyllabic conversation:

1. Dead.
2. Killed?
3. No!
4. Yes.

Since inaccuracy of tone produces the most complete misconception of the intended meaning, it is hardly astonishing that Chinese should be so difficult to acquire. To quote the amusing instance adduced by Prof. Max Müller, in Annamitic, which is a language mainly Chinese in its character, *Ba bà bâ bá* is said to mean "three ladies gave the favorite of the prince a box on the ear."

ii. But further;—interjections not only depend almost entirely on the *tone* in which they are uttered, but they are also essentially monosyllabic. They are sudden emotional *expressions* extorted by vivid *impressions*. All those natural interjections which are common to all languages are either monosyllabic, or, what amounts to the same thing, merely reduplicated. As a matter of fact, even in the Aryan languages, all the main roots consist of a single syllable, and it is impossible to suppose that the earliest races would have begun by venting powerful emo-

[1] Thus mǎ in Chinese means 'to grind,' mā means 'hemp,' má means 'to quarrel,' and mà means 'horse.'

tion in complex articulations. And here again Chinese accords with all our preconceived notions of a language in its primitive condition. It is essentially and unalterably monosyllabic, each root consisting of an initial consonant followed by a vowel or nasal sound. It is even incapable of uttering two consonants by one emission of the voice. This inability, combined with the absence of B, D, R, Q from its 36 consonants, produces some curious combinations. Thus Buddha assumes the form of *Fo tho*, English of *Ing-ki-li*, Jesuita of *Ya su hoei sse*, and Christian of *Kilisutang*.

Again, we know by examining the historical records of language that Grammar is a gradual growth. To us it may appear almost inconceivable that there could be a language which knows nothing whatever of the distinctions between parts of speech. Such however is the case in Chinese, and a little consideration will diminish our surprise at the phenomenon. It would have appeared at least equally inconceivable to an Alexandrian grammarian that a language could be terse and intelligible and beautiful without any inflections to indicate the differences of case, number, mood, tense, and voice. Yet the word 'love' in English may stand for the emotion of love, or for the god Cupid, or for an imperative mood, or for a vocative case, or for an infinitive, or for almost any number or person of the present tense, according to the context. And just as we neither suffer nor suspect any possible inconvenience from what may be called this *anaptotic* character of English, so the Chinese can make himself clear and even eloquent, without requiring any division of words, except into the two great classes of 'full and empty,' or 'living and dead.' To translate a Greek or Latin Syntax into comprehensible Chinese would however be an impossibility. Mr Wade, in his recent Chinese books, met with almost insuperable difficulties in finding even an analogue for our commonest grammatical expressions. He could find no terminology to represent even the case of a noun by anything except the most clumsy and cumbrous periphrases. Hence Chinese grammar becomes a thing *sui generis;* it is useless to attempt any fusion of it into the moulds of our Aryan logic.

But in Language, as in Nature, there is an endless power of adaptation which produces marvellous results by means apparently the most awkward and inadequate. Just as it is by means of a structure fundamentally one and the same that the vulture scents an invisible prey, and the elephant tears down boughs from the forest trees,—just as it is one and the same instrument, variously modified, which serves man for a hand, and the monkey for a fore-foot, and the lion for a paw, and the bat for a hook, and the seal for a flipper, and the fish for a fin, and the saurian for a paddle,—just as one and the same leaf, adapted to various conditions, becomes indifferently petal or sepal, cotyledon or bract or stipule or phyllode or scale or spine or tendril or pitcher,—so man, acting as nature acts, forces into varied service the same exquisite musical instrument with which he is endowed, and by methods almost infinitely diversified, finds adequate expression for every passionate emotion, and every lofty wish, and every mean thought, in mere pulses of articulated air. Man, like Nature, developes the materials already at his disposal, from inability or unwillingness to produce new ones. And, in this endeavour, his success is perfect. All that the Hebrew uttered by the majestic and sonorous economy of his strange triliteral roots, all that the Greek eternised in the rich, musical, synthetic forms of his delicately modulated language, all that the Italian conveyed in the 'vowelled undersong' of his liquid speech, the Hottentot is no less able to interpret by his dissonant clicks, and the aborigines of Malacca by their bird-like whistlings, and the Chinese by his monosyllabic interjections, and the Eskimo or the Cherokee by his guttural and immeasurable polysyllables.

The Chinese makes up for the want of grammar by definite arrangement of words in a certain order. His expressions are intelligible just as the language of children or of telegrams is intelligible, although all the minor words are omitted. If a child says 'book' or 'me book,' his nurse is at no loss to understand his meaning; and if a Chinese says 'luck sea life mountain,' we know that he is describing some extraordinarily successful and eminent person. If he says *Tsan-māu li-hai*, 'long hair full of fear,' we understand him to intimate that

those who wear long hair, i.e. women in general, are timid. We often adopt a somewhat similar style in proverbs. Such proverbs as 'Much cry, little wool,' or 'Reckless youth, rueful age,' are quite in the Chinese style, which (for instance) describes a difference of opinion by saying 'You east, I west,' and an unstable person by 'In the morning three, in the evening four.'

There is another respect in which Chinese entirely fulfils our conception of a language petrified while yet in its condition of primordial fusibility,—and that is in the multitude of its homonyms and the paucity of its roots. In fact *all* the words in Chinese are roots, and can hardly be called words at all; in one aspect they are roots only, in another they are sentences; in another they are mere relative sounds, which mean nothing except in particular connections and with particular intonations; but as Steinthal has pointed out, they are always either *more* or *less* than actual words. They are in fact the fragments of a mosaic, ugly and meaningless, unless seen in their proper position. Not only is each word any and every part of speech at once, so that, for instance, *ta* may mean either 'greatness' or 'great' or 'greatly' or 'to become great,' without any addition or modification whatever,—but also each separate word may have a vast variety of meanings apparently unconnected. Thus *Tchy* means 'that,' 'him,' 'branches,' 'endurance,' 'a yellow fruit,' 'a dead tree,' and 'a labourer,' as well as being a sign of the genitive case. We might suppose that such indeterminateness would be the source of endless confusion; yet the sound 'air' in English may mean *e'er,* or *ere,* or *air,* or *heir,* or *Ayr;* in French the sound '*il parle*' means also '*ils parlent;*' the sound *ver* may be *ver, vers, verre,* or *vert;* and the sound *sans* may be *sans, cent, sang, s'en, sent,* or *sens.* Practically these homonyms produce no confusion whatever, because they are the rare exception; but in Chinese they are the rule, not the exception. By tone, by gesture, by position, by context the Chinese diminishes the resultant obscurity; but this is still so great[1] as not unfrequently to compel a Chinese in the politest

[1] Because the *tzŭ* or 'written words' being few, many of them are known not only by one *yin* or 'syllabic sound,' but *also* by the same *shêng* or 'intonation.'

possible way to interrupt a conversation with the hint or insinuation that he (or, as he prefers to express it, that 'this little thief') does not understand some word which his friend has used. Luckily they have two expedients on which to fall back; one is the use of *synonyms*. Thus if he wants to talk of *lu*, 'a way,' he will say *tao lu*, 'path way;' or again, to quote an instance from Mr Wade, if he uses the word *ai* he can explain that he means the *ai* in *ai ch 'iu*, 'to implore,' or in *ch 'en-ai*, 'dust,' or in *kao-ai*, 'tall and short,' or in *ai usi*, 'to love.' This use of synonyms is further supplemented by an attempt at perpetual analysis in the expression of abstract terms. Language then assumes the appearance of an asymptote ever approaching nearer and nearer to the sense intended. Thus (to quote well-known instances) for 'happiness' the Chinese says 'luxury-play-food-clothes;' for virtue he says 'fidelity-temperance-justice-uprightness;' and he cannot even express so simple an abstraction as 'neighbours' without saying *kyāi fan lin se*, 'street-row-vicinity-houses.' 'To shave' becomes with him 'instrument-shave-head-man;' and he could not express 'amamus' without saying 'I-more (= we) now love.' But if all his expedients to secure clearness out of this chaos of indeterminate homonyms and exuberant analyses fails him, he falls back upon the infallible resource of writing. The 40,000 ideographic signs of Chinese writing, partly representative like the Egyptian hieroglyphics, partly syllabic like the Hieratic writing, are so managed as to make everything wonderfully clear, and to give a pictorial representation of the pedigree of almost every word. Thus '*pe*' means 'white;' but with the sign for a tree prefixed it means a cypress; with the sign for a man it means elder brother; and with the sign for the dead it means the spirit after death.

2. Assuming that all languages began their course from a condition resembling the Chinese, and that they contented themselves at first with resources equally infantile, the first step which we should expect them to take would be to *combine* their words into mechanical or parathetic compounds of which each possessed a definite unity, and retained the possibility of a separate and independent existence. And here again, if we want actual specimens of any language in such a stage of deve-

lopment, we find no difficulty whatever in procuring them. In fact this agglutinating process is the main characteristic of *three fourths of the languages now spoken on the globe.* It is found indeed in various degrees; as though in some it had barely advanced beyond monosyllabism, and in others had almost developed into flection; but something, which may be called agglutination, exists in nearly every language, and the term may even be applied to a few isolated expressions in the Semitic or Aryan families themselves.

A few specimens will illustrate the nature of this agglutination.

Thus in Hungarian *Szem,* means, 'the eye.'

Szem-e, 'his eye.'

Szem-e-i, 'his eyes.'

Szem-e-i-k, 'their eyes.'

Szem-e-i-k-et, 'their eyes' (acc.).

Or again, *var* = waiting; *at,* a sort of conjunction; *andot,* the future; *ta,* the past; *tok,* ye; and we get

Var-at-andot-ta-tok, 'ye will have been waited for[1].'

Yet each element of the word is so distinct that we may have

Var-andot-ta-tok, 'ye will have waited.'

Var-andot-tok, 'ye will wait.'

Var-ta-tok, 'ye have waited.'

Var-tok, 'ye wait.'

Everything, it will be observed, is effected by means of suffixes attached to the main stem. As might be expected, languages of this class are at once extraordinarily clumsy, and extraordinarily precise. Thus in all of them alike we find incessant *repetitions* of prominent words, as though it would be impossible for the memory to retain them if they were not reverberated with every second syllable. In Mexican 'we are all sinners' is expressed 'we all we men we sinners.' In Jakutish (a Tatar-Turkish language) 'I am a father' is *min axa bin,* or 'I father-I;' 'we are young' is *Bisigi adar-bit,* or 'we young-we;' and 'we had no command to return' becomes

[1] These instances are in Hoffmann (*Ueber Wesen der vergl. Sprachwissenschaft*); I quote them here from Dr Aug. Boltz, *Die Sprache und ihr Leben*, S. 85.

tonnuox-putugar xuolu-but suoga, i. e. 'to-*our*-return-future *our*-command *being*-not *being*[1].' In Kafir, Appleyard[2] tells us that 'a good man loves God' becomes 'man who-is-good *he-him*-loves God:' and to take another instance from South Africa, *aba-fana* means 'boys,' and the element *ba* will accordingly recur with every word in the sentence; e. g. 'my big boys love' becomes *aba*-fana *b*-ami *aba*-kulu *ba*-tandi. Supposing that a South-African had to say 'We love our large steamer which is in sight,' he would express it in a way analogous to the following: 'The steam*er*, our *er*, the great *er*, the *er* appears, we love the *er*[3].' This repetition is not due to the unconscious obsolescence of any verbal element, as when a Frenchman says '*mon* cher *mon* sieur,' or as when we call a place *Pen Hill*, or *Wans-beck-water*, but simply to an intense desire to make each sentence clear to the very dullest, dimmest, and least developed intelligence.

Our readers may probably be interested to know one or two of the peculiarities of this agglutinating class of languages. Two may here be noticed, viz. i. their weakness of abstraction; ii. the complexity and importance of their euphonic laws.

i. The first of these, the rarity of even the simplest abstract term, has frequently been noticed. It does not arise from any difficulty in framing words, for such a difficulty is never allowed for one moment to stand in the way of language. Where a subject is constantly alluded to, where any material thing is so useful as to be incessantly mentioned, words relating to such matters spring up like mushrooms in all languages alike. To mention but a few instances out of many which might be adduced, in our own language we find the words *cocoanut*, *kangaroo*, *cow*, *rice*, *tea*, *lion*, *locust*, *tramp*, *root*, *deer*, tolerably

[1] Steinthal, *Charakteristik der Hauptsächlichsten Typen des Sprachbaues*, S. 200.

[2] Appleyard's *Kafir Grammar*, p. 68.

[3] I take this instance from a yet-unpublished grammar of the South-African language by Dr Bleek. Thus, he says, the sentence u-*bu*-kosi, *b*-etu o-*bul*-kulu *bu*-ya-bonakala, si-*bu*-tanda, would literally be 'the king-*dom*, our *dom*, which *dom* is the great *dom*, the *dom* appears, we love the *dom*.' The same precision is seen working in a different direction when the *name* of a thing is derived from a combination of its qualities,—when for instance the name for a goat in Mexican is 'head-tree-lip-hair,' i. e. the horned and bearded.

sufficient for all our purposes in alluding to the several objects which they indicate. Not so, however, in the language of any nation among whom the things designated have become accidentally prominent. Thus the Fijians[1] have a separate name to describe every single stage in the growth of the cocoanut, and the Marianne Islanders have twenty such specific terms: the Australians have many terms for kangaroos of every age and description: the Chinese have several words for rice, a great many for tea of all kinds and in all conditions[2], and *separate* words for a calf, a calf that has not yet got its horns, a cow three years old, a cow four years old, a cow five years old, a cow more than five years old, a cow seven feet high, a large cow, two sorts of white cow, a black cow, a dappled cow, a mountain cow, a cow walking slowly[3],' &c. &c.; the Arabs have a hundred words for lion, and fifty for locusts[4]; the Argot has an indefinite number of names for vagabond[5]; agricultural Dorsetshire has five or six different words for different kinds of roots[6]; and Shakespeare furnishes us with some ten words for different kinds of deer. In fact no language is so poor as not to be able in this way to provide for its current expenses; but this small coinage is often excessively inconvenient, and the abundance of it does not at all make up for the deficiency of those larger valuable coins which are not forthcoming. In fact these languages, like the ancient Spartans, are loaded with a number of iron ingots which effectually prevent them from ever becoming rich. A dozen good abstract terms would supersede the necessity of numberless concrete expressions which generally indicate distinctions involving very slight differences. The redundancy of the concrete is only a clumsy way of concealing the deficiency of the abstract. The word 'brother' renders unnecessary the separate Chinese word for 'elder-brother,' and 'younger-brother.' The one word 'colour' supersedes the exuberance of terms expressing every shade of colour in Malay. The word 'tree' would have saved the Tasmanians the trouble of separate names

[1] Seeman, *Mission to Viti*, p. 38.
[2] Pott, *Etym. Forsch.* II. 167.
[3] Benloew's *Langage Primtif*, p. 20.
[4] Pusey, *Minor Prophets*, p. 58.
[5] Michel, *Étude sur l'Argot*, pp. xxii. 425.
[6] Barnes, *Poems in Dorset Dialect*, Glossary.

for every variety of tree[1]; and if they had possessed such simple adjectives as *hard, round, tall,* &c. they need not have used the awkward periphrases of '*like a stone,*' '*like a ball,*' '*long legs,*' &c. Finally, it may easily be imagined how many words are necessitated in those languages which have no verb 'to be,' and in those which, being unable to generalise a term for the third personal pronoun, can only express '*he*' by words which intimate a person lying, sitting, standing, walking, or at a nearer or greater distance[2] from the speaker.

ii. The euphonic delicacy, the intricately-woven harmony of vowels and consonants in these agglutinating languages without a literature, is really extraordinary. Here for instance is an account of the Suaheli language quoted from a letter of Miss Tozer, sister of the missionary Bishop. "Pronouns, adjectives, and nouns all possess certain prefixes, single letters for the most part which alter in the plural, e. g.:

Kasha *l*angu, 'my box,' makastra *y*angu, 'my boxes.'

Kile *w*angu, 'my chair,' viti *v*iangu, 'my chairs.'

Nyamba *y*angu, 'my house,' ny*u*mba *z*angu, 'my houses.'

We try to reduce these to rules, but I think the exceptions outnumber them." In fact the adjective varies its prefix ten or twelve times according to the prefix of the governing noun, in consequence of an euphonic concord so intricate as to appear arbitrary in its character. Appleyard, in his Kafir grammar, Threlkeld, in his Australian, Caldwell, in his Dravidian, the Church Missionary Society, in their New Zealand grammar, Charlevoix, Du Ponceau, Howse, &c. in their grammars of the American languages, devote many pages to the exposition or illustration of these alliterative and harmonic laws, which are found, though to a much smaller extent, in Celtic and other languages, and the existence of which may be clearly detected in the few words quoted above from Jakutish. It need hardly be observed that they are to the last degree childish and

[1] See abundant illustrations of this subject in *Origin of Language*, p. 107, *Chapters on Language*, p. 199, Crawford's *Malay Grammar*, I. 68, seqq. *Proceedings of Royal Society of Tasmania*, III. 281, *Ethnological Transactions* (New Series), IV. 133, &c.

[2] Humboldt, *Ueber den Dualis*, S. 21.

frivolous, that they help to render a language incapable of any literary development; and that, so far from being proofs of intelligence, they are distinct signs of its absence or imperfection.

Before we leave the monosyllabic and agglutinating languages, our readers may perhaps be amused to see specimens of the form which our own language assumes on the lips of those who have been only accustomed to such monosyllabic, grammarless, or agglutinative forms of speech. Just as we might conjecture something about the character of Hebrew from the Hebraisms in Hellenistic Greek, so we may be interested to observe the manner in which the native instinct of a Chinese or a negro dominates over the forms of an acquired language.

Here then is a specimen of that pigeon-English which forms a sort of Lingua Franca in Hongkong. We may premise that the word 'pigeon,' is a corruption of 'business,' since *b* and *z* (as well as *d* and *r*) are wanting in Chinese. By the kind of linguistic asymptote used to describe episcopal functions, Bishop Smith was known in Hongkong as the 'A-one-heaven pigeon-man.' The following is a sort of letter of introduction to a Chinese merchant;—

"My chin-chin you, this one velly good flin belong mi; mi wantchie you do plopel pigeon along he all same fashion along mi: suppose no do plopel pigeon my flin come down side my housie, talk mi so fashion mi kick up bobbery along you[1]."

This strange mixture of coordinate statement, imperfect pronunciation, slang, repetition, monosyllabism, and rejection of all articulations and flexions of speech, is, like all specimens of Lingua Franca, very interesting and philologically instructive. "It is," says Dr Wilson, "as simple as it seems absurd, but the words must be arranged as the Chinaman has been accustomed to hear them, or he will not understand what is said. It is spoken in all the ports of China open to foreign trade, and there is no disposition to adopt a purer one."

Here again is the proclamation of a negro crier, who wished it to be known to all good people that henceforth pigs without rings in their noses would be shot.

[1] Dr. D. Wilson, *Prehistoric Man*, II. 428.

"I say—pōs pig walk—iron no lib for im nose—gun shoot—kill im one time[1]."

In this specimen pōs = suppose, and the reader may observe in it the emphasis, the absolute non-subordination of clauses, the defiance of grammar, the abandonment of inflection, the evaporation of all the lighter and more delicate implements of language, and finally the difficulty of abstraction which renders the word 'is' so objectionable to the mind of the African that he invariably substitutes for it the word *lib* or 'live.' Every Lingua Franca is founded on similar principles, and the reader may see in Dr Latham's *Varieties of Man* (p. 320 seqq.) an instructive description of one, which was once used in Columbia, and which had been adopted to facilitate communication between the Chinooks, English, and French.

3. An agglutinating language on its road to inflection would almost inevitably pass through a stage analogous to that polysynthetism (as Du Ponceau calls it), or holophrasis (to adopt Schleicher's term), which characterises all the languages of America,—with the single exception of the monosyllabic Othomi,—from Greenland to Cape Horn. Languages of this incorporating class unite their words into almost measureless combinations, which, unlike those just considered, entirely obliterate the individuality of the separate parts of the compound. In consequence perhaps of a deficiency in the capacity for expressing thought, the names for all less familiar things were formed by an agglomeration of the names for more familiar things. The natural result of this attempt was a most unwieldy polysyllabism. Imagine such words as the Pawnee *shakoorooeeshairet* for 'day,' or *tsaheekshkakooraiwah* for 'devil,' or the Tlatskanai *xotschotxltsclutxltsaha* for 'tongue,' or *tlatlatlalpistiteutli* for 'fagot,' or *khotsiakatatkhlt-sin* for 'tooth!' A Mexican lover would have been obliged to make his declaration to the object of his affections in the heart-breaking combination *ni-mits-tsikāwakā-tlasotla*, 'I-thee-much-love[2].' Here, says Capt. C. F. Hall, is an Esquimaux

[1] See Hutchinson, *Ten Years' Wanderings among the Ethiopians*, pp. 21—32.

[2] "Comment croyez-vous que se dise un baiser en Mexicain? *Tetennamiquilitzli*. Dieu merci! quand on a prononcé le mot on a bien mérité la chose." *Curiosités Philologiques*. The

word, "but not the longest"—*Piniagagssakardluarungnaerângat.* We might well have supposed that compounds like this would be sufficient to "splinter the teeth of a crocodile," but custom makes them easy, and they get naturally shortened by what Mr Herbert Spencer calls "progressive integration;" that is, in order to prevent their languages from becoming absolutely unmanageable, they were obliged to create a fusion of syllables by incessant apocope. Hence in the majority of instances the separate syllables, and combinations of syllables, in the compound are mere fragments of words incapable of separate use. Thus in Mexican *nicalchihua* means 'I build my house,' but neither *ni,* 'I,' nor *cal,* 'house,' nor *chihua,* 'make,' can be employed as isolated words. Buschman, in his book on the Aztek names of places, mentions that in the Nahuatl language, the word *Achichillacachocan* means 'the place where men weep because the water is red,' but the *separate* words are *atl,* 'water,' *chichiltic,* 'red,' *tlacatl,* 'man,' and *choca,* 'weep[1].' Accustomed to such long words, and driven to adopt any expedient which might render them more manageable, they treated their sentences as merely words; and we are told by Mr Gallatin that in Cherokee the sentence 'they will by that time have nearly finished granting [favours] from a distance to thee and me,' is expressed in a single word-phrase, uttered of course with various accents, but still *uno flatu.* To give a briefer instance, to this day the common title of courtesy by which the curés are addressed in Mexico is *notlazomahuizteopixcatatsu,* or 'venerable priest whom I cherish as my father[2].' Another cause necessi-

same author wittily observes that the number *three* in Yameo is *etarrarorincouroac,* which is quite sufficient to account for their arithmetic stopping at that point.

[1] Similarly in Lenni-Lenape, *kitagichgouk,* a kind of serpent which only goes out at night, is derived from *kitamen,* 'to fear,' *gichouh,* 'the sun,' and *achgouk,* 'serpent.'

[2] Humboldt, *Essai sur le Roy. de Nouvelle Espagne,* p. 81. The reader may find a multitude of such instances in Pott, *Die Ungleichheit der Menschlichen Rassen,* S. 253. See also for other authorities which I have here consulted Steinthal, *Charakteristik,* SS. 202—272. Humboldt, *Verschiedenheit des Sprachbanes,* S. 169. Boltz, *Die Sprache und ihr Leben,* S. 87. Herbert Spencer, *First Principles,* p. 204. Capt. C. F. Hall, *Life among the Esquimaux,* p. 49. Latham, *Varieties of Man,* p. 309, &c. &c. But the best books for gaining some conception of the incorporating languages are Du Ponceau,

tating the multiplication of words, and therefore necessitating also the elimination of syllables in these sentence-words, is the endless pleonasm which results from their desire to be picturesque, and to place everything unmistakeably before the eyes. Thus we are informed by the Abbé Domenech[1] that a North American Indian cannot say 'I smoke' without saying 'I breathe the vapour of a fire of herb which burns in a little bowl of stone, wedged into a pierced stem.' If this be an exaggeration, it is but an exaggeration of indisputable facts.

As it may be interesting to see how an incorporating language looks in print, out of several copies of the Lord's prayer, I select one in Ojebway Indian which I find in a history of that tribe by the Rev. Peter Jones (a half-caste, whose name among his own people was Kah-ke-wah-quonaby)[2] London, 1861.

Our Father	*in-heaven-who-art*	*supremely-*
Noo-se-non	ish-pe-ning-a-yah-yan	too-ge-che-e-
-adored	*be-thy-name*	*Thy-kingdom*

nain-dah-gwud ke-de-zhe-ne-kah-ze-win ke-doo-ge-mah-we-win

let-it-come

tuh-be-tuh-gine-she-noo-muh-gud, &c.

At which period the reader will probably be inclined to exclaim, *Ohe jam satis est!*

We must not however leave these holophrastic languages without mentioning the astonishing and most perplexing fact that the only language of the kind found out of America is a European language, viz. the Basque, which is spoken among the valleys of the Pyrenees in the corner of the Iberian peninsula. Neither the ethnological affinities of the Eskuara as a

Mém. sur le syst. gram. des langues de l'Amérique du Nord, Paris, 1837 (a book written with a vivacity peculiarly French), Zeisberger, *Delaware Grammar*, and the writings of Gallatin and Schoolcraft.

[1] Domenech, *Voy. dans les grands déserts du Nouveau-Monde*, p. 392, quoted by Charency.

[2] These savages seem to take pride in the inordinate length of their names, e.g. an Indian chief wrote his memoirs (Boston, 1834), whose name was Maikamichikiakkiah (i.e. Black Crow); and in 1839 the King of Holland gave the order of the Lion to the Sultan of Djoujocarta, whose name was a word of 26 syllables—which we will spare the reader. Yet he was the *fifth* Sultan of the name.

nation, nor the relation of the roots of their language to any other family of languages, have yet been established; but that the grammatical structure of the language is identical with that of the aboriginal languages of America is certain[1], and it presents to the ethnologist and the philologian one of the most difficult and most interesting problems which can be offered to his notice. I cannot imagine how any Cambridge scholar, with the inestimable privilege of leisure and independence, could do a greater service to comparative philology than by living a short time at Bayonne or San Juan de Luz, and making himself a thorough master of this isolated language, in order to throw some certain light on its affinities and peculiarities.

4. It is easy to understand that any language which had accustomed itself to combine into significant compounds or sentences the mutilated fragments of separate words, would be likely to give to some of its words a purely formative character, and to confine the use of them to the mere expression of grammatical relations. A language of this character—a language which by means of affixes, apparently conventional, expresses all the modifications of case, gender, number, mood, tense, &c. is called a synthetic language; and of all languages of this class Sanskrit, Greek, and Latin, are the most perfect. The discovery of this synthetic character is the greatest triumph of modern philology; it has thrown a flood of light over all the most peculiar and intricate difficulties of Greek and Latin grammar; and it ought to give a new impulse and an immensely increased interest to classical enquiries. It is something to know more of the most perfect languages ever spoken than was known even to the people that spoke them. It is something to be able to watch, unobserved and uninterrupted, the linguistic instinct moulding and informing the few rude cries and imitations which were originally at its disposal into perfect forms capable of expressing the most delicate shades of human

[1] An instance or two in proof that Basque really *is* characterised by this eliminating amalgamation of radical sounds may be interesting; e.g. the name *Bidessoa* is from *bide*, 'way,' and *itchassoa*, 'the sea;' *Ilhun*, 'twilight,' is from *hill egun*, 'dead day;' *hamaratzi*, 'nineteen,' from *hamar bederatzi*, &c. H. de Charency, *La Langue Basque*, p. 22.

thought. If the merest elements of the science of language had penetrated into more than one or two of our grammars, every young scholar ought now to be familiar with the answers to questions which would have been put in vain even to a Bentley or a Porson. The fundamental meaning and origin of reduplication and augment,—the pronominal elements which are found in the inflections of every tense, and the modifications which they have undergone,—the verbal elements which have been assimilated into merely symbolic and formative syllables in the participles and infinitives, in the futures and first aorists, in the subjunctive and optative moods,—the certainty that in grammar there is little which is arbitrary or conventional, and still less which is purely accidental,—the manner in which all the apparent anomalies and absurdities of classical grammar become clear and rational when they are deduced from definite and well-understood laws of phonetic corruption or slurred articulation,—all these, and a multitude of other facts and laws and principles, ought now (though they are yet very far from being so) to be the common heritage of every young scholar. That they can be taught, by a rational method, even to the young,—that they facilitate toil, that they remove errors, that they inspire interest,—I have seen by experience, and hope to see to a much greater extent; and when grammar has thus been made a more human and intelligible study—when the repulsive bareness and dryness with which it has usually been taught has been superseded by a broader and more fruitful method, I believe that the decaying interest in classical studies will be revived, that the dignity of grammar will be more highly estimated, and that a good foundation in grammar will be found to be a most valuable introduction to ethnology, to history, and, above all, to metaphysics.

5. Of the progress from synthesis to analysis we need say but little. It seems almost inevitably to follow the growth of a literature and the diffusion of a language. The minute shades of meaning are worn away from the inflections; the desire for *emphasis* leads to the separate enunciation of pronouns; the desire for *distinctness* leads to the use of prepositions to define the relations already involved in case-inflections; the

finer and rarer inflected forms, being unfamiliar to the ignorant, are gradually forgotten or neglected even by the learned—they become first archaic and then obsolete; there is a gradual but complete revolt from the tyranny of formal grammar; and the necessity for being above all things perspicuous, leads to the exclusive adoption of those expressions which are most rapidly and most universally intelligible. These processes are of course precipitated under the influence of foreign conquest or the spread of commerce, which render the acquisition of a language necessary to a multitude of foreigners. Foreigners have neither the time nor the inclination to learn the niceties of accidence, and content themselves as far as possible with the mastery of roots which can be analytically combined by means of pronouns, auxiliaries, and similar determinatives[1]. These processes so much resemble each other, that they are found no less distinctly in vulgar Arabic as compared with ancient Hebrew, than they are in Italian as compared with Latin, or English as compared with Gothic. The young scholar who is unfamiliar with the workings of the analytical process will find it an interesting task to watch the laws which govern it in the history of the two classical languages. If he compare any grammar of classical Greek, with that of Winer for Hellenistic, and that of E. Sophocles for Modern Greek, he will be interested to find how completely the Greek of the New Testament stands midway between that of Thucydides and that of Tricoupi. In the decomposition of Latin he may see the same laws at work in a still more striking manner, for we possess specimens of Latin of every century over a space of a thousand years, and are enabled step by step to watch its transformation into Italian, Spanish, French, Portuguese, and Wallachian. Such books as Sir G. C. Lewis's *Essay on the Romance Languages,* Diez's *Grammar,* or an excellent little pamphlet, *Lateinisch und Romanisch, besonders Französish,* by Dr F. A. Beger, will, among many others, furnish any one who is interested in the subject with abundant illustrations.

Thus then we have passed in review the five actually

[1] An excellent instance of this may be found in the French spoken by the negroes of Hayti, of which unfortunately I have no specimen at hand.

existent conditions of language which exactly correspond with our *à priori* conception of the natural and necessary development of any language which has become analytical. It only remains to repeat our question as to whether historical facts correspond to our hypothesis, and whether we may conclude that any language has actually passed through this cyclical progress from analysis to synthesis, and from synthesis to analysis again? And to this question we must briefly answer 'No.' Neither tradition, nor history, nor philology, furnish anything which can be called *a proof* of such an assumption. If we must *necessarily* assume that such a language as Sanskrit or as Hebrew *must* have passed through a primordial analytic condition before it could possibly have presented the phenomena by which it is now characterised, we must do so *solely* on theoretic grounds, and must at the same time admit that there is no shadow of evidence remaining for the historic demonstration of the fact. When we go back to the earliest existing remains of either language, we find them already in a condition of full synthetic development. Over the origin of nations and of idioms, no less than over the origin of man, the folds of the vail of Isis fall impenetrable and dark.

There is not the faintest shadow of *evidence* to prove that any monosyllabic, agglutinative, holophrastic, or synthetic language has ever at any previous period been otherwise than monosyllabic, agglutinative, holophrastic, or synthetic. Chinese has been for thousands of years monosyllabic and grammarless, and though during those millenniums it has become the organ of a highly-developed civilization, which has taken long cognizance both of physical and ethical science, it has remained monosyllabic and grammarless still. The agglutinating languages have, for the most part, no history, but we cannot find any traces that they have ever been otherwise than agglutinative. The 'incorporating' languages of America are as completely characterised by their lack of cohesion,—that is, by their liability to incessant change,—as Chinese by its inflexible rigidity; and yet though the elements of those languages appear to be as unstable as the shifting sand,—though a dictionary or grammar or version of a gospel made for one of the tribes that speak them becomes

useless in a single generation,—though they are subjected to the most astonishing tricks of utterance and superstitions of custom[1],—though they change so radically and with such extraordinary rapidity that the inhabitants of two neighbouring valleys are often mutually unintelligible, *yet they have retained ever since we have known them, and over more than* 100 *degrees of latitude, the same unvarying idea of construction,* and are governed by the principle of amalgamation from Kodiak to Terra del Fuego. Again, the languages of the two great civilised families—the Semitic and the Aryan—though liable to the steady action of laws which determine their progress in the direction of analysis, yet retain an ineffaceable impress of their earliest grammatical character, and shew a vitality of roots and of methods, which amidst all changes demonstrates the affinity of branches of these languages which are separated from each other by the history of four thousand years. The notion that a synthetic language *can* have had a synthetic stamp upon it from its very earliest origin has been treated as an absurdity, though it has been held by such scholars as Renan and Pott; but is it a one-whit-greater absurdity than to suppose, for instance, that man was created full-grown, and in possession of all his faculties? But, at any rate, whatever may be our theoretic reasonings on the subject, they must be confined to *pre-historic* periods in which languages may be supposed to have passed through a period of primitive fusibility. We have, in our brief survey, had an opportunity for observing the astonishing diversities of method and character which separate the great linguistic groups[2]. The facts of historical philology make it *almost* impossible to suppose, and *quite* impossible to prove, that any language of any group has ever passed, or can ever pass by

[1] Such as the *Ukuhlonipa* of South Africa (Appleyard, *Kafir Grammar*), the *tepi* of New Zealand (described in Max Müller's *Lectures*), the *Shakokshe* and *Farshipse* of the Circassians (Klaproth, *Voy. au Mont Caucase*, i. 381, Paris, 1823), the *cuzecat* of the Bosjesmen (Dr A. Smith, *Rep. of Afr. Exploring Expedition*, Capetown, 1836), &c.

[2] Can any linguistic poles be wider asunder than

I came	as compared with the	Ra oki au i aire mai ai
You came	corresponding New	Ra oki koe i aire mai ai
He came	Zealand conjugation	Ra oki ia i aire mai ai?

stages however slow, into another group. All the national facts of which we are historically certain militate against such a supposition. Nations under stress of foreign invasion may lose their own language and adopt that of their conquerors, or they may mingle together the elements of several languages, as is the case in Berber, and in Turkish, and in English, or they may take their grammar from one nation, and their vocabulary from another; and in all these instances the traces of the progress will be clear to the eye of the philologian, and the facts which have caused it will probably be known to tradition if not to history. Yet even under such circumstances of external violence and constant repression, some languages have betrayed a most extraordinary tenacity of life. The Egyptians retained their own language in spite of the successive conquests of Persians, Macedonians, Greeks, and Arabians. Basque still continues in the valleys of the Pyrenees like a grain of wheat uncrushed between the millstones of France and Spain. And if there be an inherent force in languages which enables them to hold fast their original structure under such powerful adverse influences, it is hardly surprising that we know no single instance of any nation fundamentally changing by any voluntary process however gradual the grammatical character of its own speech. That grammatical character is the ineffaceable individuality of the language, which it can as little change as an animal can change its own organization. It was perhaps an instinctive sense of this fact which lay at the bottom of that tradition as to the sudden and *miraculous* splitting asunder of human languages at Babel which we find in the eleventh chapter of the Book of Genesis.

The full development of what I have here stated would require a much larger space than that which is now at my command. The general result at which we have arrived is this—that whatever may be our theories respecting the development of languages, and however much the *primâ facie* aspect of existing families of speech may seem to support those theories,

the amount of positive evidence which they receive from existing facts is only of the slightest possible description. On the very day that I had finished writing this paper, I had the honour to receive from Prof. Max Müller a copy of the *Lecture on the Stratification of Language* which he delivered on Sir Robert Rede's foundation in May, 1868. Although I had not previously read a line of this Lecture, or even heard what were the topics with which it dealt, my own paper might appear to have been written for the express purpose of modifying the views therein maintained. Such an impression would however be a mistaken one. *If tens of thousands of years be postulated* I can conceive the *possibility* of such languages as Chinese, and Sanskrit, and Hebrew, having been developed from some common amorphous primordial form, and the arguments of Prof. Müller would be additional confirmations of such a possibility. But the evidence which he has adduced, interesting and valuable as it is, is surely far too slight, and far too vague to shake my assertion that, as a matter of absolute certainty, we do not yet know of a *single* language which has changed its essential characteristic structure. Prof. Müller has pointed out a few modifications in the dialects of Chinese and other tongues which may possibly be regarded as sufficient to establish a *tendency* towards fundamental change; but certainly unless such changes acted with a constantly accelerating force, they would be insufficient even in thousands of years to change such a language as Chinese into such a language as Greek. At best they can but be considered analogous to those supposed faint traces of a rotatory movement in some of the nebulæ which were adduced by more than one astronomer as adding a slight confirmation to the *à priori* reasonings on which was founded the Nebular Hypothesis.

FREDERIC W. FARRAR.

REMARKS ON MR JEBB'S ARTICLE "ON A PASSAGE OF ANDOCIDES."

THE last number of the *Journal of Philology* contained some remarks by Mr R. C. Jebb on a passage of Andocides, which has been considered by several writers of high reputation—notably by Mr Grote (*Hist. of Greece*, Vol. IV. p. 168, *note*)—to be fatal to his authority as a witness of facts belonging to the earlier history of his country. Mr Jebb argues that the passage has been wrongly taken to refer to certain events which occurred in Attica in the year B.C. 510, the real reference being to events of the year B.C. 550. Understood of the one occasion, he thinks that the passage deserves all the hard things that have been said of it; understood, as he holds that it ought to be, of the other, he regards it as consistent with all that we know of the facts from other writers, and as in all respects authentic and trustworthy.

The passage, which occurs in the speech *περὶ τῶν μυστηρίων* (§§ 106—8) is given in full by Mr Jebb (pp. 155, 156), and will therefore not be quoted at length here. A portion of it, however, must be cited to render the following remarks clear.

Andocides says:—*Οἱ πατέρες οἱ ὑμέτεροι, γενομένων τῇ πόλει κακῶν μεγάλων, ὅτε οἱ τύραννοι μὲν εἶχον τὴν πόλιν ὁ δὲ δῆμος ἔφυγε, νικήσαντες μαχόμενοι τοὺς τυράννους ἐπὶ Παλληνίῳ, στρατηγοῦντος Λεωγόρου τοῦ προπάππου τοῦ ἐμοῦ καὶ Χαρίου οὗ ἐκεῖνος τὴν θυγατέρα εἶχεν, ἐξ ἧς ὁ ἡμέτερος ἦν πάππος, κατελθόντες εἰς τὴν πατρίδα τοὺς μὲν ἀπέκτειναν, τῶν δὲ φυγὴν κατέγνωσαν, τοὺς δὲ μένειν ἐν τῇ πόλει ἐάσαντες ἠτίμωσαν.*

Mr Jebb argues that Andocides cannot be speaking here of events belonging to the final expulsion of the Pisistratidæ for two main reasons; first, because of the scene of the battle; and secondly, because of the sequel of the battle.

The scene of the battle is expressed by the words *ἐπὶ Παλληνίῳ*, which Mr Jebb translates "at the Pallenium" or "temple of Athene at Pallene." Now I do not mean to question that

this *may* be the true meaning of the words; but I think it is a little too hastily assumed that it *must* be their meaning. The temple of Athene Pallenis is mentioned by several other writers; but nowhere else, so far as I know, is it called "the Pallenium." Its proper name was "the Pallenis." Under this title Themison wrote a description of it. By this title it was known to Polemon (ap. Athen. *Deipn.* VI. p. 234, D), to Polyænus (*Strat.* I. 21), to Photius (Λέξ. συναγ. p. 592, ed. Porson), and to Suidas (Vol. II. col. 3583, C, ed. Gaisford). This was its title in a phrase so common in the mouths of the Greeks that it grew into a proverb, τὸ ἀπὸ τῆς Παλληνίδος meaning what was alarming. (See Photius and Suidas.) If Andocides meant this temple by his Παλλήνιον, he called it by a name which no other extant author has applied to it. No doubt Παλλήνιον is by its form a likely enough title for a temple of Athene Pallenis to have borne. But in nomenclature analogy is not always a safe guide. The Greek temples had certainly in some instances proper names, which did not terminate in *-ιον*, *e.g.* the temple of Athene Parthenos at Athens was "the Parthenon" (Παρθενών), not "the Parthenion;" and so the temple of Athene Pallenis at Pallene appears to have been "the Pallenis."

The "Pallenion" of Andocides may therefore not be "the temple of Athene Pallenis," or even a temple at all. It may be a place otherwise unknown to us, the situation of which also unknown, can be no bar to its having been in B.C. 510 the scene of a battle between the Pisistratidæ and their assailants. There must have been many places in Attica the names of which are wholly lost to us: there are many which we know from only one passage.

But let us suppose that Andocides did intend the well-known temple of Athene at Pallene by his "Pallenion," and let us consider whether the position of that temple, which Mr Jebb has probably given correctly, is an insuperable hindrance to our understanding Andocides to speak of a battle at that place in the year B.C. 510 between the Pisistratidæ and those who were seeking to expel them. Mr Jebb sketches the campaign which terminated in their expulsion as follows:—"Cleomenes marched from Sparta; invaded Attica by way of the isthmus; was met

by the cavalry of Hippias; routed them; and pressed on to Athens." He then adds—"Now 'the Pallenium,' or temple of Athene at Pallene, by which Andocides indicates the scene of the battle, was entirely out of the course of an invader marching from the isthmus" (p. 157).

I think that Mr Jebb takes too simple a view of the plan of the campaign and the military movements on this occasion. He assumes that Herodotus has told us all the facts. I think it is almost certain, both (*a*) from anterior probability, and (*b*) from Herodotus' own words, that he has not told us all the facts.

(*a*) For, what was the condition of affairs? The Alcmæonidæ, with a large party of exiles had shortly before taken up a position in Attica on the outskirts of Parnes, at a place called Leipsydrium, had fortified the post, and from it kept up a long though unsuccessful struggle against the tyrants. It is probable that they were still at this place when the Spartans, at the instance of the Delphic Oracle, determined to expel Hippias. But, if so, what more certain than that the Spartan leader must have counted on the aid which he would receive from these banished Athenians, who held so important a position, and would be so sure to second his project with energy—what more probable than that he would have shaped his plan of campaign so as to effect a junction with these malcontents, whose services were likely to be of the greatest use to him? Surely, no commander would have neglected so manifest an advantage as this course offered. But in this case, the march from the isthmus would not have been, as Mr Jebb supposes, straight upon Athens, but would have taken a northerly direction, towards Leipsydrium, and so would have brought the Spartans into the near neighbourhood of Pallene.

A circumstance related in connection with the previous expedition of Anchimolius will illustrate the probability of this movement. Anchimolius landed at Phalerum, and, advancing into the interior, was met and defeated by the forces of Hippias, and himself fell in the battle. The Athenians gave him honourable burial, no doubt near the scene of the engagement. And where was this? His tomb was at Alopecæ, to the north-

east of Athens, in the same direction as Pallene, only at about a mile and a half, instead of seven miles, from the city. Now it is evident that Anchimolius, instead of marching straight upon Athens, had left it upon his left hand, had in fact passed it by, and was proceeding northwards in the direction of Leipsydrium, when the Athenians gave him battle and slew him. If he had marched straight upon Athens from Phalerum, he would not have lost his life *at Alopecæ*.

(*b*) Further, the words of Herodotus shew that he has not intended to give a full account of the campaign. For he tells us that, when Cleomenes entered Attica near Eleusis, "his *first* engagement was with the Thessalian cavalry" (ἡ τῶν Θεσσαλῶν ἵππος πρώτη προσέμιξε, v. 64)—an expression which implies, at the least, one more engagement, of which he has made no express mention. In fact the engagement with the Thessalians was a mere cavalry fight, of little moment, except that it left the Spartan infantry free to act. The main fight must have been one between this infantry and that of Hippias, who would certainly not have abandoned all Attica, and even all Athens, except the citadel, without measuring his strength against that of his enemy.

I conclude then that there was a second battle—a battle in which the Alcmæonidæ, and the exiles generally, fought on the Spartan side (comp. Thucyd. VI. 59, *ad fin.;* Philochor. *Fr.* 70; and Isocrat. *De Bigis*, § 27), a junction having been effected at or near Leipsydrium between the two bodies; and I see no reason why this battle should not have been fought in the neighbourhood of Pallene. That two or more battles should take place on the same site is a not unusual circumstance in the history of Greece.

Mr Jebb has another argument against identifying Andocides' battle with any event of the year B.C. 510; and this is "the *sequel* of the battle." Andocides says that "the conquerors, on coming to Athens, put some of their late opponents to death, sentenced others to banishment, and allowed others to remain at Athens, but under disabilities." Mr Jebb thinks that, considering the terms on which Hippias surrendered, his adherents "were not likely to suffer, would not have permitted

themselves to suffer, such rigorous treatment—treatment such as might have been inflicted upon the scattered survivors of a vanquished and broken faction." Especially he urges the improbability of any "accepting permission to remain at Athens as ἄτιμοι...after the rest of their party had emigrated, in a city where they would have neither friends nor rights." (p. 158.)

Now I think that in making these objections, Mr Jebb has not sufficiently distinguished between those adherents of Hippias who fell unreservedly into the enemy's hands in Attica and Athens itself, which was undefended, and those adherents who threw themselves with Hippias into the Acropolis, who cannot have been a very large number. These last would—most probably, though not, so far as I can see, certainly—have been included in the capitulation and would have had to quit Attica. The others would have been completely in their enemies' power —as much so as any other "survivors of a vanquished and broken faction." Indeed, what else was the party of the Pisistratidæ, after Hippias had capitulated and agreed to quit the country? Mr Jebb seems to suppose that all his party went with him. But the later history of Athens contains many proofs to the contrary. An actual relative of the tyrant, bearing the odious name of Hipparchus, remained, and was among the earliest victims of the Ostracism (Plut. *Vit. Nic.* § 11; Harpocrat. ad voc. Ἵππαρχος). A party friendly to Hippias, and anxious for his return, is found at Athens as late as B.C. 490, twenty years afterwards. As the modern historian of Greece observes, this party, at the time of the battle of Marathon, "had actually organised a conspiracy, and only failed by coming a little too late." (Grote's *Greece,* ch. xxxvi. Vol. III. p. 302, ed. of 1862.) Is it not reasonable to suppose that the existence of this party was well known to those who had the management of affairs, and that they sought to weaken and restrain it by the means customary at the time, which were executions, exile, and the imposition of political disabilities?

Mr Jebb has further one or two minor arguments against understanding Andocides to refer to the events of B.C. 510. He considers the expression γενομένων τῇ πόλει κακῶν μεγάλων unsuited to that time (p. 159), and he thinks that "we have no

mention of any event (of that period) so definite and of such large effect that it could possibly be described by the phrase, *ὁ δῆμος ἔφυγε*" (p. 161).

Now with regard to the first of these points, surely there is quite enough in what Herodotus and Thucydides tell us of the later years of Hippias to justify such an expression *in an orator*. Herodotus tells us that Hippias was "embittered" by his brother's murder (*Ἱπ. ἐμπικραινομένου*, v. 62), and again that he was "made savage" (*ἐξηγρίωσαν*, vi. 123), and "tyrannized over Athens worse than before" (*ἐτυραννεύοντο Ἀθηναῖοι ἐπ' ἔτεα τέσσερα οὐδὲν ἧσσον, ἀλλὰ καὶ μᾶλλον, ἢ πρὸ τοῦ*, v. 55). Thucydides more definitely states that during these years he "put many persons to death" (*πολλοὺς ἔκτεινε*, vi. 59). The expression, "when great calamities had befallen the state" seems to me one natural enough to be used of such a period.

Whether the expression *ὁ δῆμος ἔφυγε* is, or is not, overstrong for the occasion may perhaps be doubtful. That the exiles in B.C. 510 were a considerable number is implied in their occupation of Leipsydrium and in the war which they carried on from thence against the tyrants (Herod. v. 62). But they may not in strictness of speech have deserved to be called "the people." What, however, is certain is, that it was the habit of the Greek orators, in speaking of this period, so to term them. Isocrates says that the Alcmæonidæ during the whole time of the tyranny "continued at the head of *the people*" (*ἡγούμενοι τοῦ δήμου διετέλεσαν*, *De Big.* § 26), and again that Clisthenes and Alcibiades (the elder) "brought the people home" (*κατήγαγον τὸν δημόν*, § 57), and Demosthenes notes it as a thing well known, that Pisistratus exiled the Alcmæonidæ for their championship of *the people's* cause (*τούτους*, *sc.* *Ἀλκμαιωνίδας*, *φασιν ὑπὸ τῶν τυράννων ὑπὲρ τοῦ δήμου στασιάζοντας ἐκπεσεῖν*, *Adv. Meid.* § 144). It is therefore, not only possible, but extremely probable, that Andocides may have intended to describe the state of things in B.C. 510 by the expression *ὁ δῆμος ἔφυγε*.

I turn now from the negative to the positive side of Mr Jebb's article. Having endeavoured first to shew that the

words of Andocides are not applicable to the events of B.C. 510, he goes on further to reason that they are applicable to those of B.C. 550. Here he thinks that the "occasion," the "circumstances," and the "sequel" of the battle are all suitable. In brief, he believes Andocides to speak of the battle fought near the temple of Athene Pallenis in B.C. 550[1] between Pisistratus and his partizans on the one side and the Athenians under Megacles and Lycurgus on the other (Herod. I. 92), in which Pisistratus gained the victory, whereupon he returned to Athens and established his power by certain measures of severity. Mr Jebb holds that the "demus" spoken of is the party of Pisistratus, which (he thinks) went into exile with him, and that "the tyrants" are Lycurgus and Megacles!

To me it seems that nothing in the whole description of Andocides will apply to the events of B.C. 550, excepting the scene of the battle, ἐπὶ Παλληνίῳ, if that means "at the temple of Athene Pallenis," which I have shewn to be doubtful. The occasion, the circumstances, and the sequel of the engagement are all at variance with those of the great victory of Pisistratus.

The "occasion" is designated by three phrases—"when great calamities had befallen the city"—"when the tyrants were in possession of the city"—"when the people was in exile." None of these phrases will apply to B.C. 550. For first, we have no evidence of any "great calamities" such as executions, wholesale banishment, or the like, in the period anterior to Pisistratus' final return. When that statesman after his quarrel with Megacles withdrew from Athens, he was accompanied by his family, but (so far as we know) by no other exiles. No others are spoken of as being with him at Eretria; nor was it till he crossed to Marathon that his partisans joined him, and then they came to him "*from the city and the country-towns*" (ἐκ τοῦ ἄστεος—ἐκ τῶν δήμων, Herod. I. 62). Thus the

[1] I take this date from Mr Jebb. I do not regard it as correct; but, as the argument in the text is not affected by the question in what exact year Pisistratus finally established his power, I leave aside this consideration. Mr Clinton places the final return of Pisistratus in B.C. 537. (*F. H.* Vol. II. p. 202.)

phrase ὁ δῆμος ἔφυγε (even if we could understand ὁ δῆμος, in the mouth of Andocides, of the party of Pisistratus) will not apply to this time: for no body of exiles had accompanied Pisistratus in his flight. Secondly, it is not, I think, likely that Andocides would designate the party of Pisistratus *at this time* as ὁ δῆμος. No doubt Pisistratus had originally come into power as the leader of the democratical party, and in his scheme of government he may have favoured the poorer classes. But, the moment he made himself tyrant, he broke into the real democracy. As Isocrates says of him, "though he began as a demagogue, he ended by making himself a tyrant and destroying the democracy" (δημαγωγὸς γενόμενος...τελευτῶν τόν τε δῆμον κατέλυσε καὶ τύραννον αὐτὸν κατέστησεν, Panath. p. 148). Andocides would surely not call by the revered name of *demus* the slavish party of those who "loved tyranny rather than freedom" (Herod. I. 62); who clung to Pisistratus, though he clearly aimed at mere personal aggrandisement; and were content that their country should be enslaved provided that they profited by its enslavement. Thirdly and lastly, it is quite inconceivable that Andocides should have intended to designate the time when Megacles and Lycurgus were in power by the phrase "when *the tyrants* were in possession of the city." I venture to lay it down that an Attic writer, in speaking of the history of his country, never calls any persons "*the* tyrants" excepting the Pisistratidæ and the Thirty. And the expression is never, I believe, used even of the latter, unless the context makes it clear who are intended. To an Athenian ear the phrase, "when the tyrants held the city," occurring without explanation or qualification, could mean but one thing, viz. "during the sovereignty of the Pisistratidæ." And if every other argument which I have brought forward in this paper were pronounced worthless, this alone would absolutely determine the point in controversy, and prove that Andocides was not thinking of a time when the Pisistratidæ were in exile and endeavouring to force their return.

Again, there is a point in the "circumstances" of the engagement, which conflicts with the notion that the victory of Pisistratus is intended. Andocides says the victors "were

commanded by Leogoras and Charias," whereas the conquerors at the battle of Pallene were commanded by Pisistratus. Mr Jebb meets this difficulty by the observation that στρατηγῶν is not "holding *the* command" but "holding *a* command" (p. 113), and suggests that the two Athenians mentioned may have been officers in Pisistratus' army. But the sense of στρατηγῶν, like that of ἄρχων and other similar words, is determined by the context. Though ἄρχων means simply "holding an office," yet if we are told that an event in Athenian history occurred ἄρχοντος Πυθοδώρου, we translate "when Pythadorus was archon" and understand the meaning to be "when Pythadorus held the office of chief archon at Athens." So, when a battle is mentioned, and we are told that it was fought στρατηγοῦντος Λ. καὶ Χ., we must regard the persons mentioned as having held the *chief* command. They may possibly have shared it with others, but they cannot have been, in the view of the writer, mere subordinate officers of the army. Now in the battle of Pallene we know that Leogoras and Charias were not the commanders of the victorious army. We do not know that they may not have been the commanders, or among the commanders, of the army of Athenian exiles which coöperated with Cleomenes.

To conclude; the "consequences" of the battle, as stated in the passage of Andocides, are not suitable to the time when Pisistratus finally established himself. For, (*a*) though no doubt sentence of exile may have been then passed on many of the adverse party, yet there is no reason to believe that any executions took place. The temper of Pisistratus was mild, and the character which he left behind him was that of an equitable and moderate ruler (Herod. I. 59; Thucyd. VI. 54; Aristot. *Pol.* 5, 9. § 21). There was nothing in the circumstances of his return, or in those which had preceded it, to provoke him to bloodshed. *No Greek writer taxes him with it.* The first political execution which history records as belonging to the Pisistratid period, was that of Cimon, in the reign of Pisistratus' son Hippias. If Pisistratus had inaugurated his final triumph by taking bloody vengeance on his prostrate adversaries, it is tolerably certain that some historian or orator

would have plainly charged him with it. Again, (*b*) would not the punishment of *ἀτιμία*—a suitable enough implement of party warfare in B.C. 510, after the expulsion of Hippias have been unnatural, and almost meaningless, in B.C. 550? No doubt *ἀτιμία* included many disabilities; but its essence was deprivation of the right of speaking and voting in the public assembly. Would it have been worth Pisistratus' while, at a time when assemblies were a mere mockery, to insult and annoy a number of the citizens by disfranchising them, when their votes could not possibly do him any hurt?

I conclude therefore (1) that Andocides, in the passage quoted (p. 24), cannot possibly be speaking of the victory by which Pisistratus obtained final possession of the throne; and (2) that, in all probability, he refers to a battle in B.C. 510 between the Pisistratidæ and the confederate Spartans and Athenian exiles, after the defeat of the Thessalian horse, and before the investment of the Acropolis—a battle implied in Herodotus, glanced at by Thucydides and Isocrates, and distinctly mentioned by Philochorus, who says—*Ὑπὸ τῶν Πεισιστρατίδων οἱ Ἀλκμαιωνίδαι φυγαδευθέντες...συναγαγόντες δύναμιν ἐπέθεντο τοῖς Πεισιστρατίδαις, καὶ νικήσαντες μετ' εὐχαριστηρίων ἀνῳκοδόμησαν τῷ θεῷ τὸ τέμενος.* (Fr. 70, ed. Didot.)

I abstain from any remarks upon the rest of Mr Jebb's paper, having already occupied more space than I had intended. But I cannot agree with him in thinking it likely that there were two occasions between B.C. 510 and 480, when the exiles were recalled and the *ἄτιμοι* restored to full citizenship. I believe that Andocides has wrongly placed before the battle of Marathon events which happened only a little before the year of Salamis.

G. RAWLINSON.

THE AGAMEMNON OF AESCHYLUS. Revised and translated by JOHN FLETCHER DAVIES, B.A. Williams and Norgate, *London and Edinburgh.*

THIS is in some respects a remarkable, rather than a satisfactory book. It shows a combination of original thought and cleverness with a want of good taste and sober judgment that is sometimes almost startling, and a dogmatism that, to say the least, reads unpleasantly; yet it is a work so far above the average standard of classical criticism in this country, that it challenges, and in a manner demands, the serious attention of those who may have gone over the same ground, or devoted much time to the study of Æschylus generally. With every disposition to give Mr Davies' work a perfectly impartial perusal and consideration, it is difficult to pass on it a favourable judgment as a whole; for, to speak plainly, it may be questioned if one in twenty of the alterations he has admitted into his text has much chance of finding acceptance with scholars in this country.

If we might venture a guess, we should be disposed to say that Mr Davies was one of those who have not been sufficiently trained in the old-fashioned school of verse-writing, as practised among ourselves. He does not show that instinctive feeling for what is right, which is only to be gained by imitative composition in early life; with him, ingenuity predominates over tact and a natural sense of poetic propriety. He seems to us to have thrown himself into German thought and German tentative criticism, till plain common sense has, on some points, almost deserted him. We say this, of course, in no spirit of disparagement whatever to the illustrious critics of the continent, of the school of Cobet, whose services to ancient literature we are among the first to allow; but Mr Davies appears to have not only followed, but to have outstripped, the most rash of all the German emendators of Aeschylus. He seems to prefer to all others Heimsoeth and Enger (1861—3), and frequently admits

the most far-fetched guesses of theirs with a brief remark intimating that there can be no reasonable doubt of their absolute truth. Of the labours of other Editors he is apt to speak somewhat superciliously, and as if their opinions or explanations of difficult passages did not deserve even a hearing.

The critical notes, in Latin, are brief, and at the foot of each page. At the end is a commentary in English, of very moderate length, but "which is almost entirely new, and in which nothing is inserted but what seemed quite necessary to a right understanding of the play." Beside these notes, an important feature of the book is an entirely new metrical English translation, which is not only verbally literal, but which line by line represents even the choral metres of the original. In doing this, Mr Davies has evidently taken the greatest pains, and we allow that he has exercised the greatest ingenuity. But the fates were against him. He attempted a task in which complete success was nearly impossible; the genius of our language, and its substituting accent or stress for syllabic quantity, render it little suited for representing Greek choral metres. Hence his version, read apart from the Greek, and simply as English, has more of forced and quaint verbiage than of poetic truthfulness and elegance.

The original emendations introduced into the text are rather numerous, and not always, it is to be feared, consistent with the strict canons of the language. Still, respect is due in general to the suggestions of a critic, whose "own corrections are the result of nearly seven years' special and constant study of this one text" (Preface, p. vii). Our space, of course, allows but of a limited examination of his criticisms; we shall therefore only here and there notice some of the least plausible of the alterations he has introduced.

The prologue is fairly and soberly rendered. We pause only at two verses, viz. 17, where the well-known *ὕπνου τόδ' ἀντίμολπον ἐντέμνων ἄκος* is quaintly translated, "plying that knife of song to cure my sleep," and 21, where the very pretty and simple line *εὐαγγέλου φανέντος ὀρφναίου πυρὸς* is still more quaintly turned into "by advent of the evangel gloom-wrapt ray,"—which to our ears is nonsense.

Now there certainly is some little difficulty in *ἀντίμολπον ἄκος ὕπνου*, 'a musical remedy against sleep,' or 'a remedy of song against sleep,' because, if the genitive depends on *ἄκος*, the force of *ἀντὶ* in the compound is either to express the additional notion of *resistance* to sleep, or, as in *ἀντίπαις*, *ἀντίδουλος*, it means 'taking the place of music,' 'having the nature of a *μολπή*, or dancing-song,'—which tunes merely whistled or hummed, properly speaking, are not. The word *ἐντέμνων* too is ambiguous, for it may refer either to the *ἄκος τομαῖον*, a remedy by an operation, or to cutting and shredding of simples. Against the former it may be urged, that *ἐντέμνειν* is rather *incidere*, 'to make a cut in a thing'—a sense which at least would require some accusative like *χρῶτα*. But we are not prepared to concede to Mr Davies that the passage must be corrupt, from the "infanda vertendi difficultas," or to approve of his proposed emendation, *ἀντίμηλον*, 'like a probe' (*μήλη*), which, he says, is a figure of speech that a soldier who had once been wounded might well use!

As a specimen of the kind of rhythm which the author would have us accept for English anapaestics, we quote a short passage from ver. 48—54, *μέγαν ἐκ θυμοῦ κλάζοντες Ἄρη* &c.

"Sending forth from the soul loud clamour of war,
like two vultures
which in distracting grief for their offspring
to the utmost height over their nests float in curves,
rowing themselves with their oars of pinions,
having lost the brood-care
which before at the nest had detained them."

The fourth of these verses appears to us to have no scansion at all. It would at least have been better if the editor had marked by an accent the syllables on which he intended the stress to be laid.

The word *ἀτίται* in ver. 72 is explained to mean "paying no military service," "exempt from the war." It is difficult to defend such a compound as *ἀτίτης* "non-paying;" but Mr Davies, who has a theory that a great many verses in the Agamemnon were adapted from Hesiod, might have quoted

ἀδώτης a "non-giver," and *ἀβούτης*, a "churl who has no oxen," in Opp. et D. 355 and 451, if either passage be really genuine, which we very much doubt. "Taking no part in the vengeance," is the sense we should rather give to this word *ἀτίτης*, which clearly means "unpunished," "unrequited," in Eum. 246.

In ver. 89 we come to a strange emendation, *τῶν τε θυραίων τῶν τ' ἀγοραίων*, for the vulgate *τῶν τ' οὐρανίων* &c. The version is "gods of the doorway, and gods of the market," with no explanation in the commentary, and the too brief foot-note "hunc versum ejecit Porsonus, Engerus emendatum restituit." It was cruel not to tell us what the phrase "gods of the doorway" means, and whether we are to understand it of Hermes, or Apollo the Ἀγυιεύς, or of both, and in what capacity. We must be allowed still to prefer the old-fashioned "gods of heaven" to the *καινοὶ θεοὶ* of Messrs Enger and Davies, these "gods of the doorway," who stand very much in our way in getting to the meaning of the passage.

To say that *φανῶν* (from *φήνη*, a sea-bird), the suggestion of Heimsoeth for *στρουθῶν*, in 145, is "certissima emendatio," is to draw very largely indeed on the credulity of students, either young or old. It was, possibly, just worth mentioning, as a guess having some faint probability, but nothing more.

Mr Davies again follows Heimsoeth in giving *τὸ προκλύειν, πρὶν γένοιτο, χαιρέτω*, (ver. 251,) which he renders, "farewell to news ere the thing has been, I say." By the question in his critical note, "An credam Aesch. dixisse *ἐπεὶ γένοιτ' ἄν*?" he seems to think such a construction, which is perfectly legitimate, would be a solecism.

In the celebrated description of the beacon lights (280 seqq.) Mr Davies has introduced the scrap which Dindorf first picked out of Hesychius, and without a shadow of proof or even probability, assigned to ver. 301 of the Agamemnon, and edits, after Heimsoeth, in ver. 283,

> Ἴδη μὲν πρὸς Ἑρμαῖον λέπας
> Λήμνου, προσαιθρίζουσα πόμπιμον φλόγα
> πεύκης·

where this word *πεύκης* is transposed from the beginning of

ver. 288, in place of which *ἦξεν* is introduced on the editor's own conjecture. All this, we confess, seems to us slashing work; but Mr Davies quietly says, "Res tantum non certa, me judice." In ver. 304 of the same narrative,

ὦτρυνε θεσμὸν μὴ χαρίζεσθαι πυρὸς,

Mr Davies reads *μεγαίρειν μοι* for *χαρίζεσθαι*, and renders the verse thus, "roused up the edict not to stint me fire," which seems to us neither sense nor English.

Not less violent is the editor's alteration of *μὴ τύχοι* into *μὴ ἁμάρτοι* in 347. Will he find any English scholar who can believe that Aeschylus really wrote

εἰ πρόσπαια μὴ ἁμάρτοι κακὰ,

or that the following rendering of it is correct?

"the lost one's woe will be awake to see
if unexpected ills can hit the mark."

The use of *τυχεῖν*, "to happen," is common, as in 640, Prom. 346. The sense is simple enough; 'the *old* crimes may wake up to punish them, if no *new* evils (lit. sudden or casual) befal them.' They must not suppose they have escaped all retribution, because no fresh and startling calamity occurs on the return.

The very fine opening anapaestics of the chorus in v. 355 are rendered as follows, with a marvellous closeness, we admit, both of metre and diction, yet in language too quaint and turgid to be read with ease or pleasure:

"O Zeus, *prime* king, and thou Night the beloved
of glories majestic possessor!
who also didst fling on the bulwarks of Troy
a fast-holding net, so that no full grown,
no, nor a young one rose *and emerged* from
slavery's drop-net
immense, of all-trapping perdition!
I venerate Zeus, great lord of the board,
who accomplished these deeds; who has long had his bow
levelled at Paris in order to launch no
fatuous arrow whizzing onward before
opportunity's hint, nor behind it."

In the last verse but one he gives *ὑπὲρ ᾖσσον* for the vulg. *ὑπὲρ ἄστρων*, which, he too positively says, "defendi nequit." As if so obvious a phrase as "shooting higher than the stars," to express a very bad marksman, needed any "defence" at all.

In 413, where the text is corrupt, Mr Davies' alteration involves, if we mistake not, a doubtful quantity,

ἄδιστ' ἀδημονῶν ἰδεῖν.

We do not believe that these words can even *mean* anything; but the *ἀ* in *ἀδημονεῖν* should by analogy be long, as in *ἀδολεσχεῖν*. Still, if Liddell and Scott are to be trusted, it is made short in two passages of later writers.

In 478 Mr Davies again alters the text by inserting words which we believe to be false Greek,

εἰ δ' ἐτητύμως
τίς οἶδεν, ἤ τι θεῖόν ἐστι μὴ οὐ σαφές;

The old reading, *ἤ τοι θεῖόν ἐστι μὴ ψύθος*, "or whether it be not in truth some deception sent by the gods," appears to us at least defensible, though *εἴτε* is perhaps safer than *ἦ τοι*. It is clear that Mr Davies would combine *μὴ οὐ σαφὲς* in the sense of "not clear," "mysterious;" a construction here inadmissible. The oddest thing of all is the critical note appended: "Ridiculum est ut vertunt: Paleius enim 'quis novit utrum verum sit, an verum?' Sic utique debebat 'not-a-deception.'" The explanation given in the note to which he refers is, "*an non sit potius fraus divina?*" where the *μὴ* was not taken to negative *ψύθος*, as Mr Davies supposes, but as *dubitative* or *inquisitive*, *εἴτε ἴσως ἐστίν*, &c. No scholar could suppose that because the Greeks say *εἴτε ἐτήτυμόν ἐστιν εἴτε μὴ ἐτήτυμον*, they could use such an idiom as *εἴτε ἐτήτυμόν ἐστιν εἴτε μὴ ψευδὲς = εἴτε ἐτήτυμον*. Compare Phædrus, p. 166. B. *εἰ μὲν ὀρθῶς ἢ μὴ προσαγορεύω, θεὸς οἶδε*. That would be not only "ridiculum," but an outrage on common sense. (I am not now at all sure that my view of *μὴ = ἴσως*, in combination with *εἴτε*, is right; and I think *μοι* for *μὴ* would make all clear and easy.)

In v. 557, *τί δ' οὐ στένοντες, οὐ λαχόντες ἤματος μέρος*, our editor is not content with the rendering of the vulgate, "what

was there that we had not to lament, what that we did not receive as our daily portion," but gives on his own conjecture ἤδεος for ἤματος, and translates, "but at what did we not sigh? getting no share of joy." Now, we do not believe there is in the language such a word as ἤδεος, as the genitive of ἦδος, which is now and then used in such a formula as οὐ τῶνδ' ἦδος, with which compare ὧν ὄφελός τι, 'men of some account.' We should not be entitled to assume a genitive ὀφέλεος merely from the rather frequent occurrence of the noun in the nominative. The editor adds a wish, that some one would help him to defend such a form as ἦδμα,—which we on our parts decline to do. But even worse than this is the change a few lines further on, ἔμπεδον σίνος ἐσθημάτων τιθέντες ἐν θηρῶν τριχί. A good scholar ought to know that these words, if they meant anything, could only mean "causing a lasting damage of garments on the wild-beasts' hair." But Mr Davies renders it, "and to the wild-beasts' fur Of our apparel searching damage caused." Why this is wrong, we hardly need take the trouble to point out. We may object, in passing, to the change of δρόσοι into βόλοι to suit the masculine participle τιθέντες.

In v. 714, λαμπρῶς θὴν appears to us a very unfortunate alteration of the vulg. πάμπροσθη, which other editors have printed πάμπροσθ' ἦ πολύθρηνον, &c. The translation too, "for *quite clearly* she passed a life full of laments," &c. is very tame and prosaic. The combination ἦ πολλὰ is as common as πολλὰ δή. See, for instance, Eumen. 106; Pind. Ol. XIII. 63; Pyth. IX. 22; Callim. Hymn. Jov. 22. It is but a slight extension of a familiar idiom to write ἦ πολύθρηνον, 'a life of many sighs indeed,' or 'but too many sighs.' Mr Davies, we think, should have hesitated before he wrote "impavidus innovavi."

In the difficult passage v. 816,

τῷ δ' ἐναντίῳ κύτει
ἐλπὶς προσῄει χειρὸς οὐ πληρουμένῳ,

Mr Davies reads χέρσος for χειρὸς, "dry, barren Hope came to the opposite vase which was not filled." He says that the metaphor is from sexual generation, and that hope as it were *approached* the urn, as if for procreation, but the urn did not

become pregnant, *οὐκ ἐπληροῦτο,* viz. was not instinct with life, was not the urn of life, while the other was the urn of death. Can anything be more forced than such an interpretation?

If Aeschylus really was, as Mr Davies maintains, such a close follower of Hesiod, it is the more likely that he wrote, as has been suggested in my edition, *χεῖλος,* and took his metaphor from Hope that was left in Pandora's urn, and nearly, but not quite, filled it.

The grand speech of Clytemnestra, v. 855, is very well translated by Mr Davies throughout, and here we have no fault to find with him, except in his transposition of v. 902, *τερπνὸν δὲ τἀναγκαῖον ἐκφυγεῖν ἅπαν,* to occupy an awkward and useless parenthetical place after 895, *νῦν ταῦτα πάντα τλᾶσ', ἀπενθήτῳ φρενί,* &c.

Pass we on to v. 984, where the emendation of Mr Davies has at least the merit of novelty and originality. For the old reading, which he says is hopelessly corrupt (but which nevertheless suits the metre perfectly, and gives a good and simple sense,) *χρόνος δ' ἐπὶ πρυμνησίων ξυνεμβόλοις* (l.- *αἷς*) *ψαμμίας ἀκάτας παρήβησεν,* "time has long passed away since the fastening of the stern-ropes together on the shore from the stranded barks," Mr Davies reads

χρόνος δ' ἐπεὶ προὔμνησ' ἰδὼν
ἐν ξυμβόλοις φάσματ' ἄτας παρήβησεν.

As we very much doubt whether our readers could construe this unassisted, we append the editor's own version: "And yet the time has passed its prime since he (i.e. Calchas) forewarned Who in types saw the sprites Of destruction when to Troy Sped the ship-ascending host." A more ingenious instance of turning black into white we do not remember to have seen.

Not the remotest probability, to our critical sense, has Karsten's conjecture *ἐπαγχίσαν* for *ἐπεγχέασα* in v. 1137. Even if such a verb as *ἀγχίζω* or the compound *ἐπαγχίζω* existed at all, which is not the case, it would be a form of a much later dialect, like *ἐγγίζειν* of the Septuagint and the New Testament.

In 1235, *ἄδου λῆτορα*, 'priestess of Hades,' for *ἄδου μητέρα*, 'devils' dam,' is very inadequately defended by the gloss in Hesychius *λείτορες· ἱέρειαι*,—probably an Alexandrine word. Mr Davies adopts this alteration from Ahrens, and just below (1238) he has given on his own authority *ἐδόκει δὲ χαίρειν νοστίμῳ σωτηρίᾳ*, for *δοκεῖ*. But, if the poet had meant the past sense, he would have written *δοκοῦσα χαίρειν*, (the initial anapaest being very rare in Aeschylus). The sense however is, that she *now*, viz. when she is going to murder him, pretends to rejoice at her husband's safe return.

In 1266, *σφὲ μὲν*, *i.e.* *ὑμᾶς*, the conjecture of Auratus for *σὲ μὲν*, seems very doubtful in the position of emphasis. The same objection applies to Mr Davies' change in 1175, *σέ τις κακοφρονῶν τίθησι δαίμων κ.τ.λ.*, for *καὶ τίς σε* (*καί τίς σε* Butl.). That would mean, '*you* are made by the daemon,' &c., implying, that some one else is *not*. (Can the use of *σφε* otherwise than as an enclitic be defended? To my ear it is strange.)

The version given in 1272 of *καταγελωμένην οὐ διχορρόπως μάτην*, 'not with even scales untruly,' i.e. 'untruly, without any doubt,' is to the last degree overstrained, if it is even intelligible at all. Surely *μάτην* refers simply to Cassandra being *undeservedly* ridiculed as a prophetess; since, though she spoke the truth, it was the decree of Apollo that she should never be believed; and *οὐ διχορρόπως* to the *unanimity* of the reproach.

Difficult as is the phrase in 1355, *τυραννίδος σημεῖα πράσσοντες πόλει*, i.e. *πράσσοντες πράξεις*, or *δρῶντες ἔργα, ἃ σημεῖά ἐστι τυραννίδος*, Mr Davies is hardly justified in saying that a boy at school would be flogged for such Greek. Certainly he is wrong in calling it 'a solecism;' and probably he is wrong in altering *πράσσοντες* to *ἀράσσοντες*, which he thinks gives a kind of play or pun between striking musical notes and striking with the sword. Surely, a far-fetched idea.

In 1388, the fine verse *οὕτω τὸν αὑτοῦ θυμὸν ὁρμαίνει πεσὼν*, 'is agitated in his soul,' 'indignantly dies,' an exact parallel to which is Il. XVI. 490,

> *ὣς ὑπὸ Πατρόκλῳ Λυκίων ἀγὸς ἀσπιστάων*
> *κτεινόμενος μενέαινε, φίλον δ' ὀνόμηνεν ἑταῖρον,*

is, to my poetical sense at least, ruined by Hermann's *ὀρυγάνει* (*ὀρυγαίνει*,) 'belches forth,' an alteration adopted by Mr Davies, who however has used a sound judgment in admitting in the preceding verse Enger's *Διὸς νεκρῶν σωτῆρος εὐκταίαν χάριν*. The vulgate *Ἄιδου* is probably a gloss on *Διὸς*, intended to show that *Ζεὺς χθόνιος* was meant; and we thus gain the favourite Aeschylean combination *Ζεὺς σωτὴρ τρίτος* (Suppl. 27, Cho. 244, &c.).

Few passages in Aeschylus are more perplexing than 1594—5,

> *τὰ μὲν ποδήρη καὶ χερῶν ἄκρους κτένας*
> *ἔθρυπτ' ἄνωθεν ἀνδρακὰς καθήμενος.*

The flesh of Thyestes' children was given to the father, to eat when cooked as food, by his brother Atreus. The verse reads so smoothly and naturally, and the words used are so unlikely in themselves to be corruptions of other words, that with the slight change of *ἔθρυπτε* into *ἔκρυπτε*, founded on the precisely parallel story about the children of Harpagus in Herod. I. 119, a sober critic is desirous to retain it, provided, of course, the words can be made to give a reasonable sense. If *ἀνδρακὰς* may mean, as Suidas explains it, *χωρὶς*, there can be no doubt that *ἄνωθεν* will express that the act, whatever it was, that was intended first to deceive and then to horrify Thyestes, was done 'from the head of the table where he (Atreus) sat apart.' Rejecting this, as not worth even a word of notice, Mr Davies edits the passage as follows, from his own conjecture:

> *τὰ μὲν ποδήρη καὶ χερῶν ἄκρους κτένας*
> *ἔκρυπτ' ἄνωθεν ἁδρὰ κρέα καὶ θέρμ' ἐνεὶς*
> *ἄσημ'· ὁ δ' αὐτῶν κ.τ.λ.*

His version is as follows;

> (he) "hid foot-joints and palm's end combs,
> Setting above them plump hot bits that gave
> No sign."

And his explanation of this very different reading is, that Atreus so arranged the cannibal-fare in a deep dish, that the

raw toes and fingers of the slain children were placed at the bottom, with delicately-cooked pieces on the top, so that Thyestes only found out what he had been eating, on coming to the raw members. Then he finds a double sense in *ἐνεὶς*, 'injiciens' and 'fallaci specie illiciens ad edendum,'—a play on the word which is certainly not an obvious one.

The verse that follows at 1599, where *ἐρῶν* has been altered by general consent, after Auratus, to *ἐμῶν*, 'he fell back vomiting from the slaughter,' i.e. the feast on the slaughtered children, Mr Davies reads thus,

ᾤμωξεν, ἀμπίπτει δ' ἀπὸ σφαγὴν ἐρῶν.

There are not many scholars who could construe this at sight; a circumstance in the highest degree unfavourable to any conjecture. On looking at the explanatory note, however, we find a single passage quoted from the very late writer Alciphron, where *ἀπερᾶν* is used in a medical sense for 'pouring away,' 'getting rid of,' on the analogy of *ἐξερᾶν*, which is used by the Attics for pouring out water, or ballots, from an urn.

The last verse that demands special notice is 1625, where Mr Davies reads, after Meineke, *γύναι σὺ*, and *μένων* on Weiseler's conjecture for *νέον*. Applied to Aegisthus, *γύναι* is not inappropriate; but, as it is certain that Clytemnestra was on the stage at the time, the address would be rendered ambiguous. It may however be doubted if *γύναι σὺ* is good Greek in the sense of 'You woman!' The Attics say *ὦ μῶρε σὺ, ὦ δύστηνε σὺ*, but this seems by no means identical with the vocative of the substantive.

The following emendations appear to deserve consideration, and perhaps acceptance; *πομπᾶς ἀρχοὺς* Karsten, for *πομπούς τ' ἀρχὰς* or *ἀρχοὺς*, in 124; *ἦθος τρόπους τε τοκήων*, Enger, for *ἔθος τὸ πρόσθε τοκήων*, in 728, with Conington's *λέοντος ἶνιν* for *λέοντα σίνιν* (a very happy correction) in the strophic verse, 717; *καιρίᾳ πτωσίμοις* (i.e. *πληγῇ*) Davies, for the corrupt *δορία πτώσιμος* in 1122; *ἐμπελῶ πέδῳ* Ahrens and Davies for *ἐμπέδῳ βαλῶ* in 1172; *ἀλλόθρῳ 'ν πόλει* Enger for *ἀλλόθρουν πόλιν* in 1200; *ᾖσθα* (i.e. *ἤεισθα*, a form of *ᾔδησθα* which appears defensible from *ᾖστε* for *ᾔδειτε* in Soph. Frag. 317) *Λοξίου*

κότον Weiseler for *ἦσθα Λοξίου κότῳ* in 1211; *ἦ κάρτα τἄρα παρεκόπης* Hartung for *ἦ κάρτ' ἄρ' ἂν παρεσκόπης* in 1252; *τὴν πολύκλαυτον ἀνάξια δράσας Ἰφιγένειαν, ἀνάξια πάσχων* Weise, for *τὴν πολυκλαύτην τ' Ἰφιγένειαν ἀνάξια δράσας, ἄξια πάσχων,* in 1526. Beyond these, there are few, if any, of the changes introduced by Mr Davies which commend themselves at all strongly, at least to my own judgment.

There is not space to pursue these criticisms into more minute details. It is with real reluctance that a word of disparagement has been spoken where so much pains and research have been evinced; yet it seems a duty to protest against the principle adopted, and the system of what appears reckless and unnecessary alteration which pervades this book. At the same time, we are not unprepared to expect that the present edition will find its admirers, if only on the score of its boldness. A great deal of the translation is really excellent, and shows deep consideration, long study, and intense appreciation of the original. We should certainly have preferred, in the critical notes, a more modest and timid tone; there is too much of assertion to be altogether pleasing. Mr Davies' carefulness as a grammarian is sometimes rather questionable. It is not good Greek to say, *ἅπαξ ἔτ' εἰπεῖν χρὴ πρὶν ἢ θρῆνον λέγω* (1322), 'yet must I speak once ere I sing my dirge.' Not *πρὶν ἢ λέγω,* but *πρὶν λέγειν,* or, if a negative precedes, *πρὶν ἂν λέγω,* is the Attic usage. Again *τοιόσδ' ὁ κόμπος* (612) could not mean 'that sort of boast,' which would be *ὁ τοιόσδε κόμπος,* but *τοιόσδε* is of necessity the predicate. And when he tells us (Preface, p. viii.) that the passage in the Midias (p. 525) *ὁ τοιοῦτος πότερα μὴ δῷ διὰ τοῦτο δίκην, ἢ μείζω δοίη δικαίως*; is "sound and does not require the *κἂν* which Bekker and others wish to introduce," and gives us the following version of it, "whether *shall we say* 'let him, on this account, not be punished;' or 'would that he might suffer greater punishment, as he deserves?'" he shows that he does not understand the doctrine of the deliberative conjunctive in the third person, which virtually means *πότερα τισώμεθα αὐτὸν,* and he gives a most far-fetched sense to the optative, as expressing a wish. How much simpler is Mr Whiston's rendering (Bibl. Class. p. 262) "whether

in justice should such a man on this account escape punishment, or suffer a greater one?" Better still, "should such a man for that reason not be punished at all; or would he justly be punished even more severely?" Again, when he tells us in the same page, that the easy distich in Eur. Med. 240,

δεῖ μάντιν εἶναι, μὴ μαθοῦσαν οἴκοθεν,
ὅτῳ μάλιστα χρήσεται ξυνευνέτῃ,

"a woman must be able to divine, if she cannot learn from her own friends, the sort of husband she is to have,"—that this distich is "corrupt and untranslateable," and that we must read ὅπως for ὅτῳ, "how one should treat a husband," he does not, in our opinion, rightly understand the context, which states, quite generally, that if a woman takes a husband in a strange country, as may often happen, she has not the opportunity of learning from her own domestic circle what the character of the suitor may be. She must marry, as it were, on trust, and take her chance of having a good or a bad husband, as it may turn out.

We recommend to Mr Davies a further study of the oracular verse,

Μὴ κινεῖν Καμάριναν· ἀκίνητος γὰρ ἀμείνων.

hose who, like Baur, Hilgen-
have any genuine remains
sion as the original, feel-
lation strong enough

e the two

TWO NEGLECTED FACTS BEARING ON THE IGNATIAN CONTROVERSY.

I HOPE that the heading will sufficiently explain the object of this paper. It is not my intention to enter upon the general question of the authenticity of the Ignatian Epistles; though it may be as well to state at the outset that in my opinion the Syriac version, published by Cureton, represents the letters of this father in their genuine form. But two important facts, which may be elicited from the materials placed at our disposal by the discoveries and collations of recent years, have, so far as I am aware, lain neglected hitherto, though each might have furnished a weighty argument to the combatants on either side.

By way of introduction it may be as well to recal, as briefly as possible, the main points at issue in this controversy. The following facts therefore will be borne in mind:

(1) The Ignatian Epistles, with which we are concerned, are extant in three forms, which I shall call the Short, Middle, and Long Recensions respectively. (*α*) The Short Recension is preserved in Cureton's Syriac version, comprising only three epistles (Rom., Ephes., Polyc.), and these in a comparatively brief form. (*β*) The Middle Recension includes seven epistles. The three already mentioned appear in an amplified form, and with these are included four others (Philad., Magnes., Trall., Smyrn.). This recension is extant in Greek, Latin, and Armenian, and there are also Syriac fragments which must have belonged to it. (*γ*) In the Long Recension these seven epistles appear still further enlarged, and to them are added four others (Mar. Cass., Tars., Antioch., Philipp.) together with a letter from Mary of Cassobela to Ignatius. These five letters are also added to the existing texts of the Middle Recension,

in justice should such a man o part of it[1]. The Long Recension
ment, or suffer a greater one.
man for that reason not be at in my nomenclature the *Middle* and
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the same page, th and *longer* Greek (and Latin) epistles.

lough the Long Recension of the seven epistles has at wide intervals found champions who were not unwilling to lead a more than forlorn hope, yet its fate was sealed by the publication of Ussher's work two centuries ago, and at the present day its genuineness cannot be said to be seriously maintained. The same is true of the five epistles which are added to the seven. The controversy therefore lies between the three epistles of the Short and the seven of the Middle Recension. And the two questions to be decided are these: (*α*) Does the Short or the Middle Recension present the Ignatian Epistles in their first form? In other words, is the short an abridgement, or the long an amplification of the original work? (*β*) Supposing this first question to be answered in favour of the Middle Recension, a second supervenes. Is this original an actual work of Ignatius, or a forgery bearing his name? In other words, have we, or have we not, *any* genuine letters of this father? I say that this second question supervenes only, when the first is answered in a particular way; for, so far as I know, no critic who looks upon the Short Recension as the original and the Middle as an amplification, seriously questions the genuineness of the former (nor indeed would it be very easy to

[1] They are added in the Armenian and the Latin. The existing Greek MSS are imperfect at the end and contain the seven epistles together with the eighth (Mar. Cass.) and the beginning of the ninth (Tars.); but the Latin version shows that the absence of the other epistles is only owing to the imperfection of the MSS. Thus, so far as regards MS authority, the five epistles are on the same footing as the seven of the Middle Recension. But Cureton (*Corp. Ign.* p. lxxvii sq.) is not justified in using this fact to discredit the seven; for the circumstance that the seven only were known to Eusebius (*H. E.* iii. 36) shows that the five stand on a different footing. We may gather from internal evidence that the five were written after the age of Eusebius by the redactor of the Long Recension, to which they properly belong; and, if they are found attached to the Middle, this is doubtless owing to the zeal of some transcriber, who was anxious to make his collection as complete as possible, and added them from a copy of the Long.

do so); while on the other hand those who, like Baur, Hilgenfeld, Merx, and others, deny that we have any genuine remains of Ignatius, start from the Middle Recension as the original, feeling instinctively that this is the only foundation strong enough to support the weight of such a denial.

These preliminary remarks will suffice to introduce the two facts to which I wish to call attention.

1.

The headings of the epistles in the Middle Recension present remarkable differences in form. Of the Greek of this recension two MSS only are known to exist (*Mediceus* lvii. 7, and *Casanatensis*, G. v. 14), and these not independent, but agreeing so precisely as to show either that the one was an immediate transcript from the other or that both were derived from the same parent MS. They contain only six of the seven epistles; but the Epistle to the Romans, which is wanting in them, is found in a MS of the Martyrdom of Ignatius (*Colbertinus* 1451), into which narrative it is incorporated. From these MSS, taking the epistles in the order in which they occur, we get the following titles:

1. Σμυρναίοις.
2. πρὸς Πολύκαρπον Ἰγνάτιος.
3. πρὸς Ἐφεσίους Ἰγνάτιος.
4. Μαγνησιεῦσιν Ἰγνάτιος.
5. Μαγνησιεῦσιν Φιλαδελφεῦσιν Ἰγνάτιος[1].
6. Τραλλιάνοις Ἰγνάτιος.
7. πρὸς Ῥωμαίους.

It will thus be seen that the epistles may be divided into two separate classes, according to the form of their titles: (1) *Σμυρναίοις*, *Μαγνησιεῦσιν*, *Φιλαδελφεῦσιν*, *Τραλλιάνοις*; (2) *πρὸς Πολύκαρπον*, *πρὸς Ἐφεσίους*, *πρὸς Ῥωμαίους*. And the point to be noted is, that this second class includes exactly the same three which are comprised in the short (Syriac) recen-

[1] The *Μαγνησιεῦσιν* in the heading of the Epistle to the Philadelphians is of course a transcriber's error, and the word belongs to the termination of the foregoing epistle.

sion. The value of this fact moreover is increased by three considerations: *first,* that the epistles belonging to the two classes are not kept separate in the MSS but are mixed up together; *secondly,* that though there are minor variations in the titles (*e. g.* the omission or insertion of Ἰγνάτιος), these have not prevailed so as to obliterate this main distinction of the two classes; *thirdly,* that we owe the title of the Epistle to the Romans to an entirely different MS from the others.

In the versions of this recension we might expect to find the difference obliterated; for there are not many languages in which it would occur to an ordinary translator to render πρὸς Ῥωμαίους and Ῥωμαίοις by different expressions. The fact therefore that the Latin and Armenian versions do not observe the distinction is unimportant[1]. But the Long Recension was doubtless founded on the Middle; and in the Greek of this we might expect to find lingering traces of the distinction of titles. Here however we are disappointed. The headings of all the epistles in this recension have the form πρός τινας; *e. g.* τοῦ αὐτοῦ (*i. e.* Ἰγνατίου) ἐπιστολὴ πρὸς Σμυρναίους. But the very example quoted shows that the redactor has tampered with the titles, as he has also tampered with the body of the epistles. His object in altering the headings was doubtless to produce uniformity, and herein he has only acted as a modern editor might have done.

[1] The Latin translator *might* have preserved the distinction, e. g. *ad Ephesios* and *Smyrnaeis*. But the tendency to uniformity would naturally lead either him or his transcriber, without any deliberate purpose, to adopt the same mode of rendering in all cases; and accordingly we find him employing the dative throughout, *Ephesiis, Smyrnæis,* etc., with one exception. This exception 'probat regulam.' The Epistle to the Romans had come to be separated from the rest, and inserted in the narrative of the saint's martyrdom. The force tending to uniformity was rendered ineffective by this isolation; and accordingly the translator here, and here only, retains the original form, *ad Romanos*. [It should be added also that, though the heading of the Ephesian letter is *Ephesiis*, yet the title at the top of one page is *ad Ephesios*. The Caius MS lies open before me, as I write this]. I cannot discover that there is any difference in form in the Armenian headings (I speak in ignorance of the language); but, as the Armenian was rendered from a previous Syriac version, it would have been strange indeed if the distinction had survived all the vicissitudes of transmission.

I think it follows that this difference of title had a place in the original collection of the seven epistles as they occur in this Middle Recension, and cannot with any probability be ascribed to the caprice of later transcribers. And, if so, it is important to ask what significance the fact has. To this question it seems a safe answer that the collector or redactor must have derived these seven epistles directly or indirectly from *two different sources*. In other words, the three epistles were circulated *by themselves* at an early date; and this fact removes all ground for the hypothesis that the Syriac translator (whether we suppose him to have abridged or not) capriciously set aside the remaining four and selected these three for translation. Standing alone, the fact to which I have directed attention is far from showing conclusively that the other four epistles are spurious; but, taken in connexion with other circumstances, it throws an enormous weight into this scale. Thus it can hardly be reconciled with the circumstance that the 4th and 5th chapters of the Epistle to the Trallians in the Middle Recension form the conclusion of the Epistle to the Romans in the Short, on any other supposition than that the redactor of the Middle Recension abstracted the end of a genuine epistle of Ignatius and used it as the nucleus of another letter to a different church, which he himself forged in the name of this father. I would only add in conclusion, that the forms *πρὸς Ῥωμαίους*, etc., being in conformity with the headings of St Paul's Epistles, are more probable in themselves than the forms *Σμυρναίοις Ἰγνάτιος*, etc., in the writings of one who lived in the generation immediately succeeding the Apostolic age and was probably himself a disciple of some Apostle.

2.

The fact just elicited favours the genuineness of the Short Recension, as against the Middle. I wish now to call attention to another, which may be thought to have an opposite bearing. Though it does not furnish any positive argument in support of the Middle Recension, it yet removes an obstacle which the champions of this recension have had great difficulty in surmounting.

No student of the Ignatian controversy will need to be reminded of the passage in *Magnes.* 8, *ὁ φανερώσας ἑαυτὸν διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ, ὅς ἐστιν αὐτοῦ Λόγος ἀΐδιος οὐκ ἀπὸ σιγῆς προελθών.* So it stands in the common texts.

This passage furnished the assailants of the genuineness of the Ignatian Epistles with one of their strongest arguments. The writer, it was urged, is clearly referring to the Valentinian doctrine of emanations which was not propounded till after the death of Ignatius. Pearson (*Vind. Ign.* ii. c. 5), in replying to this objection, laid undue stress on the fact that in the common accounts of the Valentinian doctrine (Iren. *Hær.* i. i. 1, Orig. *in Joann* ii. 19, iv. p. 77 ed. Delarue; comp. Hippol. *Hær.* vi. 29) the Logos is not said to have been generated *immediately* from Sige, another æon being interposed; for Cyril of Jerusalem (*Catech.* vi. 17) certainly reports the theory of Valentinus thus, *ὁ Βυθὸς ἐγέννησε Σιγὴν καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς Σιγῆς ἐτεκνοποίει Λόγον*; while Irenæus (i. 11. 5) and Hippolytus (vi. 29) state that the Valentinians disputed among themselves about the place which Bythos and Sige should occupy in their system. Still less happy was the solution adopted by him from Petau and received also by Cotelier, Rothe (*Anfänge* p. 726), and others, that the passage is directed against the Ebionites, as though the 'procession from Silence' were equivalent to a denial of the pre-existence of the Son. With greater effect he and others maintained that this Sige was by no means a creation of Valentinus; that it was borrowed from heathen cosmogonies; that it was found in a cosmical genealogy given by the Comic poet Antiphanes (Iren. ii. 14. 1; the passage to which Irenæus refers under the name *Θεογονία* was doubtless taken from the *Ἀφροδίτης γοναὶ* of this poet, as Grabe suggested: Meineke, *Fragm. Com.* i. p. 318, begs the whole question when he rejects the explicit and detailed statement of Irenæus on the ground that Sige or Silence was first introduced by the Neoplatonists and Gnostics); and lastly that Gregory Nazianzen (*Orat.* xxv. 8, i. p. 460 ed. Ben., a loose oratorical passage, it must be confessed) gives Sige a place in the systems of Simon, Cerinthus, etc., while Irenæus himself (i. 11. 1) states that Valentinus borrowed his theory with modifications from earlier Gnostics. The

discovery of the treatise of Hippolytus confirms the justice of this reply. In one passage this hæresiologer speaks of ἡ ὑμνουμένη ἐκείνη παρὰ τοῖς Ἕλλησι σιγή (vi. 22); in another he states that Valentinus founded his system on that of Simon (vi. 21); and in a third he quotes a passage from the *Great Announcement* attributed to Simon himself, in which his primary power or emanation is styled Σιγή (vi. 18).

Thus the combatants on both sides have assumed that the common reading is correct, and argued on this assumption[1]. But there is conclusive evidence, if I mistake not, that the words ἀΐδιος οὐκ are no part of the original text, which ran ὁ φανερώσας ἑαυτὸν διὰ Ἰ. Χ. τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ ὅς ἐστιν αὐτοῦ λόγος ἀπὸ σιγῆς προελθών. The authorities in favour of the omission are; (1) The *Long Recension*, which runs ὁ φ. ε. δ. Ἰ. Χ. τ. υ. α. ὅς ἐστιν αὐτοῦ λόγος οὐ ῥητὸς ἀλλ' οὐσιώδης, οὐ γάρ ἐστι λαλιᾶς ἐνάρθρου φώνημα ἀλλ' ἐνεργείας θεϊκῆς οὐσία γεννητή. Here the words οὐ ῥητὸς κ.τ.λ. seem to be a paraphrase (though an incorrect one) of ἀπὸ σιγῆς προελθών, such paraphrases being usual in the Long Recension. At all events there is nothing corresponding to either οὐκ or ἀΐδιος. (2) The *Armenian Version*, which runs (as rendered by Petermann), 'Qui est Verbum exiens e silentio (quiete).' (3) A quotation in *Severus of Antioch* (*c.* A.D. 515), preserved in a Syriac translation (Cureton's *Corp. Ign.* pp. 213, 245); 'Who is His word who proceeded from silence.' A comment follows which not only shows that Severus did not omit the words accidentally, but also leaves the impression that he was unacquainted with any other reading. All these authorities are more important than the existing Greek (and Latin) text of the Middle Recension, which has been largely corrupted in the course of transmission. The Long Re-

[1] Cureton for instance (*Corp. Ign.* p. lxi sq.) argues against the genuineness of the Middle Recension from this text, as though there were no various reading; and even draws the conclusion that the redactor of the Long Recension 'felt this to be a solid objection against the genuineness of these epistles, and therefore cautiously endeavoured to obviate it by removing this passage and substituting another.' Yet we owe to Cureton's own volume our knowledge of the quotation in Severus of Antioch, in which ἀΐδιος οὐκ is wanting, and which should have prevented him from drawing this hasty and strange inference.

cension was probably made in the 4th or 5th century, and therefore is founded on a text at least as early as that date. The Armenian was certainly taken from an earlier Syriac Version (see Petermann, p. xii. sq.), and seems itself to have been made in the 5th century (see Petermann, p. xxv). And again, Severus of Antioch wrote early in the 6th century (*c.* A.D. 515). On the other hand it must not be overlooked, that the passage is quoted λόγος ἀΐδιος οὐκ ἀπὸ σιγῆς προελθών by Timotheus of Alexandria († A.D. 535), so that the common interpolation must have crept into some texts before his time.

This direct evidence for the omission will probably be considered almost conclusive. There is however another weighty consideration tending the same way. It is easier to account for the insertion of the words than for their omission; for, whether they be considered genuine or not, so remarkable a variation cannot be accidental, but must be attributed to design. If the original text ran λόγος ἀπὸ σιγῆς προελθών, a transcriber would be sorely tempted to alter a reading which seemed to savour of Gnostic or other heresies. I should be inclined myself to date the interpolation from the 4th or 5th century. About the middle of the 4th century Marcellus propounded his doctrine, which was assailed by Eusebius as Sabellian. From the attack of his opponent it would appear that he expressed his views in language closely resembling these words of the Ignatian writer; see esp. Euseb. *Eccl. Theol.* II. 9, ἃ δὴ Μάρκελλος ἐτόλμα ὑποτίθεσθαι, πάλαι μὲν λέγων εἶναι τὸν Θεὸν καὶ τινὰ ἡσυχίαν ἅμα τῷ Θεῷ ὑπογράφων ἑαυτῷ κατ' αὐτὸν ἐκεῖνον τὸν τῶν ἀθέων αἱρεσιωτῶν ἀρχηγόν (*i.e.* Simon Magus, as Pearson *Vind. Ign.* ii. c. 6 rightly supposes), ὃς τὰ ἄθεα δογματίζων ἀπεφαίνετο λέγων, Ἦν Θεὸς καὶ σιγή· μετὰ δὲ τὴν σιγὴν καὶ τὴν ἡσυχίαν προελθεῖν τὸν λόγον τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐν ἀρχῇ τῆς κοσμοποιΐας δραστικῇ ἐνεργείᾳ κ.τ.λ., and the passages quoted directly from Marcellus, *ib.* I. 20, II. 3, 8, 11, III. 3. This mode of expression would thus be discredited, and our text altered in consequence. When Daillé, attacking the genuineness of the Ignatian Epistles, asked how Irenæus could have failed to adduce the words λόγος ἀΐδιος κ.τ.λ. against Valentinus, Pearson replied (*Vind. Ign.* ii. c. 3) by asking in turn

why Eusebius, Athanasius, and Basil, did not employ it against Marcellus. This starts a second difficulty without solving the first. They probably would have so employed it, if *ἀΐδιος οὐκ* had stood in their copies. Venema (*H. E.* Sæc. II. § 2, quoted by Jacobson) felt that the sense required the omission of the negative, without knowing that there was any authority for the omission. Λόγος and Σιγὴ are correlative terms, λόγος implying a previous *σιγή*. The one is the manifestation of Deity in His words and works; the other the absence of this: (Iren. I. 12. 5 'Impossibile est Logo præsente Sigen esse aut iterum Sige præsente Logon ostendi: hæc enim consumtibilia sunt invicem etc.'). In fact the expression of the Ignatian writer closely resembles Wisd. xviii. 14, 15, (a passage strangely overlooked by writers on this Ignatian text) *ἡσύχου γὰρ σιγῆς περιεχούσης τὰ πάντα...ὁ παντοδυναμός σου λόγος ἀπ' οὐρανῶν...εἰς μέσον τῆς ὀλεθρίας ἥλατο γῆς*. The fantastical speculations of the Gnostics brought disrepute on the term Σιγή, though in itself quite consistent with Catholic orthodoxy, whether the 'procession from Silence' be applied to the eternal generation, or to the incarnation of the Word. Compare in illustration of its use here (besides the passage of Wisdom just quoted) Rom. xvi. 25, *κατὰ ἀποκάλυψιν μυστηρίου χρόνοις αἰωνίοις σεσιγημένου φανερωθέντος δὲ νῦν*; Tatian *ad Græc.* 5 *οὕτω καὶ ὁ λόγος προελθὼν ἐκ τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς δυνάμεως*, while immediately afterwards Tatian compares the procession of the Word to the emission of the human voice (*προβαλλόμενος τὴν ἐμαυτοῦ φωνήν*); Clem. Alex. *Cohort.* (p. 9 Potter) *ἵνα τῆς ἀληθείας τὸ φῶς ὁ λόγος τῶν προφητικῶν αἰνιγμάτων τὴν μυστικὴν ἀπολύσηται σιωπήν, εὐαγγέλιον γενόμενος.*

J. B. LIGHTFOOT.

MR TAYLOR, ON THE MEANING OF THE HEBREW ROOT,

דבר

An attempt will be made in this article to evolve the divergent significations of the Hebrew DBR from one assumed radix; and, secondly, to account for the usages of the same Arabic root, which has preserved some of the Hebrew meanings but has lost *e.g.* the predominant Biblical application, *viz.* to *speech*. Two classes of attempts have been made to explain the Hebrew root, some referring its various usages to a single original; others assuming that *dabar* (a word), *deber* (a pestilence), &c. spring from at least two separate roots, whose present consonantal identity is, so to say, fortuitous. Of modern lexicographers Gesenius adopts the former method, and writes as follows:

Variæ autem hujus radicis significationes, quæ hebræam linguam si spectas, max. part. in derivatis tantum insunt, in ceteris autem dialectis in ipso etiam verbo cernuntur, hoc nobis ordine videntur esse ponendæ: (1) *seruit*, ordinavit; (2) *ordine duxit, egit*, impr. *egit pecus, pavit gregem, dux fuit populi, rexit, administravit*, it. *coëgit*, coërcuit, imperio suo *subjecit* (*examen apium* ductum a regina tanquam pastore); (3) *sequutus est, pone fuit*, pastor enim sequitur gregem. Ita arab. *pone fuit, pars postica, podex, postremus*, hebr. postica pars templi, *adytum;* (4) *pone secutus est*, persecutus est, *insidiatus est*, struxit perniciem, unde, *exitium, mors, pestis*. A prima denique serendi ordinandique significatione proficiscitur (5) ea quæ usitatissima est et in verbo maxime conspicua, *loquendi*, ita ut pr. sit *verba serere* (unde Romanis venit *sermo*).

On this it may be remarked (1) that (the hypothetical) *seruit, ordinavit*, while too complex for an absolutely primitive

meaning, does not lead naturally up to (2) *egit pecus:* cattle are not arranged in *order* or *series* for driving; but, if the driver be moderately successful, are huddled together in a promiscuous mass. Nor, again, does it satisfy the requirements of such passages as: 'It is God that avenged me, and *subdueth* the people unto me' (Ps. xviii. 47). 'She arose and *destroyed* all the seed royal of the house of Judah' (2 Chron. xxii. 10; 2 Kings xi. 1). With regard to the meaning '*examen* apium,' it may be remarked that there is no authority for supposing that this meaning is expressed *radically:* the Hebrew word (identical with the name Deborah) is used once in the generic singular in Is. vii. 18, but elsewhere in the *plural;* and the meaning '*a* bee' is that which has to be accounted for. (3) If from the notion of *driving* came *pone fuit,* &c. this would lead not so much to *adytum* as to the *hinder surface* of a temple. (5) The Hebrew *dabar* appears to mean primarily a *single* word (or thing): the repetition of the act is expressed by the frequentative *dĭber.*

I. The Hebrew words from this root DBR which have to be accounted for, are:

(i)	*deber*	pestilence
(ii)	*d:borah*	bee
(iii)	*d:bír*	adytum
(iv)	*dabar*	word
(v)	DBR (*verb,* not always meaning)	speak
(vi)	*midbar*	mouth
(vii)	*midbar*	wilderness
(viii)	*dóber*	pascuum
(ix)	*dob:rót*	σχεδίαι
(x)	*dib:rat*	course

and to these may perhaps be added *dor:bón, βούκεντρον.*

"The primary meaning of the root I apprehend, with *Cocceius,* to be, To DRIVE, lead, bring, *agere, ducere*" (Parkhurst). This meaning it is proposed to apply *directly,* not only to (vii)—(x), as is now commonly done, but also to the preceding significations. This same word naturally includes two classes of meanings, as may be illustrated from our own and

other languages. We speak of 'driving *cattle*,' and also of 'driving *nails*,' &c.: hence it will be assumed that דבר means to *strike with a pointed instrument; thrust;* DRIVE; where the last meaning is susceptible of developments which include the former, and is, in fact, coextensive with the Hebrew DBR.

(i) In accordance with the classical analogy of *Il.* I. 47, where the strokes of the arrows of Phœbus constitute pestilence, it may be conjectured that *deber* properly signifies the *arrow* of pestilence. The notion is not un-Hebrew, as appears from such passages as the following, where the words italicized are renderings of *hec*, the ordinary word for *arrow*:—'When I shall send upon them the evil *arrows* of famine' (Ezek. v. 16). 'The *arrows* of the Almighty are within me...My *wound* is incurable...' (Job vi. 4).

Again, as *swords* and *arrows* are frequently spoken of together, so in 1 Chron. xxi. 12 occurs the combination, 'The *sword* of the Lord,' and '*pestilence*.' This *deber*, moreover, is used in parallelism with *hec*, as in Ps. xci. 5, 6: 'Thou shalt not be afraid for the terror by night; nor for the *arrow* that flieth by day; Nor for the *pestilence* that walketh in darkness; nor for the destruction[1] that wasteth at noon-day.' It may be added that *deber* is used with the same verbs as *hec*, in Numb. xiv. 12; 2 Kings xiii. 18, 'I will *smite* with the pestilence,' '*Shoot* earthward:' in Ezek. xxviii. 23; Ps. cxliv. 6, 'I will *send* into her pestilence,' '*Shoot out*[2] thine arrows;' and in Ps. xci. 6, lxvii. 18, 'The pestilence that *walketh* in darkness,' 'Thine arrows *went abroad*.' The meaning *to shoot* is most appropriate as a rendering of the verb DBR, in Ps. cxxvii. 4, 5, 'As arrows are in the hand of a mighty man; so are the children of the youth. Happy is the man that hath his quiver full of them: they shall not be ashamed, but (with these arrows) they shall *shoot*[3] *down* their enemies in the gate.'

(ii) *d:borah* (for *dob:rah*), a *stinger*, bee, hornet, &c.

(iii) *d:bír* was formerly supposed to mean χρηματιστήριον,

[1] A cognate word occurs in parallelism with the plural of *deber* in Hos. xiii. 14. See p.s. (*a*).

[2] See Ezek. v. 16, *supra*.

[3] 'Thou art half of my host, and thou art the depository of my secret, and thou art my arrow with which I shoot and miss not.' (*Arabian Nights*).

λαλητήριον, and was derived from the common meaning of the root, viz. *to speak*. There is no difference, as regards the general result, between ancient and modern renderings; but the old *derivation* is now commonly rejected. The word occurs in Ps. xxviii. 2; 1 Kings vi. 5, 19—23 ('the *oracle* he prepared in the house within'); 1 Kings viii. 6, 8; 2 Chron. v. 7, 9. In the last passage the priests are described as bringing the ark 'to its place, to the δαβίρ of the house, to the holy of holies;' where the word in question is not used absolutely (= the oracle), but relatively to the 'house,' of which it would appear to signify the *inmost part*. Gesenius, at the close of his article upon the word, thus writes: 'acquiescendum potius in significatione *loci postici*, s. penetralis.' It is here proposed to take as the etymological equivalent of *d:bír* the word PENETRALE, which is allowed on all sides to be descriptively appropriate.

(iv) *dabar* means *a word*, 'verbum, *idque proprie;*' and the frequentative conjugation Piel is that commonly used in the sense of speaking. Between *diber* and *amar* there is this general distinction, that the latter may or may not imply articulate utterance, but relates primarily to the underlying thought; whereas the former properly relates to the mechanical process of articulation. The two frequently occur together in such formulæ as, 'he spake *saying;*' where the one word describes the process of expression, and the other relates only to the purport of what is said. *Diber*, again, is transitive (to speak or utter *words*[1]); it refers to the mode of articulation (*speak Aramaic*, Is. xxxvi. 11; *speak plainly*, Is. xxxii. 4. Cp. Ex. vii. 2; Jer. i. 6); and is used in immediate connection with the organs of speech, especially the tongue (Ps. xxxix. 4). Dumbness is expressed by a word which means to bind (*Angl.* hold tongue); the restoration of speech by the loosing of the tongue (Mark vii. 35). Again, the cessation of speech is thus expressed: 'The nobles held their peace and their *tongue cleaved to* the roof of their mouth' (Job xxix. 10; Ps. cxxxvii. 6). Silence ensues when the tongue refuses to perform its office of

[1] '*Utter* a song' (Jud. v. 12); where there is an assonance between *dab:rí* and the name of the prophetess.

striking, viz. *upon the roof of the mouth.* In a subsequent chapter of Job involuntary mechanical utterance is thus described: 'Behold, now, I have opened my mouth, my tongue hath STRUCK UPON my palate[1]' (Job xxxiii. 2). If words be thus regarded as produced by a sharp instrument, *the tongue,* and if the cognate *deber* means properly (as above) an arrow, it is easy to account for the occurrence of such comparisons as: 'Who whet their tongue like a sword, and bend their bows to shoot their arrows, even bitter words' (Ps. lxiv. 3). Cp. Ps. xlv. 1, 'My tongue is the *pen* of a ready writer;' Eccl. xii. 11, 'The words of the wise are *sicut aculei*[2];' Ps. cxl. 3, &c.

(v) The hiphil of DBR occurs twice, and is rendered *subdue* in the Authorized Version. In the one case this meaning is borrowed from a duplicate passage: 'It is God that avengeth me, and *subdueth* the people unto me' (Ps. xviii. 47; 2 Sam. xxii. 48); in the other (Ps. xlvii. 4) the same phrase recurs. In 2 Chron. xxii. 10 the meaning *destroy* is, in like manner, suggested (for the piel) by the parallel passage, 2 Kings xi. 1. There are, besides these passages, others wherein the meaning *speak* should perhaps be departed from. One has been already quoted (Ps. cxxvii. 4). In Numb. xx. 8 the A. V. has, 'Take the rod, and gather thou the assembly together, thou, and Aaron thy brother, and *speak* ye unto the rock before their eyes; and it shall give forth his water, and thou shalt bring forth to them water out of the rock: so shalt thou give the congregation and their beasts drink.' But a departure from the meaning *speak* would assimilate the above to Ex. xvii. 5, 6: 'Go on before the people, and take with thee of the elders of Israel; and thy rod, wherewith thou smotest the river, take in thy hand, and go. Behold, I will stand before thee there upon the rock in Horeb; and thou shalt *smite* the rock, and there shall come water out of it, that the people may drink.' R. Aben Ezra mentions that some had proposed to make *dibartem* thus equivalent to *hikítem* (comparing 2 Chron. xxii. 10; Ps. xviii. 47). "Others, again, say that speaking to a deaf rock can only mean striking it. But if so, why was Moses punished?

[1] דברה לשוני בחכי [2] דברי חכמים כדרבונות

Some say, Because they did not address a song to it, as in Numb. xxi. 17, *Spring up, O well.*" The circumstance is alluded to in Ps. cvi. 32, 33: 'They angered him also at the waters of strife, so that it went ill with Moses for their sakes. Because they provoked his spirit, so that he babbled with his lips.'

In Ps. lxxv. 5, 'Lift up not your horn on high: *speak* not with a stiff neck[1],' there may perhaps be a double meaning: *speak, butt.* Again, cp. Jer. v. 5 ('I will speak unto them') with ver. 3. See xxiii. 29. For Jer. xxxi. 20 Ewald has: *so oft ich ihn hart schlage ich seiner doch wieder gedenke.* Jud. xv. 17 may (possibly) mean: 'when he had made an end of *smiting,* &c.'

(vi) For *midbar,* Cant. iv. 3, the LXX. has λαλία, but the meaning is doubtless *mouth;* the preformative *m* localizing the action speech.

(vii) *midbar,* ἐρῆμος (same as *bar,* Job xxxix. 4). The commonly received derivation for this, as for (viii), is (pascuum) quo pecus agitur. Is. v. 17, *k:dobram,* 'sicut in pascuo suo.'

(ix) *dob:rót,* σχεδίαι (1 Kings v. 23), '*rates,* ut quæ per mare aguntur.' Cp. *drift*-wood.

(x) From words describing motion are derived words which signify *direction,* &c. As from *drive* comes *drift* (= tendency), so *dib:rat* enters into the prepositional formula *ideo ut* (Eccl. iii. 18, &c.): and again, as in Ps. cx. 4, signifies τάξις, lit. *course.*

II. In Arabic the predominant signification of the verb is *pone fuit,* which has a great variety of applications. This might or might not be the first in order of surviving usages, but can scarcely be absolutely primitive, if, as is generally admitted, we are to expect concrete typifications, rather than abstractions, in the earliest stage of language. The meaning *pone fuit* would naturally have been expressed in the first instance by a reference to some external object; not improbably to the *hinder part of the body,* which is still an ordinary meaning of the noun *dubur.* If it be supposed that this meaning may, somehow or other, have been arrived at independently of the verb,

[1] 'He runneth upon him with (out-stretched) *neck*' (Job xv. 26).

then the meaning of the verb (to TAIL off) would naturally follow, and with it the various applications above alluded to. This would doubtless be a more primitive order of sequence than the reverse; and moreover it will be seen that there are several meanings of the root which cannot be well accounted for on the ordinary hypothesis. The meaning *dubur* comes at once (after the analogy of English, Hebrew[1], &c.) from the root-meaning *pierce*, which was above assumed for דבר; and the meaning *hinder-part* being thus established, all the applications which involve *pone fuit* follow readily. Other meanings coming directly from the root are, *death* [corresponding to (i)]; a *gall* or *sore*, not necessarily on the back; *a channel*[2] (as explained in the *Táj el-'Aroos*). The meaning to *order, regulate*, comes from that of *driving*[3]; cp. *ago*, put in motion, *drive*, pursue a course of action, and hence, generally, *do*.

The word *dabar* also means *west;* the points of the compass being determined by facing towards the sunrise and then reckoning, right, left, front, *back*. The proposed explanation of *dubur* suggests a like derivation for the Hebrew *ahór*, of which no satisfactory account has been given. Here, again, it may be said that (especially from a Semitic point of view) the meaning 'to remain behind, tarry, delay' could not have sprung suddenly into existence as a mere abstraction, but must have been first expressed symbolically, and then generalized. If the meaning *hinder-part* be first granted, the meaning *to tail off* follows as above. The organic root *hr* (to perforate) enters into several words, probably many more than are commonly said to be developed from it: but it is unnecessary to discuss disputed applications, seeing that the root occurs *absolutely* in the form *hór*, and means undoubtedly: "hole, cavity, socket of eye, hole in earth, den of wild beasts, &c." (Fürst). In favour of the hypothesis that *ahór* means primarily a part of the body, is the common antithesis for beginning and end, viz. ראשית, אחרית; where the former word is derived from *head;* why not the latter from *tail?* And, again, prepositions meaning *before*

[1] See Buxtorf, *Lex. Talm.;* Gesen., *Thesaur.;* Fürst, *Lex.* (root נקב).

[2] See حلق. Cp. *brook*, infra.

[3] See p.s. (β).

come from פנים, face; while their opposites involve אחר. To complete the hypothesis, that the four points of the compass all derive their appellations from parts of the body, we remark that קדם, east[1], may mean firstly *nose, snout,* or *bill,* and that hence would follow the word קרדם, a kind of axe, just as in English a certain implement is called, from its shape, a *bill.* [The reference in קרדם might be to the *hook*-shape, or to the *wedge*-shape of the blade.]

III. With regard to (iv) it may be remarked that the action of the tongue in producing speech is so conspicuous as to make the existence of words for *speaking* thus derived, *à priori* probable. May not *lingua,* dimin. *ligula,* be connected with *loquor?* This, again, suggests a radical identity of *tongue* and *talk.* The word *speak* (sprechen) resembles: pike, spike, peak, peck, beak, prick, &c. The word break (sometimes compared with *sprechen*) may mean, to break *through,* effect a *breach* [cp. *brook, broach*[2], &c.]. If so, it is to be classed with the above; the root *p(r)k* being supposed coextensive with the Hebrew *dbr.*

Speech is sometimes referred (tentatively) to a root, meaning to *burst forth*[3], and is supposed to express merely the *emission* of words. If, however, the root means generally to *thrust, shoot,* and may have either of the two applications, *drive, cause to move onward,* and *strike as with a pointed instrument,* it would remain doubtful whether *speech* means radically a *breaking* or *pressing out* of words, or whether it refers directly to the action of the tongue. The Arabic root كلم means (1) *to wound,* (2) *to speak;* and the second meaning is said, in the Táj el-'Aroos, to have been perhaps derived from the first: "It is said that hence the كلمة [word] is thus called, and they cite:

جراحات السّنان لها آلتئام
ولا يلتام ما جرح اللّسان

[1] Compare לפנים, מראש, מקדם, used of *time.*

[2] Richardson, *Eng. Dict.*

[3] Some compare *spark* (=something *shot forth*). The reference might be to the shooting out of the TONGUE.

[For the wounds of the spear-head there is a closing up; but what the tongue has wounded will not close up]."

There are other words in Arabic which apply to *wounding*, primarily, and secondarily to speech. Mr Lane, to whom the above quotation is due, writes in his Arabic Lexicon, *s. v.* jurh: "*A wound*, and so *jarh*, in its original acceptation; but some of those skilled in the science of lexicology say that the former is employed to denote the effect produced upon bodies by iron instruments and the like; and the latter, that produced upon objects of the mind by the tongue." And again, *s.v.* ذلق: "The *point, extremity,* or *edge,* of anything: and the *sharpness* thereof: and the last, [particularly] the *extremity* of a spear-head, and of the tongue." Compare the following verse, cited by Mr Palmer, from the Arabic translation of the Fables of the celebrated Russian poet, Kriloff, by Rizḳallah Hassoun Effendi:

ففغر النمّام فاه وذلق

لسانه وقال هذا لأحقّ

[The slanderer opened wide his mouth, and shot out his tongue, and said, This is true.]

P.S. It was suggested that the Hebrew דבר may be cognate with דרב [cp. כשב, כבש]. There may perhaps be an organic connection between the Arabic roots:

[i] دبر [ii] ذبر [iii] ذرب.

The meanings of one and all may be evolved from the root-meaning above assumed for דבר. [i] has already been treated of. (It should be added that it retains the Hebrew meaning *stinging insect;* and that دابرة is "a thing like a toe, in the inner side of the foot, with which a hawk *strikes.*") [ii] has for its ordinary meaning to *point, dot, write:* and the pointed instrument with which writing is performed is called مذبر, '*A reed-pen.*' [iii] has for its meaning *sharp, penetrating,* &c. It is applied to *spear-heads, stinging insects, the tongue,* &c. مذرب, "The *tongue,* so called because of its sharpness."

Mr Lane, on [i], gives the meaning *write*, remarking that there is only one authority for that usage; the 'known word' being [ii]. If the authority alluded to has given a correct interpretation, we have a connecting link between [i] and [ii]. Again, [i] is connected with [iii] by a common application to *stinging insects*. [ii] and [iii] have applications, the one to *pen* or *style*, the other to *tongue*. These meanings are such as spring naturally from the same notion of sharpness [Ps. xlv. 1, *supra*], but there is some authority for applying [ii] to the tongue, and thus establishing a more direct connection between the roots. "It is said in a tradition of the people of paradise:

منهم الّذى لا ذبر له

Of them is he who has no understanding, or it means, *He who has no tongue with which to speak, by reason of his weakness*."

p.s. (*a*). "Pestilence is commonly called by the Arabs طاعون, from طعن, *he pierced* or *thrust:* being supposed by them to be the effect of a thrust by a genie, or demon."

p.s. (*β*). It might come *directly* (as in the text), or indirectly, thus: *shepherd*, ruler, administrator.

ON A RECENTLY DISCOVERED LATIN POEM OF THE FOURTH CENTURY.

In a recent number of the *Bibliothèque de l'école des Chartes* (for 1867, p. 297) M. Léopold Delisle called the attention of philologists to a Latin poem containing an invective against the gods of paganism written about the same time as the work of Prudentius *Contra Symmachum*. Extracts from it had already been published in the Benedictine *Nouveau traité de diplomatique*, and by Salmasius, in his commentary on Lampridius's life of Heliogabalus; and they appear in the form of two distinct epigrams in Burmann (I. 57, 58) and Meyer (605, 606). The whole poem, as now republished, consists of 122 lines, in form and extent not unlike an inferior satire, *e.g.* that ascribed to Sulpicia. It is preserved in the last three leaves of a MS. of Prudentius in the Imperial Library of Paris (Latin 8084), which, according to a note on the 45th leaf, was revised at the beginning of the sixth century by Vettius Agorius Basilius Mavortius, and must therefore be of a somewhat earlier date. That part of the MS. which contains Prudentius is written in capital letters; the three leaves containing our poem in a different character. Since the notice of M. Delisle, these leaves have again been carefully examined by M. Morel, one of the editors of the *Revue Critique*, and his collation of the poem, with a description of the MS., a careful apparatus, and an interesting explanatory commentary, after first appearing in the *Revue Archéologique* (July and August of the present year), is now reprinted under the title *Recherches sur un poème Latin du* 4^e^ *Siècle*. I propose to examine the text, in many places very corrupt, and then state my impression as to the person against whom the poem is directed. Before doing this it may be as well to speak of the orthography and prosody. The ortho-

graphy is on the whole very correct, even if compared with the earliest MSS. It writes *Ideum Cycynum* (*cycnum*) *formonsus formonsa Iuppiter querellas conponere pulcerrima conquereret efoebus Nymfae Saturos demonis Fariam Aceronta.* The most frequent misspelling is the substitution of *i* for *e*, *e* for *i*, a fault also recurring in the fragments of Symmachus's orations discovered by Mai. Thus *virum Danain Parthenopis Magalis Cirillae iacis* for *verum Danaen Parthenopes Megales Cibellae iaces;* and, on the other hand, *stepe quaeres* for *stipe quaeris.* As in the palimpsest of Fronto *e* and *ae* are interchanged in many words *que epeta* for *quae epaeta; paecudum Egaeriae comae*(*s*) *aegregios* (*m*)*aetas* for *pecudum Egeriae comes egregios metas.* The last letter of a word is sometimes omitted, *lustravisaetas* for *lustravit metas, antiquaque turresatecta molatmanibus* for *antiquasque turres ac tecta mola ac manibus,* or written over the line, as *mugire*^{t} *percuss*^{it}.

The prosody is much the same as that of Prudentius; *qu* has become a double consonant, and lengthens a preceding short vowel, *Purpurea quos sola facit praetexta sacratos, Dum cumulat donis votaque in limine templi;* final short *us er or* are lengthened *in arsi, e.g.*

> *Quem Numa Pompilius e multis primus aruspex.*
> *Sacratus vester urbi quid profuit oro?*
> *Sarapidis cultor Etruscis semper amicus.*
> *Saturni cultor, Hellenae semper amicus.*

final *re* once *Cymbala quem inbuerat quatere Berecyntia mater; sexagintă* once *sexaginta senex; contră* once *contra deum verum frustra bellare paratus* (cf. Auson. 469, 16). But these deviations from the classical prosody are not the rule; indeed are not so frequent as in the corresponding poem of Prudentius. In fact I differ from M. Morel in considering the poem to be at least equal, if not superior, to the *Contra Symmachum:* and the inequalities of style and tone which he finds in it, and accounts for on the hypothesis of its being a school-exercise or declamation, may more probably, I think, be assigned to the corrupt state of the MS.

5. *Inmitem puerum veneris monumenta nefanda* seems to

refer to Mars, son of Jupiter and Juno, who, as brother and sister, are considered to have committed incest; cf. *Cont. Symm.* I. 251, *Adiecere sacrum fieret quo Livia Iuno, Non minus infamis thalami sortita cubile, Quam cum fraterno caluit Saturnia lecto.* Firm. Matern. IV. 1.

6. *Praetexta,* perhaps a reference to the name Vettius Agorius Praetextatus, who, if not the person attacked, was at least one of the most conspicuous revivers of pagan ceremonies.

7. *Aen.* VI. 347. Here the spelling *curtina* is vicious.

9—13 *Iuppiter hic vester Ledae superatus amore*
Fingeret ut cycnum voluit canescere pluma?
Perditus ad Danaen flueret subito aureus imber?
Per freta Parthenopes taurus mugiret adulter?
Haec si monstra placent, nulla sacrata pudica.

M. Morel considers *flueret* and *mugiret* to be used as indicatives, and compares 41, 43, 52, 79, as parallel instances of an ungrammatical use. But in none of these, except the last, is it *necessary* to explain the subj. imperf. so, although, from its being in all the cases the subj. *imperfect,* it is possible that a new use was coming in, analogous to our own 'he would go' for 'he often went.' Even in 78, 79,

Christicolas multos voluit sic perdere demens,
Qui vellent sine lege mori, donaret honores.

donaret is half dependent on *sic;* or we may explain it as the natural apodosis of a hypothetic clause. Here it is more easy to suppose the two last subjunctives *flueret mugiret* depend on *ut,* the construction being κατὰ σύνεσιν, and the final verb being in each clause supplied by the reader. In v. 13 *nulla pudica* are clearly ablatives. 'If these monstrous rites find favour, it is not that they are hallowed by any chaste woman's sanction.' *Si placent, non (placent) ulla pudica sacrata.*

9, 10. *C. Symm.* I. 59—70.

15. *C. Symm.* I. 46, *Occultate senem nati feritate tyranni Deiectum solio* are the words ascribed to Saturn.

17—22. The gods have all the passions of men: at the celebration of the Adonia, these are all represented to the eye;

Venus nude and crying; her lover Mars rejoicing at the death of the fair youth his rival; Juppiter attempting in vain to arbitrate between them (*in medium*); Bellona stimulating all present to fresh altercation. Cf. Firmicus Maternus, IX. 1, *Adonis quasi maritus plangitur Veneris et percussor eius circumstantibus vulnusque monstratur. Mars enim in porci silvestris speciem formamque mutatus, ut sibi primas partes in amore Veneris vindicaret incaute contra se ruentem percutit iuvenem.*

23, 4. Ironical, " Well may our nobles hope for safety with such gods to guide them! Henceforth let priests be left to settle the quarrels between you.' *Vestras lites* addressed to the *proceres*, i.e. the Roman nobles, not specially in their capacity as *antistites sacrorum*, but as the most powerful body of men at the time; Prudentius, whose poem opens with a passage to Jupiter, *neve togas procerum fumoque et sanguine tingui(sinat)* (*Cont. Symm.* I. 8), gives the principal names amongst them in 551, *Anniadum suboles et pignora clara Proborum Fertur enim ante alios generosus Anicius urbis Inlustrare caput*, besides the Olybrii Paulini Bassi and Gracchi: in the same passage he asserts that there were only a few noble names that still clung to the old superstitions, though amongst them was Symmachus and some of the most illustrious of the senate (590 sqq.). It is to these rare recusants, who were however perhaps more numerous than Prudentius would have allowed, that the author of our poem addresses his invective; and it is their representative whom he calls *praefectus vester* in v. 25, in the same way that Symmachus, in the famous letter addressed to Valentinian, Theodosius and Arcadius, in which he pleads for the Altar of Victory and the Vestal Virgins, calls himself *praefectus vester*, as holding the office of prefect of the city under their imperial authority.

25, 6. *Dicite praefectus vester quid profuit urbi*
Quem Iovis ad solium raptum tractatus abisset
Cum poenas (s)celerum tracta vix morte rependat?

M. Morel reads *Quod Iovis ad solium raptum trabeatus abisset*, and explains it of the urban prefect ascending in a triumphal robe to the temple of Jupiter Capitolinus, whose throne is

called *usurped,* as seized by Jupiter the usurper of Saturn's sovereignty, to which the poet has alluded before, v. 14, *Pellitur arma Jovis fugiens regnator Olympi.* This is very harsh: I read *Quom Iovis ad solium raptim tractatus abisset,* and suppose it to mean that the prefect of the city had been appointed flamen Dialis, or to some other office in which he had officially entered the temple, perhaps the throne of Jupiter. *Tractatus* is in relation to *tracta:* 'what did it profit Rome that your prefect had been hurriedly dragged off to the throne of Juppiter? he atones for his crime by the difficulty of his long-drawn death.'

28. Can *votum urbem lustravit* be a condensed mode of expressing *votum fecit urbem lustrando?* or can *votum* be a mistake for *totam?*

29. *metas tandem pervenit ad aevi* Delisle, of course rightly, cf. Aen. x. 472, *metasque dati pervenit ad aevi.* Cf. Prud. *c. Symm.* II. 437.

31. *Sed Iovi(s) vestram posset turbare quietem.* Read *secla,* and cf. *c. Symm.* 640 *nec enim spoliata prioris Robore virtutis senuit, nec secula sensit.* The allusion in these lines is very obscure; it would seem that the prefect of the city had in accordance with a vow made a solemn lustration of Rome, carefully observing the exact limits (hence *metae*) in every direction.

32. 'Who was it that forced Rome to a general suspension of business and a public mourning? what? was the people so long a stranger to war to have recourse to arms?' This looks like an allusion to some of the riots at Rome during the reign of Valentinian; Ammianus Marcellinus (XXVII. 3) mentions such riots in the Prefecture of Lampadius: *cum collecta plebs infima domum eius prope Constantinianum lavacrum iniectis facibus incenderat et malleolis* (a kind of firebrand) *ni vicinorum et familiarum veloci concursu a summis tectorum culminibus petita saxis et tegulis abscessisset,* as well as of Juventius. This latter is more famous, as the bishop of Rome, Damasus, was concerned in it, Amm. Marc. ib. *Et hunc quoque discordantis populi seditiones terruere cruentae quae tale negotium excitavere. Damasus et Ursinus supra humanum modum ad rapiendam Episcopatus sedem ardentes scissis studiis asperrime*

conflictabantur adusque mortis vulnerumque discrimina adiumentis utriusque progressis; quae nec corrigere sufficiens Iuventius nec mollire coactus vi magna secessit in suburbanum. Et in concertatione superaverat Damasus parte quae ei favebat instanti. Constatque in basilica Sicinini ubi ritus Christiani est conventiculum uno die centum triginta septem reperta cadavera peremptorum, efferatamque diu plebem aegre postea delenitam (a passage paraphrased by Gibbon, c. XXV). The bloodiness of this riot would justify the strong expression *ad saga confugerent.*

34—46.

Sed fuit in terris nullus sacratior illo
Quem Numa Pompilius e multis primus aruspex
Edocuit vano ritu, pecudumque cruore
Polluit insanum busti putentibus aras.
Non ipse est vinum patriae qui prodidit olim
Antiquasque domus turres a(c) tecta domorum
Subvertens urbi vellet cum inferre ruinam
Ornaret lauro postes, convivia daret,
Pollutos panes infectous ture vaporo
Poneret in risum. Quaerens quod edere morti
Gallaribus subito membra circumdare subitus
Fraude nova semper miseros profanare paratus
Sacratus vester urbi quid praestitit oro?

In 37 *Polluit* need not be changed into *Polluere* as Numa pollutes his disciple by the latter's performing an impure rite sanctioned by his master. For *aras* read *aris.* The two ablatives are probably both instrumental as in Cic. *de Divin.* I. 12. 20, *quae parvos Mavortis semine natos Uberibus gravidis vitali rore rigabat,* in a passage where he is talking of the Etruscan haruspices. *Insanum,* as M. Morel has done, should probably be considered parenthetical. The allusion in *busti putentibus aris* is to the pagan worship of the spirits of the dead. Prudent. *c. Symm.* II. 839, *Nempe magis non illud erunt, qui numen in urnis Quaerunt ac tumulis et larvas sanguine placant.* The prefect had become an haruspex, and, in the determination to know his science completely, had studied the antique ceremonial as handed down from the time of the first institutor Numa.

Valentinian had made *haruspicina* safe by distinguishing it from magical practices. Cod. Theod. IX. de maleficis.

38—43 are obscure, but quite intelligible if we put a question after *risum*. 'Is not this the very same man who once betrayed his country's wine?' i. e. he betrayed his charge as manager of the wine department when it had been committed to him by his countrymen, as prefect of the city. This he might have done in various ways e. g. not allowing it to be sold at a low price, a charge brought against Symmachus, Amm. Marc. XXVII. 3 (quoted by M. Morel), *Consumptis aliquot annis domum eius in Transtiberino tractu pulcherrimam incenderunt ea re perciti quod vilis quidam plebeius infixerat illum dixisse sine indice ullo vel teste libenter se vino proprio calcarias extincturum quam id venditurum pretiis quibus sperabatur;* by allowing debts to be contracted on the *arca vinaria* or wine-fund, as Orfitus the father-in-law of Symmachus was accused of doing (Symmachi *Epist.* IX. 131, X. 54); by defending or denying the contraction of such debts, as Symmachus does in the above-mentioned letters; by giving it away gratuitously or at a nominal price to impoverished provincials, and thus keeping it back from the Romans, as Hymetius, proconsul of Africa, had done with corn in a time of famine (Amm. Marc. XXVIII. 1). For *ipse* cf. *c. Symm.* II. 812, *Addo aliud; nostros potant animalia fontes: Ipso rore mihi seges est quo gramen onagris,* the very same; and for *prodidit*, ib. 592, *Distructaeque iacent ipsis prodentibus arae.*

49. The construction seems to be (*qui*)*que antiquas domus subvertens ornaret lauro postes,* the change from *prodidit* to *ornaret,* which is equally dependent on *qui,* being like 47—49, *Qui docuit, diceret,* 51 *qui studuit,* followed in 52 by *conquereret.* The allusion appears to be to some riot occasioned, as M. Morel suggests, by a conspicuous public celebration of a feast in honour of Hercules, at which the Christian sacrament had perhaps been parodied. Bay, as M. Morel points out, was specially used in the rites of Hercules; Macrob. *Sat.* III. 12. 1, *cum ad aram maximam sola lauro capita et alia fronde non vinciant. Videmus et in capite praetoris urbani lauream coronam cum rem divinam Herculi facit:* and to Hercules belong the *pollucti*

panes to which there is an obvious allusion. Macrob. ibid. *Testatur etiam Terentius Varro in ea satura quae inscribitur* περὶ κεραυνοῦ *maiores solitos decimam Herculi vovere nec decem dies intermittere quin pollucerent, populum* ἀσύμβολον *cum corona laurea dimitterent cubitum.* The 'subversion of the towers and roofs of our ancestors' may however refer to the demolition of *maeniana* or balconies which signalised the prefecture of Praetextatus. Amm. Marc. XXVII. 9, *Namque et maeniana sustulit omnia fabricari Romae priscis quoque vetita legibus et discrevit ab aedibus sacris privatorum parietes iisdem inverecunde conexos; ponderaque per regiones instituit universas cum aviditate multorum ex libidine trutinas conponentium occurri nequiret.*

41. For *daret* read *adiret,* 'partook of the feast.'

42. *infectous* for *infectos* or *infectus* is more likely to be a gibe of the poet at the revived antiquarianism of the time than a slip for *infectans.* So *c. Symm.* I. 579, and for the Christian feeling on the subject of pagan incense cf. the second of the two letters addressed to Valentinian by Ambrose in answer to the relation of Symmachus on the altar of victory. *Quid est nisi insultare fidei, unius arae sacrificium vindicare? Ferendumne istud ut gentilis sacrificet et Christianus intersit? Hauriant omnes inquit hauriant vel inviti fumum oculis symphoniam auribus cinerem faucibus tus naribus.*

43. *in risum,* to deride us Christians. For *quaerens quod edere morte* M. Morel proposes *quaerens quos dedere morti:* I propose *quaerens quom* or *quoque dedere morti.* In 44 *gallaribus* is an error for *gallaris,* as in 108 *arboribus* for *arboris;* the last three words may be either *circumdare membra sub ictus* or more probably *membris circumdaret ictus,* and the reference is of course to the voluntary castration to which the votaries of Cybele submitted.

45. *profanare* cannot be right, I think: perhaps *fanare,* a rare word found in Varro, *L. L.* VI. 5, 4, apparently in conjunction with the rights of Hercules. The whole passage may be thus translated: 'But, I suppose, no greater priest has lived on earth than he whom Numa Pompilius, foremost of a vast crowd of soothsayers, trained in all his lying ritual, polluting him (O thought of madness) with the blood of beasts, the putre-

fying altars of the tomb. What? is he not the very same who in former days betrayed the wine of his country, one who, overthrowing our ancient homes, the towers and roofs of our ancestors, when he was fain to lay the city in ruins, dressed the door-posts of his house with bay, partook of the feast, set on to mock us the bread of abomination, which the smoke of incense had tainted? When, seeking limbs to give over to death, he caused the blows of the knives of the Galli to pass suddenly about them, ever ready to initiate wretches by some new juggle —such a man your priest, for what good fortune could *he* be the voucher of Rome?'

47. *Quid hierium,* MS. Perhaps *Qui Himerium.* Himerius the philosopher was known to at least one of the principal restorers of pagan rites, Praetextatus, as, according to Photius, he wrote an encomium upon him when Praetextatus was proconsul of Achaia. The line will then allude to some half-religious, half-physical discussion on the nature of the sun. See Macrob. *Sat.* I. 19. 10.

48. *pyrum,* a pear-tree; cf. *c. Symm.* II. 944, *Ergo piris mensas silvestribus implet arator Poenus,* where pears are the worthless fruits of the *rustic.*

49. Read *diceret; diceretque* is like *Poenasque* (70) for *Panas.*

50. Sārăpidis here and in 91 is strange; but Prudentius has Serăpis, *c. Symm.* II. 532.

51. Allusion to magic, see Gibbon c. XXV.

52. *Mille nocendi vias* is incredible: either *nocendo* or *nocere* is a natural emendation.

53. Perhaps a reference to the worship of Sabazius, in which a snake was drawn across the breast of the person initiated. Firm. Matern. X.

55, 56 seem to mean that the object of the satire was always rejoiced when Christianity was openly assaulted, as in the general onslaught he need have no occasion for expressing his private disgust at its triumph: whereas if the world at large allowed the Christians to go on uninterruptedly, his own hostility was too deep to allow him to remain silent.

57—61 interesting as a description of the *taurobolium,* a rite

connected with the worship of Cybele, in which a bull was slain over a number of minutely perforated planks covering a pit. In this pit the person initiated was stationed, to catch the blood streaming through the perforations on every part of his body. From that time forward he was considered to have begun a new life, and was purified for twenty years. The rite is described at length by Prudentius: but with this difference, that the priest who descends into the pit wears fillets and a golden crown, with a toga of silk arranged in the gabine cincture (*Peristeph.* x. 1011—1050); whereas here he is described as wearing rags, and passing from a sumptuously dressed rich man to a squalid beggar.

59. *modica stepefactus epeta* is no doubt *modica stipe factus epaeta* as M. Morel admirably emends. He shows that *epaeta* is the Greek ἐπαίτης, a beggar (Athenaeus, 192 F), and though he gives no instance of its use, and I have not been able to find one, there can be little doubt that the poet used the word to express the more ordinary μητραγύρτης.

61. The construction is *Quis suasit tibi vestem mutare ut mendicus esses et pannis obsitus sordidus infectus vestes cruentas servare:* the inf. *servare* is practically coordinate with the subj. *esses,* and the nominatives *obsitus sordidus infectus* are constructed as if the subj. construction were still kept up (*ut servares*), whereas it has really been changed into the other construction admissible after *suasit,* the infinitive.

62, 3. *Vivere cum speras viginti mundus in annos*
Abieras censor meliorum cedere vitam.

Read *abiuras* and *caedere,* 'Hoping as you do to live clean for twenty years (as purified by the *taurobolium*), can you refuse on the oath of a censor to lash the lives of the better part? trusting that this might perhaps conceal your infamy, in spite of the houndish crew of the Great Mother that had always surrounded you, the triumphant chorus with its escort of strumpet and wanton?' The allusion is perhaps to an attempted revival of the censorship, of which Symmachus speaks in his letters (IV. 29, 45, V. 9). Symmachus made a speech against it which he afterwards published. v. 9. *Alteri*

(*oratiunculae*) *argumentum dedit jam pridem decreto senatus inprobata censura. Sed iudicium meum cum res acta est habitum propagavi opere largiori. Nec mihi vitio vertas priscae severitatis repulsam. Nam solis quaedam speciosa nominibus usu et experiundo plurimum nocent. Rationes sententiae meae lector invenies. Volo tamen ad inspectionem dictorum utrique parti aequus accedas. Merebitur ut spero orationis assertio ut tu etiam vetustatis patronus auctoritati ordinis manum porrigas:* but it is clear that there must have been a considerable party who wished to revive it. *meliorum* is sarcastic; the senate liked to hear themselves called the better part; so Symmachus writing to Praetextatus, I. 52, *eam secunda existimatione pars melior humani generis senatus audivit. Adiecisti sacramenti pondus et in bona verba iurasti.* If my interpretation is right the object of the satire had strongly asserted the propriety of not interfering with the lives of the better part, virtually meaning the nobles; and the satirist accusing him of wishing in this way to secure his own scandalous proceedings from investigation.

68. *Hellenae* probably a late form for *Hellados.* This line would apply with special force to Praetextatus, who had been proconsul of Achaia.

69. Read *Quivictis,* i.e. *Qui vectes.* He had induced men to believe that Termini and Fauns were divine. Cf. Prud. *c. Symm.* II. 1005—1011; Ov. *Fasti,* II. 641. *Termine sive lapis sive es defossus in agro Stipes, ab antiquis sic quoque nomen habes.* This might be an allusion to *Vettius* (*Vectius*) Agorius Praetextatus.

70. *Saturosque* for *Saturos,* as *diceretque* for *diceret* above.

72. *Cumlustrarethorus* is changed by M. Morel into *Cum lustrare choros;* I should prefer *choris,* and had thought of *conlustrare* which would suit *quem* in v. 73. But it is not clear that *conlustrare* is used in this sense; and *quem* for *que,* as M. Morel suggests, is a natural error.

74. Galatea as = 'a light woman' (Virg. *Ecl.* III. 64) is properly applied to Venus.

85. If *Ăfrorum* is right, it shows that the quantity of proper names was more easily corrupted than in other words.

Cf. *Rhēa Gangĕs* in Prudentius; but he has *tĕmulentus idŏla idŏlii poĕsis cārismata*, worse quantities than any here except *Ăfrorum*.

86. *Marcîanum* as *Adrîanum*, *c. Symm.* I. 274: a Marcianus is mentioned by Symmachus, *Epist.* IV. 21. *sibi* perhaps for *sibit*, i.e. *sivit*.

87. Perhaps *Tarpeius custos*, i.e. Iuppiter Custos on the Capitol. Tac. *Hist.* III. 74; cf. Orelli's note. After *pronuba* I should prefer *Iuno* to *mater*.

94. *formosa* ironical: *ipsa deformis et vetula ut multorum deorum mater*, Minuc. XXII. 4.

96. *Quid, miserande, Ceres, subter Proserpina mater?* seems unobjectionable, 'what help unhappy one from Ceres, or Mother Proserpine beneath the earth?' The form of the line perhaps indicates that the two goddesses were identified: *miserande* is used again 111.

97. Minuc. XXII. 5, *Vulcanus claudus deus et debilis:* the poet seems to have read the passage.

98—102. Minuc. Felix, XXII. 1. *Isis perditum filium cum Cynocephalo suo et calvis sacerdotibus luget plangit inquirit et Isiaci miseri caedunt pectora et dolorem infelicissimae matris imitantur: mox invento parvulo gaudet Isis exultant sacerdotes Cynocephalus inventor gloriatur nec desinunt annis omnibus vel perdere quod inveniunt vel invenire quod perdunt.*

101. *Quae* may be right, as the asyndeton is then less violent. 'Again, when as the barking dog Anubis you mourn for Osiris, (and) Isis, who holds him whom she has found only to lose him again, was carrying a broken bough of olive to conceal her tears.' *Post lacrymas*, behind her tears, i.e. to cover them by holding the bough in front of her face.

103. If M. Morel is right in putting the pause after *Lignea*, *iuga lignea argento facto* would seem to mean a wooden yoke plated or embossed with silver. A friend suggests to me that *lignea* would go better with the rest of its own line, and it would certainly help to explain *stridentia*. It had occurred to me that *argento facto* (? *factos*) might refer to silver images of lions which with the rest of the car would be drawn by men hired for the purpose (107). But Varro ap. Augustinum *de*

Civit. Dei, VII. 24, quoted by Munro, Lucret. II. 602, shows that tame lions were used for drawing the car of Cybele: and though silver seems to have been specially connected with Attis (Pignorius, p. 2), I have not been able to find any passage where metal animals are mentioned as employed for this purpose.

105. *Dextra levaque situm argentea frena tenere.* Perhaps *Dextrali vestitum.* He would wear a bracelet as a woman. Firm. Matern. IV. 2. *Hoc numen est quod in viro feminam quaerit, cui aliter servire sacerdotum suorum chorus non potest nisi effeminent vultum cutem poliant et virilem sexum per ornatum muliebrem dedecorent.* ib. *Exornant muliebriter nutritos crines et delicatis amicti vestibus vix caput lassa cervice sustentant. Dextralia* occurs in Cyprian *de Habitu Virginum,* in a passage of Isaiah, III. 16. A Balliol Glossary has *Dextral genus ornamenti commune viris et mulieribus quia utriusque sexus sunt dexterae.* In the illustration of Attis worship given in Pignorius's dissertation (Amsterdam, 1669), Attis or his votary points with his right hand to the genitals.

106. *Cirillae* Ms. *Cybelae* Salmasius, rather *Cibellae.*

107. *Quem,* i. e. *currum.*

108. Trunks of trees figure in the rites of Cybele, Isis, and Proserpine (Firm. XXIII. 1—3). In the rites of Cybele a pine was felled and the image of a youth fastened to the trunk: in those of Isis the trunk was hollowed and an image of Osiris made of the wood thus obtained inclosed as in a coffin: in those of Proserpine a tree was modelled into the shape of a woman, mourned forty nights and burnt on the fortieth.

109. Compare the cry *οὖλε νύμφιε. χαῖρε νύμφιε, χαῖρε νέον φῶς.* Firm. XIX. 1, where the MS. has ΔΕΝΤΝΦΕ.

The whole passage, 103—109, may be thus translated: 'we have seen lions bearing a yoke of wood and wrought silver, as they drew beneath it the creaking car; one that wore a bracelet on his right arm holding reins of silver; glorious nobles guarding the chariot of Cybele, as it was drawn along by a hired company when the games of the Great Mother were performing; one bearing a trunk from a felled tree through Rome; a gelded Attis presently declaring the approach of the sun.'

110. *Artibus seu magicis* is of course *Artibus heu* or *eu magicis.*

111. *Sic miserande iaces parvo donatus sepulcro.* Read *donate.*

112. Minuc. xxv. 8.

115. *positus* need not be changed; either he worshipped on the ground, or lay on a couch in the temple as a sick man. I do not think it can mean simply 'stationed.'

116. M. Morel alters this *Ipsamolatmanibus coniunx* to *Implorat coniunx, manibusque.* But *Ipsa mola ac manibus coniunx* followed as it is by *altaria iuxta* must be right. Virg. *Aen.* iv. 517. *Ipsa mola manibusque piis altaria iuxta.* The only difficulty is the double ablative *mola ac manibus* followed by *cumulat donis,* but this we have had already, 36, 37. *Dum coniunx mola ac manibus cumulat donis omn. monstra* is like *puerorum extis deos manes mactare* Cic. *in Vatin.* vi. 14. Cf. Serv. on *Aen.* ix. 641. *Quoties aut tus aut vinum super victimam fundebatur dicebant: mactus est taurus vino vel ture; hoc est, cumulata est hostia, id est magis aucta.*

120. Prud. *c. Symm.* i. 26, *quos praecipites in Tartara mergi Cum Iove siverunt.* Firm. xix. 1, *Quid sic miserum hominem per abrupta praecipitas?* The offerings and charms employed by the unbeliever's wife ended in his dying, it would seem by an attack of dropsy.

121. *ydropem* is the Greek ὑδρόπα, another form of ὕδρωπα. Dropsy is said to have been the death of Theodosius.

122. To Jupiter Latiaris were sacrificed human offerings. *c. Symm.* i. 26, *Incassum arguere iam Taurica sacra solemus. Funditur humanus Latiari in munere sanguis Consessusque ille spectantum solvit ad aram Plutonis fera vita sui.* Cf. Minuc. xxii. and xxx. The prefect had probably attended one of the celebrations in his capacity of priest; and this as his crowning offence is reserved for the last line.

There is great difficulty in determining who the person assailed in the poem is. M. Morel mentions four persons who might suit the description. Vettius Agorius Praetextatus, Virius Nicomachus Flavianus, Q. Aurelius Symmachus, Pom-

peianus. The last is excluded by the fact of his not being consul: of the other three M. Morel selects Flavianus as the most likely: against which it may be said that we do not know that he reached old age, and that he is not so conspicuous a man as Symmachus, or perhaps Praetextatus. In fact the references in the poem seem to suit particular events in the lives of each of these three, and it is not impossible that the author of the Satire selected them as a sort of trinity of pagan abomination (they are similarly united in the *Saturnalia* of Macrobius, a work mainly devoted to a discussion of the religions of the ante-Christian world), and purposely confused their identity. But if we must select one rather than the others, I should prefer Praetextatus. The long list of sacerdotal functions held by him and his wife Fabia Aconia Paulina, as well as his long life (*Saturn.* I. I. 5), agree excellently with the general description of the poem. Besides this it seems likely that the verses

> *Purpurea quos sola facit praetexta sacratos*
> *Qui victis faunosque deos persuaserat esse*

are an allusion to his two names Vettius or Vectius, and Praetextatus. Cf. Firmicus Maternus, XVIII. 6, *Qui sic in templo praetextatus incedis qui fulges purpura cuius caput aut auro premitur aut lauro,* words which equally point to Praetextatus, and the various trappings of his numerous offices, secular or sacerdotal. As to the objection brought by M. Morel that he was not consul, but only consul elect, when he died in 384, it is not necessary to suppose that the Satirist (112, *Sola tamen gaudet meretrix te consule Flora*) is more exact than Symmachus, who, speaking of the death of Praetextatus, *Epist.* x. 32 says, *Certe ille Praetextatus quem iure consulem feceratis, ut fasti memores celebre nomen extenderent.* The suddenness of his death, as described by the poet, agrees sufficiently well with the words of Symmachus, x. 30, *invida morte subtractus est; functus est lege naturae;* x. 31, *Vettium Praetextatum veteribus parem virtutum omnium fata rapuerunt;* x. 32, *naturae lege resolutus.*

R. ELLIS.

ON ARIST. PROBL. 19. 12.

THE Music of the ancients, and especially of the Greeks, has long been felt to possess a peculiar importance in their history, and has been a favourite field of speculation to individual students: but the extreme difficulty of many of the problems involved, and the barrenness and uncertainty of the results, have hitherto prevented the subject from taking its place in the general body of ancient learning. Recently, however, the progress that has been made by various scholars, and especially in the works of R. Westphal (*Metrik der Griechischen Dramatiker und Lyriker*, Leipzig, 1854—63; *Geschichte der alten und mittelalterlichen Musik*, Breslau, 1864—66), aided by physiological and acoustical researches, such as those of Helmholz, promises to bring Greek Music out of its isolation, and to show its many and interesting relations to other branches of knowledge.

Among the authorities on which Westphal's conclusions are based, the Aristotelian Problems hold an important place, partly from their early date as compared with that of most of the extant technical writers, and partly from their independent and untechnical character. The excessively systematic and abstract form of the treatises on ἁρμονική (as the Science of Music was called), the want of examples, and in general of the historical element, give a peculiar value to the incidental notices of other authors. Next to Plutarch's Dialogue on Music, the 19th section of the Aristotelian Problems is the longest document of this class. In what proportion this book is due to Aristotle, and in what sense any of it can be called his work, are unsettled questions; but it certainly contains much that is valuable. The text, however, is in a very unsatisfactory state, and by an unfortunate coincidence the passage which should have thrown light on one of the most characteristic features of Greek Music—its comparative want of a system of harmony or counterpoint—has hitherto yielded no satisfactory

meaning, viz. probl. 12 of the 19th section. The words as they stand in Bekker's text, and in all his MSS., are as follows:

διὰ τί τῶν χορδῶν ἡ βαρυτέρα ἀεὶ τὸ μέλος λαμβάνει; ἂν γὰρ δέηται ᾖσαι τὴν παραμέσην σὺν ψιλῇ τῇ μέσῃ γίνεται τὸ μέσον οὐθὲν ἧττον· ἐὰν δὲ τὴν μέσην δέον ἄμφω, ψιλὰ οὐ γίνεται. ἢ ὅτι τὸ βαρὺ μέγα ἐστίν, ὥστε κρατερόν; καὶ ἔνεστιν ἐν τῷ μεγάλῳ τὸ μικρόν· καὶ τῇ διαλήψει δύο νῆται ἐν τῇ ὑπάτῃ γίνονται.

Two of the College libraries in Oxford, those of Corpus and New College, possess manuscripts of the Problems. The variants which they offer in this place are, *ἐν* for *σὺν* (both MSS.) *ἄσαι* for *ᾖσαι* (New Coll.), and *γίνεται* for *γίνονται* (New Coll.). The existence of more important variation may be inferred from the two Latin versions—the Antiqua Versio and that of Theodorus Gaza—both of which were made from Greek texts not now extant. They give the first sentence of the problem as follows:—

A. V.—Propter quid cordarum gravior semper sonum accipit. Si enim oportet dimittere quae est circa mediam paramesem cum alia media fit medium nihilominus. Si autem media utraque alta non fuerit (al. fiunt).

Gaza:—Quamobrem quae gravior e fidibus est huic semper actus modulandi committitur, nam si proxima a media pulsanda sit, media tantum, nihilominus reddi medium potest. At si media subjungenda est, per proxima a media idem reddi non potest.

The first words state the fact to be accounted for, viz. that in the course of a piece of music if two notes are sounded together the lower is that which constitutes the melody, the other therefore entering only into the *κροῦσις* or instrumental accompaniment. In modern music it is well known that the reverse is usually the case. Plutarch recognises the same or a similar law in his Problemata Symposiaca, in which we find as the argument of a lost chapter the question, 2, p. 736 B: *τίς αἰτία συμφωνήσεως· ἐν ᾧ καὶ, διὰ τί τῶν συμφώνων ὁμοῦ κρουομένων τοῦ βαρυτέρου γίνεται τὸ μέλος*; Similarly in his Conjugalia Præcepta, 2, p. 139 C, D: *ὥσπερ ἂν φθόγγοι δύο σύμφωνοι ληφθῶσι τοῦ βαρυτέρου γίνεται τὸ μέλος, οὕτω πᾶσα πρᾶξις*

ἐν οἰκίᾳ σωφρονούσῃ πράττεται μὲν ὑπ' ἀμφοτέρων ὁμονοούντων, ἐπιφαίνει δὲ τὴν τοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἡγεμονίαν καὶ προαίρεσιν.

The words which follow, *ἂν γὰρ δέηται...οὐ γίνεται*, are evidently meant to illustrate the rule in question from two opposite cases: and the observations are made on two notes, the *μέση* or Fourth of the Greek octave-scale, and the *παραμέση* or Fifth, which was always a major tone higher than the *μέση*. In the first place there can be no doubt that we should read *γίνεται τὸ μέλος*, as was proposed by M. Vincent (in a paper in the Notices et Extraits des Manuscrits de la Bibliothèque du Roi, t. XVI. pt. 2, p. 118): *τὸ μέσον* is quite unmeaning, and may easily have crept in, either from the *μέσῃ* just before, or from *μέλος* being written in a contracted form, which was afterwards wrongly expanded into *μέσον*. Again, the first case being one in which 'the melody is made,' the second is obviously meant to be one in which it fails (*οὐ γίνεται*). We should therefore understand *τὸ μέλος* with the second *γίνεται*, and put a comma after *ψιλὰ* instead of after *ἄμφω*. So much the mere form of the sentence clearly shows:—*ἂν γὰρ δέηται ᾄσαι τὴν παραμέσην σὺν ψιλῇ τῇ μέσῃ, γίνεται τὸ μέλος οὐθὲν ἧττον· ἐὰν δὲ τὴν μέσην, δέον ἄμφω ψιλά, οὐ γίνεται.*

The words *δέηται ᾄσαι* are not supported by Gaza or by the *antiqua versio*, and do not suit the second member of the sentence. Bojesen, in his valuable edition of this section (*Dissertatio de Problematis Aristotelis, Hafniae*, 1836) suggests *δέῃ* or *δέῃ τινά*. But then we should have, supplying the ellipse of the following words, *ἐὰν δὲ τὴν μέσην δέῃ ᾄσαι, δέον ἄμφω κ.τ.λ.* which gives no sense. The chief corruption, however, is to be found in the words *ψιλῇ* and *ψιλά*. The technical sense of *ψιλός* in music appears in the phrases *ψιλὴ κιθάρισις*, playing on the lyre without the voice; *ψιλὴ ποίησις*, poetry without singing, &c. In such a context as the present it could only mean that the note is to be heard 'alone,' without accompaniment, &c.; but this application of the term to single notes is unsupported by parallels[1], and moreover gives two positively

[1] Cf. prob. 43, *οἱ δὲ τῆς λύρας φθόγγοι ὄντες ψιλοὶ καὶ ἀμικτότεροι τῇ φωνῇ*, where he is speaking of notes sounded along with the voice but heard distinctly owing to their different quality.

contradictory expressions. To say *σὺν ψιλῇ τῇ μέσῃ*, or *ἄμφω ψιλά*, becomes, in this sense of *ψιλός*, impossible. The Latin versions confirm these objections. Gaza omits *δέον ἄμφω ψιλά* altogether (unless 'subjungenda est' contains traces of these words). The *antiqua versio* translates *σὺν ψιλῇ* by *cum alia*, and *ἄμφω ψιλά* by *utraque alta*. The two words *alia*, *alta*, are so like, especially in late MSS., that in all probability one of them is a mere error for the other. What then does either of them suggest as to the Greek text which the mediæval translator had before him?

If *alia* is read the Greek must have been *ἄλλῃ*, or something similar, in both places; if *alta*, it can hardly have been anything but a case of *ὑψηλός*. The second of these suppositions is more probable, both because *ὑψηλός* is graphically very near *ψιλός*, and because *alta* is a rarer and a more hopelessly unmeaning word in the context than *alia*. Now from *ψιλῇ* and *ψιλά* on one hand, and *ὑψηλά* on the other, the most obvious restoration is to be found in the aorist of *ψάλλω*, or perhaps *ὑποψάλλω*. In the second clause *δέον ἄμφω ψῆλαι* (or *ὑποψῆλαι*) at once explains the different corruptions. Even Gaza's *subjungenda est* may represent *δέον...ὑποψῆλαι*.

The corruption here supposed finds a close parallel in two passages of this section. In probl. 24, *διὰ τί ἐάν τις ψήλας τὴν νήτην ἐπιλάβῃ, κ.τ.λ.*, *ψιλάς* is the reading of one of Bekker's MSS., and of that in the library of Corpus. In probl. 42, where the same words are repeated, two of Bekker's MSS. have *ψιλάς*. In the former place the Antiqua Versio has *propter quid in tenuibus*, i. e. *διὰ τί ἐν τοῖς ψιλοῖς*, or *ταῖς ψιλαῖς*. Similarly *ψιλόν* for *ψῆλον* is found in the Palatine MS. Anthol. IX. 570, 3. In probl. 42 of this section the Antiqua Versio has a reading which may serve to show that even if *alia* is genuine in the present passage it may lead by a different way to the same emendation. The words are, '*propter quid si quis alteram nitem accipiat*,' where *alteram* stands for the *ψήλας* of the Greek text.

It is not unimportant to remark in passing that the words which we have thus far had to deal with, *ψιλός* and *μέσος*, are both grammatical terms, and therefore must have been much

more familiar to the copyists than the musical technicalities which they appear to have displaced.

Bracketing for the present the corrupt *δέηται ᾄσαι* we are led to the following text and partial translation :—

ἂν γὰρ [δέηται ᾄσαι] τὴν παραμέσην σὺν ψηλ...τῇ μέσῃ, γίνεται τὸ μέλος οὐθὲν ἧττον· ἐὰν δὲ τὴν μέσην, δέον ἄμφω ψῆλαι, οὐ γίνεται.

'For if (the performer)...sound the *παραμέση* along with the *μέση*, the melody is produced none the less; but if...the *μέση* when he should sound both, it is not produced.'

If we venture to regard *δέηται ᾄσαι* as the only unknown quantity in this expression we obtain as the conditions of a perfect emendation (1) that it should explain the words of the Antiqua Versio '*si enim oportet dimittere,*' and (2) that it should furnish a verb to be supplied with *ἐὰν δὲ τὴν μέσην*, and that this verb should imply *leaving out* the note: for where both notes should be sounded the melody is lost if the important one, the *μέση*, is left out. The first of these conditions points to *ἂν γὰρ δέῃ ἐᾶσαι* as the text represented by the Antiqua Versio. Perhaps therefore the sentence ran originally as follows :—

ἂν γὰρ ἐάσῃ τὴν παραμέσην, δέον συμψῆλαι τῇ μέσῃ, γίνεται τὸ μέλος κ.τ.λ.

'If a performer omits the *παραμέση* when he should sound it with the *μέση*, the melody is still heard: but if (he omits) the *μέση* when he should sound both, the melody is not heard.'

The text might have been corrupted, first by *δέον* being accidentally transposed, so as to give *ἂν γὰρ δέον ἐάσῃ*, and by an attempt to correct this by writing *δέῃ ἐᾶσαι*. The *ἄσαι* of the New Coll. MS. may be a trace of *ἐάσῃ*; and Gaza's *si... pulsanda sit* supports *ἂν γὰρ δέῃ...ψῆλαι*.

The reading now proposed, and probably every correction which does not involve purely arbitrary change, supposes a case in which the *μέση* and the *παραμέση* are sounded together in an accompanied piece of music. Here we are met by the difficulty that this interval—the Major Tone or Second—is not a consonance even in modern music. By the Greeks, who

admitted only the Fourth, Fifth, and Octave to be consonant (*διαστήματα σύμφωνα*), it must have been regarded as a harsh dissonance. Plutarch in the two passages quoted at the beginning of this paper distinctly limits his observation about the melody following the lower note to the case of consonances. M. Fétis (*Mémoire sur l'Harmonie Simultanée des Sons chez les Grecs et Romains*, p. 41) proposes for this reason to read *παρανήτην* instead of *παραμέσην*. Is this or any similar correction necessary?

On the contrary, Plutarch is himself the best authority for the belief that dissonant intervals were used in some way in the instrumental accompaniment. In the passage of the dialogue on music already referred to (c. 19; 2, p. 1137 B, C) in speaking of certain notes which were always left out in the melody of certain of the older musicians, but were used by them for the accompaniment (*κροῦσις*), he says, *ὁ αὐτὸς δὲ λόγος καὶ περὶ τῆς νήτης· καὶ γὰρ ταύτῃ πρὸς* (leg. *κατὰ*) *μὲν τὴν κροῦσιν ἐχρῶντο καὶ πρὸς παρανήτην διαφώνως καὶ πρὸς μέσην συμφώνως· κατὰ δὲ τὸ μέλος οὐκ ἐφαίνετο αὐτοῖς οἰκεία εἶναι τῷ σπονδειακῷ τρόπῳ. οὐ μόνον δὲ τούτοις ἀλλὰ καὶ τῇ συνημμένων νήτῃ οὕτω κέχρηνται πάντες· κατὰ μὲν γὰρ τὴν κροῦσιν αὐτὴν διεφώνουν πρός τε παρανήτην καὶ πρὸς †παραμέσην† καὶ [συνεφώνουν*[1]*] πρὸς λιχανόν. κατὰ δὲ τὸ μέλος κἂν αἰσχυνθῆναι τῷ*

[1] This passage is corrected by all editors of the De Musica on the ground that the *νήτη συνημμένων* forms a consonance with the *λιχανός*. The corrections proposed are various, but agree in containing the word *συνεφώνουν*. It seems very possible however that the scale referred to is not the Diatonic, but the Enharmonic. For (1) Plutarch is probably quoting, as Westphal thinks, from Aristoxenus, in whose time the Enharmonic had the principal place in the theory of music, and therefore, it may be inferred, in its nomenclature: see Aristox. Harm. Elem. p. 2, Meib. Moreover (2) the principal musician intended by *οἱ παλαιοί* is Olympus, who is elsewhere said to have been the reputed inventor of the Enharmonic genus. And (3) in c. 11, where this is mentioned, the *λιχανός* and *παρυπάτη* of the Diatonic scale are expressly distinguished as *λ. διάτονος* and *π. διάτονος;* and (4) the scale called *σπονδειασμός*, which is one of the ancient defective scales mentioned in the text we are now discussing, is said to be the first form of the Enharmonic. If then the Enharmonic scale is meant here, no correction is needed, since the interval between *νήτη συνημμένων* and *λιχανός* is a dissonance, viz. the Major Sixth. Moreover we obtain in this way a solution of the difficulty which Volkmann suggests in his note, viz. how the *νήτη συνημμένων* could be said

χρησαμένῳ ἐπὶ τῷ γινομένῳ δι' αὐτὴν ἤθει. The passage is interesting, not only as confirming the present text of the Aristotelian problem, but still more as showing that the example given in them is only one of a number of similar combinations recognised by ancient practice. Again, the effect of dissonance followed by consonance or unison seems to be described in another passage of this section, probl. 39, *καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι* (sc. *οἱ ὑπὸ τὴν ᾠδὴν κρούοντες*) *τὰ ἄλλα οὐ προσαυλοῦντες, ἐὰν εἰς ταὐτὸν καταστρέφωσιν, εὐφραίνουσι μᾶλλον τῷ τέλει ἢ λυποῦσι ταῖς πρὸ τοῦ τέλους διαφοραῖς.* In the treatise of Gaudentius, a writer of unknown date, the word *παράφωνος* is reserved for intervals said to be 'between consonant and dissonant, but seeming to be consonant in the accompaniment' (p. 11, Meib.). He gives as examples the interval between the *παραμέση* and *παρυπάτη* (the Tritone or augmented Fourth), and between the *παραμέση* and *λιχανός*, i.e. the Major Third.

It appears then that the rudiments at least of a systematic use of dissonance may be traced in the notices of Greek instrumental accompaniment, and in particular that the combination of *μέση* and *παραμέση* was not unknown. With regard to the manner in which the interval was used, the passage before us opens up some further questions. Did the instrument sound one note, the voice another? Or was the singer's note played on the instrument in addition to such harmony as the skill of the performer could supply? The latter is clearly intended by *δέον ἄμφω ψῆλαι*, if we may quote a mere conjecture for what it is worth: and it is decidedly borne out by prob. 16, which would otherwise be unintelligible. This problem is as follows:—

διὰ τί ἥδιον τὸ ἀντίφωνον τοῦ συμφώνου; ἢ ὅτι μᾶλλον διάδηλον γίνεται τὸ συμφωνεῖν ἢ ὅταν πρὸς τὴν συμφωνίαν ᾄδῃ; ἀνάγκη γὰρ τὴν ἑτέραν ὁμοφωνεῖν, ὥστε δύο πρὸς μίαν φωνὴν γινόμεναι ἀφανίζουσι τὴν ἑτέραν.

to be omitted if the *παρανήτη διεζευγμένων* which in the Diatonic scale is the same note, was retained.

Westphal objects to the word *παραμέσην* on the ground that in the system which contained the *τετράχορδον συνημμένων* the *παραμέση* was not used. The argument seems sound, and we should therefore obelise the word: but there is no sufficient reason for putting any other word in its place.

This explanation, whatever its scientific value, seems clearly to presuppose two forms of accompaniment; (1) *τὸ ἀντίφωνον*, or the simple reproduction of the air in a different part of the scale, viz. the lower octave, cf. probl. 13, *διὰ τὶ ἐν τῇ διὰ πασῶν τοῦ μὲν ὀξέος ἀντίφωνον γίνεται τὸ βαρύ, τούτου δὲ τὸ ὀξὺ οὔ*; and (2) *τὸ σύμφωνον*, the accompanying the voice with a consonance (*ὅταν πρὸς τὴν συμφωνίαν ᾄδῃ*) in which case two notes were struck on the instrument, one the same (*ὁμόφωνος*) with that of the voice, the other consonant, e.g. a Fourth or Fifth higher. The only difficulty in the language of the problem is that *τὸ σύμφωνον*, as a technical term, is distinguished from *τὸ ἀντίφωνον*, while the verb *συμφωνεῖν*, being untechnical, applies to both. Elsewhere (probl. 39) *τὸ σύμφωνον* is said to include all consonances, of which the Octave, there called *τὸ ἀντίφωνον*, is the most perfect; *τὸ ἀντίφωνον*, however, is not a synonym for *τὸ διὰ πασῶν*, but means the repetition of the notes at a certain interval. It is only in reference to accompaniment that we find the word used to mean the Octave, and that because, as a matter of fact, the Octave was the only interval which could be used consecutively (*ἀντιφώνως*): cf. probl. 17, *διὰ τί πέντε* (leg. *διὰ πέντε*) *οὐκ ᾄδουσιν ἀντίφωνα*; prob. 18, *διὰ τί ἡ διὰ πασῶν συμφωνία ᾄδεται μόνη*; The answer in the latter problem has a close connection with that of prob. 16. It is, in effect, that a note virtually contains its higher Octave, so that when one (viz. the lower) of the two is struck the 'consonance' is sounded, and the singer is accompanied by it. Hence it is inferred that the use of *τὸ ἀντίφωνον* is virtually a species of accompaniment by means of *συμφωνία—ὥστε καὶ μιᾶς ἀδομένης ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ συμφωνίᾳ ᾄδεται ἡ συμφωνία*—and the instrument still in reality, although less distinctly, repeats the note of the melody as it is sung, while at the same time it 'takes the melody' in a lower part of the scale.

To these two forms of harmonised accompaniment, viz. 'antiphony' and 'consonance,' must be added, on one hand, the simple repetition of the air by the instrument, called *πρόσχορδα κρούειν*, and, on the other, the kind of accompaniment by dissonance already mentioned. The rule that obtained in the two former, according to which the instrument gave in any

case the notes of the melody, may be extended by an *a fortiori* argument to the introduction of dissonant intervals. Nevertheless it must be thought strange that there is no reference to them in problems 16—19, where the different kinds of harmony are compared, whereas in probl. 12 the illustration of a general law of accompaniment is taken by preference from the harshest dissonances known to have been used by the Greeks. Perhaps the following considerations may be thought to throw light on this contradiction.

All that has been ascertained thus far regarding the use of consonant and dissonant intervals is that they were introduced in the accompaniment in addition to the melody. It must still be asked whether they may not have been of the nature of passing or ornamental notes, struck before or after the principal note, and therefore only partially simultaneous with the corresponding note of the voice. On this question there seems to be nothing decisive in the problems, or in the dialogue of Plutarch on Music. The chief indications are to be found in a well known passage of Plato's Laws, where the language, although intentionally vague and even contemptuous, is nevertheless in the strictest agreement with the other accounts. The entire passage is worth quoting, p. 812:

Τούτων τοίνυν δεῖ χάριν τοῖς φθόγγοις τῆς λύρας προσχρῆσθαι σαφηνείας ἕνεκα τῶν χορδῶν τόν τε κιθαριστὴν καὶ τὸν παιδευόμενον, ἀποδιδόντας πρόσχορδα τὰ φθέγματα τοῖς φθέγμασι· τὴν δ' ἑτεροφωνίαν καὶ ποικιλίαν τῆς λύρας, ἄλλα μὲν μέλη τῶν χορδῶν ἐισῶν ἄλλα δὲ τοῦ τὴν μελωδίαν συνθέντος ποιητοῦ, καὶ δὴ καὶ πυκνότητα μανότητι καὶ τάχος βραδύτητι καὶ ὀξύτητα βαρύτητι ξύμφωνον καὶ ἀντίφωνον παρεχομένους καὶ τῶν ῥυθμῶν ὡσαύτως παντοδαπὰ ποικίλματα προσαρμόττοντας τοῖσι φθόγγοις τῆς λύρας, πάντα οὖν τὰ τοιαῦτα μὴ προσφέρειν τοῖς μέλλουσιν ἐν τρισὶν ἔτεσι τὸ τῆς μουσικῆς χρήσιμον ἐκλήψεσθαι διὰ τάχους.

Two of our previous conclusions are here confirmed: (1) that the accompaniment was higher than the melody: for *πυκνότης, τάχος, ὀξύτης* all refer to the lyre, constituting its *ποικιλία* and *ἑτεροφωνία*: and (2) that accompaniments were distinguished according as they used *τὸ ἀντίφωνον* or *τὸ σύμφωνον*.

It may be doubted whether *ξύμφωνον καὶ ἀντιφωνον* belongs grammatically to *ὀξύτητα* only, or to the three words *πυκνότητα τάχος ὀξύτητα*. In sense these adjectives clearly fit *ὀξύτητα* best: but the datives *μανότητι* and *βραδύτητι* require us to supply at least some such word as *ὁμόχρονον* by Zeugma out of *ξύμφωνον καὶ ἀντίφωνον*.

The *πυκνότης* of the lyre can only mean the use of small intervals, in particular the *δίεσις* or quarter-tone: and the *τάχος* must imply that two or more notes are played along with a single note of the voice. Plutarch, as we have seen, speaks of certain notes having been confined in particular kinds of music to the *κροῦσις* (De Mus. c. 19), and in the Enharmonic Genus this limited use of the *τρίτη* or *παρυπάτη* would at once produce a *πυκνόν*, or succession of two quarter-tones, confined to the scale of the instrument. The expression *τάχος βραδύτητι* would be satisfied by the addition of single passing notes, or of ornaments, such as the 'turn' or the 'shake.' The *ῥυθμῶν ποικίλματα* of the next clause must have variations of a more elaborate kind, such as the introduction of a running accompaniment, changing the rhythm from a simple to a compound time.

The silence of Aristotle and other writers respecting these varieties of accompaniment seems to show that the ancients did not distinguish—perhaps did not feel the distinction—between the essential part of a harmony and the subsidiary or 'passing' notes. There can be no doubt therefore that Aristotle meant to include in the discussion of probl. 12 all such passing harmonies as Plato's description involves: that in short his rule —*ἡ βαρυτέρα ἀεὶ τὸ μέλος λαμβάνει*—applies to every form of instrumental accompaniment. If so, we are able to explain why dissonances are so prominent in probl. 12 as to furnish the instance to a general rule, and yet are entirely ignored in probl. 16. In the latter problem the subject is a comparison of the two leading kinds of harmony, one of which (*τὸ ἀντίφωνον*) merely employed the octave, the other (*τὸ σύμφωνον*) employed additional notes struck simultaneously with the notes of the melody. The use of dissonant passing notes was not distinct enough to be put on a level with these two kinds; but

was probably regarded as an irregular variety of *τὸ σύμφωνον*. On the other hand, the rule of which probl. 12 investigates the reason is nothing, if it does not apply to every kind of *κροῦσις*, and its truth is most strikingly illustrated by an extreme or exceptional instance.

Some passages in the later technical writers seem to show that the rule did not obtain in their time. Baccheius gives the following definitions:—

Συμφωνία—κρᾶσις δύο φθόγγων ἀνομοίων ὀξύτητι καὶ βαρύτητι λαμβανομένων ἐν ᾗ οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον τὸ μέλος φαίνεται τοῦ βαρυτέρου φθόγγου ἤπερ τοῦ ὀξυτέρου οὐδὲ τοῦ ὀξυτέρου ἤπερ τοῦ βαρυτέρου. Introd. Art. Mus. p. 2, Meib.

Διαφωνία—ὅταν δύο φθόγγων ἀνομοίων τυπτομένων ἤτοι τοῦ βαρυτέρου φθόγγου τὸ μέλος ὑπάρχῃ ἢ τοῦ ὀξυτέρου. Ib. p. 14, Meib.

And Gaudentius has the same account, Harm. Introd. p. 11, Meib. It may be noticed that Aristotle's instance being taken from a dissonance is less in contradiction with Baccheius and Gaudentius than his rule. The discrepancy however is remarkable, and can only be accounted for by supposing the sense of harmony and the knowledge of its resources to have made considerable progress in the intervening period. Plutarch contradicts the later writers more directly: for in the two passages quoted above (p. 82) he expressly limits the rule to the concurrence of consonant notes. This departure from the Aristotelian statement, while depriving it of its accuracy for Aristotle's time, has made it entirely untrue for Plutarch's own.

The 49th problem of this section discusses a point which is obviously connected with the subject of the 12th, viz.: *διὰ τί τῶν τὴν συμφωνίαν ποιούντων φθόγγων ἐν τῷ βαρυτέρῳ τὸ μαλακώτερον*; the answer being in substance that melody in itself is *μαλακόν*, and that the lower notes are *μαλακώτεροι*. Hence Bojesen showed (in his note ad loc. p. 117) that the argument is a mere tautology, and proposed to correct it by reading in the statement of the problem *τὸ μελικώτερον* 'the more essential to the melody.' Now the Antiqua Versio has 'propter quid sonorum facientium consonantiam in graviori

est melior?' It is possible indeed that this melior is an error for mollior: but it seems more likely that it is an attempt to reproduce μελικώτερον: just as ῥυθμοῦ in the next sentence is represented by rithimi. If we accept the present text we must suppose that the rule of probl. 12 is tacitly taken for granted.

It is time to say something of the reason which Aristotle suggests for the phenomenon which we have been discussing. Is it, he says, that the lower note is more powerful: that it contains the higher note, as the whole contains the part; and as, in particular, the ὑπάτη is equivalent to two νῆται?

These conjectures are made from a point of view which will be at once recognised as Pythagorean. It was the peculiarity of that school to make no distinction between the musical intervals and the ratios upon which they had been found to depend. They said, not merely that the lower note was produced by a longer string, or by slower vibrations, but that it was itself greater than the higher note. Such conceptions must fail to satisfy as soon as they are applied to explain new facts in nature; but it may be long before men become aware that in speaking of notes as greater or smaller they have been putting words in the place of things. In this way the fallacy of making a difference of quantity only, as the ancients said, between musical notes was felt by several of the Greek philosophers—in the first instance perhaps by Aristoxenus and Theophrastus—although they could do little more than put other abstractions, such as quality, in its place. The polemic of the latter is quoted at some length by Porphyry (in Ptol. Harm. p. 240 ff. Wallis). It has no direct reference to the Problems, and is occupied more with refuting the view that the higher note is the stronger. In every case of consonance it is argued there must be equality, greater volume balancing greater intensity of sound. The higher is recognised as the more prominent and as being heard at a greater distance; but the rule which assigned the melody to the lower is not noticed.

Insufficient and meaningless as Aristotle's reasons must appear, they indicate an obscure recognition of some phenomena of acoustics which have only recently received their full expla-

nation. The *ὑπάτη* includes its Octave, *νήτη*, because a string tends to divide into equal parts, and the higher Octave which each half yields is an integral part of the total sound. Again, though the note of a string does not contain its Fifth in the same way, yet by its natural division into three equal parts it contains the Octave of that Fifth, and consequently an important part of the sound which the Fifth yields. In the same manner, but in a gradually lessening degree, the note is related to its Third, Seventh and Second. Hence the words of the text—*ἐν τῷ μεγάλῳ τὸ μικρόν*—apply in their literal meaning to the facts of accompaniment by the Octave (*τὸ ἀντίφωνον*) and less exactly to the other consonances, but the conception which they furnish to explain these facts is of too abstract a kind to lead to scientific progress or even to more accurate observation of phenomena.

Turning from the purely acoustical to the æsthetical side of the question, we find that the Aristotelian rule has important analogies with modern theory. It is well known that the problem of harmonising a given melody is usually one of the inverse kind, like integration, or geometrical analysis. When the 'Roots' or 'Fundamental Bass' notes are known, the upper notes of the chords are derived from them directly, and therefore by few and simple rules. The difficulty is to find a progression of 'Roots' formed by consonant intervals, and at the same time giving chords whose highest notes constitute the given melody. Each Root is then accompanied by the notes which wholly or in great part coincide with its own 'partial-tones' or upper harmonies. Conversely, if we find a system of music in which the accompaniment is above the melody we are led to infer that as a rule the harmonies are obtained in the direct way, the melody and the fundamental bass forming virtually one and the same progression. A good illustration of this reasoning will be found in the passage where Helmholz analyses the causes, partly acoustical and partly æsthetical, by which the final harmony of every piece of music was limited to certain forms of the chord of the tonic. (*Tonempfindungen*, 15*ter Absch. ss.* 443—6), and shows that they depend upon the general law of tonality. The leading principle is that, as the

music must end upon the key-note, so it must be accompanied by a chord which shall reproduce as much as possible the 'clang,' or total effect, of that note: and such a chord is formed by the Third and Fifth. In the same way the ancient accompaniment appears to have been guided by the 'clang' (we follow Professor Tyndall in borrowing this useful word) of each note of the melody. The cardinal difference in other words is that the modern rule requires the melody to end in unison with the fundamental bass, the ancient rule aimed at this unison throughout the piece. Here the choice of consonances to give prominence to a particular clang is guided by acoustical facts: but the laws which determine what clang should predominate are æsthetical only.

These conclusions are confirmed by some of the other points in which a parallel or a distinction has been observed between the ancient and modern systems.

1. The observation of Aristotle (quoted above p. 87), regarding the satisfaction which the ear feels in 'agreement after difference' of notes is analogous only, not identical with the corresponding effect in modern music. With him it is harmony followed by unison: with us it is dissonance followed by consonance. A similar æsthetical result is gained by the employment of acoustical means, different in themselves, but similar in their relations.

2. The melody of the ancients must have used a much greater variety of intervals than modern fundamental bass. This is at once explained by the much more complex character which harmony has assumed, in consequence of which the fundamental bass is a matter of the imagination rather than of the ear. The freedom allowed to its progression must be in inverse ratio to the prominence which it holds in the whole system. As Helmholz expresses it, the greater building needs stronger cement to hold it together.

3. The natural predominance of the higher part, which the ancients observed (*τὸ ὀξύτερον φύσει ὂν ἐκδηλότερον—ἀεὶ μειονεκτοῦντος τοῦ βαρυτέρου*, Theophr.) must have been balanced by its subordination in other respects. Accordingly it was not made the basis of vocal harmony or part-music, but confined to

the instrument, chiefly to the thin, tinkling sounds (ψιλοὶ φθόγγοι, probl. 43) of the lyre.

4. The feeling indicated in the passages of Baccheius and Gaudentius (p. 14) that the συμφωνία has a character of its own, apart from either of the constituent notes, bears a strong analogy to that which prevails in recent music in regard to the chord of the Tonic, as distinguished from the 'clang' of the Tonic itself. Hence a progress may have taken place in ancient harmony analogous to that which Helmholz has so successfully traced in the musical history of the last two centuries.

It seems to follow that Westphal has considerably exaggerated the amount of agreement between the Greek and the modern harmony (*Harmonik.* § 11, pp. 117—123). He has been too ready to apply modern principles to the reconstruction of a system from the fragmentary notices of the ancient practice—a method which would be applicable if the general similarity of the two systems were already established, but which is in this case peculiarly liable to error. The contrast of movement between different parts, which is now so essential, cannot be traced in antiquity. The chord of the Tonic Third and Fifth is equally distinctive of modern harmony. Westphal indeed obtains a series of chords as the result of his interpretation of the passage in Plutarch: but his authorities never testify to combinations of more than two notes: and the assumption that these may be recombined into triads begs the whole question. It is like attempting to restore a Greek building by the aid of a series of arches. Such an error would be impossible, because in architecture it is known that the fundamental type, the *idée mère*, of the Greeks is different from that of the Middle Ages. In music there is every reason to suppose as profound a separation. The materials of the art, the sounds and their acoustical properties, including even their effects on the human senses, may be as much the same as the stone and lime of the two periods: but the methods of using them, with the æsthetical and moral effects which depend upon these methods, are probably the developments of radically different conceptions.

The preceding arguments, so far as they refer to general characteristics of ancient music, are not affected by the questions which have been raised as to the date and authorship of the Problems. Some interesting points however have been made to turn upon their being in substance either the work of Aristotle, or of the Aristotelian period: it may be worth while, therefore, to notice such evidence as the 19th section supplies of the age to which it belongs.

1. No scale greater than the octave is mentioned, the *ὑπάτη* and *νήτη* are still, as in Plato, the lowest and highest notes recognised by the ordinary use of language.

2. The only genus distinctly recognised is the Enharmonic: see the mention of the *δίεσις*, probl. 4; of the *πυκνόν*, prob. 47. The word *ἐναρμόνιος* occurs prob. 15, but in a different sense.

3. The Hypodorian and Hypophrygian Modes are mentioned, but not the Hypolydian. This agrees with the notices in the Politics (Bk. VIII.) and the account of Aristoxenus, the contemporary of Aristotle: see Harm. Elem. p. 37, Meib.

4. The language is not quite uniform, but shows traces of the more ancient usage. The Fifth is usually *διὰ πέντε*, but in one problem (34 repeated in 41) it is called by the old name *δι' ὀξειῶν*. Sometimes we have the uncontracted form *νεάτη* (probl. 39, 42, 44). The name *παραμέση* which was introduced when the ancient Heptachord was increased to eight strings, is used with a trace of the sense of novelty (*ἡ νῦν καλουμένη παραμέση*, probl. 47).

5. The polemic of Theophrastus is directed against the view of the musical ratios followed in probl. 12 and elsewhere in the 19th section. On the other hand, this section shows no knowledge of the view which Theophrastus and Aristoxenus maintained.

It may be well, by way of conclusion, to give one or two further examples of the critical value of the sources which were referred to in the early part of this paper—the Antiqua Versio and the two Oxford MSS. In some cases they are interesting as confirming emendations recently made by Bonitz (*Aristotelische Studien*, IV. *Wien*, 1866).

Section 1, probl. 49: *ὑγροῖς καὶ μόνοις* (opposed to *ξηροῖς καὶ δριμέσι καὶ στρυφνοῖς*), 'humidis et acutis.' Antiqua Versio. For *μόνοις* Bonitz proposes *λείοις*. The A. V. confirms the suspicion of corruption. I would suggest *μανοῖς*.

17. 3: *ταὐτὰ* corrected by Bonitz for *ταῦτα*: 'eadem,' A. V.

18. 5: *διὰ τί τὸν φιλόσοφον τοῦ ῥήτορος οἴονται διαφέρειν; ἢ ὅτι ὁ μὲν τί ἐστιν ἀδικία, ὁ δὲ ὡς ἄδικος ὁ δεῖνα, καὶ ὁ μὲν ὅτι τύραννος, ὁ δὲ οἷον ἡ τυραννίς.* Bonitz, comparing the duplicate passage in 30. 9, reads *ὁ μὲν τί ἡ τυραννίς, ὁ δὲ οἷόν τι ὁ τύραννος.* 'hoc vero sicut tyrannus,' A. V. points to *ὁ δὲ οἱονεὶ τύραννος*, an intermediate variant.

19. 34: *ἢ ὅτι ἡ δὶς δι' ὀξειῶν οὐ* (al. *οὐδὲ*) *δὶς διὰ τεττάρων ἐστίν· τὸ δὲ διὰ τεττάρων καὶ διὰ πέντε.* The true reading *οὐ δὶς δι' ὀξειῶν οὐδὲ κ.τ.λ.* (as Bojesen showed) is that of the Corpus MS. The New Coll. MS. has *οὐδείς* for *οὐ δίς*.

19. 43: *τὰ ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως μιχθέντα ἢ ὑμῶν.* Both Oxford MSS. have *ἢ ὑφ' ἡμῶν*, which must be right.

19. 48: *ταῦτα* (sc. *τὸ γοερὸν καὶ ἡσύχιον ἦθος καὶ μέλος*) *ἔχουσιν αἱ ἄλλαι ἁρμονίαι. ἥκιστα δὲ αὐτῶν ἡ ὑποφρυγιστί· ἐνθουσιαστικὴ γὰρ καὶ βακχική· [ἡ δὲ μιξολυδιστὶ ἔχει]· κατὰ μὲν οὖν ταύτην πάσχομέν τι· παθητικοὶ δὲ οἱ ἀσθενεῖς μᾶλλον τῶν δυνατῶν εἰσί, διὸ καὶ αὕτη ἁρμόττει τοῖς χόροις· κατὰ δὲ τὴν ὑποδωριστὶ καὶ ὑποφρυγιστὶ πράττομεν κ.τ.λ.* The words in brackets, which are indispensable to the sense, are wanting in Bekker's MSS., but are added on the margin of the New Coll. MS. They are also supported by Gaza's version.

21. 14: *διὰ τί τὰ αὐτὰ συνεθιζομένοις τε ἡδέα φαίνεται καὶ λίαν προσφερομένοις οὐχ ἡδέα; τὸ δὲ ἔθος ἐστὶ τὸ πολλάκις καὶ συνεχῶς τι ποιεῖν. ἢ ὅτι τὸ μὲν ἔθος ἕξιν δεκτικήν τινος ἐν ἡμῖν ποιεῖ, οὐ πλήρωσιν, τὸ δὲ συνεχῶς προσφέρεσθαί τι πληροῖ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν; καὶ καθάπερ αἴτιον; ἔστι γάρ τι καὶ ἡ ἐπιθυμία.* Bonitz has most happily corrected the last words by reading *ἀγγεῖον* for *αἴτιον*, and *κενόν* for *καί*, and his emendation is made quite certain by the A. V. which has 'et sicut vel vasa: causa est. nam. quis et desiderium,' i. e. *καὶ καθάπερ ἢ ἀγγεῖα αἰτία ἐστὶ γὰρ τίς καὶ ἡ ἐπιθυμία.*

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ENGLISH PRONUNCIATION OF GREEK.

THE controversy respecting the true pronunciation of ancient Greek, which began in the early part of the sixteenth century, has been resumed at intervals even down to our own times, till the literature of the subject has grown to such a mass as almost to deter inquirers from entering upon it. Some years ago I read through the most important works which this controversy had produced, and tested their conclusions by referring to the ancient texts, and by the knowledge which I had acquired of the modern language during a residence of six months in and about Greece. The results of this inquiry were embodied in two long papers read before the Cambridge Philosophical Society. In the present paper I propose briefly to trace the progress of the discussion in England, and to state the conclusions which have been arrived at, indicating rather than detailing the evidence and arguments, and omitting minor particulars. The discussion has for its object the solution of two questions, one theoretical, the other practical; (1) how did the ancient Greeks pronounce their language? and (2) how ought we to pronounce it?

When Greek first began to be studied in modern Europe, it was learned by oral instruction from Greeks of the time, and the pronunciation of the teachers was adopted without question. At that time the pronunciation was to all appearance the same as it is among the Greeks of the present day, except perhaps that in Magna Græcia κ was in some cases pronounced like the soft Italian c (our *ch*). It was in the twelfth century that, among the most inquiring minds, an ardent desire arose to be able to study the New Testament and Aristotle in the original. Bishop Grosseteste, as Roger Bacon tells us in his *Compendium Studii*, p. 434, ed. Brewer, brought over several Greeks from Southern Italy in order to teach their language, a measure which, as Bacon implies, had not the success which it deserved. Grosseteste was before his age. Even in Italy, which was far in

advance of England and indeed of all Europe, Greek was unknown till Petrarch's time. Petrarch himself learned Greek from a Calabrian monk, and by his advice and example gave an impulse to the study which was never afterwards relaxed. Guarini visited Constantinople[1] for the purpose of perfecting himself in the language, and before his early death had communicated to many illustrious scholars the knowledge he had gained. The continued successes of the Turks, and the imminent danger which threatened the Imperial city, long before the actual catastrophe of 1453, drove many Greek scholars to seek a refuge in Italy, where they gained a quiet livelihood as teachers, librarians, transcribers of MSS., and in some cases, like Bessarion, rose to wealth and rank in the Church. Early in the sixteenth century Reuchlin introduced the study of Greek into Germany, teaching it according to the pronunciation of his own instructors. Reuchlin died in 1521. Erasmus was the first to call in question the propriety of the pronunciation then in vogue. It was in 1528 that he published at Basle his famous dialogue between 'Leo' and 'Ursus,' 'De recta Latini Græcique sermonis pronuntiatione,' whence all who followed him were called 'Erasmians,' while those who adhered to the system as taught by Reuchlin were called 'Reuchlinians.' Quite independently of Erasmus, John Cheke of St John's College, Cambridge, and Thomas Smith of Queens', had come to the same conclusions. The latter says, in his treatise addressed to Gardiner, and dated August 12, 1542: "Septem sunt amplius anni cum colloquebamur inter nos Chæcus et ego de ista importunitate Græcæ scriptionis et manifesta vanitate tot literarum et diphthongorum uno sono et exilissimo conclusarum, et questi sæpe difficultatem docendi in hac lingua propter tantam et tam absurdam confusionem, eo rem duximus ut autores perscrutaremur, si quid certi forte atque comprehensi poterat inveniri: neque dum Dionysium videramus nec Erasmum...' (*Havercamp,* Sylloge Altera, p. 557). In 1535 Smith lectured publicly at Cambridge on Aristotle's *Politics* and on the *Odyssey,*

[1] In the Vatican library I found a MS. of the Plutus of Aristophanes with a note in Guarini's hand stating that it was bought at Constantinople in the year 1406.

using the pronunciation recommended by Erasmus, whose work he had then procured. The pupils, he says, laughed immoderately; but it seems that his authority and that of Cheke, which was still higher, speedily prevailed, insomuch that, on St John's day in the same winter, the Plutus of Aristophanes was acted, apparently at St John's College, in Greek with the Erasmian pronunciation. Ascham, Redmayn, and others in the University adopted it. In May 1542 Gardiner, Bishop of Winchester the Chancellor, issued an edict[1] reprobating the novelties introduced into the University, and ordering the students to return to the old method of pronunciation. Doubtless to the Bishop, the Erasmian method, which professed to be a 'reformation,' savoured of the new-fangled heresies of Germany. The Bishop followed up his edict by a letter to Cheke. Cheke replied by a long defence of his system, to which Gardiner rejoined. Several other letters passed till Gardiner finally closed the discussion by a letter dated October 2 of the same year, in a tone which shews that his confidence in his own views was shaken, advising Cheke 'ut omissa contentione de sonis, re frivola et inutili, seriis studiis operam dare velis,' and adding 'pereat, si vis, memoria eorum quæ scripsimus, unà cum sonorum controversia.' Strype tells us that 'though this authority put some stop for the present to Mr Cheke's commendable purpose, and the reformation of the reading of Greek; yet afterward it prevailed as truth is said to do, and doth take place to this day' (*Ecclesiastical Memorials* I. p. 578. ed. 1822). In this last remark, I think, Strype is mistaken. Long before the time at which he wrote (1721) the English pronunciation had superseded both the Reuchlinian and Erasmian. But of this by and bye. Soon after this time the minds of Englishmen were occupied with questions of far more pressing interest than the pronunciation of Greek. Cheke himself, under the hardships of a prison and the threat of the stake, recanted his opinions on the weightier matters of religious belief. But the controversy which languished in England was carried on in

[1] Perhaps the only points on which Gardiner insisted which are retained in our present anomalous system, or non-system, are the sound of γ before κ, γ, χ, and the sound of η.

Germany far into the seventeenth century. The earlier part of it had relation entirely to the pronunciation of letters, while the system of accentuation which prevailed among the modern Greeks was not called in question by any of the disputants. The following are the chief peculiarities in the modern Greek pronunciation, objected to by the Erasmians.

First and foremost, the iotacismus, i.e. the pronouncing so many vowels and diphthongs with the same sound, that of the Italian *i*; when accented, like the English *ee* in *bee*, when unaccented like *i* in *bit*. These are, besides *ι*, *η*, *υ*, *ει*, *οι*, *υι*.

Again, *αι* is pronounced like *ε*, the Italian *e*; *αυ* like *av* or *af*, *ευ* like *ev* or *ef*, *ηυ* like *iv* or *if*. The iota subscript has no effect on the pronunciation of the vowel above it.

For the consonants:

β is pronounced like our *v*, as *βασιλεὺς*, *vasilefs*, (the sound *b* in foreign words being represented by *μπ* as *tobacco*, *ταμπάκκω*).

γ, before *ε*, *ι*, &c. like *y*.

δ, like the soft English *th*, or Spanish *d*, (our *d* being represented by *ντ*), but this is not noticed by the earlier controversialists.

ζ, like our *z*.

χ, as a strong aspirate, like *x* or *j* in Spanish.

τ after *ν* sounds like *d*, as *πέντε*, *pende*.

π after *μ* like *β*, as *ἐμπρὸς* '*forwards*,' *embros*.

The initial rough breathing is quite disused.

The Erasmians maintained, and, as I think, conclusively proved, that among the ancients each vowel and diphthong had its own proper sound, *α* like[1] the Italian *a*, iota like the Italian *i*, *υ* like the French *u* or German *ü*, *ε* and *η* like the Italian short and long *e* respectively, and that the diphthongs had the sound which results from the combined sounds of their component letters. They proved also that *β* had the sound of our *b*, *γ* of our hard *g*, *δ* of our *d*, *ζ* of *ds*, *χ* of hard *ch*, guttural,

[1] The word 'like,' here and elsewhere, must be understood to signify resemblance, not identity. We cannot be sure that any letter, especially any vowel, in an ancient language had exactly the same sound as any has in a modern language.

as in the German *auch* or the Scotch *loch*, that τ and π should always retain the sound of *t* and *p*, and that the initial aspirate should be sounded as *h*.

These points are established mainly from Dionysius of Halicarnassus, who in the 14th section of his work *περὶ συνθέσεως ὀνομάτων* gives precise rules for the pronunciation of each vowel and consonant while of the diphthongs he says nothing, thus implying that it was not necessary to give special rules for them.

Besides distinct statements of Dionysius, Terentianus Maurus and other grammarians, the Erasmians brought their proofs from incidental notices of other ancient authors, from the phonetic spelling of sounds uttered by animals[1], from ancient puns and riddles, and from the spelling of Greek words in Latin and of Latin words in Greek.

Their opponents supported the traditional pronunciation by the spelling of inscriptions and by quotations from grammarians and authors of the 'decadence.' They succeeded so far as to prove that corruptions in pronunciation had begun very early (if indeed among the common people pronunciation was ever pure).

The Erasmian method was advocated by the most distinguished scholars of the continent, Adolph Mekerch of Bruges, Theodore Beza, H. Stephanus, &c., and was adopted by Lambinus in his lectures at Paris in 1565.

The change was the more easily made since in all countries the pronunciation of the consonants according to the Erasmians was nearly the same as that already employed both for Latin and for the vernacular tongues, while the Erasmian pronunciation of the vowels was the same as that already in use in France, and with the exception of υ, with that used in Italy and Germany. In England alone the anomalous pronunciation of the vowels in the native tongue presented an obstacle which did not exist elsewhere.

[1] For example Cheke brings forward the dog's speech in the Vespæ of Aristophanes *αῦ, αῦ* as conclusive against the modern Greek pronunciation of that diphthong. The Bishop replies that though big dogs say 'bow-wow,' little dogs when angry say 'af, af.'

Thus gradually in all countries the native pronunciation obtained also in Greek. As the vowels have nearly the same value in continental languages, the final divergence between the French, German, and Italian pronunciation is not very marked, while the English stands out solitary and distinct from all. The pronunciation of Latin in England underwent a similar change. In the beginning of the 16th century there was no question as to the right method, namely the Italian. On this all scholars were agreed, though as Palsgrave tells us, there were some who in practice pronounced it ill. Erasmus praises the English pronunciation of Latin as being better than that of all nations except the Italians. Smith's treatise (1542) proves that at Cambridge the vowels were pronounced with the Italian sound. But gradually the severance brought about by the Reformation produced its effect. It was no longer necessary for our clergy to be able to speak the common language of the Roman Church. The English pronunciation, which saved trouble to teachers and learners, gradually crept in, first probably in grammar schools, and thence infecting the Universities themselves. The quaint pedant Coryat, who travelled to Venice in 1608, tells us that only his pronunciation of *i* was found fault with. We cannot doubt that the students who acted Ignoramus before James I. pronounced Latin so as to be intelligible to the royal pupil of Buchanan, but except on state occasions they were probably not so careful. The evil habit had doubtless made great progress when Milton wrote his treatise 'Of Education.' He recommends that the speech of boys should 'be fashioned to a distinct and clear pronunciation, as near as may be to the Italian, especially in the vowels,' and adds: 'To smatter Latin with an English mouth is as ill hearing as Law-French.'

Concurrently with the change in the pronunciation of letters in both the learned languages, another change took place with respect to Greek, and that not in England only but all over the continent, *i. e.* it began to be pronounced not according to the modern Greek accent, but according to the Latin. The reasons for this change are not far to seek. Greek began to be learned rather from books than from oral teaching, and even in the latter case, the teachers being no longer Greeks

by birth, the use of the familiar Latin accent saved both teachers and pupils a great deal of trouble. Again, the disuse of the Greek accent enabled people to understand much better the rhythm of the poets. For the Greek accent perpetually clashes with quantity, the Latin much more rarely and less markedly. In Latin the accent always falls upon the penultimate when long, and, in words of more than two syllables, never when short.

Compare for instance the second line of the Iliad, first according to the Greek accent, and next according to the Latin.

(1) *οὐλομένην ἣ μυρί' Ἀχαιοῖς ἄλγε' ἔθηκε.*
(2) *oulómenyn ḗ múri' Achaíois álge' éthēke.*

Thus people, when pronouncing according to the Latin accent, actually fancied that they were reading according to quantity. So throughout all Europe the Greek accentuation was disused.

It was, I believe, Mekerch who first mooted the question of the meaning of the Greek accents, in the appendix to his treatise on pronunciation (1565). He gave what I think the correct view of their meaning, but did not recommend their disuse.

A long controversy followed, in the course of which the pronunciation according to the modern Greek accent was abandoned. In the middle of the 17th century Isaac Voss and others recommended the disuse of accentual marks in writing and printing, a suggestion which was in many instances adopted. In the last century several Greek books were issued from the Oxford press without accentual marks. However in 1761 Mr Foster, a Fellow of King's College, Cambridge, came to the rescue: he attacked with great learning and judgment the errors of his predecessors in the field, whether upholders or impugners of accents; and his book is still worth reading, although a great part of it is occupied in refuting positions which it seems almost impossible that any man of learning could ever have maintained. Other controversialists were Primatt, Horsley, &c.[1]

[1] Mr Pennington, also a Fellow of King's, at a later date wrote an elaborate work on the pronunciation and prosody of ancient Greek.

Many of the questions mooted in this controversy are now settled beyond dispute and need not be reopened. No one now doubts the high antiquity of the system of accentual marks[1], no one doubts that they represent a system of enunciation in vogue when the Greek language was in its prime, a system derived traditionally from remote ages[2].

What was this system? and how did it differ from modern use in English and in Romaic Greek?

In all modern languages, of which I know anything, French alone excepted, all words of more than one syllable are pronounced with an emphasis or stress of voice upon one particular syllable. How is this emphasis given?

According to Priscian, 'vox tripartite dividitur, scilicet altitudine, latitudine, longitudine,' and thus a syllable may be emphasized in three ways:

1, by raising the note,

2, by increasing the amount of sound,

3, by prolonging the sound.

Emphasis may be given by employing each of these methods, or any two of them, or all three together.

What we blend, the ancients, both Greeks and Latins, kept distinct. In modern Greek the ancient tradition is so far preserved that the stress, as a rule, falls upon the syllable which in ancient Greek received the accent and in pronouncing which the voice was raised. But the stress in modern Greek is exactly like our own and is given by prolonging the sound as well as by raising the note. When it falls upon a syllable it lengthens the vowel, except before a double consonant. Thus λόγος, ὄνος, ἄνθρωπος are pronounced λώγος, ὤνος, ἄνθροπος.

[1] Their invention is usually attributed to Aristophanes of Byzantium about 200 B.C. But there is reason to think that they were used long before his time. Aristoxenus, a scholar of Aristotle's, wrote a treatise on Attic accentuation, and many other grammarians dealt with the subject. They must have had some method of notation. A system of accentuation requires a corresponding notation as much as Algebra requires symbols. The earliest example of the use of accentual marks of which we know is a verse of Euripides written on a wall at Herculaneum.

[2] See Bopp's *Vergleichendes Accentuationssystem des Sanskrit und Griechischen*, Berlin, 1854.

Their metre is entirely regulated, like our own, by the stress, and no account is taken of the length of any syllable which does not receive this stress. See, for instance, the two following lines, in the modern Heroic metre, which, as Byron observed, is identical with the metre of the English song, "A captain bold of Halifax who lived in country quarters:"

εἰπέ μας ὦ φιλέλληνα πῶς φέρεις τὴν σκλαβίαν
καὶ τὴν ἀπαρηγόρητον τῶν τούρκων τυραννίαν.

How these lines would have puzzled Aristoxenus or Dionysius! But to us the rhythm is perfectly natural and familiar.

Again in modern Greek the circumflex sounds exactly like the acute, and, to my ear at least, an oxytone in the middle of a sentence is emphasized just as fully as if it came at the end.

Taking into account all that has been said on the subject by authors and grammarians of the best times and all that may be inferred from what they do not say, we cannot doubt that, while the Greek and Latin languages were still spoken in their purity, the distinction between accent and quantity[1], between the height and the length of syllables was always observed. Doubtless every one learned from his cradle and instinctively appreciated the distinction, and would have been as incapable of understanding how they could be confounded as we are of understanding how they could be distinguished. It was probably in the fourth and fifth centuries, in the general cataclysm which befel the ancient world, that the barbaric confusion which had long been growing among the vulgar finally pervaded palace, convent and school. Thenceforward the rhythm of all popular poetry, such as it was, in both languages was founded of course upon the modern accentual system.

It may be asked, how it came to pass that the length of each syllable was alone taken into account in the ancient Greek poetry and the height entirely disregarded? The earliest song, like the earliest music, was merely an adjunct to the

[1] The word 'quantity,' as we use it, is apt to mislead. It ought to be used either as Scaliger uses 'quantitas,' embracing all the three modes of emphasis, or specially, for the amount of sound, corresponding to *ποσότης* in Greek.

dance, in which time alone counts. When in somewhat later days rhapsodists recited epic poems in the open air to the assembled multitudes at Olympia or Crissa, they must have chanted in monotone or nearly so; else they could not have been heard by the vast audience. So also in the theatres the players who had to make themselves audible to thirty thousand spectators must have chanted the dialogue in a kind of ad libitum recitative. If the intonation of ordinary life had been adopted, by which one syllable in each word was pronounced in a tone higher than the rest, nothing but a confused sound would have reached the ears of the audience. Yet we may infer from Aristotle (De Soph. Elenchis, c. IV.) that the accent was heard in the recitation of Homer, and from the famous story of the mistake made by the actor Hegelochus in line 279 of the Orestes of Euripides, that it was heard also in stage dialogue. How was this done? In our modern cathedrals when a priest is chanting in monotone, the emphasis of each syllable may be indicated either by prolonging it or by giving it more breath. Of these two methods only the latter was open to the Greek actor or rhapsodist. And this I conceive was the case. The accented syllable was pronounced louder than the rest, but in the same musical note.

I will add a few words by way of practical conclusion. Our present English pronuciation of Greek and of Latin is confessedly anomalous and indefensible. Both Cheke and Gardiner would have repudiated it. What are we to do? It may be said by some that the difficulties of eradicating an established system are so great that it is no use making the attempt, and that the confusion which would for some time prevail would be scarcely compensated by the resulting advantage, especially as neither Greek nor Latin is now used as the medium of oral intercourse between different nations. They argue on the same grounds as those who are opposed to a change in the currency, and I am not prepared to say positively that they are wrong.

Certainly I am opposed to the adoption of the modern Greek pronunciation, which is at least as far removed from the ancient pronunciation as our own. The modern system of

accentuation is also, as we have seen, widely different from the ancient, and its adoption would only tend to confuse such ideas as we at present possess of the rhythm of ancient Greek verse. I was present at the examination of a school at Athens and saw how hopelessly puzzled the boys were in attempting to read Homer according to the scansion. The suggestion that we should first learn modern Greek and approach the ancient through the medium of the modern seems to me to be fraught with much graver evils. Sound scholarship would then be almost impossible of attainment. All clear views would be confused by the cross lights of modern barbarism.

I think it is impossible in practice to recur to the ancient system of accentuation, supposing that we have ascertained it in theory. Here and there a person may be found with such an exquisite ear and such plastic organs of speech as to be able to reproduce the ancient distinction between the length and tone of syllables accented and unaccented, and many not so gifted may fancy that they reproduce it when they do nothing of the kind. For the mass of boys and men, pupils as well as teachers, the distinction is practically impossible.

On the whole I incline to think that we ought, retaining the Latin accent as at present in both languages, to adopt the pronunciation generally in use on the continent, taking the French *u* for the Greek *υ* and the Italian *u* for the Latin. The change might be made without much difficulty. Our consonants are nearly right as we now pronounce them, and it would be a good thing for boys to acquire betimes the vowel sounds which they must learn when they come to study French, German and Italian. They would thus feel more readily the power and beauty of both the ancient tongues, especially the stately majesty of Virgilian verse and Ciceronian prose. It would also be useful whenever, as now happens with increasing frequency, we meet with Foreign scholars and discuss with them questions relating to the Classical languages.

W. G. CLARK.

ON SOME PASSAGES OF THE SAXON LAWS.

THAT the laws of Æðelberht are in an ordinary sense not laws at all is evident from the first sentence, "God's fee and churches fee, xii fold." They are a schedule of penalties, and are an epexegesis, or further better defined interpretation of laws or customs unwritten or written previously in existence.

Everywhere therefore we are to expect something of that abridged way of writing which we use in tabular forms and lists of similar items. Thus we supply rightly, "Let a thief on conviction compensate twelve fold for Gods fee, consecrated property, and churches fee, ecclesiastical property, stolen by him." The clause proceeds, (Laws, p. 1, § 1) "for a bishops property eleven fold; for a priests, that is a parish priests, property nine fold; for a deacons property six fold; for a clerics property, that is, of any one in the lower offices of the church, three fold." It adds on the right of asylum, "(Breach of) church asylum (is to be compensated) two fold; of mynster asylum two fold." Right of asylum was a beneficial and desirable institution in those early days of blood feuds, when the spear was readier than the tongue. A friðstol or stool of asylum, on which the hunted victim of vengeance sat, is still preserved in Beverley Minster. In a fit of slumber Wilkins and Price talk of supplying a lacuna by reading mynsteres frið, while "in the MS. there is not space for so long a word," and the preceding expression cyric frið, as well as the analogies of the language, compel us to read mynster frið.

On the second section the note appended by Price and Thorpe leaves the meaning to be made out by the reader, the editors being at a loss. That note is as follows: "I have been unable to discover whether this meant a particular class of per-

sons, such as the Leudes of France; or whether it is used in the ordinary sense of "people." In Anglo-Saxon poetry, "leod" frequently occurs for chieftain, prince, &c. (*Price*). Perhaps people, subjects (*Thorpe*). The words of the schedule are thus read: "If a king invites his people to him, and any there do them evil, (let him compensate) with a two fold assessment of damage to the wronged and fifty shillings to the king." Right of asylum having been just mentioned, a kindred subject is what we should now call privilege of parliament, and these words protect every one attending the king in obedience to his summons from molestation by the violence of his adversary. A similar protection was thrown about the royal court in later times, when a blow struck within the courtly precincts was punishable by the loss of the hand: and every court of justice now enforces order by exercise of its own authority and repression of all "contempt of court." The aggressor paid a fine to the king for disrespect to his summons and his keeping of court.

The Saxon kings were not tyrants supported by standing armies. They met their nobles on all important occasions, whether general or local, and the grants of land registered in the various charters are validated by the consent of the signatures of both king and his earls. So that this clause contemplates a gathering and summons of very frequent occurrence.

Clause iii throws some measure of protection over the garð or premises of the kings host, while entertaining him at a convivial meeting; "If the king drinketh at a mans home, and there one do any mischief let, the aggressor make good with double compensation."

Clause v as interpreted will be misunderstood. The words are, Gif in cyninges tune man mannan ofslea .L. scill gebete, and the printed version stands thus; "If a man slay another in the kings 'tun,' let him make 'bot' with L shillings." The meaning is "for homicide, in itself justifiable or unjustifiable, if done within the precincts of the royal court, the killer must pay to the king in atonement of the disrespect to his dignity, fifty shillings." The penalty is the same as that for disrespect to privilege of parliament in Clause ii, where it is contradistin-

guished from "bot;" but gebetan is simply *to make good*, and no exclusively forensic sense must be saddled upon our common word boot, in "to boot," or in "it boots not." Nor was it reasonable to use such a word in translation of the clause before us.

Clause vi is, "If one slay a free man (he shall pay) fifty shillings to the king as for a lord ring." Here we are reminded of ring money, about which talk abounds. Rings to encircle the wrist or arm were mostly of gold, and were much in use as articles of value easily transferred. This law shews us, that in still earlier times the king, as head of the state, claimed on every killing of a free man a lord ring, as penalty for breach of the peace (note g by Price is in error): and now the parliament of Kent sanctions a payment of fifty shillings in lieu of the ring. Observe that penalties are cumulative; this payment for breach of the peace must be added to the payment of equal amount mentioned in Clause ii, and a homicide within the precincts of the royal court pays fifty shillings for trespass on the royal majesty, and fifty shillings more for breach of good order of the realm.

In clause vii, Mr Price saw that his translation gives no sense; he says, it is the only way the present text admits, and affirms that by inserting "man," the difficulty would vanish. But "man" already is seen on the face of the record: it is read in the previous clause, and may be supplied *ἀπὸ κοινοῦ* in the present, as Thorpe supplies it, p. 3, note l; the difficulty then would vanish, says Price. I cannot think that, if his translation is to be our standard. When the common word for *guide* latteow is written in an older and more etymon like form it is ladðeow. Here we have laad, which is only written with double vowel because a is here long, and the syllable pronounced as in load, or lode: the derivation is seen in our Lead, *ducere*. Then rinc seems invested with some mysterious virtue, for Price says rinc and man are only synonymous in poetry. An essay on the hidden force of rinc would be out of place here, because it is plain enough that ladrinc and ladðeow convey for the present purpose one idea, *guide*. But then notwithstanding that "all difficulty has vanished," one seems to wonder why mannan should

be added; *guide* is sufficiently expressed by ladðeow, why think of adding man, as if Unas lion, or Kadmuses cow, would contend in the readers thoughts for the office. Now mannan is added, because the person contemplated by the law was not the guide for the occasion, but a member of a "corps des guides;" he was not a man like Efialtes to do one good days work, but a soldier of a prætorian camp; and *escort man* rather expresses his duties, than guide, dux itineris. In the same way ambehtsmið was an amptman, an official of the court; one of the royal pioneers, and "præfectus" as it is not expressed in the syllables, so formed no part of the sense.

We arrive then at a clear view of part of the clause: "If one villanously slayeth a kings pioneer or escort man:" but why is royal patronage to fail, and only a half blood money to be paid? A reference to Lyes Dictionary, and the examples there collected, will at once shew that medeme means *worthy, dignus;* meduman is equivalent to, and a varied mode of writing medemum, a dative. The clause proceeds then, "let him pay for it with a suitable compensation."

In clause xii, fed-esl contains a printers sticking plaster, commonly called a hyphen, which we may dare to presume was not in the text as written. It should be fedels, rightly glossing *altilis* in gl. R. 114, and meaning *one brought up* in the royal household. The termination -els is masculine.

Clause xiii is to be understood as ii and v; the twelve shillings were to be paid to the earl.

In xviii, as no injury is done, and as the editors strictly define bot to be "compensation to the injured party" (p. 1, note g), their version is contradictory. Gebete means only *make good,* that is, the misdemeanour, by payment to the king of six shillings, as in v. See similarly p. 14, fol. ed. xiii.

In clauses xix, xx, the shillings go to the king, as penalties for breach of the peace: should any argue otherwise, let him observe that an eye costs in xliii, fifty shillings, and a life cannot be appraised at twenty.

In xxi medume again is *suitable,* mannan standing for simple freeman.

In xxxii scyld in any sense is masculine: ham as a prefix

will take no case ending; and adjectives, as riht, often become prefixes, and refuse inflexion. Hence hamscyld is any sort of armour protecting the skin or person, and rihthamscyld is such as duly serves its purpose. We turn therefore, "If one stab through a sound piece of armour, let him pay for it at its value."

Clause xxxiv is to be read in connexion with xxxiii; if one pull a mans hair so fiercely as to expose the skull. So also of xxxv, xxxvi, xxxvii; the struggle being without weapons.

In xliv woh means *awry, distorted.*

In xlvi hleore is *cheek.* In xlix a word such as muð, or weolore has dropped out, meaning mouth or lip.

Two textual errors bane for ban and gebroced for gebrocen occur in lii.

Mr Price's translation of lviii has some sense as its result, while Mr Thorpe's has none. High handed is still familiar.

Gegemed in lxii is the "overlooked" of modern days, that is spitefully regarded with the evil eye: as in the Leechbook.

Bugan in lxxix is *dwell,* not go away; and the next law takes the alternative choice; "if she will have a husband" she loses her half share and shares only equally with her children: the printed translation is in a high degree absurd, for her husband died first.

Sinne willan in lxxxii is *his consent,* "buy his consent of the owner." Read lxxxiii by the light of lxxxii. Gængang in lxxxiv is plainly, *on her journey* to her betrothed. "If a man carry off a maiden by force on the way to her betrotheds house." The signification must surely have some alliance to Gangan the older and Mæsogothic form of Gan, *go;* and the word is itself in all probability, Gangende.

The later clauses of Æðelberht's Dooms use *bot* in the sense ascribed to it in the notes, as payable to the injured, but still quite within the wider and truer sense, *amends,* boot, payable where due.

In the laws of Hloðhære (Lothaire) and Eadric on p. 11, the introductory clause has a mistranslation producing an unsuitable sense; in the hyræfter sægeð, the construction, which is not rare, is parallel with that in the Greek language, in

which they say ἐσάλπιγξεν and mean ὁ σαλπίγκτης ἐσάλπιγξεν: so sægeð means þas boc sægeð: and in fact sægeð is singular, and not plural.

In p. 12, clause v, is a translation accommodated to Mr Price's reading of some foreign enactments, and requiring an alteration of the text. In stermelda the "*fiscalis*" is not existent; the word is compounded of stær, a Saxon accommodation of the Greek and Latin Historia, and of melda, *a tell tale:* any notion of "fiscalis" only comes in as far as an informer has a fiscal penalty in view. Stermelda secge an (on) andweardne; *let an informer say of him that he is present.* Some difficulty may seem to arise from the rarity of the verb gecænnan and its simple form. The examples of the use of the term and the argument for the interpretation *cleanse* are to be seen on p. 18. But the editors themselves saw that in its own force the word could only signify *make to know,* that is, *aver, affirm,* for they translate on p. 15 mid rihtre canne, *by lawful averment,* and the form of words, "Veritatem dico in Christo, non mentior," does not involve the essence of an oath, the invocation of divine vengeance on perjury. Whose the averment in this instance is, whether the accusers or the alleged kidnappers, remains therefore doubtful. But since the expression æghwilc man, *each man* of the three, not of the two, which would be of the form hwæðer, comes in here, it seems that every one, the accuser, the kidnapped, and the kidnapper, was to make his averment, each at his own place of residence. The translators, as if Saxon must ever remain an impenetrable mystery to the vulgar, end thus: "if he be unable, let him pay as he gono hage." The MS. they tell us is of the xiith century and some slovenliness in copying must be allowed for, but in this wondrous passage we are to fall back upon those mysterious characters. I give an emendation genoh age: and translate the clause afresh.

If a freeman steal a man.—If the man return let some accuser (take upon himself the responsibility and) say he is present: let him make his averment at the altar, and produce (the due) number of free men whose testimony may be legally accepted; and have one of these joined with him in oath.

Each man to make his averment at the town or place to which he belongs.—If he be unable to do that, let him pay as he have enough, that is, as far as his property goes.

The translation of clause vi is many ways incorrect in regard to the language and absurd in its result. Borh is "*caution*" *money*, "security," and it is absurd to give goods or cash as security to a child under ten years of age. It is also ludicrous to fetch this security, "from among his paternal kinsmen." But *security* is borh and not beregea, and wilsum is *willing* not *sufficient*. The true sense is; let a willing guardian, bound in law to enter into security, be given, from his relatives on the fathers side.

In viii p. 13, which decrees that every accuser must find a surety for himself in case the penalties of false accusation be doomed to fall on him, the word byrigean is as before p. 12. vi. *vadem*, not *vadimonium*, for it was one of the relatives on the fathers side in the last passage, and *vadimonium* is borh. In p. 50, 22 the byrgea, *bailsman* is to have notice, and in that passage the editors avoid translating by borh, as they had before done, because to do so was by this time impossible. There are some instances in which borh as on p. 119 means bailsman, but its ordinary use is otherwise. In p. 53 again byrgea is a person, "make bot to his byrgea" is the translation so called of the editors, the correctness of which I do not guarantee. They repeat the error or ambiguity in the two next clauses p. 13. ix. x. using "borh."

In x. p. 13, the note supposes a cross action, which is altogether a misapprehension. In our modern courts the expenses of a lost trial commonly deter hasty prosecutions, but our forefathers put a distinct penalty upon such as worried a man with legal process without sufficient cause. The next preceding clauses required first that a plaintiff should find a bailsman for himself for the better protection of the defendant, if his defence were successful: secondly, that on the plaintiffs refusal to do so, the cause should be "open," as if no action had been taken. The laws of Magnus of Norway required the loser of the cause to pay all expenses and fifty per cent. more to the winner. Nú sá sem felzt at máli, þa halldi allt þat sem laugmaðr hefir

skilt þeirra millom oc gialldi kostnat hálfo aukinn p. 32. The Salique laws (xxi) condemn the accuser of an innocent man in his absence to pay lxxii and a half solidi, and if the accusation involve his life two hundred solidi. Payment of these dues required by the laws of Hloðhære a warrantor. The punctuation as the words themselves shew is thus, "If one sue another after he has given him a bailsman." The clause ends, gelde he þonne c. buton aðe siþþian ane neaht ofer þaet gesem hie, and as c. contributes nothing to the sense it has justly been condemned as an intruder: but the last two words have been regarded as a verb and pronoun, "let them settle." This is contrary to any notion of verbal termination, and gesem is either a substantive or gesemhie represents such a substantive, *settlement,* with corruption of the last syllable. Wilkins printed gesem bie and Lye has entered geseme which must be taken as his emendation.

What is the advantage of the grotesque way of leaving in the modern version the original words of the ancient text is not very clear. I venture to propose for clause 12, "If one upset, displace, overset a drinking cup, where men are drinking, without meddling with the man, let him pay," etc., the object of the law being to repress fights and feuds by giving every one insulted an appeal to a law court. The next law is of similar effect, "If one draw weapon where men are drinking and no harm is done, let him pay," etc.

Clause 16, p. 14, refers to cattle. Not that the word Feoh itself is confined to that signification, its proper one, Vieh, Pecus, but because ordinary chattels, having no motion of their own were not easily removed stealthily beyond the limit of the owners observation. Wic is what we now call *town,* and a purchaser of cattle was required on account of the frequent losses of stock, to be careful about the man he dealt with. It was sufficient justification for his possession of stolen cows or sheep, if he bought them as we now say "in open market," in the presence of the town reeve: see p. 68. i.

P. 16. ii. Mundbyrd is not explained in the Glossary, where the reference to p. 8. lxxv. is of no assistance. It is however by p. 14. xiv, a payment to cottager, church or king

for a wrong done within the cottage church or royal precincts: and the wrong in view is homicide, as is clear by the association of clauses in p. 2.

In 17. iv, it is ordained that English living in unhallowed commerce suffer excommunication, ungestrodyne, which is turned "without expulsion." Now excommunication without expulsion is neither a secular nor an ecclesiastical idea, nor a clear mode of expression. The word has been misunderstood. In Beda p. 646, line 37 Ne gestrodu with angelþeode syrwaƀ is the version of *nil insidiarum moliuntur aut fraudium,* where fraudes, as we shall see, means not "expulsion" but *rapine.* Reubens's Glossary, p. 9, gives "Agressor, strudere vel reafere." Mr Thorpe himself long before he edited the laws, translated in his Cædmon, p. 219, line 27, gestrudan gestreona "*plundered the treasures,*" quite correctly. In Salomon and Saturn p. 139, line 148, helle gestrudeƀ, Mr Kemble should have given *hell it harrieth:* and p. 144, line 310, *they harry the cattle.* So that ungestrodene signifies *unharried, unplundered,* and man living with woman in concubinage is punished by excommunication but with no other penalty, as far as church is concerned, for the next clause levies a fine payable to the lord.

P. 18. xii. On healsfang in the Glossary, Mr Thorpe has assumed that strictly this punishment was pillory and that it was always compounded for. It would be a very Utopian felicity if money could always be found to redeem condemned criminals. Healsfang itself seems to me merely a putting on some iron neckband, and equivalent to imprisonment, for old prisons inconvenienced the prisoners by chains and steel circlets. Racentea, or -teah, is a contraction for Racenteage, feminine (not masculine) commonly standing for *chain,* but compounded of Hracu, *throat,* and Teage, *tie.* Thus it is of parallel elements to those which produce Healsfang, which is no *pillory* but *throatband.* A Greek book gives us the true picture of an antique prison, Δεσμωτήριον, *habitation of men chained, or bound.*

With his hide equals *by a swingeing, flagellation.*

P. 18. xvii. Let the (abbot, prior, or other) chief authority of a monastery make an averment with the (form of) averment used by a priest (as in next section). Canne was trans-

lated "averment" by Price on p. 15, and the sense is satisfactory, as Cyðan *make known,* is derived from Cunnan *know.* The examples imply or state the declaration to be solemnly made, with hand on altar.

P. 18, xix. að abycgan, *to abuy* (or *aby* as some spell), *the oath,* that is, take the responsibility. Abuy is used in this way still.

P. 18, xxii. "Clear himself by the person of the reeve" gives no sense, unless we are to regard a reeve as sacred as an altar. On hand eodon means *surrendered, submitted,* as in the Chronicle. *In submission to, at the discretion of, the reeve* seems therefore the true sense.

P. 23, xxvii requires a small emendation. Gif fyr sie ontended wyht to bærnenne, *if fire be kindled to burn aught.*

P. 27, i. The translation of other mennisc by "other man's" is contrary to the analogies: the termination -isc as Folcisc answers to -ish, in Spanish, Frankish, Swedish, churlish, and the like. "Another man's" is oðres mannes. Hence oðermennisc will be *foreign.*

P. 28, ii. The obscure terms of this law are explained in the note, feorm *purveyance,* freone hired, *free fraternity.* The last words will bear a sense reconcileable with the context, and quite obvious; preferable therefore to the suggestion at foot of the page, where cause is supplied out of that inexhaustible storehouse called ellipses. Agne being definite form after personal pronoun for agene, the words mean *"let him not have his own property, wrongly taken"* by the asylum seeker.

P. 28, iii. Since borh is *vadimonium* for the most part, this law is not at first sight to be read off intelligently. The word is doubtless connected with beorgan, *protect, shelter,* and it seems distinguished in its personal character from the mundbyrd which belonged to the flet (14, xiv) or dwelling, and was local. Borh is here then *personal guarantee,* as it is also in *vadimonium.* Borhbryce is *breach of such guarantee.* This guarantee may be interpreted to belong to all persons forming a retinue or wearing a badge. In mærra we see nothing technical, mære is *egregius, nobilis,* and will stand for *of the best quality.* The absurd system some modernizing interpreters adopt of employing a small black mark they call a hyphen to

help out their skill at reading, exhibits some of its ill features in this clause. There is a compound or semicompound word borhbryce; but there is no such single word as borgesbryce, which remains two words as þæs borges bryce, *breach of the personal protection.* The words therefore, "For an archbishop's 'borh-bryce,' let him make 'bot,'" are in the worst slovenly style of the slipshod school: the Saxon says, *a breach of an archbishops personal protection.* This neglect is here repeated.

Some similar slovenliness has produced, p. 30, viii, the version "to the church-hlaford who owns the nun." Now no one ever owned a nun; she was, in the eyes of Saxons, "the bride of Christ," and had no other lord. The Saxon relative has for its antecedent church not hlaford, nor does the sentence contain any such compound as church hlaford, but the text gives, *to the lord of the church which has or owns the nun:* agan being widely used, and the church representing its head, Christ. The lord is its patron and protector.

P. 30, note b. Mr Price's view is correct; Mr Thorpe could not extract sense from his view without an interpolation. Butan is Nisi, as well as Præter. Mth. xii. 24, 39. DD. 33. xix.

It is more satisfactory to quit these minor points, and pass to an attempt to throw some light upon the Twelvehynde man and the Sixhynde man. It appears by Spærhynde, in Ælfric's Grammar, p. 14, line 28, *sparehanded, parsimonious,* that Hynde is connected with Hand. That the terms above with Twyhynde owe their origin to this etymon is further plain by their being always multiples of two; they are therefore equivalent to *Twelvehanded, Sixhanded, Twohanded,* and a man with these epithets respectively is one who employs five, two, or no servants, his own two hands making up the number.

P. 32, xviii. If a woman formally contracted (with sureties on both sides) forlay herself, *commit breach of chastity,* let her make amends to the sureties (in so much).

P. 34, xxii. The error and confusion in the interpretation of this law are excusable. No such word as eofot is elsewhere known, and the various readings themselves suggest the solution. We are to read from their hint þeofot, THEFT. It occurs in Lacnunga as þeofent, by error of text, and in Gregory's Dia-

logues. Some other words are formed by the same analogy, as Reowet *rowing*, (not rewete,) bærnet, rymet, theowet. It is no wonder that Andetlan, a word unheard of, should present a difficulty; the editors go to a dictionary and find Andettan *to confess*, out of which they try to extract some sense. In reality Andetlan is an unusual way of writing Ontihtlan, *accusation.* "*Of accusation of theft. If one at a folkmoot denounce a theft to the king's reeve* (or sheriff) *and by and bye wish to withdraw from it,* his denunciation."

P. 35, xxiii. "Amends for whatever wound he may cause."

P. 38, xxxvii. The serfs or farm labourers deriving their subsistence from agriculture were adscripti glebæ: for their houses and holdings they paid in service to the lord. By this law it appears they were at liberty to cancel their bargain in lawful form: and would of necessity give service, and accept holdings on some other estate. A cottier with wife and family must accept his lot: his line of life is taken.

P. 39, xl. Fyrd is *agmen:* the national army of militia in the field. Butan leafe, *without dispensation.*

P. 39, xli. The whole soil of England had belonged to the king in name; to the nation, as a populus, a state, a body capable of action, in fact. Portions from time to time were granted in fee simple or for lives, by deed, by "book," as they said, in the king's name, but with consent of the parliament, the Witena Gemoot, of the day. Such land held by deed, or charter, was Bookland. See Allen in Glossary.

P. 41, xliii. The sense of the last clause is; All men of servile condition are entitled to hold as their own, *peculium*, whatsoever be given them in God's name, according to the discretion of the givers, and whatever they earn at their odd whiles (when not working for their masters).

P. 42, xlix. The translation transposes the sense. Wong is *cheek;* cheek tooth is grinder. Tusk is that tooth which becomes tusk in the modern usage in boars, *the canine tooth.*

P. 42, l. Ceacan should be turned *jaws*, as is plain from the expression "broken," and the old gloss, Mandibula ceacban.

OSWALD COCKAYNE.

ON THE STONE USED IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE CLOACA MAXIMA AT ROME.

Dr Theodor Mommsen, in his History of Rome, states that the Cloaca Maxima must be considered as belonging to an epoch subsequent to that of regal Rome, "for *travertine* is the material employed[1]." On the contrary, Dr Arnold, in his history of Rome, writes thus. "The stone employed in the Cloaca is in itself a mark of the great antiquity of the work, it is not the peperino of Gabii and the Alban Hills, which was the common building stone in the time of the Commonwealth: *much less the travertine*, or limestone of the neighbourhood of Tibur, the material used in the great works of the early emperors; but it is the stone found in Rome itself, a mass of volcanic materials coarsely cemented together, which afterwards was supplanted by the finer quality of the peperino[2]." A third and different statement is made by Niebuhr, who remarks on the material of the Cloaca as follows. "Without encroaching on the domain of Roman topography, a historian may record of this astonishing structure, that its triple vault is formed of hewn blocks of *peperino* fixed together without cement[3]." Of these three different statements about the stone used in the Cloaca Maxima, Mommsen's is undoubtedly erroneous, that of Niebuhr is founded upon a mistaken use of the term *peperino*, and Arnold, though correct in naming tufa as the stone employed, draws from this fact an inference as to the great antiquity of the Cloaca, which cannot be admitted as correct.

(1) It is now known by every archæologist who has visited Rome that the arch of the Cloaca Maxima is not built of *tra-*

[1] Th. Mommsen, Röm. Gesch. I, 7. II, 9.

[2] Arnold's Roman History, Vol. I. ch. 5.

[3] Niebuhr, Röm. Gesch. I. 409. Vortr. über Röm. Gesch. I. s. 140. 190.

vertine, the material of the Colosseum, and of most structures of imperial Rome. From the lamentable absence of any reference to authorities in Mommsen's history, it is, in this as in many other cases, impossible to ascertain whence he derives his facts. I presume however that on this point he has followed Hirt, who in his history of ancient architecture, with the view of supporting a theory of the later date of the Cloaca, has exaggerated the statement he found in Canina, to the effect that the substructions of the Cloaca are of travertine, and has extended it to the whole structure[1]. All the most competent authorities, Brocchi, Abeken, and Bunsen, agree in the assertion that there is no reason to suppose any part of the Cloaca to be of travertine[2]. I have from time to time requested my friends who have lately visited Rome to examine it, and have also done the same myself, and I have no doubt that it is built of Roman tufa.

(2) Niebuhr, in the above quoted passage, has apparently used the name *peperino,* generally applied to the hard grey tufa from Gabii, Albano, or Marino (lapis Albanus or Gabinus), to denote the harder kind of Roman tufa which very closely resembles the lapis Gabinus. The triple arch at the mouth of the Cloaca Maxima is undoubtedly built of this hard grey Roman tufa, and several Italian writers use the term peperino in speaking of it[3]. The triple arch however only extends for about forty feet from the pulchrum littus or Tiber Embankment, and the rest of the archway is composed of a single arch of the

[1] Hirt, Gesch. der Baukunst. Band II. s. 188. Canina, Arch. Rom. Parte II. cap. XI. p. 650.

[2] Brocchi, Suolo di Roma p. 112, says, Di tal pietra (tufa litoide) non di peperino come da alcuni vien detto, e molto meno di travertino come altri vociferano, e costrutta l' arcata della cloaca Massima; and Abeken, the Secretary of the Archæological Institute at Rome, in his Mittelitalien s. 171. Der Bau ist ganz von Tuf, Angaben dass in untern Reihen Travertin gebraucht sey, ist mit Bestimmtheit zu widersprechen: Schwegler in his Römische Geschichte. Band I. s. 799, avoids the error into which Mommsen has fallen. The fact that the other cloacae which lead from the forum to the Cloaca Maxima were of travertine, may have contributed to the mistake. See Fea's Miscellanea, p. CLVII.

[3] Bunsen, Beschreibung der Stadt Rom. Bd. I. s. 154. Das Material ist zwar nicht Peperin, sondern Tufstein, also der Stein des römischen Bodens. See Venuti, Antichità di Roma. Parte I. cap. 2. and notes.

common red tufa (tophus ruber, saxum rubrum). The harder tufa was doubtless used near the mouth to ensure greater strength and to resist exposure, just as in the tabularium, the inner walls are partly built of red tufa, and the outer surface of the harder quality of stone.

(3) It cannot be shewn, as Arnold seems to think, that the material (*tufa*) used in the Cloaca is any proof of its antiquity. *Tufa* has been occasionally used at all periods of Roman history for the interior of structures, and sometimes for outer walls. Thus *tufa* is used in several parts of the Claudian aqueduct, in the substructions of the ambulacra of the theatre of Marcellus, in portions of the Aurelian walls near the gate of S. Lorenzo, and even in buildings of the middle ages, as may be seen in the fortress Gaetani, at the tomb of Cecilia Metella, on the Appian Road. It is therefore quite possible, that the Cloaca might have been built of *tufa* long after the regal period; and we must in fact conclude that the stone of which it is composed cannot be taken as evidence of its high antiquity.

R. BURN.

ON PARTS OF RIBBECK'S PROLEGOMENA CRITICA TO HIS EDITION OF VIRGIL.

II.

Turning to M. Ribbeck's remarks on the Aeneid, which are comprised in a single long chapter, I am happy to find myself agreeing with him in regarding as highly probable a theory propounded by Conrads in his 'Quaestiones Virgilianae' (Treves, 1863), that Virgil did not write the several books of the poem in the order in which he eventually left them. This theory had not been promulgated at the time of the publication of the second volume of my edition: but it certainly seems to clear up some things which are not satisfactorily accounted for on the ordinary hypothesis. One or two of these I will mention, making use of Conrads' remarks, but not necessarily confining myself to them. The apparent discrepancies between the story of Palinurus as told by himself in the Sixth Book and as told by the poet in the Fifth have often been remarked upon. Palinurus speaks of something like a storm as happening at the time of his falling overboard: in the Fifth Book we are merely told that the vessel became unsteady in passing the breakers near the coast of the Sirens, and that Aeneas then was made sensible of his loss. Palinurus talks of himself as living till the third or fourth day from the time of his misfortune: if we followed the narrative alone, we should suppose that Aeneas finds him in the shades after a shorter interval. Again, the voyage in which Palinurus was lost is called 'Libyco cursu,' whereas it would more properly be spoken of as the voyage from Sicily. All these points can be explained on the ordinary hypothesis, but not without effort: and as soon as it is suggested that the Fifth Book may have been written some time after the Sixth, we feel that the solution is far easier. 'Libyco cursu' in par-

ticular is at once accounted for, if we suppose that when Virgil wrote the words he intended to bring Aeneas from Carthage to Cumae without halting by the way. There are other appearances which point in the same direction. When Aeneas tells the Sibyl that it was Anchises who bade him seek her out, it is generally explained by referring to the words of Anchises himself in the Fifth Book. Yet the imperfect 'dabat' (Book 6. v. 117), following closely on 'ferebat' (v. 114), looks as if Virgil was thinking when he wrote the passage of advice given by Anchises when alive: in other words, that the apparition of Anchises had not then been devised. It is true that Aeneas says later in the book (v. 695) that it was the repeated appearance of his father which compelled him to visit the shades: but it may be replied that though Virgil, having talked of a repeated appearance, might think himself bound to describe a single visit, he is not equally likely first to have described a single visit and then to have talked of a repeated appearance. Not wishing however to push such reasonings into mere refinement, especially in the case of an author like Virgil, who is fond of telling the subordinate parts of his story by incidental hints, I will merely notice that the question which we know to have been entertained by the early critics, whether the two first lines of Book 6 really belong to that book or to Book 5, is at once explained if we suppose those lines to have been added to Book 6 later, at the time when Book 5 was written. I need not say that Book 5 is precisely one of those parts of the story which might most naturally be supplied as an after-thought, as the conception of his work gradually opened upon the poet. Another book, the peculiarities of which are best accounted for by supposing it to have been written at a different time from those among which it is found, is Book 3. Probably no book of the twelve contains so many discrepancies from the rest of the story. There is the inconsistency between Aeneas' ignorance where he is to settle, as exemplified throughout the earlier part of the book, and his having heard from Creusa at the end of the Second Book about the land of Hesperia and the river Tiber. There is the inconsistency between the attribution of the prophecy of eating the tables to Celaeno and its attribution in the

Seventh Book to Anchises: not to mention that in the former case it is predicted as an infliction consequent on landing in Italy, in the latter as a token that the unknown land on which they will have disembarked is to be their home. There is the inconsistency between the white sow as a token that they have reached their home, which is Helenus' prediction, and the white sow with her young as a symbol of the number of years that are to elapse before the foundation of Alba, which is the purpose it actually serves. There is the inconsistency between the promise, that Aeneas shall be instructed about the war in Italy by the Sibyl, and the fact, that he is instructed about it by Anchises. I do not know whether we are to follow Conrads in adding to these that the Third Book, as read naturally, represents Aeneas' wanderings as lasting two years, while in other parts of the poem they are made to extend over seven. At any rate, enough has been adduced to make it probable that the Third Book was not written immediately after the Second: though it may still be doubted whether it was an early composition, containing intimations on which the poet afterwards improved, or a late production, embodying hints to which, had Virgil lived, he would have accommodated his narrative. On the whole, I cannot doubt that Conrads' theory throws real light on the composition of the Aeneid, though here as in other instances we doubtless need be on our guard against carrying the spirit of hypothesis too far.

I now come back to M. Ribbeck's own criticisms: and here I am afraid my differences with him recommence.

After examining the notices of the composition of the Aeneid preserved by Donatus and others, he discusses the several books in detail, beginning with the Fourth, which is one of those that Virgil is said to have read to Augustus. Besides the five hemistichs occurring in the book, he finds other traces of imperfection. V. 53 he thinks was originally incomplete, the last clause being due to an interpolator. He does not say why: nor does his note on the passage help us to a reason. All that we are told is 'sequentia' (i.e. 'dum non tractabile caelum') 'ferri omnino non possunt, ut ficta videantur ex Georg. 1. 211.' Most students of Virgil, I apprehend, find no difficulty

in tolerating the clause, and are not likely to think it suspicious because Virgil has talked elsewhere about 'bruma intractabilis.' In his note he goes on 'ceterum optimum erat v. 51 Annae orationem concludere, et poterat interpolator pannos desumere ex Aen. 1 535 et 551.' We can only meet assertion by assertion, maintaining that Anna's speech would read very baldly without the lines in question, and that the partial verbal similarity to the expressions in Book 1 is Virgilian enough. We are also told, after Peerlkamp, that the latter part of v. 343 is spurious. I have elsewhere remarked that the use of 'manerent' there in the sense of restoration to permanence may very well intimate that the restoration would efface the memory of the fall, and may probably have been intended to remind us of the passage from which M. Ribbeck supposes the interpolator to have borrowed it, Book 2, v. 56. Other charges follow: 'hiare orationem circa v. 418, paulo durius abrumpi v. 160, etiam v. 98 fortasse imperfectum esse.' In the first of these passages M. Ribbeck arbitrarily supposes a gap, attempts to fill it by two lines torn from a later speech of Dido's, vv. 548, 549, and finding naturally enough, that the passage, so re-arranged, is not symmetrical, declares 'quoniam vel sic hiat oratio, non absolvisse locum putandus est poeta.' That there is some abruptness in v. 360 we may safely concede, as the next line, being a hemistich, shows that the poet could not finish the speech to his mind. V. 98 is not unfinished: the apparent difficulty arises from a rare construction of 'quo' with the ablative, which I have illustrated in my commentary. Lastly, M. Ribbeck finds an indication of two draughts in vv. 382 foll. The cause of his perplexity appears to be v. 387: he cannot understand how Dido can say in one line that her spectre shall constantly haunt Aeneas, and in the next line that the news of his punishment shall reach her in the lower world. The solution seems to be that Virgil regarded the spectre and the spirit (so to call them) as different things, just as he makes Anchises in Book 6, vv. 687 foll. unaware that his spectre has appeared to Aeneas.

M. Ribbeck next proceeds to the Sixth Book, as having been also read to the emperor by the poet. Here again he finds various tokens of incompleteness, over and above the dis-

crepancies with the Fifth Book, already noticed. He thinks there is a hiatus after v. 254, as 'superque,' the reading of all the best MSS., cannot be otherwise explained. Yet in Book 1. 668, where there is almost as great authority for 'que,' he omits it, doubtless as sufficiently accounted for by the metrical scruples of transcribers. Here the evident imitation of Hom. Il. 11. 775 is decidedly in favour of supposing that Virgil wrote the line as it stands in the majority of modern editions, and consequently that the passage is complete. Next come two instances of 'dittographia,' vv. 586 and 716. The latter passage is certainly rather awkward: the former, though much vexed by modern editors, really only requires explanation, the meaning being that Salmoneus, while engaged in his impious imitation of Jupiter, was struck with the vengeance from which he still suffers. He goes on 'narrationis lacunam indagavi post v. 361.' Boot, a Dutch scholar, has also found a difficulty in the passage: but there can be little doubt that both are wrong. Palinurus intimates plainly enough that he was killed by the natives and thrown back into the sea: they rush on him with the sword, and now the wave holds him. Why are we to suppose that Virgil would have made him dilate on the circumstances of the murder? Deiphobus, whose end was still more cruel, speaks of it still more briefly. About vv. 602 foll. there is some difficulty, as the torments spoken of do not seem to have been specifically appropriated to Ixion and Pirithous: but the rhetorical structure of the passage shows that the poet, after having enumerated various sufferers and their sufferings in detail, is at length hurrying on and dealing with the subject more promiscuously, mentioning here a criminal and there a form of punishment, but not caring to assign the one to the other. M. Ribbeck concludes by intimating that vv. 93, 94, 826—835, may very probably have been added in revising the book. The two first mentioned lines are unoffending enough: as for the others, it is perhaps sufficient to say that M. Ribbeck in his text inserts them after v. 807 (a most inappropriate place, interfering with the feeling of the whole passage, without really satisfying the chronological order); so that the theory of 'curae secundae' may be said to prove little more than the

critic's dissatisfaction with his own arbitrary re-arrangement of the lines as found in the MSS.

In Book 1 M. Ribbeck finds one lacuna after v. 550. 'Post hunc versum,' he says in his critical commentary, 'poetam suspicor et de gratia per Acesten referenda plura additurum et eis quae v. 551 rogat Ilioneus paulo accuratius praefaturum fuisse.' This assumes, what is by no means certain, that Acestes is introduced as one who is able to requite any kindness Dido may show even if Aeneas should be dead. It is more probable from the context that Ilioneus mentions Sicily as a δεύτερος πλοῦς, if the death of Aeneas and his heir should cut off the hope of Italy. Thus there will be no need of a preface to the request which follows, that being in fact the point of Ilioneus' speech. He asks to be allowed not to settle, but to refit the ships for either of the voyages which await them in the two alternative contingencies. M. Ribbeck quarrels with the latter part of v. 188, 'fidus quae tela gerebat Achates,' though he is not sure whether it is an interpolation or a stop-gap of Virgil's own. I must profess myself unable to see anything inappropriate in it: it is simply one of those little incidental details which the poet from time to time introduces. Surely we are not obliged to think with Servius that Achates was occupied all this time in keeping up the fire he had lighted. V. 426 is at first sight a little incongruous: but it is not un-Virgilian, as the mention of political and civil institutions in similar connexions, Books 3. 137, 5. 758, is sufficient to show. Vv. 367, 8 again seem unjustly suspected: there was no occasion to introduce the detail, but there is nothing unnatural in doing so: and there is perhaps something lively in Venus' interrupting herself as she seemed about to continue her story. V. 711 also is harmless, if unnecessary: it is a piece of epic surplusage, such as Virgil not unfrequently indulges in after Homer's example. M. Ribbeck is anxious to identify the twenty ships with which Aeneas (v. 381) tells Venus he originally embarked. Seven are still with Aeneas: thirteen remain to be accounted for. He turns to the description of the storm, and can find only twelve, Aeneas' own ship (vv. 102 foll.), three driven on rocks (v. 108), three on quicksands (v. 110), Orontes' ship (v. 113), and those of Ilioneus,

Achates, Abas, and Aletes (vv. 120 foll.). Either then Virgil has been careless, or we must create a thirteenth by emending 'illam' v. 116 into 'aliam.' It is evident on a comparison of v. 584 of this Book with Book 6. 334, that only one ship was sunk, and that Orontes', so that the emendation breaks down. But the fact is that the twelve ships mentioned as suffering from the storm are not necessarily identical with the thirteen that are missing. The missing ships did not fare worse than the others, though they parted company with them: those that were with Aeneas are said by him to be 'convolsae undis Euroque.' All the ships doubtless suffered more or less: all, but Orontes', were eventually recovered. How would M. Ribbeck account on his theory for Aeneas and Achates getting to land with the seven ships, after their own vessels had been disabled among the thirteen? Does he suppose that they left their own ships when they found them becoming unseaworthy, and got on board others?

M. Ribbeck's remarks on the Second Book are few. The celebrated passage about Helen (vv. 567—588) he considers to be the work of an interpolator, though he does not explain how an unknown author should have written verses which Virgil need not have disowned. With Conrads, he is surprised at the appearance of Iphitus and Pelias in v. 535, and suspects that if Virgil had finished his poem he would have mentioned them among those named in vv. 339—346, as if this incidental and allusive mode of narration were not one of Virgil's most salient characteristics. Three other lines he regards as spurious, vv. 76, 749, 775. Of these the first and third have more or less external authority against them: the second is unobjectionable, as though we are not told where Aeneas left his armour, it is natural enough that he should require it when searching for his wife, not having worn it while carrying his father. Vv. 46, 47 he thinks a 'dittographia' of v. 45, failing to see, what surely is plain enough, that it is one thing to regard the horse as a receptacle for soldiers, as it actually was, another thing to look upon it as a means for scaling the walls from outside. He is 'almost sorry' to have marked in his text a lacuna after v. 25; a feeling which it may be hoped

further reflection will confirm. The latter part of v. 360 appears to him a stop-gap: vv. 383, 409 he thinks too like each other to have occurred at so short an interval in a finished poem.

The Third Book, as is well known, contains a line (v. 340), the only one in the poem, where not only the metre but the sense is imperfect. M. Ribbeck is of course quite right in treating the passage as unfinished: but there was no reason why he should fancy, however hesitatingly, that an interpolator had been at work. The πρῶτον ψεῦδος of his criticism is the adoption of the false reading 'quae' for 'quem' in 'Quem tibi iam Troia.' Wagner had introduced it from the 'Menagianus alter:' M. Ribbeck asserts repeatedly that it is found in the Medicean. I do not know what his authority may be: but I know that my friend Mr A. O. Prickard of New College examined the MS. for me in this place at Florence last year, and found 'quem' written in the clearest and most unmistakeable way, just as it stands in Foggini's transcript. All is plain sailing enough: we do not know how the line would have ended, but we know pretty well what the sense must have been: and we know from the next line that Andromache, no matter how, was aware that Creusa was no more. Quite as arbitrary are M. Ribbeck's observations on the passage following Andromache's speech. No rational cause, he says (following Peerlkamp), can be imagined why Helenus should be said to shed many tears between his words, when nevertheless we are told that he conducts Aeneas with joy to his home. Are tears of joy unknown in Germany or in Holland? As to the objection that Helenus' words ought not to be mentioned when his speech is not given, I need only refer to Book 5, v. 770. What M. Ribbeck asks us to accept in place of the passage as we are accustomed to read it is a 'dittographia,' 'Haec multum lacrimans verba inter singula fundit,' supposed to be left by the poet as an alternative for 'Talia fundebat lacrimans longosque ciebat Incassum fletus.' V. 135 is not free from difficulty: but there is greater difficulty in believing that Virgil left 'Iamque fere,' and that 'sicco subductae litore puppes' was added by an interpolator. Vv. 595 and 603 are treated as

a 'dittographia,' as if Virgil could not first say that Achemenides looked like a Greek who had served at Troy and then make him own that he was one. Vv. 128 foll. give M. Ribbeck trouble, as they have given trouble to other modern editors: they need trouble no one who is not disposed to bind down the poet to a formal sequence of narration. He is surprised that no objection has been made to the stop-gap in v. 256, 'nostraeque iniuria caedis,' as he thinks it harsh to couple 'fames' and 'iniuria' as reducing the Trojans to eat their tables. Virgil, I need scarcely say, never scruples to co-ordinate two nouns either of which separately might have been the subject of the verb he happens to be using: and in the present case 'fames' and 'iniuria' are related as effect and cause. V. 486 M. Ribbeck judiciously defends, as also vv. 472, 3: I wish he had extended his protection to vv. 470, 471, which he agrees with Peerlkamp in condemning. V. 230 may very possibly be an interpolation from Book 1, v. 311, as the agreement of the best MSS. in 'clausam' is suspicious: it is strange, however, in that case that no copy should omit it. To M. Ribbeck's 'languere admodum sentio v. 262,' I can only answer that I for one have no such feeling. Vv. 690, 691 he condemns by a simple reference to Wagner's arguments against them: I must defend them by an equally simple reference to the reply to Wagner in my commentary. Vv. 684—686 are no doubt full of difficulty. Whatever may be the case with other parts of the poem, there can scarcely be a question that here the poet's last hand is wanting. This may obviate the only serious objection which M. Ribbeck makes to the common reading of the lines as explained by most recent commentators, that to sail between Scylla and Charybdis was not to sail 'leti discrimine parvo,' but to encounter certain destruction on one side or the other. M. Ribbeck's own solution, to restore 'Scylla atque Charybdis' from the Vatican fragment and to transpose vv. 685, 686, understanding the alternative to be between running upon Scylla and Charybdis and running back upon the coast of the Cyclops, seems to me at once more violent and less plausible.

On the Fifth Book M. Ribbeck discusses Conrads' opinion, to which I have already alluded, that when Virgil wrote

Book 3 he intended Aeneas' wanderings to occupy a much shorter period than they are represented to have done in Books 1 and 5. I will only say that while the narrative in Book 3 can be reconciled to a seven years' period, it would certainly, if standing by itself, suggest something shorter, and consequently, that supposing it to be probable on other grounds that Virgil would be inconsistent with himself in these particular portions of his work, we may well believe that he is so in this special instance. The difficulty of his talking about summer in Book 5, v. 625, I think I have obviated by the suggestion made in my commentary that we should prove the sense of 'vertitur,' which may surely mean 'is passing into winter.' I do not agree with M. Ribbeck in thinking it certain that the episode of Nisus and Euryalus in Book 9 was written before the mention of the two friends in Book 5, on account of the great fulness of the description in the later book, though it is of course possible. Drances is more fully described on his last appearance in Book 11 than on his first introduction earlier in the same book; and in fact such varieties are indispensable to the freedom of poetical narrative. As usual, M. Ribbeck points out various lines in Book 5 which he regards as stopgaps or interpolations; and as usual, I am unable to agree with him. In v. 120 Virgil is only following his ordinary custom of reiterating a thing in a new form: v. 403 contains one of his most characteristic verbal manipulations: v. 467 would never have been suspected by any one who was not, like Peerlkamp, suspicious by profession: the repetition of v. 538 in v. 572 may be a carelessness, but it may be a deliberate imitation of Homeric commonplace: v. 802 is an amplification, but a sonorous and effective one: in v. 440 the picture of the preceding line is given *more Vergiliano*, with a circumstantial difference: if v. 603 savours of the commentator rather than of the poet, a large number of similar lines in the Iliad and Odyssey must be due not to Homer but to the Scholiasts. V. 506 has nothing to do with the dove's clapping her wings, but is a translation, as I have shown in my commentary, of Iliad 23. 869. V. 290 is not free from difficulty: but there is no reason why 'consessu' should not mean 'in consessum,' the place of assembling

being spoken of as the assembly, and though there may be no authority for making 'exstructo' a substantive, it can be amply supported by analogies like 'suggestum.' I cannot think that vv. 82, 83 make an inappropriate close to Aeneas' brief address. 'Non licuit' is to be understood as in Book 4, v. 550, where it is similarly introduced at the end of a speech, not as a mere statement of fact, but as a passionate ejaculation. Lastly, I do not see that we need seriously arraign either the poet or a copyist for 'ab Ida' v. 254, closely following 'frondosa Ida' in v. 252. If anything, it is Virgil's own carelessness, though a slight one: but perhaps, as I have already suggested, the repetition may be intended to show that the two actions, Ganymede hunting and Ganymede carried off, are represented as taking place on the same spot.

In the Ninth Book M. Ribbeck finds fault with vv. 367 foll. for their obscurity. They are not quite plain, certainly: but the difficulty does not seem to arise from the poet's carelessness, but from his habit of indirect narrative. Ladewig seems substantially right in supposing that a legion was on its way from Laurentum, in answer to a request from Turnus, and that the horsemen were sent on before to announce its approach. They were reaching the Rutulian camp just as Nisus and Euryalus were leaving it: and so the two parties naturally came into collision. M. Ribbeck's own explanation 'immo speculatum ultra Rutulorum castra missi, dum ex urbe reliqui profecti castra Troiana oppugnant, equites illi iam redibant,' I do not clearly understand: at any rate it appears to ignore the obvious opposition between 'praemissi' and 'moratur.' With the passage generally we may compare Book 11, vv. 511 foll. Whether the mention of Numa v. 454 and that of Asilas v. 571 are carelessnesses or pieces of indirect information is not easy to say, and matters but little. There is perhaps some awkwardness in the omission of Turnus' name v. 749: but Virgil probably did it intentionally, meaning to be rapid and vivid. V. 403, as read in the oldest MSS., can scarcely be right: so there, as in a few other places, we must suppose that the later copies have contrived to preserve the true reading. Vv. 85 foll. can hardly be explained as a 'dittographia,' as neither the first

line nor the two last could well stand alone: it is better to suppose that Virgil means to tell us indirectly that besides pines, there were pitch-trees and maples in the grove, while we admit that there is a clumsiness in 'lucus' following 'silva' and a strange ambiguity in 'arce summa.' The gifts promised to Nisus and Euryalus vv. 263 foll. certainly do seem extravagant in some respects, and the mention of a single bowl where other things are double is awkward: there accordingly we may say that Virgil's later thoughts would perhaps have corrected his earlier. I am glad to see that M. Ribbeck does not quarrel, as some tasteless critics have done, with the striking and pathetic passage vv. 314 foll.: he is far, however, from seeing its full beauty. The explanation 'tamen' does not lie in the word 'inimica,' though that word was no doubt chosen intentionally, to strike a note of melancholy, but in the suppressed thought, 'perituri quidem ipsi.' I know nothing more touching in Virgil than the manner in which he has chosen to indicate what he will not mention, nothing more disheartening in criticism than the blindness of the commentators to this wonderful stroke of art. The 'loci Albani' (v. 387) are a puzzle: but a puzzle does not necessarily imply a corruption or a carelessness. Vv. 151 and 363 can be explained, though the last is awkward, so that it is rash to pronounce them interpolations: v. 777 is necessary for the full close of the paragraph, and to obliterate it shows a want of feeling for rhythm. Vv. 146, 147 are somewhat inconsistent with the end of Turnus' speech: but he may well be supposed to change his mind, and after proposing an attack, decide on deferring it to the morrow. They would come in awkwardly where M. Ribbeck places them, after v. 72: indeed, if they had appeared in the MSS. anywhere in that neighbourhood, the critic would probably have condemned them as a 'dittographia' of v. 51.

The Seventh Book, according to M. Ribbeck, is especially faulty in the latter part, the account of the origin of the war and the catalogue, though the earlier part also shows signs of imperfection. V. 444 he thinks may have been filled up by an interpolator, not improbably, but Heumann had been before him in the supposition: in suspecting the latter part of v. 571 he

follows Heyne, but the notion is less plausible. He next points out some lacunae, mostly on insufficient grounds: one after v. 242, on account of the change of nominative in v. 243; a second after v. 543, on account of the difficulty in 'convexa;' a third after v. 663, where it must be confessed there is some abruptness; a fourth after v. 695, where the verb can easily be supplied by a zeugma; while in v. 535 the same craving for a verb after 'seniorque Galaesus' leads him to the same suspicion of incompleteness. Then come 'dittographiae,' v. 75—77 for v. 74, a needless supposition, and vv. 624—627 for vv. 638—640, an injurious one, the lines in question being first dislocated and then condemned. Other dislocations are the transposition of vv. 395, 396, where a natural variety is sacrificed to an ill-advised endeavour after regularity, and that of vv. 698—702 and vv. 703—705, of which the same may be said. The two 'vanissimi versus' vv. 146, 147 are attributed to an interpolator, because after telling us that food had run short, Virgil would not have talked of 'instaurant epulas,' while there is no evidence that the wine had ever been removed, as is implied in v. 134. But Virgil plainly means that having come to the end of their meal, they renew it in honour of the discovery of their new home, not necessarily by eating more, but by drinking, and especially by libation. To M. Ribbeck's 'Otiosi praeterea videntur vv. 386 et 575,' I can only reply, 'Ribbeckio fortasse et Peerlkampio, sed non mihi.' It is satisfactory, however, that M. Ribbeck does not follow Peerlkamp in condemning the whole exordium of the book, vv. 1—35, in which he thinks him excessive, 'nimius.' I should like to see the Peerlkamp who could have written the lines.

The Eighth Book M. Ribbeck thinks unusually finished and accurate. He approves of Heyne's notion of getting rid of the hemistich in v. 41, by combining it with the latter part of v. 49 and striking out the intervening lines; an alteration which might appear tempting to one who, like Heyne, would be troubled by the inconsistency with Book 3, but need not attract persons who, like M. Ribbeck and myself, accept Conrads' theory expounded above. Peerlkamp, M. Ribbeck considers, has 'demonstrated' that the latter part of v. 13 and the whole

of v. 14 were not written by Virgil; the fact being that the language used is that of intentional exaggeration, such as would be consciously or unconsciously employed by the Italian princes and their emissaries. M. Ribbeck puts v. 654 after v. 641, following the example of the Parma edition; but if he had sufficiently realized the fact that Virgil is describing not the historical scenes as we may conceive them to have taken place, but as they would have been represented on the shield, he would scarcely have quarrelled with the old order. V. 3, according to him, is not only superfluous but perverse, as the stirring up of steeds and armour ought to follow the moving of men's minds, not to precede it. But Virgil meant to represent Turnus' fiery spirit as kindling the spirits of others, and so he represents him like a roused war-god, shaking his bridle-rein and smiting on his shield, and thus exciting the Italian tribes. We may compare the description in the simile Book 12, vv. 331 foll. V. 149 is condemned with Peerlkamp, to the injury of the rhythmical effect of the passage. Vv. 283, 284 are rejected after a suspicion of Heyne's; a second instance of M. Ribbeck's antipathy to the notion of a renewed banquet. V. 601 is called in question, because a Latin poet would hardly have thought it necessary to specify that Silvanus was god of agriculture and cattle. The specification would be pardonable as a mere piece of poetical surplusage like 'Mars armipotens:' it is laudable when we consider that Virgil, though a Latin poet, is identifying himself with the Trojan new-comers, and, as it were, explaining Italian customs for their benefit. Lastly, while rejecting Peerlkamp's view that vv. 666—670 are a grammarian's addition, M. Ribbeck censures the passage as inappropriate. I might myself be inclined to question it if I were certain that I thoroughly comprehended Virgil's conception of the shield: as it is, I remember the warning that one ought to be sure that one understands a writer's ignorance before one professes one's-self ignorant of his understanding. If my readers are as tired as I am of discussing similar criticisms in similar words, they will be glad to hear that in this Book at any rate there are no supposed cases of 'dittographia.'

In the Tenth Book M. Ribbeck suspects the latter half of

v. 27, 'nec non exercitus alter,' of being an interpolation. A stop-gap it may be, as it does not seem particularly forcible: but there is no reason to doubt that Virgil wrote it. Servius indeed does not explain it: but why should he? V. 20 is objected to because we have not previously heard of Turnus as riding in a chariot: but he may have appeared in a chariot nevertheless, as M. Ribbeck admits he does later in this book, v. 440. The mention of Capua, v. 145, is thought frigid: why so, more than the mention of the competitors in the ship-race in Book 5, as founders of Roman families? Virgil has named Mnestheus and other Trojan worthies with some honourable addition, and he naturally does the same in the case of Capys. Vv. 109, 110 are complained of, perhaps because they are not understood. Jupiter declines to entertain the question whether the advantage gained by the Italians in investing the Trojan camp is due to their own favouring destiny on the one hand, or on the other to the mistake of the besieged in allowing their leader to leave them and to the malignant warning conveyed to Turnus by Juno. Perhaps there is something inconsistent in condemning the Trojans implicitly because Aeneas, following a divine intimation, left them to go to Evander: but that is no ground for doubting the integrity of the text. In v. 475 Pallas, like a Homeric warrior, having thrown his spear, prepares to come to close quarters with his sword: but he has no opportunity of doing so. We are not obliged to suppose that everything is related in the precise order in which it occurs: in v. 474 the spear is thrown: in vv. 476 foll. we follow its course: the drawing of the sword doubtless took place while Turnus was levelling his own spear. The simile in vv. 804 foll. may be a little over-loaded; but this is a Homeric fault, and makes us realize the picture more completely. From some of M. Ribbeck's other remarks I do not greatly differ. The Arcadian cavalry, whom we left in the Eighth Book, meet us rather unexpectedly in vv. 238 foll. of the present. Turnus in v. 285 is said to encounter the Trojans as they land with his whole force: we hear nothing of those who were to continue (v. 285) the blockade of the camp. The enlargement of Ascanius and his followers is noticed v. 604 with strange and inconvenient

brevity. Altogether, the conclusion, 'Ergo non satis diligenter ac plene haec relata sunt' does not seem an unwarrantable one. But I cannot agree that vv. 270—275 are out of place where they stand. We are meant to see Aeneas as the Rutulians saw him, as the fleet came nearer and nearer, a glorious and terrible presence, like that of a comet or of Sirius. For the time we think of Aeneas and of him only, so that we do not need to be told in v. 270, *whose* head is a blaze of light. He is described, as he appears to the enemy, just as in the parallel passage in the Twenty-second Iliad, Achilles is described as he appears to Priam. Then, when we have looked at him sufficiently with their eyes, we are told that what appals them does not appal their leader, and our sympathy reverts to Turnus in consequence.

Like the rest, the Eleventh Book is declared to contain instances of incompleteness, interpolation and dislocation. V. 87 is said to be incomplete, the poet having probably intended to insert the complaints of Acoetes; a supposition required neither by literary propriety, which would rather reject the notion of a third lament, in addition to those of Aeneas and Evander, nor by grammar, which is amply satisfied by making 'sternitur' the verb of the sentence, 'keeps throwing himself on the ground.' The only reason for suspecting v. 822 is the use of the infinitive of habit in a relative sentence, which is an arbitrary objection enough, when we consider that the historical infinitive is found after 'cum' (see Madvig's *Lat. Gr.* § 392): while the integrity of the passage is strongly supported by the parallel Book 4, vv. 421 foll. Vv. 537—584 would certainly be a monstrous parenthesis, if they were a parenthesis at all: but something more conclusive than the dogmatic 'errat magnopere Servius cum ceteris' must be urged before a judicious editor will abandon the milder alternative of making them part of Diana's speech. The proposed transposition of vv. 264, 265 after v. 268 destroys the effect of 'Ipse Mycenaeus,' &c., coming at the end of a series of enumeration: and there is more force in making 'invidisse deos' a sorrowful exclamation, like 'non licuit' Book 4, v. 550 spoken of above (I am adducing of course a rhetorical, not a grammatical parallel) than in constructing it with 'quid

referam,' as if Diomede were likely to dismiss his own misfortune among the et ceteras. I need hardly discuss the question of transposing vv. 469—472, as M. Ribbeck is not quite certain whether they ought to go after v. 476 or v. 485, and finally has recourse to his usual panacea 'nimirum ne hunc quidem locum satis absolverat poeta.' I may say however that the lines appear to me perfectly in place; there is a general rush to the walls; even Latinus sees that he must break up the council; and the preparations for defence immediately begin. The lament of Evander is pronounced too garrulous, and various things in it are excepted against. "The Trojans ought not to be called 'Phryges' (v. 170), except in contempt:" a sweeping statement, to which Book 1, v. 468 is a sufficient answer. "It is vain to say that if Pallas had been as old and as strong as Turnus he would have killed him (vv. 173 foll.):" why is it no praise to say that of two well-matched warriors one would have prevailed? "Vv. 179—181 ('Meritis—imos') are redundant and feeble:" they are rather difficult, but I should call them forcible and appropriate. M. Ribbeck once thought v. 80 a 'dittographia:' he now thinks it spurious. I do not see why it should be either, though it is not particularly striking. Vv. 523 foll. he suspects to be a repetition of Book 7, vv. 565 foll., as if, because there is a gorge (or rather, as appears to be the fact, a pond under a hill) in one spot, there cannot be a wooded defile in another. Lastly, v. 607 is condemned as harsh in itself, 'ardescit' being not even suited to 'fremitus,' much less to 'adventus,' and as absolutely needless after vv. 597 foll. I should myself have said that 'ardescit' was a word which none but a poet like Virgil could have used, suggesting the comparison of an approaching flame with its heat and glare, while at the same time we are made to think of the actual glow of the rapid advance and the warm breath of the horses. But tastes differ.

In the Twelfth book three instances of incompleteness are noted, v. 218, vv. 732, 733, and vv. 889—893. In the first the language is confessedly harsh and obscure, and until some parallel shall be produced, we need not hesitate to admit that Virgil has expressed himself carelessly. The connexion between vv. 732, 733 is like that of which I spoke in the Ninth Book:

the poet passes from the regular narrative to the unexpressed thoughts of Turnus, who feels that he is undone 'ni fuga subsidio subeat.' So far from being incomplete in a poetical sense, the passage is highly finished. The third passage would hardly have been excepted against by any one not possessed by an unseasonable spirit of logical precision. Aeneas first tells Turnus plainly that he can fly no longer but must stand and fight, and then tauntingly bids him to transform himself as he pleases, soar into the air or dive into the depth. Vv. 879—881 and 882—884 M. Ribbeck apparently thinks a 'dittographia:' but Juturna may be allowed a little amplification in her parting lament. The speech of Latinus on ratifying the treaty is complained of: vv. 203, 205 are thought too exaggerated for Virgil, and interfere, it is urged, with the construction of the following lines: the poet however has followed Homer, who introduces the appeal to the sceptre with still less attention to regularity, though in each case the reader receives the impression intended, that of physical impossibility that the thing spoken of or hinted at should take place. 'Haud nescia rerum' (v. 227) is not an idle supplement, but an epic mannerism. Why we are to suspect vv. 439 foll. 'et te animo—Hector' because we know that interpolators were in the habit of filling up imperfect lines does not appear. I need hardly defend vv. 563, 564, as M. Ribbeck admits that Wagner has excused them sufficiently. The transposition of vv. 515, 516, adopted from Peerlkamp, is ingenious but unnecessary. To remove vv. 801, 802 from their present place and insert them after v. 831 (which is M. Ribbeck's last proposal) is to remove from Jupiter's first speech the one touch of playfulness which shows that he means to conciliate even where his commands are peremptory. If it is replied, as M. Ribbeck replies in his 'emendationes Vergilianae,' that Jupiter in his first speech ought to be simply peremptory, and that the time for conciliation is afterwards, when Juno has declared herself willing to submit, we may rejoin by urging the inconsistency of the words 'precibusque inflectere nostris' (v. 800) with the tone of unqualified command which M. Ribbeck bids us expect. Here, as in so many other places, the critic is misled by failing to

appreciate the free play of feeling, which, both in poetry and in impassioned rhetoric, refuses to be bound by the strict rules of logical sequence.

What more I have to say about M. Ribbeck's Prolegomena relates chiefly to the last section of his thirteenth chapter, that in which he defends the various conjectures which he has introduced into the text. I will notice however one or two points *in transitu*, from the earlier sections of the same chapter.

In speaking of the Verona fragment (p. 275), M. Ribbeck proposes to read 'velis' for 'ventis' in Aen. 3. 705. 'Dare vela' is of course common enough: and perhaps for that very reason Virgil did not use it here. M. Ribbeck is quite right in saying that 'datis ventis' is not to be supported from 3. 61, where 'dare classibus austros' has a different meaning: but he gives no reason why 'datis ventis,' in the sense of winds vouchsafed by the gods, is improper or unnatural. Does he forget the common expression 'ventis vocatis,' which may be said to be almost correlative to 'ventis datis,' or the many passages in the classics where the gods are said to send favouring winds?

In the section on the Vatican fragment he defends his conjecture 'num' for 'cum' Aen. 9. 513, by attacking the received reading as expressing a state of things which is contradicted by what happens immediately afterwards. But that is precisely Virgil's object: he throws himself by turns into the feelings of the two contending parties: the Trojans hurl down stones: the Rutulians (so to say) laugh at them, and declare that under their penthouse they can endure everything with content and even pleasure: in the moment of their satisfaction however a huger mass than usual thunders down upon them, and they are crushed and broken.

In the section on the Roman MS. 'effrena' is proposed for 'ea frena' in Aen. 6. 101. Nothing is said against the reading of the MSS., so that it is not easy to see how to defend it. I can hardly suppose M. Ribbeck not to be aware that 'ea frena concutit' is Virgil's way of saying 'tam vehementer frena concutit,' or that shaking the bridle is a natural expression for making the horse feel the bit: and yet if neither

of these supposed difficulties was the motive for altering the text, it is hard to say what can have been.

In the section on the Gudian MS. M. Ribbeck takes occasion to discuss two passages where he changes the received reading. In Aen. 1. 396 Pal. corrected has 'captos iam respectare,' Gud. originally 'captos iam etpectare,' words which he supposes to point to what he considers the true reading, 'capsos iam respectare.' The swans are said to look towards their coops or enclosures, a strange sense, as nothing in the passage leads us to suppose that tame swans are spoken of, and expressed by a strange word, the authority for which in that sense seems to be a single passage in Velleius. He objects to the common reading 'in despectando per se spes perfugii nulla:' true: but the poet (as Dr W. Wagner remarks) is speaking not of escape but of freedom from danger: the eagle is out of the way, just as the storm is over, and the swans are settling on the ground at leisure. The other passage is v. 323 of the same book, where M. Ribbeck thinks Madvig right in objecting to the common reading, or at least to the common punctuation, wrong in connecting 'maculosae' (or 'maculoso') 'tegmine lyncis' with 'cursum,' as 'tegmine' could not be used for the hide of a living beast. M. Ribbeck himself adopts 'tegmina' from Gud., making 'tegmina lyncis' coordinate with 'cursum' as the object of 'prementem.' I do not know Madvig's remarks, which were published in a Dutch periodical in 1859, so that, as before, I am not sure what I am to answer: I suppose however that it is not the huntress wearing a lynx's skin which is objected to, as that might be paralleled, but the apparent awkwardness of 'aut' as coupling 'succinctam' with 'prementem.' 'Prementem,' however, is coupled not with 'succinctam' but with 'errantem,' the two cases supposed being that the huntress is wandering about in search of game and that she is in the full cry of the chase. As to 'prementem tegmina lyncis' in the sense of hunting a lynx for its hide, I scarcely think it will be considered to add much beauty to the passage.

In speaking of the Berne MS. which he calls c, he mentions his own conjecture on Aen. 1. 455, 'intrans' for 'inter se,'

as partially supported by that copy, which has 'intra se.' 'Artificum manus inter se miratur' is a Virgilian expression for 'artificum manus miratur dum aliam cum alia confert:' 'intrans,' unless I am greatly mistaken, would be exceedingly flat, and not at all like Virgil's manner. 'Variis,' which M. Ribbeck extracts from 'uaseis,' the reading of the aforesaid MS. for 'roseis' in Aen. 7. 26, does not seem particularly tempting, though had it been the reading of the MSS. it might have passed without remark. 'Croceis,' Schrader's and Bentley's conjecture, is far more plausible. But 'roseis' is supported by an exact parallel in Ovid, Fasti 4. 713, 'Postera cum veniet—Memnonis in roseis lutea mater equis,' which I owe to my friend Mr Nettleship.

In the sixteenth section of the same chapter, in which the inferior MSS. are discussed, M. Ribbeck speaks of six Paris MSS. as containing the 'optima emendatio' 'Paris' for 'creat' in Aen. 10. 705. In his critical note on the passage he had expressed himself more cautiously, 'si fides Potterio,' Pottier's reliability as a reporter of the readings of his Paris MSS. having been generally questioned by subsequent critics. Some years ago, being anxious to set the question at rest, I requested my friend Mr Duckworth (now Governor to Prince Leopold), who happened to be in Paris, to examine the six MSS. in this passage: and he assured me that none of them contained the word 'Paris' or anything like it, all having 'creat' or some slight variety of 'creat.' After this, I should not be disposed to trust Pottier's report of the transposition of the lines 660—665 in the same book without further evidence. The mistakes which M. Ribbeck has made in this section about the English MSS. of Virgil have been pointed out by Dr W. Wagner in the postscript to his first paper 'On Ribbeck's Virgil' read before the Philological Society.

I now come to the seventeenth section, which is chiefly occupied by a defence of the conjectures introduced by M. Ribbeck into the text. He believes that all the extant copies of Virgil can be traced to a single (unknown) archetype, written 'parum nitide,' and filled with a multitude of conjectures, glosses, and interpolations. The arguments by which he sup-

ports his belief are first, the instances of agreement presented by particular MSS. in the transposition of words, secondly, the instances where the true reading has had to be restored conjecturally. So far as I understand the first argument, it is to the effect that instances may be produced where any two of the better MSS. agree against the rest in a particular transposition, which points to the conclusion that there must have been one great repertory of transpositions from which copyists drew ad libitum. I do not profess to be skilled in the art of constructing a conjectural history of the text of an ancient author: but I should have thought that the phaenomena of the text of Virgil were likely to be particularly impatient of being accounted for on any such hypothesis, and it certainly does not seem to me that the instances of transposition which M. Ribbeck adduces are either so numerous or so striking as to require any other explanation than that of accidental coincidence in the case of copies considered to be otherwise independent. But I must hasten to the second argument, or rather to the conjectures which are produced as constituting its strength.

In E. 3. 110 'hau temnet dulcis, haut' cannot be called a happy conjecture. The received reading at any rate gives an appropriate sense, 'both are worthy of the prize, and so are all who like you can realize the sweet and bitter of love:' the new reading introduces a general maxim for which Palaemon's speech hardly seems the place. 'Alte' for 'ante' E. 6. 80 is ingenious, but not convincing. The sense it gives is unobjectionable, but it would I think be a little feeble here: and so I would rather take my chance between the two rival interpretations of 'ante,' though neither is free from exception. Neither the change of 'an' E. 8. 49 into 'at,' nor the reconstruction of the whole passage which it involves, seems to me Virgilian: nor can I recognize the necessity of exact strophical correspondence in Damon's and Alphesiboeus' songs, though I am glad to introduce an additional burden from MS. Gud. after v. 28.

In G. 3. 402 M. Ribbeck thinks Scaliger's 'exportans' necessary. I have endeavoured in my commentary to prove that it is unnecessary, and that the reading of the MSS. is unobjectionable: but as M. Ribbeck adduces no reasons, I cannot defend

myself. 'Tussos' G. 4. 62 is highly ingenious, though the credit is really due to Reiske: but 'iussos' is perfectly Virgilian, being supported by 'monstratas aras' v. 549 of the same book, 'iussos honores' Aen. 3. 547. If any one objects to 'iussos' of things which are not yet commanded, he may refer to Aen. 8. 629 'pugnataque in ordine bella,' a stronger case. Here the things are said to be already prescribed, because they will have been prescribed before the action enjoined can take place.

The conjectures introduced into the text of the Aeneid are naturally more numerous. Rutgers' 'Eurum' for 'Hebrum' Aen. 1. 317 would be quite unobjectionable, scarcely going beyond the licence which may be taken in dealing with the MS. spellings of proper names, if 'Hebrum' were not placed beyond doubt by the imitation of Silius 2. 73 foll., and by its evident appropriateness to Harpalyce of Thrace. Huet's 'auri' for 'agri' v. 343 is highly plausible: but it is natural enough that Virgil should be thinking of a wealthy Roman of his own time, 'dives agris, dives positis in fenore nummis,' rather than of the particular kind of wealth which a Phoenician would be likely to possess, and to talk of land in one place and gold in another is quite in keeping with his love of variety.

In Aen. 2. 76 M. Ribbeck reads 'Quive fuat, memores quae sit fiducia capto.' I see no objection to 'quive fuat,' if only Virgil had written it: but the MSS. tell us he wrote 'quidve ferat,' which is equally unobjectionable. M. Ribbeck says the Trojans could not know that Sinon had anything to tell: but it was natural to presume that he had, as he had purposely thrown himself in their way. But the rest of the emendation, 'memores quae sit fiducia capto,' which I suppose must mean 'recollecting that a prisoner would require to be reassured,' does not seem to me in Virgil's manner. In the common reading 'quae sit fiducia capto' means, as Dr Henry well puts it, 'why he should not meet the captive's doom.'

In the vexed passage Aen. 4. 436 M. Ribbeck gives in his text 'Quam mihi cum dederit, cumulatam monte remittam.' The last words he apparently understands 'I will repay it with a mountain by way of interest.' To promise mountains of gold, or to promise seas and mountains, are, as he says, proverbial

expressions in Latin for to make extravagant and excessive promises. But there is no reason to believe that such a colloquial hyperbole would be admitted into epic poetry: besides, M. Ribbeck ought to have remembered that nothing is so hazardous as to attempt to manipulate a familiar proverb by varying the expression. Half the stories which are told of blunders made by foreigners in trying to speak an unfamiliar language idiomatically turn upon unadvised experiments of this sort. I fear if Aulus Gellius could come to life again, he would write a chapter on the stranger who wished to introduce 'cumulatam monte' into Virgil.

Dr W. Wagner thinks M. Ribbeck's conjecture of 'funibus' for 'finibus' Aen. 5. 139 deserving of much praise. I cannot myself think it plausible. The new expression seems to me slightly harsh: the old is quite unobjectionable. As for the assertion that 'fines' is never used for the station of ships in a harbour, what is to be said of it? 'Fines' is a word of general and almost universal application for the limits within which anything is contained: and no English poet would scruple to use 'limit' on a similar occasion.

In Aen. 6. 520 the MSS. make Deiphobus talk of himself as 'confectum curis' on the night when he slept his last sleep. M. Ribbeck objects that we have just been told that the Trojans spent their last night in revelry. True: but it was a short revelry succeeding a long agony of care: and in taking, as they thought, their first rest after the departure of the Greeks, they must have had heavy arrears of weariness to get rid of. There is exactly the same feeling in 'mortalibus aegris' Aen. 2. 268, where, though the expression is general, the poet evidently intends to excite our special sympathy for the Trojans. Schrader's 'choreis' is ingenious: but it is precisely one of those changes which critics make from taking a too contracted view of a subject.

Peerlkamp's 'arva' for 'arma' Aen. 7. 430 is not at all impossible: but I think it more likely that 'arma' after 'armari' is a carelessness of Virgil's. On this however there may well be two opinions, and probably my own judgment is biassed by my general

belief in the integrity of the MSS. In v. 667 I do not think M. Ribbeck's insertion of 'os' after 'inpexum' is required by the sense, while it certainly does not improve the rhythm.

In Aen. 8. 211 there is no occasion to couple 'raptos' with 'tractos' and construct it with 'versis viarum indiciis.' Those words belong to 'tractos': 'raptos' goes closely with 'occultabat.' At the same time I do not mean to deny the plausibility of Wakefield's 'raptor,' if we were dealing with an author whose text was more liable to suspicion.

M. Ribbeck complains of Lucian Müller's invective against his emendation 'qua vi clausos' in Aen. 9. 67, saying that if he had not been aware that the rhythm introduced was an unusual one, he should not have apologized for it. It is really a question of ear: and there are doubtless many ears to which the new line will seem hardly Virgilian, in spite of G. 3. 276 and Aen. 7. 634. 'Via' in the received reading is synonymous with 'ratio,' as in Aen. 12. 405. 'Sic' for 'sed' in v. 146 of Aen. 9 depends on a transposition which we have already seen reason to reject. In v. 226 'et,' though not found in the MSS., is said to be necessary before 'delecta.' I do not know what is the objection to taking 'delecta iuventus' in apposition with 'ductores,' but I suppose it is either that the leaders would be too old to be designated as 'iuventus,' or that the word naturally implies the rank and file, as distinguished from the chiefs. To the first I reply that 'iuventus' means little more than fighting men, and that Aeneas and Achates are addressed as 'iuvenes' Aen. 1. 321; to the second that Catillus and Coras, who are unquestionably leaders, are called 'Argiva iuventus' Aen. 7. 672. V. 403 is critically difficult, as the MSS. vary, and the best supported reading is not the most likely intrinsically: but that seems no reason for introducing a conjecture. V. 676 'freti armis' is unobjectionable, as the opposition is not between arms and personal strength, but between the protection afforded by walls and that which a warrior can give himself by his use of his weapons. It is conceivable however that as in Aen. 4. 11, Aen. 11. 641, and possibly other unsuspected places, 'armis' may be from 'armi.' At any rate we do not need to read 'animis.'

As to 'transiit' Aen. 10. 785, I must refer to the Excursus on G. 2. 81 in the second edition of my first volume. Peerlkamp's 'quamvis dolor alto volnere tardet' for 'quamquam vis alto volnere tardat' (or 'tardet') is really ingenious; far more so than Hoffmann's 'vis alti volneris ardet.' The received reading is difficult: 'vis,' in Virgil at any rate, is generally used for offensive force, and the intransitive use of 'tardo' is rare, though we might give it its active meaning, and say that his physical strength keeps him back by reason of the wound. On the whole I am not sure that the 'perversa ratio' of Servius (as M. Ribbeck calls it) is not right, and that 'vis' is not the violence of the wound, as the use of the instrumental ablative instead of the possessive genitive is quite in keeping with Virgil's other manipulations of language.

There is not much force in M. Ribbeck's objection to 'acceperit ultro,' Aen. 11. 471, 'qui accipit sequitur voluntatem alterius, ergo nihil ultra id facit quod voluit alter.' A person may be compelled to accept a thing, or he may accept it voluntarily; and it is the latter of these situations in which Latinus would gladly have been. 'Asciverit urbi' is better than 'acceperit urbi:' the one implies that Aeneas would have been the 'gener' of the state (comp. Aen. 11. 105): the latter could only refer to Aeneas' admission within the walls, a much poorer thought. In v. 728 I cannot agree that 'iniicit iras' is weak, though Heinsius' 'incutit,' if Virgil could only be shown to have written it, would be an exceedingly good word. 'Iniicio' is a strong word in itself: the only question is whether it can be used idiomatically with 'iras,' and that the dictionaries, with their 'iniicere metum,' 'formidinem,' &c. set at rest.

Last of all is a passage in Aen. 12. 55, where it is said of Amata, 'ardentem generum moritura tenebat.' M. Ribbeck objects that 'moritura' would mean that she was actually going to die, and substitutes 'monitura.' Is it possible? Virgil, in the rapidity of his passion, says that the queen clung to her son-in-law with the tenacious grasp of one with death before her: the critic says she held him in order to advise or reprove him. *Utri creditis, Quirites?*

As I said in my former paper, I have no wish to derogate from the undoubted merits of M. Ribbeck's work: but I cannot but think that such criticisms as many of those which I have been noticing are a serious drawback to its value. English scholarship has not a few deficiencies: is it not preserved from some errors by the practice of Latin verse composition?

JOHN CONINGTON.

NOTES.

1. Soph. Trach. 1012, 1013.

καὶ νῦν ἐπὶ τῷδε νοσοῦντι
οὐ πῦρ, οὐκ ἔγχος τις ὀνήσιμον οὐκ ἀποτρέψει;

THIS passage is rendered perfectly easy by consideration of what would probably have been the stage-directions, while Brunck's correction *ἐπιτρέψει* for *ἀποτρέψει* entirely destroys a striking piece of stage effect, besides committing the fault of taking two simple negatives as equivalent to one. I am sorry to find that this emendation has lately been admitted into the text by Dindorf for want of a legitimate explanation of the passage. Amongst the attendants of Hercules many must surely have been armed with spears (*ἔγχη*), and when Hercules in his agony utters the word *ἔγχος*, it would be a natural movement, and a proper stage-direction, in imitation of nature, for such persons to withdraw or 'turn away' their spears out of his reach, for fear of his snatching one and using it to destroy himself. Thus, instead of *δώσει* or some equivalent word, Hercules uses the expression *οὐκ ἀποτρέψει*. 'And now in my agony will not some one not turn away [but bring me] fire or a beneficial spear?'

"And now, in this my woeful day,
Won't some one flame, won't some one near
A kindly spear—
NOT TURN AWAY?"

2. Thucydides, VII. 28. § 3.

τὸ γὰρ αὐτοὺς πολιορκουμένους ἐπιτειχισμῷ ὑπὸ Πελοποννησίων μηδ' ὡς ἀποστῆναι ἀπὸ Σικελίας, ἀλλὰ κ.τ.λ.

Arnold and Göller say, that there is no regular construction here, the length of the sentence having made Thucydides forget the apodosis, as in VI. 31, § 3. To me, on the other hand, it appears, that the length of the sentence has prevented the commentators from recognizing its perfectly regular construction, which we shall see at once by comparing Plat. Phæd. 99 B, *τὸ γὰρ μὴ διελέσθαι οἷόν τ' εἶναι, ὅτι ἄλλο μέν ἐστι τὸ αἴτιον τῷ ὄντι, ἄλλο δ' ἐκεῖνο ἄνευ οὗ τὸ αἴτιον οὐκ ἄν ποτ' εἴη αἴτιον.* "For fancy not being able to distinguish that the real cause is one thing, and that, without which the cause can never be a cause, another!" So here: "For strange, that, when beleaguered by the Peloponnesians by a fort erected in their own country, they did not even under these circumstances leave Sicily, but, &c.!" The corresponding Latin constructions of the acc. and inf. with or without the appended *ne*, and *ut* with the subjunctive, are well known.

3. Propert. I. xx. 25—30.

"Hunc duo sectati fratres, Aquilonia proles,
Hunc super et Zetes, hunc super et Calais,
Oscula suspensis instabant carpere palmis,
Oscula et alterna ferre supina fugâ.
Ille sub extremâ pendens secluditur alâ,
Et volucres ramo submovet insidias."

From the first four lines of this passage, which probably, as many commentators have seen, was intended to express the grouping of some well-known picture, it is pretty clear that the two winged men, Zetes and Calais, are represented as flying over Hylas with their hands extended downwards, endeavouring to catch him under the chin, turn his face upwards, snatch a kiss, and fly away again. The difficulty of the passage lies in discovering the manner in which Hylas is supposed to defend himself. And here, I think, the commentators have one and all been misled by attaching the signification 'wing' to *ala*. It would have been a simple impossibility for Hylas to have

concealed himself under either end of a wing used at the moment in actual flight, while his most natural mode of concealing his face would have been to have thrust it as far as possible under his own shoulder (sub extrema ala). 'Arm-pit' is a well-known signification of *ala*. With the other hand he would endeavour to drive away 'the winged nuisance' with the branch of a tree, which he would use as a whip. The only difficulty now remaining is in the word 'pendens.' If he were suspended in the air by the chin with the hands of his tormentor round his neck, he would have been utterly unable to move and in great danger of being throttled. But he is clearly represented as actively defending himself. Hence I am led to take *pendens* as either 'pendens animi,' 'in perplexity,' for which I should quote 'pendens metus,' 'anxious fear,' from Seneca's Œdipus, 574, or as 'pendens digitis,' 'on tiptoe,' which I should defend by Ov. I. Pont. Ep. 7. 51, 'pendentes rupe capellæ.' Translate: "He in his perplexity (or, on tiptoe) withdraws himself under the farthest part of his armpit, and drives off the winged nuisance with a branch."

4. Prop. III. v. 29.

"Nunc ad te, mea lux! veniat mea litore navis
Servata, an mediis sidat onusta vadis."

There is no need of any alteration in this passage, nor indeed is there any real difficulty in it, if *ibo* be supplied to *ad te*, and if it is borne in mind, that [*utrum*]—*an*, is not unfrequently used by the poets instead of *sive—sive*. This is found with the appended *ne* instead of *an* in Prop. v. IV. 55:

"Sic, hospes pariamne tua regina sub aula,
Dos tibi non humilis prodita Roma venit."

Another very apposite instance, in which also *utrum* is omitted, is Ov. Rem. Am. 797:

Daunius an Libycis bulbus tibi missus ab oris,
An veniat Megaris, noxius omnis erit."

In the passage under consideration, after dedicating gifts with an inscription to Venus, Propertius says: "Now to thee, my love, [will I go], whether my ship come safe ashore, or sink burthened in the midst of the waters." For the ablative *litore* after *veniat*, compare Prop. I. XVIII. 11:

> "Sic mihi te referas levis, ut non altera *nostro*
> *Limine* formosos intulit ulla pedes."

Also Cæs. B. G. v. 10: "omnes naves adflictas atque in *litore* ejectas esse." The sentiment is simple enough: "Now I will go to you, Cynthia, whether I am to sink or swim," i.e. whether I am to be fortunate or unfortunate in so doing.

5. Prop. III. XXVI. 72.

If this line be enclosed in a parenthesis and supposed to refer to the unfortunate connexion between Propertius and his avaricious mistress, Cynthia, all difficulty vanishes, and a very beautiful and touching sentiment displays itself. I give the context at length with the proposed punctuation. Addressing Virgil, Propertius writes:

> "Tu canis umbrosi subter pineta Galæsi
> Thyrsin et attritis Daphnin arundinibus,
> Utque decem possint corrumpere mala puellas,
> Missus et impressis hædus ab uberibus.
> Felix, qui viles pomis mercaris amores,
> (Huic licet ingratæ Tityrus ipse canat.)
> Felix, intactum Corydon qui tentat Alexin
> Agricolæ domini carpere delicias!"

The sentiment is: "Happy are you, Virgil, in your love affairs. To this ungrateful girl of mine Tityrus himself may sing, and sing in vain." Of course it is taken for granted by Propertius, that Virgil alludes to himself and his own affairs under the feigned names of shepherds made use of in his Eclogues. It is a very frequent complaint of Propertius, that a full purse was of

more value in the eyes of Cynthia than his best verses. For *licet* cf. Cic. de Or. I. 44: "Fremant omnes licet; dicam quod sentio." "All may roar; (I care not:) I shall say what I think."

6. Prop. IV. IX. 25.

"Vel tibi Medorum pugnaces ire per hostes."

On this passage Hertzberg remarks: "Hunc [genitivum] exemplo in omni, quantum sciam, latinitate singulari cum nominativo plurali junctum habet Propertius." By 'hostes Medorum' he understands 'enemies consisting of Medes.' But were not the Medes and Persians both conquered by the *Parthians*, who were then the ruling Asiatic people? Thus "Medorum pugnaces ire per hostes" would mean "to charge through the *Parthians*, the warlike foes of the Medes." Shortly afterwards, in line 54, we find the Parthians called by their proper name:

"Parthorum astutæ tela remissa fugæ."

7. Juvenal, VIII. 26—28.

"Salve, Gætulice, seu tu
Silanus, quocunque alio de sanguine, rarus
Civis et egregius patriæ contingis ovanti."

The construction halts in this passage for want of *sive* or *aut* between the words Silanus and 'quocunque.' For my own part I cannot help thinking, that *quoquove* is the original expression of Juvenal, and that *quocunque*, a gloss for *quoquo*, has been substituted in the place of *quoquove* from accidentally coinciding with it in metrical value.

A. H. WRATISLAW.

ON SOPHOCLES' ELECTRA, vv. 1288—1292 (Dindorf).

τὰ μὲν περισσεύοντα τῶν λόγων ἄφες,
καὶ μήτε μήτηρ ὡς κακὴ δίδασκέ με
μήθ' ὡς πατρῷαν κτῆσιν Αἴγισθος δόμων
ἀντλεῖ, τὰ δ' ἐκχεῖ, τὰ δὲ διασπείρει μάτην·
χρόνου γὰρ ἄν σοι καιρὸν ἐξείργοι λόγος.

I am glad to find from Mr Jebb's commentary that he finds a difficulty in this passage, which has always seemed to me a very strange one. Why should Electra be warned against talking of things which she has as yet shown no inclination to enter upon? Orestes from the first has urged her to speak as little as possible: but this specification of topics from which she is to abstain seems wanton and gratuitous. Mr Jebb's solution of the difficulty, however, by supposing *κακᾶς δ' ἐν ἴβρει ματρός* to have dropped out in v. 1283 is surely rather hazardous. I should prefer to believe that Sophocles is following the example of Euripides, and jeering at the treatment of the subject by some other writer. This is what Euripides has done three times at least in his extant plays, Electra 520—537, Phoenissae 751, 752, Supplices 846—856. Part of the last passage I will quote, as, while it is less known than the other two, it bears a considerable resemblance to these lines of Sophocles. Theseus is questioning Adrastus about his comrades who were slain at Thebes.

ἓν δ' οὐκ ἐρήσομαί σε, μὴ γέλωτ' ὄφλω,
ὅτῳ ξυνέστη τῶνδ' ἕκαστος ἐν μάχῃ
ἢ τραῦμα λόγχης πολεμίων ἐδέξατο.
κένοι γὰρ οὗτοι τῶν τ' ἀκουόντων λόγοι
καὶ τοῦ λέγοντος, ὅστις ἐν μάχῃ βεβὼς
λόγχης ἰούσης πρόσθεν ὀμμάτων πυκνῆς
σαφῶς ἀπήγγειλ' ὅστις ἐστὶν ἀγαθός.

This is evidently, as Hartung has seen, a sneer at Aeschylus; doubtless at the lost play of the Eleusinians, which treated of the burial of the slain chiefs. Sophocles is certainly less likely to have indulged in such an illiberal and undramatic escapade than Euripides: but the unlikelihood will be diminished if it should prove that the object of his satire is the satirizer of Aeschylus. Now there is a scene in the Electra of Euripides to which the reflection would apply naturally enough, where Orestes, as yet unknown, after a long *στιχομυθία* with Electra, desires to know more particularly about the insolences of Clytaemnestra and Aegisthus, that he may report them, as he says, to her brother. The Chorus seconds his request, observing that they live in the country and so do not know all that goes on in the city. Electra upon this in a speech of about forty lines (vv. 300—338) describes the state of things, contrasting her own life of poverty with her mother's splendour, and relating how Aegisthus drives in Agamemnon's chariot, jumps on his tomb when drunk, and throws stones at it. Except for the great homeliness of the detail, there is nothing in the speech which differs greatly from that which Sophocles puts into the mouth of his Electra (vv. 254—309); but Euripides betrays a sort of awkward consciousness that he is doing wrong by apologizing beforehand in the person of the Chorus, and Sophocles may have thought that though the speech might be appropriate for Electra to make, it was not appropriate for Orestes to listen to. I believe that there is nothing to determine the relative dates of the two plays, so that on that point conjecture is free.

JOHN CONINGTON.

ON 1 CORINTHIANS i. 26.

THE ellipsis in 1 Cor. i. 26 is supplied in our Authorised Version by the words *are called*, shewing that our translators followed the general opinion of the ancient commentators in supposing the verb *ἐκλήθησαν* to be understood, as suggested by *τὴν κλῆσιν ὑμῶν*, preceded by *κλητοῖς* in ver. 24. The words *οὐ πολλοὶ σοφοὶ κ.τ.λ.* are thus made to refer to the converts whom the Apostle was addressing. Now, as the whole tenour of the argument plainly indicates that they refer to the preachers (*ἡμεῖς κηρύσσομεν*, ver. 23), it may reasonably be concluded that there is some misconception. It seems to have originated thus:

I conceive that the Apostle began to say *βλέπετε* (imperative) *γὰρ τὴν κλῆσιν ὑμῶν, ἀδελφοί, ὅτι οὐ πολλοὶ σοφοὶ κατὰ σάρκα, οὐ πολλοὶ δυνατοί, οὐ πολλοὶ εὐγενεῖς ἐξελέχθησαν ὑπὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ, ἵνα καταισχύνῃ τοὺς σοφοὺς κ.τ.λ.*, but that, pausing after *εὐγενεῖς*, he interchanged the subject and object of his sentence and concluded it thus, *ἀλλὰ τὰ μωρὰ τοῦ κόσμου ἐξελέξατο ὁ Θεὸς, ἵνα κ.τ.λ.*

The ellipsis of *ἐξελέχθησαν* is readily accounted for by the immediate use of this verb, shewing what was in the Apostle's mind: and, as he avoided the ambiguity by the use of separate and distinct verbs, as indeed do our translators, we ought, I think, to do so here and substitute *were chosen* for *are called* in our Version, an insertion which only serves to establish and perpetuate a misinterpretation of the original. A passage in Acts xv. 7 may be compared with this: *ἀναστὰς ὁ Πέτρος εἶπεν πρὸς αὐτοὺς Ἄνδρες ἀδελφοί, ὑμεῖς ἐπίστασθε ὅτι ἀφ' ἡμερῶν ἀρχαίων ἐν ὑμῖν ἐξελέξατο ὁ Θεὸς διὰ τοῦ στόματός μου ἀκοῦσαι τὰ ἔθνη τὸν λόγον τοῦ εὐαγγελίου καὶ πιστεῦσαι.* As

an inveterate prejudice is not easily removed, I will add a few remarks, to point out that the Apostle is throughout speaking of the preachers. He commences (1) by rebuking the converts for ranging themselves in parties distinguished by the names of their respective teachers, himself among the rest (13), as if they were entitled to honour. He proceeds to disparage their preaching (21), in order to shew that whatever success it had met with was owing solely to God, who by means so weak had overcome the boasted power and wisdom of man. To enforce this he bids the converts reflect on the agency (cf. iii. 5) by which their calling had been effected. God (to whom St Paul always ascribes the 'calling,' as in ver. 9; Rom. xi. 29; 2 Tim. i. 9) had *not chosen* his instruments from among those, whose wisdom, power or rank gave them influence, but from among the ignorant and illiterate, and for the reason given in ii. 5.

This train of argument is continued, with occasional references to the starting-point of the argument (iii. 4, 22), even to iv. 10, and he employs it also in 2 Cor. iv. 7 and xii. 9. St Paul was not likely to overlook or neglect an argument, which occupies the foremost place in every work that ever was composed to prove the divine origin of the Christian religion. Surely then it is a great loss that this argument, as it comes from the lips of the Apostle himself, should be wasted through misapprehension, while nothing is gained to our faith by the questionable declaration that *few* of the wise, great or noble embraced Christianity. On the contrary, St John (xii. 42) thought it deserving of mention that *many* of the *rulers* believed, though they were deterred by fear from avowing their belief.

I will here observe that a like interchange of subject and object occurs in Gal. ii. 6; Rom. ii. 7, 8 and ix. 10, 12.

Although I believe that scholars of the present age (and it is to their judgment that I appeal) are at least as capable of interpreting the Scriptures as those of olden time, yet, for the satisfaction of those who are not content without ancient authority, I transcribe the following comment from Photius (Cramer's Catena in loc.): *μὴ τούτους* (scil. *σοφοὺς, δυνατοὺς, εὐγενεῖς*) *ἐποιήσατο ὁ Χριστὸς ἑαυτοῦ μαθητὰς καὶ δι' αὐτῶν ἐκλήθητε ὑμεῖς; οὐδαμῶς· ἀλλὰ τουναντίον, τὰ μωρὰ κατὰ τὸν*

κόσμον καὶ τὰ ἀσθενῆ καὶ τὰ ἀγενῆ καὶ τὰ ἐξουθενημένα ἐξελέξατο, ἀνθρώπους ἁλιεῖς, πένητας, ἀγραμματοὺς· καὶ δι' αὐτῶν ἐποιήσατο τὴν κλῆσιν ὑμῶν.

GILBERT AINSLIE.

INSCRIPTION FOUND AT SÉRANCOURT.

In the last number of the *Philologus*, p. 377, is quoted the following inscription, found on a vessel discovered at Sérancourt, near Bourges, in 1848 :

BVSCILLASOSIOLEGASITINALEXIEMAGALV

This is explained to mean *Buccellas otio legas III in aleximagalum*, and this to be a corruption of an original hexameter, perhaps *Buccellas tacito lege tres in aleximagiam.* It seems to me more likely that it is a corruption of *Buccillas o si legasit* (*legassit*) *Alexia Gallum* (*Gallorum*) or possibly *Gallo.*

R. ELLIS.

NOTE ON FRONTO.

With regard to the corrupt passage in Fronto (Journal of Philology, No. I. p. 20) *ἀλλ' ἔγωγέ σοι ἐπιδείξω,* ΙΙΧΟΤΣ *πρὸς τὸν Ἰλισὸν ἅμα ἄμφω βαδίσαιμεν*—ought we not—instead of the words ΕΠΙΔΕΙΞΩ ΙΙΧΟΤΣ—to read ΕΠΙΔΕΙΞΩ, ΕΙ ΕΞΩ ΤΕΙΧΟΤΣ *πρὸς τὸν Ἰλισὸν ἅμα ἄμφω βαδίσαιμεν*?

The writer, who is at Athens, proposes to his correspondent to take a walk with him *outside* the *city*-wall (*ἔξω τείχους*) to the banks of the Ilissus, and promises to point out to him there the flower of which he is in quest.

The Ilissus, I need not say, flowed outside the city-wall, on the east of Athens, and is often described by Athenian writers as *ἔξω τείχους*, and in Mai's MS. of Fronto the words *εἰ ἔξω* seem to have been absorbed into the foregoing word *ἐπιδείξω*; and by a common itacism it has ΙΙΧΟΤΣ instead of ΤΕΙΧΟΤΣ.

CHR. WORDSWORTH.